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Pandemic influenza poses a significant risk to public health and safety, though not 
every population group will be equally at-risk.   It is therefore important to study 
how communication with the public can be used to encourage the uptake of 
protective behaviours both in the public at large and, particularly, with at-risk 
groups, in order to improve health outcomes during a future pandemic.  The aim of 
this project is to understand the likely perceptions of risk, behavioural responses, 
and communication needs for groups who may be particularly at risk during an 
influenza pandemic. Using an analytical framework based on Protection Motivation 
Theory and the COM-B model, this project examines two potentially at-risk groups.  
Older adults (>70 years) are traditionally considered at-risk or vulnerable during 
extreme events whilst younger adults (18-25 years) are not.  In the event of an 
influenza pandemic, however, there is the potential for older adults to be less 
affected than with seasonal influenza whilst younger adults may find themselves at 
greater risk.  By exploring perceptions of risk and vulnerability and likely 
behavioural response in these groups, this project aimed to determine how public 
health communication can be adapted to result in better health outcomes in the 
event of a future pandemic. 
 
Following a review of relevant published literature and emergency preparedness 
planning guidance, interviews were conducted with emergency planners 
responsible for universities, facilities catering to older adults, London boroughs, and 
the UK in order to gain a better understanding of existing pandemic planning 
challenges. Individual and small group interviews were then conducted with 
London-based university students and older adults to better understand their 
perceptions of risk, likely responses and communication needs during an influenza 
pandemic.   Participants across both population groups were largely consistent in 
their perceptions of at-risk groups.  Whilst participants were broadly open to 
adopting protective behaviours, social isolation received slightly more support 
amongst older adults.  Additionally, preferred communication methods varied 
between the population groups with older population favoured traditional 
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communication methods rather than new media.  A further set of interviews were 
then conducted with an older adult population group to test the effectiveness of 
providing information to address likely misperceptions about risk profiles as 
identified in Phase 1.  Participants in this second set of interviews expressed similar 
views around risk perception, behavioural intent and communication needs as the 
first set of interviews.  Participants in the second phase of interviews were divided 
into two groups with Group B receiving additional information on public health 
decision making. Participants in both groups expressed a desire for further 
explanatory information but participants in Group A were more inclined to assume 
utilitarian rather than risk-based motivations thereby highlighting the importance 
of effective communication with the public during an extreme event. 
 
The findings of this research would suggest that perceptions of response and self-
efficacy around recommended protective behaviours are consistently high amongst 
older and younger adults.  Social isolation, however, appears to be the most 
challenging behaviour to adopt, particularly for younger adults.  Additionally, both 
older and younger adults expressed similar perceptions of at-risk groups.  
Information needs vis-a-vis content were consistent between the population 
groups and in line with practitioner assumptions.  Preferred media routes, however, 
varied between older and younger adults, highlighting the need for a multi-media 
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1 Chapter I: Introduction 
 
1.1 Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the interrelatedness of risk perception, 
behavioural intentions, and information needs amongst potentially at-risk 
populations during a future influenza pandemic.  This chapter will introduce the 
background and aims of the research, and provide an outline of the studies 
presented in this thesis.  As such, the health security implications of pandemic 
influenza, classification of vulnerable populations, and the importance of 
communication in extreme events will be explored in this chapter. 
 
1.2 Aims of the thesis 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to better understand the likely perceptions, 
reactions and communication needs for those who may be particularly at risk or 
vulnerable during an influenza pandemic, and to assess how communication with 
these groups can be used to encourage behaviours that may improve health 
outcomes.   How the public responds to health threats plays a key role in 
determining the impacts of public health crises and other disasters. Research 
regarding the ability of effective risk communication to increase the likelihood of 
public compliance with official health advice during emergencies indicates that risk 
communicators must understand and address issues such as an individual’s 
perception of risk and belief in the efficacy of protective action as well as their 
perceived capability, motivation and opportunity to respond in order to change 
their behaviour.1  This work, however, has primarily focused on the general public 
rather than particular at-risk population groups.  Older adults (>70 years) are 
traditionally considered at-risk or vulnerable during extreme events whilst younger 
                                                        
1 Teasdale et al., “The Importance of Coping Appraisal in Behavioural Responses to Pandemic Flu”; 
Bish et al., “Factors Associated with Uptake of Vaccination against Pandemic Influenza: A Systematic 
Review”; Sadique et al., “Precautionary Behaviour in Response to Perceived Threat of Pandemic 
Influenza.”Rubenstein et al., “Public Preferences for Vaccination and Antiviral Medicines under 
Different Pandemic Flu Outbreak Scenarios.”; Smith et al., “A Systematic Review of Factors Affecting 
Intended and Actual Adherence with Antiviral Medication as Treatment or Prophylaxis in Seasonal 
and Pandemic Flu.” 
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adults (18-25 years) are not.  In the event of an influenza pandemic, however, past 
experience has demonstrated there is the potential for older adults to be less 
affected than with seasonal influenza, whilst younger adults may find themselves at 
greater risk as pandemic influenza does not always follow a typical or traditional 
profile of risk as those who are susceptible or at-risk (ie: both young or old) tends to 
change in a pandemic.2 
 
In order to address the gap, this project uses an analytic framework based on 
Protection Motivation Theory and the COM-B model to examine two at-risk groups; 
young adults (18-25 years) and older adults (>70 years). By exploring perceptions of 
risk and vulnerability and likely behavioural responses in these groups, this project 
aims to determine how public health communication can be adapted to encourage 
greater adherence to public health advice through the adoption of recommended 
protective behaviours such as hand hygiene, respiratory hygiene, voluntary 
isolation, and vaccination. 
 
1.3 Background to the Research 
1.3.1 Pandemic Influenza 
Pandemic influenza is recognized by the UK government to be one of the pre-
eminent risks facing the UK.3  Over the past century, the world has experienced 
four influenza pandemics (1918, 1957, 1968, 2009) of varying severity4 and a future 
pandemic is considered to be a question of ‘when’ rather than ‘if’.5  Whilst the 
timing, strain, and severity of a future pandemic are uncertain, it is nonetheless 
important to ensure that preparedness measures are in place to respond to the 
next pandemic. 
 
Influenza is a respiratory illness caused by a viral infection with common symptoms 
including: fever, cough, sore throat, headache and muscle pain.  It is spread 
                                                        
2 US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Past Pandemics.” 
3 Sellwood, “Operating Framework for Managing the Response to Pandemic Influenza.” 
4 US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Past Pandemics.” 
5 UK Department of Health Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Team, “UK Influenza Pandemic 
Preparedness Strategy.” 
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primarily through the transmission of infected airborne particles from person to 
person.6  It is divided into three types: A, B and C.  Influenza A viruses are named 
according to the hemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N) proteins found on their 
surface.  There are 18 H subtypes and 11 N subtypes and the combination and 
associated naming protocol (ie: H1N1) provides information on the specific strain.  
Influenza B viruses are categorized according to strain and lineage (ie: B/Victoria).  
Influenza C is generally quite mild and of limited spread.7    The difference between 
subsets of influenza is important both in terms of preparing the composition of the 
yearly seasonal flu vaccine as well as in understanding how pandemics occur.  
Influenza pandemics occur when a strand of influenza A develops the ability for 
sustainable human-to-human transmission.  In particular, it requires a variant of 
influenza A to which there is little to no existing immunity.  This often occurs when 
human and animal influenza viruses either mix or when one variant becomes 
transmissible to other species.8  Seasonal influenza usually infects around 10% of 
the population while pandemic influenza is typically expected to infect between 15-
40% and sometimes more.9 
 
A further distinction between seasonal and pandemic influenza is in the morbidity 
and mortality profile as pandemic influenza can skew to younger adults.   Seasonal 
influenza tends to be predictable and primarily attacks the very young (under two 
years of age) and the elderly (over 65 years) as well as individuals with certain 
medical conditions.10  These subpopulations as a whole account for the majority of 
influenza related-hospitalizations however older adults represent over 90% of 
influenza-related deaths, often due to complications such as pneumonia.11 In 
addition, influenza infections in older individuals have also been associated with 
decreased overall health and functional decline.12  
                                                        
6 World Health Organization, “Influenza.” 
7 US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Influenza (Flu): Types of Influenza Viruses.” 
8 World Health Organization, “Pandemic Influenza Risk Management: WHO Interim Guidance.” 
9 Barry, “Observations on Past Influenza Pandemics.” S95 
10 Jain et al., “Hospitalized Patients with 2009 H1N1 Influenza in the United States.”  
11 Deans, Stiver, and McElhaney, “Influenza Vaccines Provide Diminished Protection but Are Cost-
Saving in Older Adults.” 
12 Lang et al., “Influenza Vaccination in the Face of Immune Exhaustion: Is Herd Immunity Effective 
for Protecting the Elderly?” 
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While seasonal influenza tends to target older adults as well as the very young and 
individuals with specific medical conditions, pandemic influenza tends to feature 
higher proportions of younger adults affected.13   In the 1918 pandemic, for 
example, more than 50% of deaths occurred in individuals between the ages of 14 
and 40.14  This pattern was also observed in the 1968 pandemic where 65% of 
deaths were among individuals under 65 years of age.15  In the United States during 
the recent 2009 H1N1 pandemic, 79% of the cases reported as of November 2009 
were in people younger than 30 years of age.16   It has been suggested that this 
difference is the result of antigenic cycling as older adults may possess a measure of 
immunity due to previous exposure to similar viruses, often decades earlier.17 The 
increased risk for younger adults is significant as it demonstrates that seasonal flu 
preparedness plans are not sufficient to deal with pandemic influenza.   
 
Although mortality rates among older adults (in the United States) were considered 
low during the H1N1 pandemic, it should be noted that a ‘low’ percentage was still 
8%.18  While case incidence in older adults decreased in the 1918 pandemic, they 
suffered a high case-fatality rate due in large part to complications such as 
pneumonia.19  Protective measures such as handwashing and vaccination can help 
to reduce the risk of infection however, aging is often accompanied by a reduction 
in immunity.  Vaccination is believed to be able to reduce seasonal influenza-
associated fatalities in older populations by as much as 80%20, though the immune 
systems of older adults may not be able to respond as effectively to vaccinations as 
those of younger adults.21  
                                                        
13 Greer, Tuite, and Fisman, “Age, Influenza Pandemics and Disease Dynamics.” 
14 Barry, “Observations on Past Influenza Pandemics.”, S96 
15 Simonsen et al., “Pandemic versus Epidemic Influenza Mortality: A Pattern of Changing Age 
Distribution.”, 57  
16 Yang, “Predicting Young Adults’ Intentions to Get the H1N1 Vaccine: An Integrated Model.”, 69 
17 Nguyen and Noymer, “Influenza Mortality in the United States, 2009 Pandemic: Burden, Timing 
and Age Distribution.” 
18
 Abdel-Haq and Asmar, “Novel Swine-Origin Influenza A: The 2009 H1N1 Influenza Virus.”, 75 
19 Morens and Taubenberger, “Pandemic Influenza: Certain Uncertainties.”, 271 
20 Lang et al., “Influenza Vaccination in the Face of Immune Exhaustion: Is Herd Immunity Effective 
for Protecting the Elderly?” 
21 Katz et al., “Immunity to Influenza: The Challenges of Protecting an Aging Population.” 
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The difference between seasonal and pandemic influenza becomes particularly 
important when considering the development and use of vaccines.  The seasonal 
vaccine is traditionally composed of three strains of influenza (two of A and one of 
B) and is referred to as a trivalent vaccine.22  The three strains in question change 
annually based on World Health Organization recommendations, though each 
country makes its own decision as to the composition it will use.23  As the northern 
and southern hemisphere peak-influenza seasons differ, these recommendations 
occur twice a year and take into account the dominant strains circulating.  In order 
to prepare the vaccine in time to be ready for the start of flu season, the 
composition of the vaccine does not always perfectly match the strains that 
circulate, though there may still be a measure of transferred immunity from 
exposure to similar strains.24 Unlike the proactive preparation of the seasonal 
influenza vaccine, pandemic influenza vaccination is developed reactively in 
response to a particular strain and, as such, is not available until the pandemic is 
underway.  The vaccine development process requires approximately five to six 
months.25   
 
It should also be noted that availability of pandemic vaccination is not only 
dependent on scientific research and industrial development but also on individual 
state contracts with the manufacturers.  States with contracts in place will be at an 
advantage.  For example, the UK has what are referred to as ‘sleeping contracts’ 
with two pharmaceutical manufacturers to guarantee a specific number of vaccine 
doses in the event of a pandemic. The UK, however, is one of several countries with 
the contracts and so it is not guaranteed to receive the full order right away.26  A 
slightly different model can be seen in Canada where the government has pre-
existing contracts in place with domestic manufacturers to ensure as rapid and 
                                                        
22 World Health Organization, “Influenza (Seasonal), Fact Sheet N. 211.” 
23 US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Influenza (Flu): Selecting the Viruses in the 
Seasonal Influenza (Flu) Vaccine.” 
24 US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
25 World Health Organization, “Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Manufacturing Process and Timeline.” 
26 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, “H1N1 ‘Swine Flu’ Vaccine.” 
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fulsome a production and distribution of vaccine to the public as possible and has 
worked with the manufacturer to ensure rapid regulatory approval.27   
1.3.2 Vulnerable Populations in the Context of Pandemic Influenza 
There is increasing interest in targeting vulnerable populations in emergency 
preparedness planning.28 Unless the specific circumstances and requirements of 
each vulnerable population are understood, it will be difficult to ensure their needs 
are met.  A 2008 Cabinet Office report on ‘Identifying People Who Are Vulnerable in 
a Crisis’ lists 13 categories of vulnerable individuals, including older adults.29  Older 
adults, for instance are not just more vulnerable to a pandemic but to extreme 
events in general.  This population group represents 90% of seasonal influenza 
deaths.30 Following Hurricane Katrina, 75% of bodies found were over the age of 
6031, as were 95% of fatalities in the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake.32 Despite a 
tendency to disproportionately affect younger populations, pandemic influenza is 
still a threat to older adults.33  Aging often results in a reduction in immunity that 
not only increases an individual’s vulnerability to influenza but also to other 
infectious diseases and may limit the body’s ability to respond as effectively to 
preventive treatments such as vaccinations.34 
 
Younger adults, on the other hand, are not a population traditionally considered to 
be at-risk and yet, depending on the strain and virulence of an influenza pandemic, 
may find themselves at greater risk.  More than 50% of fatalities in the 1918 
Spanish Flu pandemic were between the age of 14 and 40.35   Furthermore, in the 
United States during the recent 2009 H1N1 pandemic, individuals under 30 years of 
                                                        
27 Public Health Agency of Canada, “Lessons Learned Review: Public Health Agency of Canada and 
Health Canada Response to the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic.”, Section 3.8 
28 UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat, “Identifying People Who Are Vulnerable in a Crisis.” 
29 UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat. 
30
 Katz et al., “Immunity to Influenza: The Challenges of Protecting an Aging Population.” 
31 Adams et al., “Aging Disaster: Mortality, Vulnerability, and Long-Term Recovery among Katrina 
Survivors.” 
32
Ichiseki, “Features of Disaster-Related Deaths after the Great East Japan Earthquake.”, 204 
33 McClelland et al., “Psychological and Physical Impacts of Extreme Events on Older Adults: 
Implications for Communications.” 
34 Katz et al., “Immunity to Influenza-the Challenges of Protecting an Aging Population.” 
35Barry, “Observations on Past Influenza Pandemics.”, S96 
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age represented 79% of the cases reported as of November 2009.36  This potential 
for an atypical profile of risk during an influenza pandemic, as compared to 
seasonal influenza, may create a challenge for policymakers and planners in 
effectively communicating to the public.  In this case, policymakers will need to 
tailor messaging to reach a group that wouldn’t typically see themselves as 
particularly at-risk or vulnerable to influenza and who may also consider themselves 
to be healthy in general.  This challenge requires further examination of public 
perceptions of risk and likely responses to a pandemic with a view to informing the 
preparation of official pandemic flu communications. 
1.3.3 Security Implications of Pandemic Influenza 
Pandemic influenza is not solely a public health issue but, rather, represents a 
crossroad between health and security.  Security is often ill defined; however, it can 
broadly be categorised as: ‘the state of being protected or safe from harm’.37  In the 
20th century, the 1918 Spanish flu and the AIDS epidemic accounted for casualties 
at a level that ‘terrorists and dictators can only dream of’.38  World War One 
resulted in 17 million deaths, the Spanish flu had a death toll of between 20-50 
million.39  Both are tragedies with an extraordinary loss of life but, equally, both 
also represent security threats. 
 
In the Middle Ages in Europe, plague is believed to have caused a 30-60% reduction 
in the population40 and 300 million people fell victim to smallpox in the 20th 
Century.41  Equally, the use of biological agents as a security risk is not new.  From 
the Mongol use of plague corpses as catapult fodder at Kaffa in 134642 to the 2001 
Amerithrax attacks, the use of plague and pestilence as a weapon has a long 
history.  The threat of weaponisation of biological or bacteriological substances and 
their subsequent use in conflict prompted the development of the Biological 
                                                        
36Yang, “Predicting Young Adults’ Intentions to Get the H1N1 Vaccine: An Integrated Model.”,69 
37 Merriam-Webster, “Security.” 
38The Economist, “The World’s Deadliest Bioterrorist.” 
39 World Health Organization, “Pandemic Influenza Risk Management: WHO Interim Guidance.” 
40 Austin Alchon, A Pest in the Land: New World Epidemics in a Global Perspective., 21 
41 Flight, “Smallpox: Eradicating the Scourge.” 
42
Mayor, Greek Fire, Poison Arrows and Scorpion Bombs., 119 
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Weapons Convention (BWC) that entered into force in 1975.43  The BWC sought to 
curtail state development of biological weapons and to create a norm against their 
use in conflict.  Whilst the efficacy of this agreement can be debated, particularly 
given the lack of verification protocols and lapses such as the Sverdlovsk anthrax 
incident in 1979, its existence demonstrates a willingness on the part of many 
states to renounce the use of biological weapons. Although the BWC represents an 
important step in protecting the world from lethal disease, it represents only one 
half of the threat.   Through social norms and treaty conventions, state use of 
biological weapons has been largely constrained however, the natural development 
and spread of illness remains a serious risk to human health. 
 
The UK government has therefore recognized the security threat posed by 
pandemic influenza.  A 2014 report by Parliament on the National Security Strategy 
recommended that ‘the scope of the next NSS be wide, encompassing resilience, 
deterrence and defence; and also emerging risks, such as pandemics and climate 
change, which threaten international order’.44   This sentiment is echoed in the 
2015 UK National Risk Register which identifies pandemic influenza as ‘the most 
significant civil emergency risk’.45  Internationally, the 2010 US National Security 
Strategy singled out pandemic as a threat and hazard alongside terrorism, natural 
disasters and large-scale cyber-attacks46 and a 2007 WHO report referred to 
pandemic influenza as ‘the most feared security threat’.47 
 
The recent H1N1 pandemic accounted for a comparatively low estimated excess 
mortality worldwide (between 100,000 and 400,000) and governments have been 
accused of over-reacting in response to the H1N1 pandemic48. What is often 
                                                        
43 United Nationa Office for Disarmament Affairs, “The Biological Weapons Convention.” 
44House of Lords and House of Commons-Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, “‘The 
Next National Security Strategy’ First Report of Session 2014-2015.”, 11 
45 UK Cabinet Office, “National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies.”, 14  
46 US Government, “National Security Strategy May 2010.”, 18 
47 World Health Organization, “The World Health Report 2007 A Safer Future: Global Public Health 
Security in the 21st Century.”, 45 
48 Taylor et al., “Crying Wolf? Impact of the H1N1 2009 Influenza Pandemic on Anticipated Public 
Response to a Future Pandemic.”, 563 
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forgotten is that the prior two pandemics (1957 and 1968) both resulted in 
between 1-4 million in excess mortality and the 1918 Spanish Flu, which was also 
driven by H1N1 virus, resulted in between 20-50 million fatalities.49  The 2011 UK 
Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy concluded that, ‘There are no grounds 
for complacency and any presumption that the relatively mild H1N1 (2009) 
influenza pandemic is representative of future pandemics is dangerous’.50 
 
The costs associated with a pandemic are not just limited to human lives.  The 
economic ramifications of such events can be widespread and substantial.  The 
2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa is estimated to have cost Guinea, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone $2.2 billion USD in lost economic growth.51  The World Bank has 
estimated that from 1997-2009 six outbreaks of deadly zoonotic diseases (such as 
Ebola, SARS, Avian and H1N1 influenza) resulted in an estimated $80 billion in 
economic losses.   Should an airborne 1918-type pandemic hit today, it could kill an 
estimated 33 million people and cause $4 trillion USD (5% of global GDP) in 
economic costs.52 
 
The threat potential of an influenza pandemic is clear.  The recent debate over 
H5N1 research serves as a prime example. H5N1 (also known as avian influenza) is a 
highly infectious influenza variant that infects birds.   Since 2003 there have been 
over 600 cases of human illness (animal to human transmission) reported in Asia 
and the Middle East with a mortality rate of around 60%.53  Although the mortality 
rate for H5N1 is quite high, at present infection with H5N1 occurs only through 
contact with infected poultry. There is, however, the possibility that the virus could 
mutate and become transmissible from human to human.54  
 
                                                        
49World Health Organization, “Pandemic Influenza Risk Management: WHO Interim Guidance.” 
50 UK Department of Health Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Team, “UK Influenza Pandemic 
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51 The World Bank, “World Bank Group Ebola Response Fact Sheet.” 
52  The World Bank. 
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Recognizing the risks associated with potential H5N1 mutations, researchers began 
conducting “gain of function” experiments (positively modifying a trait of the 
original virus such as ease of transmission or virulence) related to H5N1.55   The 
risks and benefits of increasing the lethality of a pathogen in order to get ahead of 
future deadly mutations as well as the need for a safe way to share the results 
prompted an intense debate on the ethics of these actions.  Scientists agreed to a 
yearlong research moratorium starting in January 201256 however, this ended, in 
part due to concerns that, while they discussed the issue, the virus was continuing 
to mutate.57   
 
Courtesy of vaccination, improved knowledge of public health practices, and, in 
many parts of the world at least, sanitary living conditions, several of the major 
historical ‘killers’ such as smallpox, polio and plague have been either eradicated, or 
a treatment has been developed.  Nevertheless, despite, substantial progress in the 
control and curtailing of serious infectious diseases, pandemic influenza remains an 
ever-present threat.  The unpredictability of a pandemic, both in strain, severity 
and timing of occurrence, creates an additional challenge in planning for and 
mitigating a future pandemic.   
1.3.4 Importance of Communication in Emergency Preparedness and Response 
The importance of communicating with the public has been widely recognized and 
governments, for example, have expressed a need to ensure that effective 
communication, both in terms of accessibility, capability and content is in place.  In 
2015, former UK Prime Minister David Cameron created a Civil Service award for 
clarity, stating that ‘All our communications with the public should be human, clear, 
helpful and professional’.58  Additionally, the UK Civil Contingencies Act 2004 
outlines the responsibility of emergency responders to communicate with the 
public as, ‘a well-informed public is better able to respond to an emergency and to 
                                                        
55 Briseno and England. 
56 Briseno and England. 
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Fears.” 
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minimise the impact of the emergency on the community’.59  Equally, the 
Communications Policy of the Government of Canada states that, ‘modern 
government requires the capacity to respond effectively over multiple channels in a 
24-hour, global communications environment.’60  Accordingly, in Canada between 
2006-2013, public service communications staff increased by 15.3%.61   In the 
context of pandemic planning, the importance of communication has not been lost, 
with pandemic planning documents from both UK and WHO (amongst many others) 
specifically emphasising the importance of communication.62   
 
Communication is a key element to effective preparedness and response in the face 
of pandemic influenza.  The UK review of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic states that, 
‘clear, consistent and co-ordinated messaging across the full range of 
communication channels, tailored to the needs of specific audiences, is crucial to 
maintaining the public trust, compliance and support essential to the effective 
management of a pandemic’.63   The Public Health Agency of Canada H1N1 Lessons 
Learned report echoes this sentiment and stresses that public communication is 
necessary not only to encourage citizens to take necessary action but also to build 
trust in the government response.64  OECD guidelines on the management of 
critical risks emphasise the need to raise awareness to mobilise households and 
provide them with the information they need to take protective measures.65 
 
Communication, when done effectively, not only informs the public and empowers 
them to adopt protective behaviours but, in so doing, it can prevent additional 
strain being placed on existing infrastructure.  For example, In September 1987, in 
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Goiania Brazil a caesium-137 teletherapy unit was left behind when a private 
radiotherapy clinic moved locations, and was discovered by two individuals 
scavenging for scrap metal who brought it home to dismantle.  This resulted in a 
small number of people becoming exposed to the caesium and becoming ill.66   
Emergency services were mobilized, areas of known contamination were evacuated 
and individuals potentially contaminated were brought to a local stadium that had 
been repurposed as a staging area.  The authorities, however, did not communicate 
what had transpired resulting in uncertainty and large numbers of individuals, 
approximately 10% of the population or 112,000 people, arriving at the stadium.  Of 
the 112,000 individuals who presented themselves for testing, only 249 were 
actually contaminated and the incident passed with only four fatalities. 67 
 
In contrast to the Goiania radiation incident where a lack of effective 
communication resulted in an overabundance of so-called ‘worried well’, is the 
November 2006 polonium poisoning of Russian dissident Alexander Litvinenko in 
London. 68  Unlike Goiania where large numbers of unexposed individuals appeared 
for testing, in the Litvenenko case several individuals contacted by the NHS with 
offers for testing declined and, individuals who had been present at the locations 
but were not offered testing were generally not upset.  This is attributed to several 
factors including a lower perception of risk due to a belief that the incident was 
largely a targeted action and the use of effective communication that the risk was 
contained to affected areas.69   
 
It should be noted that recognition of the need to communicate with the public is 
not restricted to the public sector; indeed, the classic examples of effective and 
failed risk/crisis communication come from the private sector with the comparison 
of the handling of the 1982 Tylenol product tampering, and the 1989 grounding of 
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the Exxon Valdez tanker.70  When Johnson and Johnson received reports that 
several deaths in Chicago were the result of someone putting cyanide into Tylenol 
tablets, they immediately acted by warning the public, recalling the product, 
offering a reward to capture the killer, and by modifying the packaging to be 
tamper resistant.   In doing so, they were able to show a commitment to resolving 
the problem and maintain public trust.71  In comparison, when the Exxon Valdez 
grounded in Prince William Sound, Alaska in 1989, spilling millions of gallons of oil 
into the water, the company did not react quickly, failed to communicate with the 
public, and even attempted to place blame on other actors such as the Coast 
Guard, with the incident eventually becoming the byword for poor risk 
communication.72  
 
Trust, or credibility, is a key element in effective communication.73  Without trust in 
the communicating individuals or organisations, communications may not only 
become ineffective, they may, in fact, increase perceptions of risk amongst the 
target audience.74  It is therefore important that communication not only have the 
correct content and be delivered through the appropriate media, but also that the 
source of the information is deemed to be trustworthy by the public or specific 
population the communication is targeted at.  An additional challenge is that trust 
is not static and the balance between trust and distrust is assymetrical.75  This 
asymmetry is supported by a number of reasons such as negative (trust eroding) 
events tend to be more visible than positive (trust reinforcing) ones and are often 
considered to hold greater significance. Individuals are more likely to place higher 
values of credibility on bad news over good, and, once begun, distrust tends to 
beget or reinforce further distrust. 76 
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While crisis communication traditionally presents in the aftermath of a crisis, risk 
communication centres around advising the public of a hazard to encourage them 
to make informed decisions.77  Reynolds and Seegar outline distinguishing features 
of risk and crisis communication.   Although the two communication models are 
similar, or have overlap, there are a number of key distinctions in many aspects, 
such as the use of mediated delivery systems and the use of technical experts as 
spokespeople.  Risk communication, for example, is structured rather than reactive, 
involving long-term (pre-crisis) message preparation, and is principally persuasive 
rather than informative.  Crisis communication involves information about the 
current state of a specific event rather than reducing the known probabilities of 
negative consequences.78  
 
The nature of an influenza pandemic means that communication plans must 
incorporate elements of both risk and crisis communication, as it is taken as a 
certainty that an influenza pandemic will occur, but there is uncertainty over 
specific timing, duration, and severity.  The public will likely want information on 
the state of affairs (how many cases/fatalities, and what the government is doing) 
but also want to know what actions they can take to reduce their risk (health 
protective behaviour).  Furthermore, while pre-crisis messaging will be prepared, it 
is impossible to predict how a pandemic will unfold, and so responsive and reactive 
messaging will be required.79 
 
The US Centres for Disease Control (CDC) sidestep the division between risk and 
crisis communication through the use of a Crisis Emergency Risk Communication 
model (CERC).  CERC was developed in the wake of the September 11th and Anthrax 
attacks in the United States.  The September 11th attacks required the government 
to communicate in an environment of great uncertainty, high perception of threat, 
and limited response time.  The role of the CDC within this was limited (testing and 
monitoring air quality, providing advice to first responders and mental health 
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support), and in keeping with the supportive role the agency had played in previous 
disasters.  The Anthrax attacks, on the other hand, being biological in nature, meant 
the CDC was given a far more primary role, and highlighted the communication 
challenges and shortcomings of the agency from the use of multiple spokespeople, 
inaccurate predictions and poor response time.  From this experience, CERC was 
created.80 
 
CERC promotes six key principles in communicating with the public: timeliness, 
accuracy, credibility, empathy, empower the public to take action, and respect.  It 
also incorporates both crisis and risk communication into an integrative approach 
meant to cover the life-cycle of a health emergency.81  There are five stages to the 
CERC model: Pre-crisis (focused on preparedness), Initial (rapid communication 
designed to reassure and inform), Maintenance (keep the public up to date with 
accurate information), Resolution (continued communication; starting to move 
toward recovery and rebuilding) and Evaluation (lessons learned).82  This type of 
communication model is ideally suited to communicating with the public during an 
influenza pandemic as it provides guidelines with the flexibility to adapt to a long-
term health event with a series of unknown variables, such as: severity and 
virulence of the strain, at-risk populations, and resulting recommended protective 
behaviour.  
 
Communication during an influenza pandemic is necessary to keep the public 
informed. Effective communication is also necessary to improve health outcomes.  
When done successfully, communication has been shown to help maintain 
confidence or public trust, provide reassurance and encourage the adoption of 
protective behaviours.83   During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the Director General, 
Communications for the Department of Health in Canada testified before a 
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Parliamentary committee about the usefulness of communication to promote 
behaviour change.  
“…in our communication strategy the outcome is very much the ending for us, 
which is a behavioural outcome ultimately.  So, for example, in the spring we were 
testing very much people's levels of awareness and behaviour around handwashing 
and cough etiquette and the infection-prevention behaviours we wanted them to 
adopt. Throughout the spring we could actually track changes in people's 
behaviours.  In the early days we saw a tracked change in behaviour around 
handwashing, and coughing in the sleeve was slow. It's really amazing, you could 
see a change in behaviour as you changed your messaging, and when you changed 
your tactics as well.”84 
 
In the event of a crisis, governments are expected to provide accountability and 
leadership.  They are charged not only with providing support and information to 
guide the public through the crisis but also with preventing a recurrence (when and 
wherever possible) while defending perceived gaps in policy and planning.85  
Whether a crisis is perceived as being well or poorly managed can have great effect 
on a Government’s term in office.  Failure to communicate effectively and to 
manage and mitigate the effects of a crisis can be detrimental to a leader and the 
government.86 During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, in anticipation of higher-than-
average casualty rates, Canadian health authorities delivered body bags to rural 
and remote Aboriginal communities in advance of winter weather potentially 
rendering accessibility to the communities difficult. By not communicating the 
context ahead of time, however, this action was interpreted as reflecting inaction 
and unwillingness by the government to prevent casualties in these communities.87 
 
This pressure on government to act can be further complicated by a lack of clear 
and executable options.  In the event of an influenza pandemic, particularly in the 
early stages when the scope may not yet be known and a vaccine is in the nascent 
stages of development, effective action can still be taken. Preventing the spread of 
influenza is not just about vaccination; actions such as handwashing, respiratory 
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hygiene and social isolation can do a great deal to prevent the spread of pandemic 
influenza and are excellent public health practices in general.88   
 
When used correctly, communication provides not only an outlet for emergency 
planners, public health authorities and Government to control the spread of the 
disease, but also provides an opportunity to build trust with the public and 
establish pathways for information sharing that can be used throughout the crisis. A 
lack of clear, consistent and accurate communication, however, produces the 
opposite effect.  During the US Anthrax incident in 2001, a Congressional staffer 
reported, “You hear from CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention], you 
hear from HHS [Health and Human Services], you hear from the Mayor’s office; and 
the stories shift from day to day as to what the threat is.”89   Uncertain, 
contradictory or unclear communication is far more likely to create distrust in the 
capability of the authorities to manage an emergency and to make the public less 
likely to cooperate with public health measures.90  
 
The focus of this thesis is on communicating actionable protective steps in the most 
effective manner to encourage protective behaviours in a pandemic.  A key element 
to this is ensuring that communication activities are not only clear and consistent, 
but also ensure that necessary information is conveyed.91  Additionally, 
understanding the perceptions and assumptions of the target population is 
necessary to increase the efficacy of the communication; in effect, ensuring the 
message resonates with its intended audience.  To achieve this an understanding of 
both context and content of messaging is critical.  Given the key role that 
communication plays in effective emergency management, it is important to 
examine ways to improve communication in order to lessen the impact of 
pandemic influenza and to promote uptake of protective behaviours.   
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1.4 Overview of the Thesis 
This thesis examines how communication can increase uptake of protective 
behaviour amongst at risk or vulnerable populations during an influenza pandemic. 
First, a review of the existing literature concerning impact of pandemics and other 
disasters on vulnerable and at-risk groups is presented. To take into account 
practical realities around pandemic planning, interviews were conducted with 
emergency planners responsible for universities, facilities catering to older adults, 
London boroughs, and the UK in order to gain a better understanding of existing 
strategies and challenges in preparing for a future pandemic, particularly in regard 
to communicating with at-risk populations.   These were supplemented by a review 
of published pandemic planning guidance by the authorities in London, the UK, as 
well as international partners. 
 
The research presented in this thesis is focused on an influenza pandemic from a 
London population perspective.  London is not only the political and financial centre 
of the UK but also represents a high population density area with a robust public 
transit network.  It is a culturally, ethnically, and linguistically diverse city with 
multiple points of global connection (e.g. Heathrow and Gatwick Airports, Eurostar 
terminal).  These characteristics create planning challenges around the potential 
ease of the spread of a new pandemic virus, and the potential severity of its impact 
on the population.   
 
To understand pandemic risks from the perspective of the London population, a 
series of individual and group interviews were conducted with younger adults 
(operationalised as university students) and older adult (>70) participants to 
determine perceptions of risk and vulnerability, behavioural intentions in a 
pandemic and information needs.   This led to the development and testing of a 
communication intervention with older adult participants examining their 
behavioural intentions and willingness to accept public health advice challenging 
typical perceptions of risk during a pandemic.  
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In the first phase, older adults and younger adults were given a two-part scenario 
covering the early stages of a pandemic: the initial outbreak abroad (Greece) and 
the declaration of a pandemic by the WHO (by which point the virus had reached 
the UK and fatalities had occurred).  Participants were asked to comment on their 
knowledge of pandemic influenza, perceptions of risk, likely behavioural responses 
and communication needs.  These data were then analysed to identify areas where 
communication could be used to inform and improve behavioural responses and 
associated health outcomes.  For example, whilst pandemic influenza often 
presents an atypical morbidity/mortality pattern, most participants felt that those 
most at-risk in a future pandemic would be the same categories as those at-risk to 
seasonal influenza.  The second phase of the research built on these findings and 
was designed to test participant willingness to follow official advice regarding 
vaccination where the risk groups did not fit with their expectations.  This phase 
was conducted with older adults and examined their responses to not being 
included in a vaccine priority list, and the effect that additional information had on 
their acceptance of this and intention to follow the associated guidance.  
Furthermore, as with the first phase of research, participants were also asked about 
their knowledge of pandemic influenza, perceptions of risk, likely behavioural 
responses and communication needs. 
 
This chapter provides the background and context for the research presented in 
this thesis.  In the next Chapter, existing research concerning vulnerable or at-risk 
populations and pandemic influenza as well as current pandemic planning and 
challenges is reviewed.  Chapter 3 examines current practice in the management of 
vulnerable and at-risk populations in pandemic scenarios.  Interviews were 
conducted with emergency planners at national, local (London), and institutional 
(university and adults social service providers) levels.  This chapter, therefore, 
incorporates both a review of existing pandemic planning guidelines (from a local, 
national, and international perspective) and also interviews with emergency 
planning practitioners.   The theoretical background to this research is detailed in 
Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 provides the methodological structure of this research.  
The outcomes of the three sets of individual and group interviews (Phase 1-older 
 30 
adults, Phase 1-younger adults, and Phase 2-older adults) are presented in Chapters 
6 to 8.  Finally, the outcomes and implications suggested by this research are 
presented and discussed in Chapter 9. 
 
1.5 Chapter Summary 
Recognizing the risk of and potential threat posed by a future pandemic, this thesis 
aims to provide a better understanding of the perceptions, behavioural intentions 
and likely communication needs of potentially at-risk groups in order to improve 
official communication with these populations during influenza pandemics.  
Pandemic influenza is recognized as a grave risk to health security.  The uncertainty 
over timing, severity, and strain create planning difficulties, particularly around the 
identification or at-risk or vulnerable populations as, unlike seasonal influenza, 
pandemic influenza can affect atypical populations such as younger adults.  
Communication can reduce the uncertainty around the event and, in so doing, 
provide reassurance and direction to the affected population.92   Health outcomes 
can be improved through increased uptake of protective behaviours, but the 
adoption of these behaviours will require effective communication on the part of 
responding authorities.  In the next chapter, the existing literature concerning  
communicating with at-risk or vulnerable populations during an influenza pandemic 
will be reviewed.
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2 Chapter II: Pandemic Influenza and At-Risk Populations: Risk, 
Response and Communication Overview  
 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter will examine current literature around risk, behavioural responses and 
the communication needs of at-risk groups during an influenza pandemic.  A review 
of the literature was conducted through a database search using key word 




While extreme events such as natural disasters and public health crises broadly 
impact communities and societies, they also represent unique challenges for 
specific population groups who may be more at risk.  These at-risk population 
groups have often been categorized based on geography93, ethnicity94, or age95.  
The 2008 UK Cabinet Office report ‘Identifying people who are vulnerable in a crisis’ 
recognizes thirteen vulnerable groups such as ‘older people’, ‘pregnant women’, 
and individuals who may be mentally or cognitively impaired.96  Planning for 
vulnerable or at-risk populations can be seen throughout emergency or extreme 
event planning guidance.  The UK’s climate change adaptation plan, for example, 
considers how to reduce the probable effects of climate change on at-risk 
population groups.97   Whilst risk and vulnerability are not necessarily static 
concepts, there are a number of population groups that are frequently classed as 
vulnerable, in particular, older adults who tend to be considered as requiring 
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particular attention or care in an emergency.  This classification is understandable 
given the often disproportionate effect of extreme events on older adults. Recent 
natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina and the 2011 earthquake in Japan, have 
demonstrated the extent to which older adults can suffer from disproportionate 
morbidity and mortality rates.  Older adults (>60) made up 15% of the pre-
Hurricane Katrina population of New Orleans, however approximately 75% of the 
bodies found were from this population group.98  In March 2011, an estimated 95% 
of fatalities resulting from the Great East Japan earthquake were adults above the 
age of 60.99  Although older adults are typically more vulnerable to disaster100, by 
virtue of having reached an older age, they are also survivors.  Many older adults 
are as capable as the average individual and age, therefore, does not automatically 
equate to vulnerability.  Resilient older adults can be of great assistance during an 
extreme event, for example, by helping younger populations better understand 
how to cope with stressful situations.101   
 
Furthermore, whilst older adults represent a ‘typical’ category of risk or 
vulnerability, there may well be situations where an atypical risk profile is present.  
Some studies on flooding, for example, have found middle-aged men to be most at 
risk, however this is attributable to risk-taking behaviour such as trying to swim 
through rivers during a flood.102   
 
Pandemic influenza provides a novel opportunity to study communication 
challenges and vulnerability for a number of reasons.  Unlike most natural disasters 
that require specific geographical or meteorological conditions to develop, 
pandemic influenza is global; the challenge of managing pandemic influenza is not 
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bounded by national borders.  An estimated fifth of the world’s population was 
affected during the 1918 ‘Spanish Flu’ pandemic, the 1968 pandemic claimed 
between one and three million lives, the 1958 pandemic killed approximately one 
million and estimates of the ‘Spanish Flu’ death toll vary between 50 and 100 
million people dead.  While the recent 2009 H1N1 pandemic featured a much lower 
death toll (14,000) this was largely due to a much less virulent strain of the virus 
than feared and most experts agree the threat remains and a more severe strain of 
flu is no less likely in the future.103 As well, although older adults are particularly 
vulnerable to seasonal influenza, pandemic influenza often results in high morbidity 
and mortality amongst otherwise less-affected populations, including younger 
adults. 
 
The focus of this thesis is on communicating risk to vulnerable populations during 
an influenza pandemic, however a number of the articles identified in the literature 
review addressed the perceptions and behaviour of the general population. These 
articles have been included in the literature review for several reasons.  Firstly, 
their inclusion provides a broader understanding of human perception and 
response to the threat of an influenza outbreak or, in the case of the post-2009 
H1N1 studies, the public perceptions and response to an actual outbreak.  
Secondly, including these studies allows for a larger number of international 
examples, which not only provide additional information on general perceptions 
and reactions but also demonstrate how different countries manage infection 
prevention and prioritize measures, as well as how different national groups may 
be willing to accept certain preventive measures.  Finally, broad inclusion criteria 
provide a clearer picture of the work that has been conducted in the field of 
influenza perceptions and communications to support the identification of any 
research gaps.   
 
Through the use of journal databases (PsychInfo and Medline) a search was 
conducted using three main key word categories: age terms (ie: old, young, senior, 
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student, age), condition terms (ie: behaviour, risk, perception, communication), and 
circumstance terms (ie: pandemic, influenza).  Results were limited to English 
language and assessed for relevance based on title and abstract.  These results 
were then supplemented with additional articles based on bibliographical 
references as well as literature passed on by colleagues. 
 
2.3 Risk Perceptions and Behavioural Responses to Pandemic Influenza in 
the General Population     
Many of the studies examined addressed issues around general population 
understanding of influenza –for example, what it is, and the extent to which it is a 
threat.  Determining knowledge of influenza is a key element to assessing 
communication needs as well as the extent to which behavioural recommendations 
might be acted on.   A Dutch study published in 2010 found that only 46% of 
participants indicated familiarity with the concept of an influenza pandemic.  
Perhaps more concerning is that after having been provided with a definition, only 
21% reported being completely familiar and 38% mostly familiar.104  This challenge 
is not unique to the Netherlands. A study published in 2012 examining general 
perceptions in Australia found that, although intended compliance with behavioural 
recommendations such as social isolation when ill and vaccination were higher 
during the 2009 H1N1 event, pandemic literacy did not greatly improve.105   
 
Experience can influence perceptions of risk and the milder-than-anticipated 2009 
pandemic, has both positively and negatively impacted knowledge and perceptions 
of risk in a future pandemic.  Individuals are more likely to assess the likelihood of 
an influenza pandemic occurrence as high, however, they are also more likely to 
rate the severity of such an event as low.106  Whilst people are more open to the 
possibility of a pandemic and not dismissing the threat as a thing of the past, the 
lack of concern regarding severity, however, could reduce willingness to employ 
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protective measures such as respiratory hygiene (covering mouth/nose with tissue 
or arm when coughing or sneezing, and not spitting, hand-washing, social isolation 
(particularly when ill) and vaccination. Prior to a vaccine becoming available, non-
pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) such as hand washing, respiratory hygiene and 
social distancing are recommended methods of infection prevention.107   Washing 
hands with soap and water, for example, has been shown to be an effective 
method to remove pathogens; an important step since studies have shown the 
influenza virus can survive on nonporous surfaces for at least 24 hours.108  Further, 
the use of antivirals in both the prevention (as prophylaxis) and the early treatment 
of pandemic influenza can limit the impact of the pandemic; particularly in the 
initial stages when a vaccine is not yet available.109  Not employing these and other 
protective measures may well risk allowing a future influenza pandemic to gain a 
foothold and prove a more deadly force than might otherwise have been the case.   
 
This relationship between perceptions of severity and willingness to take action is 
also compounded by perceptions of the efficacy of action - both in terms of 
response efficacy (the effectiveness of the recommended course of action) as well 
as self-efficacy (the ability of the individual to carry out this recommendation).  Bish 
and Michie (2010) reviewed studies conducted in the UK, Hong Kong and China that 
demonstrate that perceptions of disease and infection severity (H1N1, SARS and 
Avian Flu) were generally correlated to willingness to adopt protective measures 
such as handwashing and wearing masks.110  Likewise, additional studies have 
demonstrated a strong relationship between belief in the efficacy of a particular 
protective behavioural action (i.e. handwashing or vaccination) and a willingness to 
engage in it; for example, a Turkish study, which found perceptions around the 
efficacy of a behaviour to be the most important factor when predicting 
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behavioural responses whether recommending protective behaviours (ie: 
handwashing or avoiding shaking hands), avoidance behaviours (ie: avoiding public 
transport) or ineffective behaviours (ie: avoiding the outdoors or keeping the room 
temperature higher than usual).111    
 
The link between perceptions and action has been further demonstrated with 
vaccination as there is indication that, internationally, perceptions of low risk are 
linked to poor rates of vaccination.112  Concerns over safety of a vaccine, 
particularly when it relates to illness that are no longer common, have the potential 
to outweigh concerns over infection.  A US study found that adults were less likely 
to vaccinate for pandemic influenza than for seasonal influenza largely as a result of 
safety concerns.113  Knowledge can be a useful tool to counter false narratives and 
alleviate concerns.  A UK study examining adult intentions to vaccinate during 2009 
H1N1 demonstrated that knowledge of vaccination may not be particularly high.  
This study found that slightly less than 56% of participants were aware that H1N1 
vaccination does not protect again seasonal flu and 53% recognised that the 
vaccination cannot cause H1N1.114  This may demonstrate an area where improved 
communication could increase vaccination rates.   
 
Perceptions of vaccine safety, however, are not the only factor influencing 
intentions to vaccinate as perceptions of the severity of a pandemic as well as 
vaccine efficacy can also greatly influence behavioural intentions (and subsequent 
action) to vaccinate.  Positive perceptions regarding efficacy, control and 
susceptibility were shown to be linked to intent to receive the H1N1 vaccination.115   
A Greek study found that a significant portion of study respondents (63%, with 15% 
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as yet undecided) intended to decline vaccination, largely over concerns relating to 
the safety of the vaccine but also influenced by perceptions of low risk of infection 
and of illness severity.116  Bults et al (2011) also noted the importance of severity in 
the findings of their study with older age, high anxiety, higher perceptions of 
severity, efficacy of measures, self-efficacy and trust in government all associated 
with intention to adopt recommended measures.117 
 
Willingness to adopt protective measures before or during a pandemic is influenced 
by a variety of factors.  It should be noted that ‘protective measures’ is a broad 
category ranging from non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) such as respiratory 
hygiene (proper cough and sneeze etiquette), mask wearing, handwashing and 
social isolation to pharmaceutical interventions including vaccines and antivirals-
though for the purposes of this thesis, research relating to antivirals has been 
excluded, as this thesis will focus on pre-infection behaviour interventions.  While 
antivirals can be used for prophylaxis, unlike vaccines or NPI, they are used for 
treatment of infection.   In addition, the timing of an incident and local conditions 
can affect intention to adopt protective measures.  For example, surveys conducted 
in May 2009 in the UK and Mexico found vastly different results around uptake of 
protective behaviours such as handwashing. However, at that time, the UK had yet 
to experience its first H1N1 related death while Mexico had been in the throes of 
H1N1 for some weeks.118 
 
Behavioural changes that are adopted and perceptions held at the start or during a 
pandemic may not be sustained in the long-term.  A Spanish study identified that 
respondents indicated a more positive view (safety and efficacy) of the vaccine a 
year after the pandemic (perceptions of safety increased from 41.2% to 63.0% and 
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efficacy from 44.4% to 67.7%).  However, whilst many had adopted better hand and 
respiratory hygiene practices during the pandemic, continued practice of these fell 
approximately 20% (from 37.1% to 16.7% and 56.4% to 36.5%).119   As Bish and 
Michie demonstrate, several studies have linked perceptions of susceptibility to a 
variety of behavioural changes including: hand-washing, mask-wearing, respiratory 
hygiene, improving immunity through healthy choices and vaccination.120   
 
Self-efficacy, either in terms of perceptions or practical considerations, can impede 
the uptake of protective behaviours.   Specialised masks such as N95 respirators 
requires fit-testing and creates the potential for improper use which may 
undermine the efficacy of this measure.121   A British study found that participants 
were open to the idea of respiratory hygiene measures but were concerned about 
practical barriers such as being caught by surprise by a cough/sneeze, or not having 
access to tissues or waste bins.122  An observational study in New Zealand during 
2009 H1N1 reinforced this conclusion and found that, despite public health 
advisories and mass media coverage of pandemic deaths, discouraged behaviour 
such as uncovered coughing was commonplace.123   
 
An additional factor which can influence the effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical 
interventions is the timing of implementation.  This is particularly relevant with 
regard to social isolation measures as adherence to these measures can greatly 
affect the outcome of a pandemic.  During the 1918 pandemic both St. Louis and 
Philadelphia implemented social distancing.  In Philadelphia, authorities initially 
minimised concerns over the severity of the disease and allowed public gatherings 
to continue after the first cases were reported for a little over two weeks, at which 
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point the health services were inundated.  St Louis, on the other hand, 
implemented social isolation measures two days after the first cases were reported.  
By acting earlier, St Louis was able to considerably reduce the scope of epidemic it 
faced compared to Philadelphia.124  Social distancing measures can be effective but 
are significantly less effective if implemented after the fact.  Mass social distancing 
measures also carry a risk if not followed through until the threat has waned or a 
vaccine is developed.  If these measures are relaxed too early, it risks a second 
wave of the illness with a largely unexposed population.  In the 1918 pandemic 
several US cities that had implemented non-pharmaceutical interventions quickly 
had lower mortality rates in the first wave of the pandemic but were then at 
greater risk during the second wave.125   
 
It should be noted that social isolation is not limited to staying home from work 
when ill but also to avoiding exposure and limiting opportunities for the influenza 
virus to spread.   For example, individuals who see their work as necessary to social 
functioning are more likely to insist on working.  Medical professionals such as 
doctors and nurses are far more likely to believe they have a duty to work during 
pandemics than do hospital administrators; despite the latter having a necessary 
procedural role.126 The mandatory closure of community venues, in particular 
religious institutions, can be controversial.  Participants in one study highlighted 
that religious venues can be a place for information sharing and provide community 
support.127 
 
Whilst social isolation can be an effective public health measure, it can be difficult 
to maintain.  Over a third of participants in a Dutch study indicated that avoiding 
entertainment venues, public transportation and limiting shopping to the essentials 
would be feasible and 40% indicated they were willing to avoid health care 
professionals; though many were uncertain how long they could maintain 
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avoidance of health care experts.128   Maintaining non-pharmaceutical approaches, 
particularly those like social isolation that significantly disrupt everyday patterns 
over the long-term is an historical as well as contemporary challenge.  As Morse 
indicates, even in the ‘more obedient social climate’ of 1918, citizens were not 
prepared to accept these restrictions indefinitely.129 
  
For many, the idea of staying home from work during illness or to care for children 
in the event of school or childcare facility closures is considered to be a ‘luxury’.130  
For lower income households or, arguably, any households living paycheque to 
paycheque, missing work may simply not be a viable economic option.  The 
challenges or perceived barriers associated with staying home when ill are not 
isolated to economic considerations, although that is a recurrent and significant 
concern.  A US study found that a sense of anxiety about work not getting done was 
a strong predictor of intent.131 
 
Existing research suggests that the public is generally accepting of measures to 
prevent the spread of infection during an influenza pandemic however, behavioural 
intentions in a pandemic are influenced by a number of factors including 
perceptions of risk, behavioural efficacy, and self-efficacy.  Having examined 
general risk perceptions and behavioural responses to pandemic influenza, it is 
important to narrow in on those attitudes and approaches specific to the target 
population groups of this study.   
 
2.4 Risk Perceptions and Behavioural Responses to Pandemic Influenza in 
Older Adults 
The majority of studies included in this review found greater pandemic awareness 
in older adults.  A 2012 study examining community perceptions and response in 
relation to pandemic influenza found that older age was linked with greater 
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awareness about pandemic influenza.132   These results were confirmed by a 
systematic literature review, conducted between 2011 and 2013 which found that 
older adults exhibited higher pandemic knowledge.133  An Australian study found 
that older adults were more likely not only to have increased knowledge of 
pandemic influenza but were also more likely to adopt protective behaviours.134  A 
review by Bish and Michie found results from several studies confirm that older 
adults are more likely to adopt protective behaviours, possibly as a result of feeling 
particularly susceptible to a pandemic.  However, not all studies have had the same 
outcome.135  In contrast, an American study conducted in Autumn 2009, several 
months into the H1N1 pandemic, found that adults over 65 years of age seemed 
the least aware of pandemic influenza despite being active news media 
consumers.136  Furthermore, knowledge may not always equate to action.  While 
the above-mentioned studies found increased likelihood of older adults adopting 
protective behaviours, these results were not universal. Older adults may also be 
inclined to wait before seeking care and, by so doing, jeopardize their health; for 
example, antiviral drugs can be used to treat influenza but are most effective if 
prescribed within 48hrs of the onset of symptoms, however in the UK research 
suggests that very few older adults will have visited a physician in the first 48hrs.137 
 
A 2009 Dutch study found older adults were more likely to have higher ‘perceived 
efficacy, self-efficacy and intention to comply with measures’.138   An American 
study however, found that older adults were more likely than younger adults to 
oppose social distancing measures, and to support caring for the sick at home.  The 
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researchers hypothesized the former may be the result of a different generational 
work ethic or that older adults are more lonely and reluctant to give up social 
connections through activities such as church.  It was thought the latter might be 
due to concerns of hospitals as ‘germ-filled’.139  Although older adults tend to 
demonstrate greater knowledge of pandemic vaccination and greater intent to 
adopt and follow through on protective behaviours, when considering vaccination, 
the results are somewhat mixed.   A review of vaccinations studies by Bish et al 
found that, although most report older age to be linked with intent to vaccinate, 
there have been some contrasting results demonstrating either no age effect or a 
greater intent among younger adults.140  
 
Given that older adults are defined as an influenza-vulnerable group and the 
frequency of seasonal flu compared to pandemic, it is useful to examine seasonal 
flu vaccination rates among older adults.  The EU Council, in 2009, encouraged 
Member States to seek an influenza (seasonal) vaccination target of 75% of at-risk 
groups including older adults, a number previously shared with the World Health 
Organization before the latter, in 2012, amended their recommendation to suggest 
coverage rates be determined at the domestic level due to varied resources and 
availability.  Nonetheless, in 2007-2008, of 15 countries examined, only two states 
(UK and the Netherlands) exceeded the recommended 75% figure.141   The 
Netherlands introduced a vaccination program for older adults in 1996 and, 
between 1993 and 2003, vaccine uptake increased by 40% while, at the same time, 
excess mortality due to influenza decreased by 35%.142   Influenza vaccination rates 
vary greatly between countries.  In 2009, 68.9% of older adults in the United States 
were vaccinated while vaccination rates in Canada have been reported at 55.2% 
and 31.1% in Hong Kong.  Europe, by contrast, comprised national older adult 
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vaccination rates varying from 1.8% to 82.1%.143  A review examining the impact of 
social factors on vaccine uptake amongst older adults found that characteristics 
such as being unmarried, living alone, and being an immigrant contributed to a 
lower uptake of vaccination.144 
 
Though not conclusive, older adults do seem to express greater pandemic awareness.  
It would also seem that older adults are more likely to adopt protective behaviours 
though this differs somewhat depending on the behaviour, as there are indications 
that older adults may be less inclined to seek medical assistance in a timely fashion 
when ill.  Vaccination rates amongst older adults vary greatly by country with results 
indicating there is room for improvement. The next section will examine risk 
perception and behavioural responses amongst a younger adult population. 
 
2.5 Risk Perceptions and Behavioural Responses to Pandemic Influenza in 
Younger Adults 
Research into risk perceptions and behavioural responses to pandemic influenza in 
younger adults indicates that knowledge or awareness may not necessarily 
translate into action and that younger adults may hold misconceptions around 
issues of risk and vulnerability.  A 2009 study found that perceptions of 
susceptibility and knowledge of pandemic influenza symptoms were important, but 
that perception of a public health threat was most closely connected to the 
adoption of non-pharmaceutical interventions in university students in the United 
States.145  Younger adults may be inclined to dismiss risks associated with pandemic 
influenza due to a sense of invulnerability.  Research on the effectiveness of H1N1 
messaging and younger adults has found that, although prevention messaging may 
lead young adults to adopt certain non-pharmaceutical behaviours, vaccine uptake 
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may be limited.146    Seale et al further demonstrated this sense of invincibility (and 
lack of pandemic influenza knowledge) in a 2010 Australian study.  Many university 
students struggled to correctly define pandemic influenza and considered young 
children and the elderly to be the most vulnerable groups.   The ‘well educated’ 
were viewed to be at least risk as were younger adults and teenagers due to being 
‘physically and socially healthy’.147    
 
These findings were reinforced by a 2009 survey of university students in Australia 
found that, despite being among the group most often affected by pandemic 
influenza, younger adults (20-34) were among the least likely to consider 
themselves at risk.148  A Canadian study also reported that this sense of 
invulnerability in younger adults extends to attitudes about peers with respondents 
reporting that they were less likely to be infected than their friends and, were it to 
happen, their symptoms would be less severe149.  This may, in part, be attributed to 
past experience.  For example an assessment of the threat of H1N1 was coloured by 
the experience of SARS, which was not as severe as predicted150.  Public health 
planners should, as a result, take into account the potential for a future public 
health crisis to be viewed through the lens of the-milder-than-anticipated 2009 
H1N1 pandemic. 
 
A British study conducted in Autumn 2009-Winter 2010 found that students in both 
healthcare and non-healthcare focused disciplines demonstrated reasonable 
knowledge of pandemic influenza (however the authors point out that participation 
in the study may well have represented a pre-existing interest in the topic).151  
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Although the students demonstrated knowledge of pandemic, this did not 
necessarily equate to behavioural change and may indicate a gap in understanding 
(rather than knowledge) as most students (53% on average) indicated they would 
avoid social events but only a minority (40% on average) would avoid university.152   
A 2009 study of Australian university students found similar results with a high 
number of students intending to attend university, even if they were displaying 
symptoms of influenza and in the case of an exam or assignment deadline, this 
proportion tripled.153  This division between knowledge and action can also be seen 
in the results of a study examining student intent to receive the H1N1 vaccine 
which supports the view that knowledge alone does not necessarily result in 
behaviour change.154 
 
Although many non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) were adopted by younger 
adults during H1N1, not all were embraced with equal vigour.  For example, an 
Australian study found that hand-washing and respiratory hygiene were 
demonstrated to be more readily accepted and adopted than social distancing 
measures.155  There is some evidence to suggest that, in contrast to NPIs, 
vaccination, younger adults may be more reluctant to vaccinate.  In examining 
student intent to vaccinate during the H1N1 pandemic, Maier, Berkman and 
Chatkoff found that perceptions of severity of the disease had little effect but 
perceptions of the risk of illness was linked to intention to vaccinate.  Furthermore, 
perceptions of severity became more relevant to vaccination intent if the described 
pandemic was viewed as more severe.156  Studies have also found links between 
perceptions of susceptibility and vaccination. Ravert, Fu and Zimet determined that 
perceived susceptibility was not a primary factor but that perceptions of safety and 
efficacy and prior vaccination were better indicators of intent.  In addition, students 
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who received the seasonal influenza vaccine were more likely, though not 
guaranteed, to vaccinate for pandemic influenza.157 
 
Reluctance to vaccinate was demonstrated in a 2009 study of university students in 
Hong Kong.  Prior to the vaccine being made available, nearly 58.6% of students 
indicated intent to vaccinate though only 4.6% actually followed through.  Reasons 
for eschewing the vaccine included concerns over side effects and a perception that 
vaccination was unnecessary.158  Safety concerns were also documented in a study 
of students in New Mexico where 57.5% of respondents believed it was possible to 
catch influenza from the vaccine.159  Lack of action on vaccines can be found not 
only at the individual level but also at an institutional level.  An American College 
Health Association survey found that while the average vaccine uptake was 8%, 
only 61% of participating educational institutions had acquired stocks of vaccine.160  
 
Whilst younger adults do adopt protective behaviours in response to 
communication, vaccine acceptance remains a challenge due to perceptions that 
the vaccination is not effective and that pandemic influenza (in this case 2009 
H1N1) does not pose a threat.161  Despite being potentially at risk during an 
influenza pandemic and, often, exhibiting negative health behaviours such as 
alcohol and drug usage and poor nutrition, Decker and Slawson found that 
university students demonstrate a reluctance to get vaccinated.  In the autumn of 
2009, 70% of students surveyed indicated they would not receive the H1N1 
vaccine.162  The same study found that two-thirds of respondents indicated they 
had adopted some non-pharmaceutical interventions, in particular hand washing 
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and the use of hand sanitizers.163  The discrepancy in uptake between non-
pharmaceutical interventions and vaccination is a recurring theme.  A study of 
American college students found that the majority (69%) had adopted NPI in 
response to H1N1 but only 10% had received the pandemic influenza vaccine and 
66% indicated they did not intend to vaccinate.164   
 
The relationship between perception and action is described by Katz et al through 
the lens of the Health Belief Model.165  If students understand they are at-risk, 
consider that the severity of the illness is such that action should be taken, and 
believe that the benefits to taking action outweigh the costs, they can then be 
influenced by preventive health messaging.166  Based on the volume of research 
concluding the links between perceptions and action, it is not sufficient to advise 
younger adults on the actions they should take without ensuring they have the 
means to do so; most notably knowledge and comprehension-to understand the 
‘why’. 
 
Younger adults may be more inclined to possess a sense of invulnerability and 
therefore not recognise that they may be at-risk in a pandemic.  Knowledge of 
pandemic influenza in younger adults does not necessarily result in greater uptake 
of protective behaviours.  Protective behaviours such as hand washing and 
respiratory hygiene were more readily accepted than social distancing and 
vaccination.  Research suggests that, whilst younger adults may be receptive to 
communication around behaviour, it is important not only to indicate what they 
should do but also provide the rationale. 
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2.6 Communication and Pandemic Influenza 
Communication is a fundamental part of a successful pandemic influenza response. 
Prompting lasting behaviour change involves gaining public trust, which in turn 
involves clearly explaining the situation and the decisions being made, and should 
employ an all-media campaign.167  Understanding audience perceptions about 
influenza is an important part of developing communications to encourage uptake 
of protective behaviour during an influenza pandemic.168  Effective communication 
is also key to engaging the population and gaining their support for the decisions 
that will be made and policies that will be implemented, particularly potentially 
controversial topics such as priority access to vaccines and antivirals.169  It is also 
important to ensure that the language used is clear and, where necessary, 
explained.  A 2010 study found that university students, while understanding how 
flu is transmitted were unable to explain what pandemic influenza was and, as a 
result of the commonly used term ‘swine flu’, were confused as to what actually 
was the porcine role in infection.170 
 
Pandemic influenza is epidemiologically different than seasonal influenza as there is 
increased susceptibility in younger populations.  Consequently, vaccination 
strategies and vaccination campaigns need to be adapted to recognize this variance 
and target a younger population.171  As was demonstrated in the previous section, 
younger adult (student) uptake of vaccination during H1N1 was, for a variety of 
reasons, quite low and this clearly represents an area where improved 
communication strategies could be useful.  Agarwal argues that, because of the 
influence of past behaviour on behavioural intentions, students can be a difficult 
group for public health messaging and the use of communications intended to 
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resonate with a target group can help promote specific messaging and suggested 
behaviour.172 
 
Communication is not simply about what is said but also how it is said.  This can 
apply to both the nature of the message, for example whether it is fact or emotion 
driven, but also to the medium.  The means through which individuals receive their 
health information affects the nature of the messaging.  For example, an 
informational leaflet found in a physician’s office can contain far more detail than a 
280 character tweet.  A 2009 study on H1N1 media usage in Arizona not only found 
local television was a primary news source (70% of respondents) but, perhaps not 
surprisingly, the disparity between use of the internet as a source between younger 
adults (18-34) and older (over 65) greatly differed with 24% of younger adults using 
the internet to locate H1N1 news compared to only 6.6% of older adults.173  A 2009 
Canadian study found that university students were far more likely to rely on the 
internet as their primary source of information (70%) than any other medium.  A 
mere 3% of students identified health providers or public health agencies as their 
primary source and less than 3% turned to traditional news media (television, radio 
and periodicals).174  
 
In contrast, an Australian survey conducted in 2007 and 2009 across age groups 
found a much more diverse pattern of media consumption.  Television was the 
primary source for many (39.2% in 2007 and 56.6% in 2009) while use of the 
internet was lower at 1.3% in 2007 increasing to 4.5% in 2009.  In both 2007 and 
2009, respondents overwhelmingly indicated a preference for television as an 
information source (71.1% and 72.3% respectively).175  Whether the increased 
reliance on internet-based information in Canadian students vs the Australian 
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public is due to age, nationality or some other feature (such as dormitory living 
without easy access to traditional media) is not clear. However, it is apparent that 
public health information providers must ensure not only that their messaging is 
suitable but, that they utilize the correct medium (or media) to ensure their target 
population groups receive the message.  
 
The use of clear and easily comprehensible communication is a key element to 
successful emergency communication but is particularly important in dealing with 
vulnerable individuals.   For example, during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, affected 
Veterans Affairs nursing homes had an estimated 50% of residents suffering from 
some form of cognitive difficulty.  Consequently, staff used clear and easily 
understandable language so that residents were able to understand the 
situation.176  Further, a study of older flood victims advised avoidance of 
bureaucrat-ese in favour of ‘ordinary’ language.177 
 
Determining primary information sources is important not only to ensure that 
communication messages reach those they are intended for but also to identify 
how perceptions about the messenger affects behaviour.  There have been 
indications that individuals who considered either their employer or health care 
provider to be the most influential source of information were more likely to 
vaccinate against influenza.178  Communication plans must also address when to 
communicate.  Liao et al suggest that the initial epidemic stage, when uncertainty 
abounds, provides the most effective opportunity to encourage behavioural 
change.179 
 
A US study examining emotional response, information seeking and vaccination 
among college students during H1N1 highlights questions around the efficacy of 
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threat appeals and suggests that future public health campaigns should instead be 
based on providing knowledge with a focus on correcting incorrect assumptions 
and providing new facts to trigger information seeking and thereby allow the 
population to become informed without the risk of feeling manipulated.180  Public-
facing communication should empower its audience by providing a sound factual 
basis on which to assess risk and the adoption of protective behaviours; including 
vaccination.181  Understanding the information needs and information seeking 
behaviour of both the population at large and individual population groups will 
enable communication agencies, be it international, national or local government, 
charities, hospitals, public health and public service agencies or other interested 
actors, to better prepare for a pandemic and to ensure communication during a 
pandemic meets the needs of the public. These agencies, in turn, must cooperate to 
ensure that the public is given accurate, consistent, timely and actionable 
information but not overloaded or, to the extent possible, provided with 
contradictory information.182   
 
The development of communication and behavioural messaging should take into 
account the target audience and reduce the potential for confusion in how 
messages are interpreted.  Broad messages such as ‘avoid contact with sick people’ 
can be understood in different ways and do not necessarily provide clear direction 
for how this should be accomplished, potentially leading the audience to 
misinterpret the best course of action.183  In New Zealand during the H1N1 
pandemic, the Ministry of Health focused on reinforcing public health messaging 
with clear, concise advice, in particular ‘stay at home if you have symptoms, wash 
your hands regularly and cover your cough (with some health education material 
explicitly advising ‘covering your cough with a tissue’ or coughing ‘into your upper 
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sleeve’)’.184  Recommendations should also be practicable.  For example, 
encouraging individuals to cough and sneeze into a tissue requires them to have 
not only ready to access to a tissue but also nearby rubbish bins in which to dispose 
of them.185 
This attention to fact-based, information-driven messaging has been recommended 
by the WHO and the EU who suggest that messages about behavioural change, 
such as vaccine uptake, how to care for the sick and proper respiratory and hand 
hygiene, be provided to the public during a pandemic.186  This is supported by a 
Dutch study, published in 2010, which found that the messaging respondents most 
wished to have as quickly as possible in the event of a pandemic was information 
that would assist them to assess risk and protective measures, recognise an 
infection, understand infection transmission and infection treatment.187 This study 
also looked at trust and found that 40% of respondents assumed the media and 
government would exaggerate a pandemic threat, but more than 70% still 
considered the government trustworthy - though patient organizations were 
ranked at 85%.188  An American study found similar patterns with 73% of 
participants considering public health officials to be credible while medical 
professionals (91%), local media (88%) and national media (85%) were all ranked 
higher.189   
 
Trust is important in communication to ensure the public are not only receiving but 
are receptive to public health information such as adopting encouraged protective 
behaviours in order to improve overall health outcomes.  An Italian study found 
that individuals with trust in the media and government were more likely to adopt 
recommended protective behaviours, even if they felt the media were overhyping 
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the threat and the government was performing poorly.190  Discouraging 
misinformation campaigns and sources is also important.  As Taha, Matheson and 
Anisman write, ‘disreputable information can be obtained from an array of 
websites’ and individuals will assess a course of action based on the trust they have 
of the source of information.191   
 
While it is not advisable to attempt to scare the public into action, in 
communicating with the public it is necessary to find a balance between providing 
reassurance while not assuaging concerns to the extent that the public’s perception 
of risk is inaccurate.  Following the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, research demonstrated 
that the public appeared to have assumed the danger was overstated and that 
government communication did little to change their perspective.192  A Norwegian 
study found that a measure of fear or concern could motivate individuals to adopt 
protective behaviours.193   Contrasting with this is the need to avoid creating 
unnecessary fear.  While a measure of concern paired with informed risk analysis 
can result in positive behaviour changes, excessive fear -especially if accompanied 
by poor messaging - can have negative effects on behavioural change.  In the latter 
case, individuals are more likely to engage in avoidance behaviours that carry socio-
economic costs and the use of fear as a motivator can damage trust in the 
authorities delivering the message.  Additionally, while using concerns around 
security can be effective in the short term by causing emotional concern, it risks 
causing longer-term psychological issues among the population.194 
 
Communication agencies involved in public health messaging (either directly like 
government or indirectly like the media) should be cautious to avoid ‘disease 
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fatigue’.  Comparatively low adoption of protective behaviour in Hong Kong is 
thought to be linked to repeated high-alert infectious crises, notably SARS (2003) 
and cases of H5N1 (starting in 2004).  Past situations viewed to be false alarms and 
the normalizing of epidemic threats can negatively affect preventive behaviour 
uptake as individuals may view a present threat as either overhyped or simply 
business as usual.195  Indeed, as H1N1 progressed through the year, the view that it 
had been overestimated by the media and government increased as did agreement 
with the sentiment ‘we just have to accept it’.196 
 
A 2013 study examining the response to H1N1 in three European countries (UK, 
Hungary and Italy) found that due to a sense of emergency in managing the 
pandemic, none of the countries used audience research in formulating their 
messaging; nor did respondents view this as problematic since the preventive 
behaviour messaging was relevant to all segments of society.197  Of note, in 
England, public health messaging is encouraged to avoid a ‘one size fits all’ strategy 
in favour of targeted communication.198  This targeted approach is supported by 
the field of behaviour change, which has found that generic messaging advocating 
behaviour change is far less effective than tailored communications, as the latter 
are better able to address the specific needs and motivations of its audience.  An 
added complication in Italy was the politicization of pandemic management by the 
government that, in turn, encouraged media to treat the pandemic as they would 
any other issue and to push back on government advice and recommendations.199   
 
A discussion of effective communication must include mention of the role of the 
media.  In 1918, close ties between the government and media resulted in an 
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agreement to limit coverage of the crisis as well as of the severity.  In contrast, 
during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the World Health Organization provided weekly 
statements, national governments viewed communication as a key tenet of their 
response and media were active in shaping opinion with 2,374 articles in the UK 
alone during the period of March 2009 to February 2010.200 
 
Effective communication with the public during an influenza pandemic is key.  
Through communication the public can be informed, not only of the circumstances 
and severity of the illness but also what steps they can take to protect themselves.   
Ensuring that the message delivered to the public is appropriate and informative 
requires consideration of multiple variables including content, tone, and, medium. 
 
2.7 Limitations of the existing literature 
Public response to a pandemic influenza, as regards to behavioural intentions and 
communication, has been widely researched.  This research has encompassed a 
variety of facets of population and behavioural considerations.  This research has 
not been limited to a high-level general population approach as specific age-based 
sub-population groups have also been studied.  However, where a specific 
population group has been researched, this research is usually quite focused and 
limited to that particular population group.   
 
In examining behavioural intentions during a pandemic, studies have considered a 
wide variety of potential behaviours including non-pharmaceutical interventions 
(NPI) as well pharmaceutical options such as vaccination and anti-virals.  Although 
several studies have considered protective behaviours as a suite, several studies 
have focused on one aspect of behaviour which allows for a more in-depth 
examination of the subject at hand, however does not permit a comparison across 
behaviours to see how intentions to adopt protective behaviours may vary, 
depending on what is being recommended. 
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Finally, although the international nature of the literature provides a richer 
perspective on behavioural intentions and communication needs during a 
pandemic, it does not necessarily have cross-border applicability as linguistic, 
cultural, socio-economic, political, and geographical variables are likely to differ 
from country to country and so results from an international study may not be 
applicable to the United Kingdom.  Whilst the UK and Australia, for example, share 
many similarities, Australia’s geographic location in the Southern Hemisphere 
means that its flu season tends to run opposite that of the UK.   
 
This thesis will further the existing literature in three ways.  Firstly, comparing two 
potentially at-risk population groups will allow for a greater understanding, not only 
of the risk perception, behavioural intentions, and communication needs of those 
groups, but also of how at-risk population groups may differ.   As well, examining a 
variety of protective behaviours, including NPIs and vaccination, will allow for a 
greater comparison of factors which may promote or inhibit behavioural uptake 
and how these differ across recommended behaviours.  Finally, this research will 
present a UK perspective of these potentially at-risk groups. 
 
2.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter examined the existing research literature around at-risk populations 
and pandemic influenza.  The public is broadly supportive of illness prevention 
methods during an influenza pandemic, in particular the adoption of protective, or 
recommended, behaviours.  These behavioural intentions however are influenced 
by a number of factors including perceptions of risk and severity, behavioural 
efficacy, and self-efficacy.  Knowledge of pandemic influenza would appear to vary 
somewhat between different population groups (in this case, older and younger 
adults).  Behavioural intentions also seems to vary between population groups.  
Although hand and respiratory hygiene measures are generally supported, there is 
some evidence that older adults are less inclined to seek medical assistance when ill 
whilst younger adults are less inclined to support social distancing and vaccination 
behaviours.  The literature suggests that, to be effective, communication should 
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inform the public by providing necessary information while being careful not to 
create an information overload or ‘disease fatigue’.   As well, communication 
should provide the public, and at-risk groups, with clear, actionable direction to 
support the adoption of protective behaviours Communication interventions are 
needed to promote the uptake of protective behaviour in at-risk groups.  The 
development of an evidence-based intervention for older adults will be a focus of 
this thesis. 
 
The next chapter will examine current pandemic preparedness planning and 
challenges.
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3 Chapter III-Review of Practice 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
Chapter 1 introduced the context of this thesis while chapter 2 contained a review 
of the literature relating to risk perceptions, behavioural responses, and 
communication vis-à-vis pandemic influenza.  This chapter will examine existing 
pandemic preparedness planning at a national, local and institutional level.  This 
analysis was based on interviews with officials responsible for emergency planning 
and a review of pandemic preparedness planning guidance documents.  Results of 
this review were then analysed in relation to organisational preparedness and 
planning challenges, perceived population characteristics and needs during a 
pandemic, and perceptions of risk and vulnerability in the face of an influenza 
pandemic. 
 
3.2 Introduction and Methods 
This review was conducted in order to better understand existing practice in 
pandemic preparedness; particularly as it relates to issues of at-risk or vulnerable 
populations, and communication.  To conduct the review, two separate, but 
complimentary, data sources were included: interviews with practitioners and grey 
literature.  This allowed for the inclusion of a greater variety of sources as well as a 
more targeted approach to determining specific population challenges in planning 
for a future pandemic.   
 
Interviews with practitioners were conducted with individuals responsible for UK 
national and local emergency planning as well as with individuals responsible for 
managing facilities or services that cater to older adults (ie: adult social services) 
and younger adults (ie: universities).  These two groups were selected as the focus 
of the research as they represent two opposite risk profiles during a pandemic 
where older adults may be less at-risk and younger adults more at-risk as compared 
to seasonal influenza. Although not all younger adults are university students, for 
the purposes of this research, younger adults were operationalized as university 
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students, and so university emergency planners were interviewed to gain an 
understanding of the planning challenges around this population group.  
Recruitment relied heavily on online sources, both to locate potential practitioners 
and to contact them.  The majority of practitioners contacted (as well as those 
interviewed) were located through google searches of London universities, older 
adult residential or activity service providers, and London boroughs.  Whilst contact 
information could usually be found, more often than not it was either a general 
email/number or contact form and, frequently, did not receive a reply. Where more 
specific contact information was available (ie: email for the borough emergency 
planning department rather than council-wide contact form), responses were more 
forthcoming and resulted in a higher number of positive responses.  Certain 
practitioner groups were much more inclined to engage with the research as both 
London borough emergency planners and university practitioners had relatively 
high rates of response.  In contrast, older adult service providers were very difficult 
to reach and those contacted were less willing to participate in the research.   
Although most of the participants were recruited in this manner, a few 
interviewees were accessed via gatekeepers such as previous interviewees or 
practitioners associated with this research.   
 
A total of 13 individuals responsible for emergency planning across 11 London 
universities were interviewed (interviewees coded as PRYA).  The research also 
included interviews with three individuals responsible for adult services, seven 
individuals responsible for London-level emergency planning, and two individuals 
responsible for UK national pandemic preparedness (interviewees coded as PROA) 
(See Appendix A)  Although the London and national-level emergency planners 
have responsibility for more than just older adults in terms of pandemic 
preparedness, these practitioners were able to clarify the way in which vulnerable 
populations are taken into account in overall emergency planning and the 
challenges that can ensue.  As well, practitioners discussed their expectations of 
population needs, communication plans, and engagement with the population 
groups in question (See Appendix B).  These interviews were conducted in person 
and were recorded for transcription.   
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To supplement these interviews, a review of official pandemic planning guidance 
was conducted.  The review included guidance from the UK, London (and boroughs 
where available), the European Union (EU), the World Health Organization (WHO), 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.   Although the focus was on 
UK and London-area planning as they are the most relevant to this research, the 
WHO was included as it is the pre-eminent global health authority.  Whilst the UK, 
at time of writing, is scheduled to leave the EU, geographic proximity and historical 
interrelatedness of governance and services would suggest that EU guidance is 
likely to influence, if not directly affect, UK pandemic planning.  Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the United States provide a relevant point of comparison as these 
countries share a similar socio-economic, linguistic and politico-legal profile to the 
United Kingdom and, in the case of the three former dominions, also share a similar 
health care system (universal health care).201  The UK national pandemic plan was 
included as were London borough planning guidance documents as/where 
available.  This resulted in a total of 27 pandemic planning guidance documents 
reviewed. 
 
The data collected from the practitioner interviews and grey literature review was 
then coded using NVivo.  The coding framework broke down the data across three 
main themes with several sub-themes in each: planning considerations and 
challenges (including institutional responsibilities and assumptions around 
population needs), perceptions of risk and vulnerability, and communicating with 
the public.   This helped to identify a clearer understanding of the current state of 
pandemic planning in order to understand the practical realities as well as to set up 
a comparison with how the public, and in particular at-risk populations, view this 
issue, which is the subject of subsequent chapters. 
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3.3 Pandemic Planning and Preparedness 
This section will examine considerations around pandemic planning and 
preparedness from a governmental, or organizational level.  This will include how 
pandemic planning incorporates different levels of government or jurisdictions, as 
well as the role of stakeholders in planning.  Additionally, the responsibilities and 
population requirements of different organizations can affect pandemic 
preparedness.  Finally, this section will address practical challenges for pandemic 
planning identified by practitioners. 
3.3.1 Pandemic Planning and Preparedness as a Collaborative Endeavour 
Although multiple pandemic plans are prepared at varying levels of government 
and in various institutions, both pandemic planning documents and practitioners 
demonstrate that pandemic preparedness is a collaborative effort. Supranational 
organizations, such as the World Health Organization or European Union, offer 
guidance and, where appropriate, coordination.202  National pandemic planning, in 
turn, can be affected by secondary levels of government.  In the UK, for instance, 
priority groups for vaccination are decided jointly by Ministers of the four 
countries.203  Equally, in Canada, although the provision of health care is a 
provincial or territorial responsibility, the federal government is responsible for 
coordinating in a pandemic.204  National pandemic planning in the UK also feeds 
into local plans.  Public Health England (PHE) was consistently listed as the primary 
source in preparing for or responding to a pandemic.  Local government planning, 
in turn, will not only involve local agencies but also require cooperation from local 
organizations.205 
So I guess it would depend on what was communicated by, say, Public Health, for 
example, so we are a public space and if it was a case that we were told you need 
to make sure that your members are doing this and this to avoid any 
contamination or anything like that, then obviously we would meet that need as it 
was communicated to us. (PROA-01) 
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We wouldn’t do anything in-house unless we were specifically asked to; we would 
look to Public Health England in the first instance in the early stages and the NHS 
once it goes into the treatment phase. (PROA-04) 
 
Stakeholder, or public, engagement is also a key element in pandemic 
preparedness.  The WHO recommends that states gather feedback from the public 
on their willingness or ability to adopt recommended behaviours in order to 
influence communication materials.206  This approach is reinforced by the Canadian 
pandemic plan which argues that risk perception is key to encouraging the adoption 
of protective behaviour and urges government to monitor public perception and 
engage with stakeholders to improve pandemic response.207  In practice, the 
inclusion or, at least, consideration of stakeholders in pandemic planning appears 
to a consistent factor at both a London government and organizational level.  
So in London we have a voluntary sector panel as a sub group of the LRF and they 
have Age UK, they have Red Cross, St. John, all of the obvious ones as well as some 
of the more random London-specific groups that exist just because of London 
ethnicities. (PROA-12) 
 
Keeping their [university student] stakeholders informed, so if it’s something 
sufficiently serious that there’s national activity, I would expect parents to be on 
the phone and so it’s not overlooking the fact that students themselves may well 
be quite relaxed about something, but actually other stakeholders may well not be. 
And within that I would include internal university stakeholders…. …But the ability 
to be able to keep others, who are other internal and external stakeholders, 
involved is quite important. (PRYA-01) 
3.3.2 Institutional Considerations 
Institutional roles and responsibilities affected pandemic preparedness as the 
extent of pandemic planning varied across categories of interviewees.  Government 
bodies demonstrated greater responsibility to prepare for a pandemic whilst some 
service providers, such as activity centres, had a health and safety plan but had not 
necessarily given consideration to specific risks such as pandemic. 
Yeah, we do a combination of both, so in terms of statutory obligations the law is a 
little bit… you can interpret it in different ways but it just says that as a category 
one responder the council has to make emergency plans or has plans in place but it 
doesn’t specifically say what those plans consist of, whether or not it’s just a 
generic plan. So there is a generic plan that we have which outlines the general 
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framework of how the council manages incidents but then we do have these 
specific plans for pandemic flu, flooding and so on. (PROA-06) 
 
We also have a health and safety plan that covers all our members from children to 
the general population to the older population, so if the fire alarm goes off it 
affects everyone, everyone has to evacuate in the same way, everyone goes to the 
same meeting point, so there’s all those type of fire evacuation, fire alarms, 
anything like that. (PROA-01) 
 
Within London, factors such as population density, socio-economics and cultural 
diversity can vary amongst boroughs and affect the planning and preparedness 
requirements. 
I’m not entirely familiar with every demographic of boroughs in London, but we 
certainly do have an older population and we also have very good schools in the 
borough, so we do have a high school population. So in terms of those vulnerable 
groups of people there’s definitely gonna be an emphasis on touching base with 
them. In London boroughs that are more kind of commercial in a sense and have a 
transient population they will have a different need of communication if you like or 
a different avenue to get it out there, get out the message to their population, but 
we’re quite suburban in that sense. (PROA-05) 
 
And I think in terms of transmission, then it’s a lot of things, because [London 
borough] is one of the most densely populated boroughs, right? And there’s the 
austerity in certain group of populace, mainly those with less resources where 
crowding has increased so this is all very good for transmission of infectious agents. 
(PROA-08) 
 
One interviewee also highlighted that the ebb and flow of people in London, 
including tourists, commuters and a transient population, creates a need to 
consider how to diversify official communication to reach these varied populations. 
And then thirdly the status of London in a way, so you’ve got lots of people coming 
in, coming out, it’s a busy place for tourists, for commuters, so how can we work 
with those individuals, so they’re informed? They might not be London residents so 
we can’t post them a letter, but how can we still make sure they get information 
that’s relevant to them? And you don’t necessarily get the same transient 
population in other cities. (PROA-10) 
 
Population characteristics were also seen to affect university pandemic planning 
and preparedness with factors such as international students, halls of residence, 
and average age of students being referenced as influencing characteristics. 
We have a significant number of foreign students on the campus, so these are 
students who have no home location in the United Kingdom, so any emergency 
that closed part of the campus, for instance, major emergency that closed part of 
the campus, whereas UK residents could go home, those students we would have 
to find alternative accommodation… (PRYA-09) 
 64 
I mean we have a slightly different sort of cohort of students here generally, they 
are generally more mature, I think our average age is about 23, 25, so we do 
generally have much more mature students, a lot of them commute in from home, 
quite a number of them have their own families in the sense that they have their 
own children, or they have their own homes, so they have different kind of 
responsibilities. (PRYA-11) 
 
3.3.3 Pandemic Preparedness Challenges 
Interviewees identified several challenges in pandemic preparedness and planning.  
One recurring theme was the challenge around the uncertainty of a pandemic and 
the difficulty this can create in effectively planning.  To develop a plan, assumptions 
must be made but the nature of a pandemic is that its impact cannot be fully known 
until it has arrived.208 
So pandemic planning is brilliant and terrible in equal measure. It’s really hard to 
get people engaged because you have no idea when it’s gonna happen, you have 
no idea how bad it’s gonna be, when it’s gonna start, all of these uncertainties.  
(PROA-12) 
 
Another challenge referenced was the identification of vulnerable individuals, 
specifically needing to identify individuals not currently known to the authorities 
whilst an emergency is unfolding.209 
And the same with flu pandemic, adult social care will know adults, children, the 
children’s services will know the children obviously that are in receipt of a service, 
that general public that’s out there would be through a GP and the GP would then 
know who’s on their books from the local area.  Now, if they’re in receipt of 
benefits, yes, we will know that, but you’ve still got this whole group of people, 
working families, that at some point could have a need or vulnerability and they 
are not on our books. (PROA-03) 
 
I suppose it’s the same with getting information out to any vulnerable people, it’s 
who they’re in touch with. I Chair the Borough Resilience Forum and I sit on the 
Health Protection Forum, so we’re kind of well linked in terms of who does what 
and who knows who, but in any emergency trying to get information about 
vulnerable people is quite difficult, contrary to what people believe. I know they 
have some lists but they’re always a little bit reluctant to release them. (PROA-07) 
 
An influenza pandemic could, potentially, result in a reduction of services either 
due to health and safety considerations or to a lack of staff resources. 
So within that business continuity plan is a structure in terms of if they’ve not got 
enough staff resources, for example, for something like flu, we would then stop 
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non-critical services, which we don’t have many left anymore, we used to have day 
centres, they’ve all closed. (PROA-03) 
 
So we have closed early before so it’s not out of the realms of possibility that if 
there was some type of pandemic or something like that and there was a health 
risk or an outbreak, that we would consider closing early or changing hours for a 
while or something like that. (PROA-01) 
 
The potential loss of staff due to morbidity or mortality would not only affect 
business continuity and regular service provision but also potentially limit the 
ability of an organization to respond to the pandemic.   
We might have eight Comms Officers normally but in the middle of a pandemic we 
might have half of them off with it or looking after ill relatives, so I suppose there 
has to be a little bit of realism about the degree to which we can finesse the 
messages to different groups but I’m pretty sure that the people would want that 
to be the case. (PROA-06) (in context of capacity to communicate during an 
influenza pandemic) 
 
Loss of key personnel will always be problematic and making sure that we have a 
system in place for somebody to take decisions. … …If push comes to shove, we 
shut it down but, of course, your next step is who’s ensuring it’s shut down, who’s 
managing that. (PRYA-05) 
 
Although measures are in place for local resource sharing and assistance in an 
emergency, emergency planners felt that, the broad nature of a pandemic would 
mean that all boroughs would likely be affected and resource sharing would be 
unlikely to occur. 
I have to say, it won’t because a flu pandemic, it’s not geographically confined, so 
[London borough] can’t just call on [alternative London borough]’s staff because 
they’d have a plethora ‘cause [London borough]’s all down with the flu. No 
unfortunately I think in a pandemic I think it would be very unlikely. (PROA-09) 
 
No, I think we… we’re a London borough, we’re part of the London arrangements. I 
suppose the challenge for boroughs such as [London borough] within London is 
that we’re small, we’re on the outskirts and we mustn’t forget that our populations 
blend into [adjacent county]… …And even London, as an outer London borough, 
you know resourcing often with London problems can be focussed on if something 
is within inner London because of the challenges there, then resources can be 
directed there. (PROA-04) 
 
3.4 Defining Risk and Vulnerability 
This section will consider the lexicon of ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerability’ in pandemic 
planning.   These terms are used throughout official guidance on pandemic planning 
however, whilst similar, use, or definition of these terms is not consistent either 
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internationally or nationally.    In the pandemic planning guidance documents 
reviewed, it is clear that risk has a much broader usage.  The use of the term isn’t 
restricted to the concept of an individual or group being at-risk of pandemic 
influenza related morbidity and mortality but is also used with regards to systemic 
or business continuity challenges including risk management210, risk assessment211 
and risk communication212.  When referenced in relation to populations or 
individuals however, risk, or at-risk, tends to be used to specify increased threat of 
morbidity or mortality in relation to pandemic influenza.213  Where specific at-risk 
population groups are listed, they tend to conform to seasonal flu guidelines for 
risk.214  At both a national and local level pandemic plans tend to identify older 
adults, young children, pregnant women, and individuals with pre-existing or 
chronic medical conditions as at-risk groups.215   Although at-risk groups listed tend 
to be consistent, there is often recognition of the potential for variance in at-risk 
groups, particularly with regards to age ranges.  This can be seen, for example, in 
both the London Resilience planning document and the UK pandemic preparedness 
strategy which recognize pre-existing medical conditions, pregnancy and childhood 
as risk factors but also identify otherwise healthy young adults as being potentially 
at risk depending on the pandemic.216  Similarly, Haringey’s planning document 
acknowledges there may be ‘age-specific differences in the clinical attack rate’ 
however as this is not possible to predict, the planning will assume a uniformity in 
attack rate for all ages.217  Of the planning documents reviewed, this recognition of 
age-related variability in risk is most strongly communicated in the guidance for 
Tower Hamlets’ which states that, unlike seasonal influenza, pandemic strains are 
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more likely to attack healthy young adults and may create the highest risk in non-
traditionally affected groups.   
 
The identification of vulnerable populations in the UK would appear to be 
influenced by Cabinet Office guidance for ‘Identifying People Who Are Vulnerable in 
a Crisis’ which defines vulnerable individuals as those who ‘are less able to help 
themselves in the circumstances of an emergency’218.  The guidance also identifies 
thirteen categories of potentially vulnerable people.  The list includes many of the 
expected groups such as older adults, mobility impaired individuals and pregnant 
women but also includes tourists, travellers and minority language speakers219.   
The Lambeth and Southwark Pandemic Flu Coordination Plan refers to the Cabinet 
Office guidance and repeats the definition of vulnerability listed above.220  
Additionally, for planning purposes such as vaccine priority, Lambeth and 
Southwark distinguish between vulnerability and clinically at-risk.221 
 
This distinction was supported by several practitioners who expressed vulnerability 
as an issue of capability rather than susceptibility. 
That’s a very good question. I’d kind of classify it [Vulnerability] as it’s dependency, 
so it’s whether they are independent or whether they need support getting 
through their normal daily life if you like. (PROA-05) 
 
That’s a good one [are risk and vulnerability the same?], I think it’s more about 
capability to deal with rather than just being exposed to a danger. If we had young, 
fit people that are at risk we wouldn’t necessarily consider them vulnerable, 
because they’re more capable of looking after themselves, they’re more likely to 
have family and friend networks that could provide the support to them but I think 
that’s probably where we would make the distinction. (PROA-06) 
 
The concept of vulnerability is not always limited to specific groups and can be used 
to refer to the national or state level such as in the ‘Australian Health Management 
Plan for Pandemic Influenza’ which refers to the vulnerability of ‘our’ population222, 
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or in the EU-EEA guidance, which states that, despite an impressive array of 
countermeasures, Europe ‘has never been more vulnerable to a pandemic’; a 
judgement based on specific factors (growing populations of older adults and 
individuals with chronic disease) but applied to the whole.223  Harrow uses a similar 
though not identical list and is more detailed in its classification of vulnerable, for 
instance, excluded older people or disadvantaged people who move frequently.224   
	
The situational nature of vulnerability creates the potential for greater disparity in 
national experiences of, and associated planning for a pandemic as national 
circumstances will not be homogeneous across countries.  Variances in geography, 
infrastructure, and socio-economics, for example, will affect a country’s experience 
of, and ability to deal with a pandemic.  The Australian guidance recognizes that 
‘vulnerability is unique’ and argues that the pandemic experience overseas can only 
be indicative as the conditions observed abroad may not be relevant in Australia.225   
An example of the uniqueness of vulnerability can also be seen in the Canadian 
pandemic guidance, which includes specific reference to ‘remote and isolated 
communities’.  With a population density of 4 people per sq km of land, geography 
presents a challenge to Canadian planners and creates vulnerability that is less 
likely to be seen in the UK (population density 269 people per sq km).226 
New Zealand’s pandemic planning guidance introduces an additional term or 
concept into the lexicon.  Susceptibility is used primarily as a synonym for risk, or 
more accurately, at-risk.  Whilst risk is used in the New Zealand planning guidance 
primarily to denote structural or systemic risks and, to a lesser extent populations 
under threat, susceptibility is used exclusively to indicate personal or population 
risk and denotes inherent characteristics that increase predisposition to higher 
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morbidity or mortality.  This distinction can be clearly seen in the section on 
vulnerable and susceptible people which states that:  
‘Māori and Pacific people, pregnant women and morbidly obese people were more 
susceptible, and therefore harder hit, than other groups in the first wave of the 
influenza A (H1N1) 2009 pandemic. People living in institutions such as rest homes 
or barracks, and schoolchildren, are at higher risk of infection than other groups 
because they are living or working closely to each other.’227 
Although risk and vulnerability tend to be defined separately, they are often used 
jointly.  The ‘Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza’ classes 
vulnerable populations amongst at-risk groups.228  The inclusion of vulnerable 
populations within risk is also seen in the Canadian guidance, which refers to 
vulnerable populations as part of high-risk groups.229   In the UK guidance however, 
this relationship between risk and vulnerability is reversed as at-risk groups are 
considered to be more vulnerable. 230 
 
Whilst concepts of risk and vulnerability do tend to be separated in pandemic 
planning guidance, they are not always clearly delineated.  Although the Australian 
pandemic plan separates risk and vulnerability, it also points out that, because a 
pandemic will be caused by a novel virus, it is possible that some population 
groups, such as older adults, may have immunity while the general population is 
vulnerable.231  In this instance vulnerability is used to denote susceptibility to the 
virus.  Tower Hamlets pandemic planning document also initially distinguishes 
between risk and vulnerability as, while risk is discussed in the context of morbidity 
and mortality, vulnerability is referenced in the context that vulnerable populations 
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‘may be less able to help themselves’232 but then later refers to the borough having 
a more vulnerable population if the pandemic targets younger individuals.233 
 
The lack of consistent definition and use of risk and vulnerability in pandemic 
planning was also considered by emergency planners.  When asked how they would 
define risk and vulnerability, practitioner responses were generally consistent, 
expressing the view that they felt these were two different concepts which broke 
down along the lines of hazard and impact. 
Yeah. I think the risk is the risk that you are exposed to an infectious agent. The 
vulnerability, for me, is more the consequences of the exposure and how people 
are much more likely to be affected than others, so I think they are two different 
dimensions I think, two different aspects, no? (PROA-08) 
 
OK, so the way that we do it in practice is that we have… there’s a kind of overlap 
but we kind of look at risk first in the sense of, OK, let’s understand hazard, so what 
are the things that might occur? … … Impact you’re starting to get into vulnerability 
because how much impact depends on the population that’s affected and impact is 
differential based on vulnerability. (PROA-11) 
 
Having a clear and consistent definition of ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerable’ across pandemic 
planning was considered to be useful though some concerns were raised over the 
feasibility of such definitions. 
It would be helpful to define ‘at-risk’ vs ‘vulnerable’ because I think it’s a confusing 
line to draw, so you wouldn’t put… If a 40-year-old, for example, has mental health 
problems, then the vulnerability is quite high but the risk of a flu pandemic you 
would categorize as quite low, even though it’s not, because you’re concentrating 
your resources on those older generations. And I think we miss a trick there 
because even children with vulnerabilities are at risk of flu and then they would 
pass onto the parents who are then… So I think it would be useful to try and define 
it a bit clearer in terms of flu pandemic. (PROA-03) 
 
But from a communication’s perspective I think it would be incredibly helpful if we 
could set it out but the challenge then reflects back to that second point about how 
it’s incredibly difficult to work out who is at risk and who is vulnerable. One of the 
challenges we’ve seen is that people’s vulnerability changes; in a pan flu 
perspective you could have someone who is living at home and has a carer for 
them, they’re not vulnerable, they’ve got that carer but should that carer become 
sick then instantly that person is then vulnerable. But they may be totally unknown 
to the wider society because they don’t need to be known because they’ve got a 
carer who looks after them all the time, so that person is at risk but they're not 
vulnerable, they're at risk if their carer gets sick but they’re currently fine. And 
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that’s a big challenge and we have no register of those people, we have no need to 
have a register of those people. (PROA-12) 
 
3.5 Communication 
Communication plays a crucial role in shaping public response234 and ensuring 
tailored communication to vulnerable populations is a repeating theme across 
pandemic planning and preparedness guidance.235 Effective communication can 
‘influence attitudes, minimise misconceptions, encourage positive behaviours’236 
and it provides the means to raise awareness and to empower the public to act in 
ways that will promote health.237  Although this research draws on pandemic 
planning guidance documents, this section will focus on information needs within a 
London context. 
3.5.1 Communication Content 
The role of communications is broadly defined as providing advice to the public to 
enable them to protect themselves and others by adopting protective 
behaviours238.  As such, advice on content across pandemic planning and guidance 
emphasises the provision of basic medical information and practical advice such as 
the ‘Catch it, bin it, kill it’ message around respiratory hygiene as a primary focus.239  
This was echoed by several interviewees. 
Well, we did a whole lot about prevention and infection control and hand hygiene 
etc. etc. all of that stuff so actually that was a really, really big part of it. (PROA-11) 
 
So there will be whole levels of messaging, not just, ‘Actually this is for your…’ the 
health related messaging about here’s what you do and here’s what treatment you 
might want to consider getting, here’s when you stay at home, but they’ll be wider 
messaging that we need to do as government to say, this is what a pandemic is, 
this is what as central government we’re doing about it and working out what 
those points are to tell people that this is ramping up now and you need to be a 
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little bit more concerned, without creating full out panic and people stockpiling 
food as though it’s the end of the world! (PROA-13) 
 
Additionally, emergency planners indicated that communications with the public 
would need to be as clear and concise as possible in order to ensure efficacy. 
In terms of content the engagement with the public, it’s a simple rule that it needs 
to be as simplistic as possible, it needs to be factual, it needs to be accurate and it 
needs to be concise, and essentially on those principles whatever we put out will 
follow that.  (PROA-05) 
 
It’s not always possible and I think that’s one of the challenges, is people want a 
really simple message and organisations want to provide a really simple message 
but actually a lot of the messages that we’re trying to get out are really complex. 
And I think there’s a real balance to be struck about things being easy to 
understand and comprehend, and giving people all the information. And I think 
that’s something that we struggle with. (PROA-10) 
 
A few emergency planners also highlighted the importance of ensuring message 
consistency between sources and mediums. 
It will be important to ensure that messages to the public are consistent across all 
agencies, reach all sections of the local community and are effective.240  
 
…we would try and align ourselves with people that were in a similar business to 
us, their shared experience, knowledge, and consistency because actually our 
student population in London, they’ll have friends in King’s, they’ll have friends in 
UCL, so yeah … if we’re all speaking and sending out the same messages, hopefully 
they’ll believe it! (PRYA-13) 
 
As would be expected, both national and local practitioners responsible for 
pandemic flu planning were aware that PHE would be the lead agency if there was 
an outbreak.   
The usual response is that the health and safety advisor would get advice from 
those people in the know, Public Health England and the like, publicise that on the 
internal website to the staff and also on our external website should we need to 
communicate with students. (PRYA-05) 
 
… it’s just that if we’re generating it then quite often we will give people the bare 
bones of an incident and the advice that we’ve received from whoever is the lead 
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However, a few university emergency planners indicated their reference would be 
the Health Protection Agency, despite this having been closed in 2013 when PHE 
was established.241 
We would be looking for direction from the Health Protection Agency as to what 
precautions we should be taking. (PRYA-09) 
 
So we would take, in terms of the pandemic and that, we would take the lead from 
either NHS England or the Health Protection Agency, or Health Protection England 
as they are now. (PRYA-02) 
 
Although emergency planners were consistent in their view of PHE as having the 
lead in a pandemic and of being a primary source of information, a few individuals 
did highlight the potential difficulty arising out of a disparity between national level 
communications and regional experience.  
Because we have the understanding of our populations, national goes through 
regional, London is seen as something quite different, again because of the 
complexities of the travel networks, the populations and the diversity and the 
transient nature of everything. So I would take the London side of things rather 
than any national stuff… (PROA-09) 
 
I actually worked in the West Midlands in 2009 and that was where a lot of the 
cases were. They were particularly in schools and so there was a real 
communications challenge to those pupils and their families. They’re hearing the 
national message is … it’s relatively low levels of flu, and yet they’re seeing in their 
school that their child goes to, 50/60% of the class was off ill. And trying to manage 
that, the mixed messages because of the audience, you’re talking to a very discreet 
audience in the school but then a much wider audience that PHE are nationally 
talking to, and I think trying to get people to understand that was a challenge. 
(PROA-10) 
 
3.5.2 Communication Methods 
Communication, to be effective, must not only consider content, it must also be 
successfully disseminated to the public.  This, in turn, requires consideration of the 
methods, media, or forums used to communicate with the public.  The UK Influenza 
Pandemic Preparedness Strategy references the need to use a variety of media in 
order to reach the public.242  The need for this multi-media, or multi-forum, 
approach was also referenced by university planners despite having a relatively 
homogeneous (as compared to the general population) and accessible population. 
                                                        
241 Health Protection Agency, “Health Protection Agency Has Closed.” 
242 Department of Health, “UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy 2011.”, 47 
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If anything in halls, I think being able to give them a leaflet, that’s something 
tangible, I think we would need to do mass communication and in more than one 
format because otherwise you’re gonna miss people. So there could be 
announcements in lectures, at the beginning of a lecture, so that they’re face to, 
and where they could ask questions. And we could put information up on the 
revolving boards, we could give information by email…. (PRYA-10) 
 
We have various methods of communication, so the online portal for students, we 
also use social media, Twitter, Facebook, email, the university is formed of four 
colleges, so all the resident students belong to a college and then there is a head of 
college and a pastoral team for that college. So they maintain a close information 
relationship with the students of their college, so information would flow out in 
that way. There’s also our central comms team who can put information onto the 
bulletin board, so there would be physical posters going up. (PRYA-09) 
 
The use of multiple formats or methods to reach the public is also key to ensuring 
communication is disseminated across different population groups; with a 
particular focus on ensuring communication with vulnerable populations.243  
Generational differences in communication preferences were often referenced as 
an example where different communication methods would be required. 
And that’s one of the things with pandemic, it’s not like a lot of the emergencies 
we deal with where you’re fighting against time, it doesn’t just creep over the 
horizon, you start to detect it some time off… I think it’s over a 15-week cycle 
anyway which is a long, long time, albeit very challenging. I think you get plenty of 
time to think it through, who you need to tell, how you need to tell them, your 
different communication methods; so for young people you’d be using social media 
and stuff like that, for elderly people you’d be using the clubs, the different forums 
they engage with, of which there’s lots. (PROA-07) 
 
So primarily through our business improvement districts, we’ve got three of them 
in [London borough], so we’d reach out to all of them and we try and filter that 
information through multiple avenues if you like, bearing in mind that different 
populations and different age groups will respond or receive information from 
different communication methods. So social media primarily for schools and things 
like that and probably with our vulnerable residents and our older generation it’d 
be flyers, posters, actual visits from frontline professionals, things like that would 
be our main conduit of getting information to them. (PROA-05) 
 
Amongst national and local practitioners there was a lack of consensus regarding 
general levels of trust in authorities, although many leaned more toward a lack of 
trust. 
I have to say I think in the current, and this is my personal opinion, I think in the 
current climate with the government that we’ve got, there is so much unrest and 
disbelief. (PROA-09) 
                                                        
243 Beveridge and Sellwood, “Pandemic Influenza Framework.”, 23 
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A trusted source? Sometimes yes, sometimes no, it’s really difficult…. … I think the 
government message itself is a really hard one because sometimes they’re trusted 
and sometimes they’re not and that can change on the flip of a coin, it can change 
during an outbreak. (PROA-12) 
 
A few practitioners also highlighted that trust in authorities may vary depending on 
the source with some agencies or individuals having higher levels of trust than 
others. 
Yeah, yeah I do. I think all the statutory agencies are trusted in this borough. The 
council and the police tend to suffer a little bit at the hands of local press, certainly 
from when I was a fire commander here, they kind of love the fire brigade, we 
didn’t seem to be able to do much wrong to be fair.  (PROA-07) 
 
So what can we do at a local level, who is the trusted spokesperson at a local level? 
It might not be your town mayor, they might not have any medical history or they 
might not have a good reputation, so at that local level who can we find to get 
those messages out and I think it really is that tier-ing of it, who can we have? 
(PROA-13) 
 
 When dealing specifically with the context of pandemic, however, there was a 
general agreement that on this type of issue, the public would consider the 
authorities to be a trusted source of information.  
They don’t necessarily believe everything that we say to them, well, not everybody 
believes everything we say to them. The council is a body which is led by… there 
are elections and different political points of view come into play and so forth, but I 
don’t think that a pandemic is seen as a political issue. (PROA-11) 
 
Yeah, I think in something like this they probably are. If you’re trying to explain 
something else, sometimes there is a slight element of it’s the institution telling us 
it’s this, we need to question it, but I think where you are telling them something 
around health and safety, around being responsible, I think it’s less questionable. 
(PRYA-03) 
 
3.5.3 Older Adult Population Information Needs  
Several emergency planners identified population specific considerations that 
would need to be taken account in communication planning.  Three main sub-
themes emerged around accessibility, comprehension, accessibility and, acceptance 
of communication.   
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The diversity of age as well as general capability and engagement with technology 
within the older adult population was highlighted as a potential communication 
challenge. 
I think with the older adults these days a lot of stuff is on social media, a lot of 
information is on webs and internet, whether it’s Yahoo, Google or whatever 
search engine and a lot of people don’t have access to that. A lot of them are quite 
good with technology but there are groups that aren’t really that good because 
they come from a generation, ‘Oh no!’ If you say to them, ‘There’s your mouse, 
there’s your cursor there,’ they look at you and think it’s a mouse, a real mouse 
that runs around with whiskers and ears and stuff, they don’t get it.  (PROA-01) 
 
It is, because you do get people going to work still and then you get the other 
extreme where it’s not happening and they’re not looking at the wifi and they’re 
not looking at phones and they don’t want a phone and cash, there’s people on 
Direct Debits and there’s some cash. (PROA-02) 
 
A further challenge in ensuring communication reached older adults was identified 
in regards to targeting lonely or socially isolated older adults. 
No, it’s very weird and I think there are a lot of very, very lonely people who are 
over sixty in London. I always think there’s an invisible group out there. (PROA-01) 
 
It’s a hard question to answer because the thing is it’s just a reality that different 
audiences you have to think a bit about how we’re gonna reach them. I guess 
probably the biggest problem or biggest problem group are those that are very 
socially isolated, so we do know that there are older adults who their friends kind 
of die-off and they end up very alone and isolated. (PROA-11) 
 
In addressing the perceived information needs of older adults, several practitioners 
identified comprehension as a potential barrier, with some older adults requiring 
additional assistance in interpreting or understanding communication material. 
Large letter format in … some people are English but some people speak … a lot of 
Turkish, but bigger, large letters, maybe a few colourful pictures that they can get 
them to see and understand. (PROA-02) 
 
I don’t think they need more messaging ‘cause I think the messaging that comes 
out from Public Health is sufficient because they do a separate one for vulnerable 
residents but it’s making sure that is understood by all the key partners and making 
sure social workers, and even our private providers, and making sure they’re 
having those conversations with the clients, and making sure the message is clear 
to them. (PROA-03) 
 
Older adult responses to a pandemic, and, more specifically, to pandemic 
communication, were assumed to be broadly accepting through perhaps with some 
trepidation or reluctance. 
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I think it depends on how it’s relayed to them as well, if you give them that 
information and let them make the decision as to what they want to do, that’s fine. 
As I said, I don’t know all 803 members [of the older adult activity program] but the 
ones that I do know certainly seem to be quite headstrong!  You know, ‘We will not 
be moved,’ it’s that old British bulldog kind of… ‘No one’s going to tell us what to 
do or where to go,’ kind of thing! And then there are others who are a bit more… 
but generally I think they would take the advice on board. (PROA-01) 
 
We’d like to think that they’re gonna be informative and they’ll take them on face 
value and they won’t panic. However, you have to kind of expect that there’s 
gonna be a lot of apprehension and fear as well, so we’d be in that conversation 
with the police about community tensions and things like that.  (PROA-05) 
 
3.5.4 Younger Adult Population Information Needs  
In addressing the information needs of younger adults, practitioners expressed that 
clear information explaining the state of the pandemic as well as general medical 
information, such as symptoms and how to prevent becoming ill would be 
paramount. 
I think they need to be advised about where they could get a vaccination and how 
soon and the proximity, ‘cause they won’t go anywhere, they would need it fairly 
close by. And I think they need very simple information about the difference, how 
they could tell the difference between it being a cold and flu, and what to do if they 
think it’s a cold and what to do if they think it’s the flu. (PRYA-10) 
 
I think they’re no different to most of the public and they want certainties and it’s 
very difficult to give them those messages, but I think the most important is 
consistent information and facts about how we know that these types of diseases 
are spread. (PRYA-13) 
 
Several practitioners also expressed the view that younger adults inclination to take 
the pandemic seriously would vary depending on whether they perceived a 
personal risk. 
…I think they’d probably want clear information on what the risks are and how it is 
transmitted so they know what they can and what they should or shouldn’t do to 
prevent them getting it because there is that certain kind of personal, ‘I don’t want 
to get sick, I don’t really want other people to get sick but I certainly don’t want to 
get sick,’ so that’s probably what a lot of people focus on is how to make sure you 
don’t get whatever the pandemic is. (PRYA-03) 
 
I think there would be a lot of concern, particularly if cases were evident here on 
the campus, it’s like a lot of… take fire, you bang on about fire safety and until 
there’s actually a fire they don’t think gonna happen to them. So I think in the 
media that would raise concern, that would raise awareness. If we’re also 
communicating hopefully that will also put it into the context we’re seeking to put 
it into, so I think the concern would go up dramatically when people became aware 
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that there were cases on the campus because that’s when they begin to think, ‘I 
might catch this,’ with an influenza pandemic. (PRYA-09) 
 
Perceived student responses to a pandemic, and specifically pandemic 
communication, were assumed to be somewhat varied. 
Well, there would be those that would read absolutely every word and would be 
really well informed and grateful that they’d been kept informed. There would be 
others that would be absolutely hacked off that someone’s wasting their time 
giving them this information because it’s not necessary, and there are those that 
actually won’t read it now but will keep it ‘til later and will refer back to it if 
necessary, so there’s more than one way that they will respond. (PRYA-10) 
 
I think with anything you’ll have extremes, you’ll have a few students who will be 
demanding that we do more quicker and better and louder… …And there will be 
others that will just ignore it and not be interested and not follow any kind of 
direction whatsoever and the vast majority will be somewhere in the middle where 
they’ll be, ‘Oh, I’ve heard about that, [University is] doing something, OK, I’ll come 
along and get my injection,’ or, ‘OK, I’ll wait for the updates.’ I think the majority 
would be reasonable! (PRYA-06) 
 
The prevalence of international students in universities in London was also 
considered to influence student responses to an influenza pandemic through the 
introduction of additional linguistic and cultural considerations. 
We have a lot of overseas students like a lot of universities in general but 
universities in London in particular and that means that there are additional things 
that you have to factor in. In the UK it can go from language to different cultural 
expectations to whatever else it might be, so having overseas students adds a 
different dimension. (PRYA-03) 
 
I think that they do need consideration because their expectations are different, so 
depending on which country they come from, they have very different 
expectations on what they should receive from the health service, for example, and 
we have international students, some, who will call an ambulance, because they 
sneezed, and others who are at death’s door and don’t want to bother anybody. 
And much of that is to do with the culture from where they come from and what 
their expectation that they bring with them is, so I think there is a different piece of 
work about that. (PRYA-12) 
 
Additionally, one practitioner highlighted that, as students are often quite politically 
active, there was the possibility that they might be less receptive to information 
due to an existing anti-establishment opinion. 
From our perspective, it is the fact that we have a very diverse population. … ... But 
also, there's also a similar type of issue around the academic cohort as well. They 
also have very strong opinions, and some of them are quite happy to argue against 
the World Health Organisation, PHE, whatever. (PRYA-02) 
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3.5.5 Communication Challenges 
Whilst effective communication with the public is acknowledged as a key element 
of national and local pandemic planning, several challenges have been identified in 
planning documents and by practitioners as potential barriers to good practice. 
 
The unpredictable nature of a pandemic, both in terms of timing and virus 
characteristics (severity, virulence, etc) creates a potential challenge in ensuring 
that timely, accurate information is provided to the public.  Due to the limitations 
of scientific or medical knowledge at the outset of a pandemic, it may prove 
difficult for emergency planners to ensure the public is receiving clear information 
that meets their needs.  Furthermore, government must communicate the 
uncertainty around the pandemic and the potential for future changes or variances 
in information content in a fashion that does not jeopardise public confidence in 
future messaging.244 
 
Although many pandemic planning guidance documents reference the need to 
ensure communication is relevant for identified (whether at-risk or vulnerable) 
populations, the practical aspect of this type of communication was identified as a 
potential challenge by a few emergency planners. 
I think we are pretty bad, as organisations, at communicating with the public, we 
tend to put one size fits all blanket communications, although we do try to make 
use of the networks that we’ve got access to. So particularly when we’re talking 
about vulnerable adults, we would make use of the care providers that we have 
close relationships with, with the care homes, schools, things like that, but in terms 
of targeting particular groups we’re just not at that level of complexity. (PROA-06) 
 
I think on the surface of it, when we’re planning for these sorts of things, I think it’s 
easier to just do a one-hit communication and then you’re confident that 
everyone’s got the same message at the same time… …But I think our recent 
experience over recent months is that actually different groups require different 
things, they require it in different ways and they also have differing levels of 
background knowledge. … … So I think what’s become really apparent to me, 
certainly over the last couple of months, is that we need to be much more nuanced 
in how we communicate with people, both in terms of how we do that but also 
what we communicate. (PROA-10) 
                                                        
244 UK Department of Health Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Team, “UK Influenza Pandemic 
Preparedness Strategy.”, 45 and Australian Department of Health, “Australian Health Management 
Plan for Pandemic Influenza.”, 57 
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Challenges around effective communication during a pandemic are not limited to 
message content as ensuring message saturation brings about its own challenges 
relating to medium and accessibility.  The linguistic and cultural diversity of the 
population in a city such as London can create communication barriers. 
So I think that’s a challenge. Languages is a challenge. There are a lot of people that 
English isn’t their first language so you’re trying to think about how you can 
communicate with those groups that might not be receptive to the general 
message, either because they don’t receive it, because some people are very 
isolated within that community, or that they don’t understand it even if they do 
see it. I think that’s a challenge. (PROA-10) 
 
I think we would definitely have a problem with communicating with certain 
groups, both boroughs, particularly [two London boroughs], there’s some areas 
there’s quite low levels of English being the first language. I’m not sure the degree 
to which that’s changed since 2011, the willingness of people to listen to public 
health messages I think are not always that high in migrant communities, 
particularly transient ones that aren’t there for very long, so there that would be a 
massive, massive challenge. (PROA-06) 
 
Additionally, ensuring that communications are received by hard-to-reach 
populations (or individuals) was highlighted by both London emergency planners 
and university administrators as a potential challenge. 
There will always be difficulty in reaching every single student because there are 
some who don’t read their emails every day, they perhaps haven’t uploaded the 
app, they don’t come onto campus every day… (PRYA-10) 
 
I think it is gonna be quite a challenge, particularly people who are housebound, so 
even if you distribute flyers and posters and put it on social media they’re not 
necessarily gonna see it. So it’s ensuring that you get that communication across to 
those individual residents, which is a challenge at the beginning when you’ve got 
quite a lot of resources, but when you get further into the pan flu arguably they 
become more at risk because there’s more contagion, if you like, or whatever and 
we have less resources because our staff are going off sick. So	there	could	be	a	
kind	of issue there in terms of being able to support the most vulnerable group of 
individuals. (PROA-05) 
 
Furthermore, emergency planners may be unaware of the best ways to reach 
potentially vulnerable populations such as older adults is a challenge for them. 
Well, you kind of look at, OK, what’s the group and what’s the best way to reach 
them? There’s no point in Tweeting to the over 60s, they’re not gonna get that, so 
it’s just common sense really. (PROA-11) 
 
I think we could probably do with knowing how they [older adults] want to be 
communicated with because I don’t think we know that, we make assumptions but 
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I don’t know that anyone has actually asked them how they want to be 
communicated with.  (PROA-12) 
 
Technology-based media provides a useful and resource-effective way of delivering 
a message to the public but, over-reliance on technology risks excluding specific, 
and likely vulnerable, populations from the communications. 
So obviously electronic we can very quickly amend it, the hard copy things, 
obviously it is gonna be more resource intensive and we have to keep on top of the 
most up to date information on what’s being put out. I guess from a reputational 
point of view we would need to be seen to be making sure that we make them 
resources available to support the public, and we would, so even though that might 
be a strain on our own systems we would support that kind of communication 
function. (PROA-05) 
 
I think there was an estimate that there were 10% of London’s population, when 
they had the welfare benefit reform, who didn’t have access to internet. … … So 
bear in mind that [London borough’s] population is 330,000 roughly, so 10% of that 
is 33,000 people that we’re not getting in touch with by internet. (PROA-08) 
 
The challenge around communication in relation to technological media and access 
was also expressed by university administrators, though from the opposite end of 
the spectrum.  University administrators were in agreement that technological 
media, and, in particular social media, represent an ideal way to communicate with 
students. The ever-evolving nature of social media, however, creates a challenge 
for the university in ensuring it is using the most appropriate platforms to reach 
students. 
I guess part of my challenge, or people who work in student services in universities, 
their challenges will be around maintaining a stake in how students communicate 
with each other and with the organisation in order to get messages out quickly. So 
that’s part of the challenge, keeping up with the interests of the age group. (PRYA-
01) 
 
It’s trying to keep up with what is their latest thing because we started Facebook 
because it was good but then a student told me it’s only middle aged people like 
me that use it so then we’re like, ‘Oh we need to go to Twitter,’ but now it’s like my 
nephew’s telling me it’s Instagram, so it’s keeping up with what is the channel that 
people are accessing? (PRYA-08) 
 
A final challenge identified by some university administrators in reaching students 
was around the accuracy or accessibility of contact information, in particular phone 
numbers.  Although not identified by emergency planners or in planning 
documents, this example may also be a challenge for communication more broadly 
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given the use of texting or mass email platforms in other areas, such as air pollution 
warnings in London.245   
We found, in a different context recently, that a lot of our students’ mobile 
numbers that we have on the student record system aren’t accurate. (PRYA-06) 
 
So, I think there has been more of a focus on making sure we try and keep 
telephone, mobile numbers up to date, that’s enormously difficult, trying to get 
people to update their records, ‘cause the uni takes the details from people when 
they enrol and then although we do re-enrol every year, which is may be a little bit 
different to more traditional universities, ‘cause students can more easily pause 
their studies, so we might have slightly more up to date records, but I suspect if 
talked to someone in Student Journey they’d say … I wouldn’t bank on it, I suspect 
they’ll say probably half the numbers we have are historic or something, we don’t 
know how well they work. (PRYA-11) 
 
3.6 Discussion 
Pandemic planning and preparedness is effected at a variety of levels, both in 
government and organizationally or institutionally; such as universities.  Successful 
planning requires cooperation and collaboration between levels to ensure that 
planning and communication at local and national levels is aligned.  Population and 
demographic characteristics such as age, socio-economics, cultural diversity and 
population density will influence the needs of the population and must be 
accounted for in pandemic planning.  Business continuity challenges such as a 
reduction in staff, service provision and a lack of additional resources may affect 
the ability of government and organizations to function during a pandemic. 
 
Although ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerability’ in pandemic planning tend to be considered as 
separate entities, the distinction between these terms is not always clear, nor is it 
consistent across jurisdictions.  A recurring theme, however, is the use of risk, or at-
risk, to denote those individuals or populations who may be more medically 
susceptible to pandemic influenza and the use of vulnerable to indicate those 
individuals or population groups who may suffer from adverse social effects.  The 
two categories may overlap, as in the example of the Pacific Islanders in New 
Zealand who have historically had greater susceptibility to pandemic influenza but 
                                                        
245 AirTEXT, “Air Quality, UV, Pollen and Temperature Forecasts for Greater London and the South 
East.” 
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also have socioeconomic factors and cultural preferences which may render them 
vulnerable as well.246  Providing a clear division between these terms may prove 
beneficial for emergency planners both in a structural sense (clear division between 
medical risk and social vulnerability) and in terms of communicating with the public 
(ie: differentiating between risk and vulnerable in the context of vaccination priority 
lists). 
 
A World Bank report on poverty defines the two terms by clarifying a distinction 
between ‘risk-related ‘vulnerability’ to poverty’ and ‘vulnerable’ groups whose 
chronic poverty requires specific attention.247   From a pandemic planning 
perspective, this could be re-defined, or interpreted as distinguishing between risk 
as medical susceptibility to pandemic influenza (ie: individuals or groups who may 
be more prone to higher morbidity and mortality) and ‘vulnerable’ groups whose 
circumstances require specific attention (ie: individuals or groups who may be 
reliant on external carers or linguistic minorities).  For the purposes of this research, 
where not otherwise specified, the above definition will be used to clarify ‘risk’ vs 
‘vulnerability’. 
 
Communication with the public during a pandemic is key to encouraging the uptake 
of protective behaviours.  Planning guidance documents and practitioners support 
the use of clear, concise messaging which provides general medical information (ie: 
risks, what protective actions can be taken) to meet public information needs 
during a pandemic.  To ensure messaging reaches the population as a whole, 
methods of communication need to be carefully considered and a wide array, or 
multi-media approach must be undertaken using a mix of traditional and new 
media sources. Access to media is not the only potential barrier to effective 
communication as linguistic or cultural barriers may also exist and will need to be 
addressed. 
 
                                                        
246
 New Zealand Ministry of Health, “New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan: A Framework for 
Action.” 
247 Hoogeveen et al., “A Guide to the Analysis of Risk, Vulnerability and Vulnerable Groups.”, 4 
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3.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter addressed existing guidance, planning, and challenges around 
pandemic preparedness at an international, national, and local level.  Pandemic 
planning is complicated by a number of factors including institutional 
responsibilities, population considerations, and communication challenges.  
Although pandemic planning occurs at multiple institutional or governmental levels, 
planning and approaches to preparedness are not always consistent, particularly as 
regards concepts of risk and vulnerability which lack a clear and uniform definition. 
 
The next chapter will examine the theoretical principles influencing this research. 
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4 Chapter IV: Risk Perception and Behaviour Change 
4.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter outlines the theoretical underpinnings of this study and addresses the 
importance of understanding risk perception to encourage behaviour change during 
large-scale infectious disease outbreaks.  In order to develop an explanatory 
framework that is capable of identifying key principles for communication with at-
risk populations during an influenza pandemic, this chapter will introduce 
psychological theories of risk perception and behaviour change.  Further, this 
chapter will identify how Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) 248 and the Capability, 
Opportunity, Motivation – Behaviour (COM-B)249 model can be used to understand 
behaviour change in a way that has the potential to improve health outcomes 
during an influenza pandemic through effectively encouraging the adoption of 
recommended protective behaviours.  
 
4.2 Risk Perception  
Public responses to extreme events are influenced by the nature of the event and 
also by their perceptions of the event.  Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 sarin to attack the 
Tokyo subway resulted in 13 fatalities and more than 1,000 people suffered from 
exposure to the nerve agent however an additional 4,500 individuals were 
considered psychological casualties or ‘worried well’.250  Although estimates of 
those affected by the attack vary somewhat depending on the source251, research 
indicates that a significant number (between 73.9% and 85% of patients evaluated 
at hospitals following the attack) demonstrated no signs of exposure to nerve 
agents.252  A failure on the part of the authorities to convey accurate and timely 
information not only resulted in a surge of low risk patients seeking medical care 
but also had long term psychological implications for residents of Tokyo with some 
                                                        
248 Rogers, “A Protection Motivation Theory of Fear Appeals and Attitude Change.” 
249 Michie et al., ABC of Behaviour Change Theories. 
250 Beaton and Murphy, “Psychosocial Responses to Biological and Chemical Terrorist Threats and 
Events. Implications for the Workplace.” 
251Tucker, Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons., pg 219  
252 Stokes and Banderet, “Psychological Aspects of Chemical Defense and Warfare”; Stone, “The 
‘Worried Well’ Response to CBRN Events: Analysis and Solutions.” 
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individuals experiencing effects including ‘fear of commuting, absenteeism from 
work, lack of trust in public authorities, insomnia, de- pression, anxiety, and 
uncertainty about long-term health impacts’.253  
 
Understanding how people perceive and process risk is necessary in order to affect 
behavioural intentions and subsequent actions.  Consider, for example, the ongoing 
debate over childhood vaccination.  Although it has long been established that 
vaccination is a safe and highly effective way to prevent illness, the publication in 
the Lancet of a paper linking the MMR vaccine and autism provoked an anti-
vaccination movement.  Despite this research being roundly discredited, the anti-
vaccination movement has persisted and, in so doing, altered the perception and 
estimation of risk for many people.254 Sporton and Francis found that, though non-
immunizing parents often listed more than one reason for their decision, their 
concern over the risk of adverse effects on their child was referenced in each case.  
Despite recognizing the deleterious nature of the ‘awful disease’ the vaccine sought 
to prevent, avoidance of immunization was seen as ‘the lesser of two evils’255.  
 
As evidenced in the examples above, factual considerations may not be the 
primary, much less sole, influencer in determining perceptions of risk.  Risks that 
are more likely to cause concern are not necessarily the risks that are more likely to 
cause harm as risk perception is influenced by a wide variety of factors.256   
Activities that are voluntary or familiar are often seen to be less risky than those 
that are involuntary or unfamiliar.257  Similarly, if control of a risk is perceived to be 
external (ie: under the control of others), the risk is more likely to be perceived as 
higher than if under one’s own control. Further to this, naturally occurring events 
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(‘Acts of God’) often provoke lower levels of risk perception than those generated 
by human acts whether intentional or otherwise.258 
 
Additional factors influencing public perceptions of risk are the probability and the 
severity of an event.   Low-probability, high-consequence events that result in 
multiple deaths are described as dread risks and tend to produce greater 
psychological effect and behavioural change than events encountered on a daily or 
regular basis. 259   Activities or occurrences, therefore, that are perceived to have 
the potential to cause a number of fatalities within a set or discernible time and 
space are frequently considered to be of higher risk than those occurring over a 
random period of time and geographic area.260  Sheppard’s risk perception matrix 
categorizes perceptions of risk according to two axes: dread vs. non-dread and 
known vs. unknown. Dread vs non-dread divides risks according to controllability, 
non-fatal consequences, easy reducibility and whether a risk personally affects a 
particular individual.  Known risks are observable, have immediate effect, and 
would be classed as ‘old’ risks; while unknown risks are the opposite.261  This 
echoes the work by Gigerenzer and colleagues which post that, following the 
attacks of 9/11, fears over recurring terrorist activity in the aviation sector 
prompted many people to avoid air travel even though the probability of dying on a 
flight from Boston to New York (215 miles) was the same as driving 12 miles in a 
vehicle.  During this same period, there was a significant increase in interstate 
highway traffic, along with an increase in fatal crashes when compared to previous 
years.  Consequently, Gigerenzer et al. argue that terrorist activity may have 
contributed to the deaths of an estimated 1,500 Americans on the highway due to 
an increase in motor vehicle activity (a controllable risk) as a way to avoid the 
perceived risk of air travel.262  
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Prior experience or exposure to a particular risk may also affect risk perception as 
the familiarisation to the event can move a previously unknown risk closer to the 
known category such as during the Second Intifada where the regular recurrence of 
terrorist attacks resulted in a level of complacency amongst the public.263  Other 
studies have also shown that past experience with extreme events may also reduce 
perceptions of risk264.   During hurricanes, for example, many older adults have 
opted to shelter in place rather than evacuate as they had either survived previous 
incidents unharmed or had evacuated unnecessarily in the past265. Conversely, a 
study examining risk perception relating to floods and landslides in Taiwan found 
that participants who had experienced a disaster perceived a higher risk due to 
previous experience of financial or other losses.266   In both instances, it would 
appear as though the effect of the previous experience, whether the risk was borne 
out or overrated, contributed to risk perception.  In order to encourage positive 
behavioural responses to a major event such as a pandemic we therefore first need 
to understand the risk perceptions that shape these behaviours.  
 
4.3 Behaviour Change 
4.3.1 Psychological Models of Health-Related Behaviour 
Psychological models of health behaviour recognise the importance of risk 
perception for understanding behavioural responses to extreme events. These 
models have established that behavioural responses are influenced by a variety of 
factors including risk perception but also considerations such as belief in the 
effectiveness of a response or action (response efficacy) and belief in one’s own 
ability to perform a particular behaviour (self-efficacy). 
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The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) was one of the first attempts to better 
understand the link between attitudes and behaviours. The Theory of Reasoned 
Action proposed that intention was the best indicator of future behaviour and is the 
result of an individual’s attitude toward, or evaluation of a behaviour combined 
with subjective norms (ie: social pressure) concerning the behaviour.267  The Theory 
of Planned Behaviour (TPB) was developed to address limitations of TRA the Theory 
of Reasoned Action.  TPB incorporated a third component, ‘perceived behavioural 
control’.268  Perceived behavioural control refers to the perceived ease or ability to 
undertake a particular behaviour and is considered to influence not only 
behavioural intention but also behaviour itself.269  TPB with the inclusion of 
perceived behavioural control, was found to have greater explanatory ability than 
the theory of reasoned action.270  In the case of, for example, vaccination during an 
influenza pandemic, TPB would propose that behavioural intention would be 
affected not just by a belief in the efficacy of the vaccine and societal 
encouragement to vaccinate but also by logistical ease of obtaining a vaccine.  The 
Theory of Planned Behaviour has been used in several studies on pandemic 
influenza, in particular intention to vaccinate.271   In this context, however, an 
amended version of the theory has also been applied.  For example, in one case, 
researchers included elements of the Health Belief Model272 and, in another, 
additional factors such as anticipated regret were included.273   Both studies which 
used an amended TPB found that their enhanced models were an improvement on 
the original theory as they provided additional explanatory power through the 
inclusion of additional factors affecting behaviour. 
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An alternative approach, the Health Belief Model (HBM) was an early model that 
aimed to explain preventive health behaviour.274  This theory posits that, in order 
for an individual to adopt protective or preventive health behaviours, he or she 
would first need to believe that they were susceptible to the illness under 
consideration; that, if contracted, this illness would have at least a moderately 
severe effect on their life, and that the adoption of a particular behaviour would be 
beneficial in either reducing the susceptibility to or severity of the illness.  
Additionally, the behaviour should not require overcoming particular psychological 
barriers such as ‘cost, convenience, pain, or embarrassment.’275  Thus the perceived 
pain associated with vaccination could create a barrier to action.276  Early research 
using the principles of the HBM found that the uptake of preventive health 
activities (tuberculosis x-ray screening and dental check-ups) was influenced by 
perceptions of susceptibility and an understanding that undertaking these 
behaviours could prevent more serious effects.277  The model has been applied to a 
variety of health challenges including preventive behaviours and adherence.278 
 
The Health Belief Model has been used in research on pandemic influenza and 
behavioural response.  Research on vaccination rates of health care workers found 
the HBM provided a useful structure for understanding aspects contributing to 
vaccine uptake such as perceived barriers and benefits of vaccination, perceived 
vulnerability to infection, perceived severity of the illness, and additional stimuli 
which could encourage vaccination.279  Further research on vaccination rates, in this 
case with university students and grocery store patrons found that perception of 
barriers, a history of influenza vaccination, and medical advice were predictors of 
intention to vaccinate.  Conversely, this study found that perceived susceptibility 
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was not a significant predictor of intent to vaccinate. 280  The relationship between 
perceived susceptibility and vaccination has been observed in other studies as well 
though the strength of this relationship has varied by study. 281 
 
A further model, Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), was developed to explain 
behavioural responses to health threats.282  PMT attributes the adoption of 
protective behaviours to threat and coping appraisals (see Figure 4.1).  Threat 
appraisal consists of judgments about the perceived severity of the threat and the 
perceived vulnerability to the threat.283  In the case of an influenza pandemic this 
could be affected by the extent to which an individual considers the pandemic, in 
general, to be a real threat as well as the extent to which an individual believes 
he/she may be personally vulnerable to becoming ill or worse.   Coping appraisals 
are affected by perceptions of efficacy of a particular behaviour as well as 
perceptions of self-efficacy.  For example, an attempt to promote respiratory 
hygiene (ie: using a tissue to cover a cough or a sneeze) will be influenced by 
whether an individual perceives this to be a useful mechanism to prevent the 
spread of illness as well as whether he/she feels this is an action they have the 
ability to perform successfully.284 These four perceptions (severity, 
vulnerability/probability, efficacy of response and self-efficacy) form the basis of 
PMT.285  
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Figure 4-1 Protection Motivation Theory
Adapted from: Rogers 
 
PMT also posits that fear appeals can contribute to behaviour change, whether 
positive or negative, and is linked to an individual’s assessment and perception of a 
threat. Threat perception, in turn is influenced by the severity of an event, the 
likelihood of the event occurring and the efficacy of a given response.286 PMT 
requires that all three variables be activated in order to trigger intent to change 
behaviour.  If an individual perceives severity and effective response but no 
personal threat, they are less likely to take action.287  Additional factors, however, 
are also identified which may also affect behavioural intention.  These are intrinsic 
and extrinsic rewards (such as pleasure or social approval) and response barriers 
(ie: costs) as potential enablers or obstacles to action.288  A review of research 
involving fear appeals concluded that fear appeals can influence behavioural intent 
however they may have a negative effect if the public does not have confidence in 
the efficacy of the actions they can take to protect themselves.289 
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PMT has been applied to studies examining factors influencing behavioural 
responses in the context of pandemic influenza.290  Research to date on pandemic 
influenza using PMT has largely focused on two behaviours; vaccination and 
voluntary isolation (either staying home when ill or reducing external contact 
during a pandemic).  A 2007 study researching the relationship between taking 
precautionary behavioural actions and risk perceptions of influenza also used PMT 
in developing the study and found it a useful model to identify the key factors.291  
An additional study examining influences on willingness to vaccinate found PMT to 
be ‘a useful framework for understanding the psychological and demographic 
factors affecting intentions and uptake of H1N1 influenza vaccination’.292  A 2011 
study examined behavioural responses to pandemic influenza and willingness of 
participants either to remain at home when ill or to go to work when healthy.  The 
researchers concluded that the relationship between behavioural intentions and 
perceptions of risk and efficacy of response supported the theoretical principles of 
PMT.293   
4.3.2 COM-B Model 
The differences in the models presented in the previous section have led to the 
development of initiatives to reconcile these theoretical approaches, to better 
understand and enable behaviour change.  In ABC of Behaviour Change Theories, 
Michie et al identify 83 separate behaviour change theories.294  In some cases these 
theories are clearly targeted towards understanding a particular behaviour295, 
usually an addictive behaviour, or illness296.  It therefore falls to the researcher or 
practitioner to determine which theory is best able to address and interpret the 
behaviour under study.  This task is often made all the more challenging as many 
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theories have overlapping elements.297  In response, therefore, to concerns that 
behaviour change theory had become overly complex and lacked substantive 
guidance on appropriate selection and contextual use of these theories, the COM-B 
model was developed.298  There was also a perceived need to better connect 
research and practice to ensure the science of behaviour change could be 
incorporated into the development of policy and behaviour change intervention 
campaigns.299   As a result, researchers developed the COM-B model to understand 
the individual components associated with behaviour and, consequently, 
behavioural change.300  COM-B associates behaviour with three primary influences: 
capability, opportunity and motivation (see Figure 4.2).  Each of these categories is 
then further divided into two subsets.  Capability refers to the ability of an 
individual to execute a specific behaviour and consists of physical (strength or skill) 
and psychological (knowledge or intellectual capacity) abilities.301   Motivation is 
defined as ‘the processes in the brain that energise and direct behaviour’ such as 
decision-making or emotional reaction.302   The subdivisions in Motivation are 
defined as reflective processes (planning) and automatic (impulse).303   The final 
primary influence is Opportunity and refers to external influences that facilitate or 
impede behaviour.  Opportunity involves physical opportunities (time and money) 
and social opportunities (influenced by culture).304   
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Figure 4-2 COM-B 
 
Adapted from Michie, Van Stralen, and West  
 
In comparison to the theories of behaviour change outlined in the previous section, 
COM-B is a comparatively recent (less than a decade) addition to the pantheon.  It 
has been used in a variety of health research studies including medical 
adherence305, hearing aid use306  and healthy eating307.   Although it has been 
applied in research involving extreme events such as pandemic influenza308, the 
examples used to explain COM-B are centered more around ‘everyday’ health 
threats as opposed to extreme events, such as smoking cessation, antibiotic over-
prescription or increasing physical activity.309  Indeed, even a case study using COM-
B (and its associated Behaviour Change Wheel approach to designing interventions) 
to prevent illness was focused on an endemic threat (melioidosis in Northern 
Thailand).310  The lack of specific focus around perceptions of risk and threat within 
the COM-B model diminishes the important role these factors play in influencing 
behaviour change during an extreme event; such as an influenza pandemic.   
Although perceptions of risk and efficacy would fall under the mantle of 
‘Motivation’, this is not clearly delineated.  In this, the strengths of COM-B are also 
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its weakness.  The intent to create a framework that ‘should apply to every 
intervention that has been or could be developed’311 resulted in an all-
encompassing, general structure.  The counter is that, with a such a broad remit, 
specific characteristics may not be able to be clearly drawn out. 
 
4.4 Understanding the Likely Risk Perceptions and Behavioural Responses of 
At-Risk Groups During an Influenza Pandemic  
The social cognition models focused around individual cognition such as Health 
Belief Model, Theory of Reasoned Action/Theory of Planned Behaviour, and 
Protection Motivation Theory were deemed to be most appropriate for the 
purposes of this research as these theories are aimed at influencing behavioural 
intentions through perceptions of factors including threat, susceptibility, and 
behavioural control.312  As the research will consider how to best communicate 
with at-risk or vulnerable populations, it is important to understand how, or even 
whether, these groups perceive themselves to be at risk and what effect this may 
have on their willingness to adopt protective behaviours.   
 
Risk perception has been established as a key influencer of behavioural intent and 
forms a cornerstone of Protection Motivation Theory.  PMT also highlights the 
importance of perceptions of efficacy, both in terms of an individual’s capacity or 
capability to perform a particular action and their belief in the utility of said action.  
While perceptions of risk and efficacy have been successfully applied to a variety of 
research involving behavioural intentions in a pandemic, it is also important to 
understand the practical barriers or enablers that affect behaviour. Behavioural 
intentions may not always equate to behaviour change, which forms the basis of a 
recurring critique of social cognition theories. Therefore, careful examination of 
what factors act as enablers or barriers to action should be included in any 
research,313 and will be a focus of the studies presented in this thesis.  
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Whilst this research will examine vaccination and voluntary isolation (staying home 
when ill or avoiding external contact to prevent inflection) behaviours, it will also 
include less researched non-pharmaceutical interventions-handwashing and 
respiratory hygiene.  This will allow for an examination of the extent to which 
barriers and enablers to action are variable across the behaviours.  Additionally, the 
two specific population subgroups selected for this study have different profiles of 
risk (older adults being traditionally more at risk compared to younger adults) 
which may be altered in the event of a pandemic.  This allows for a comparative 
analysis of perceptions of risk, willingness to engage in protective behaviour, and 
communication needs of two distinct age groups. 
 
Understanding how perceptions of risk and efficacy affect behavioural intentions, 
as well as what capability, opportunity or motivational factors may encourage or 
inhibit uptake of recommended protective behaviours can, in turn, improve the 
effectiveness of public health communication interventions.  These factors provide 
a number of avenues where communication can potentially be used to effect 
positive behavioural change by influencing perceptions and recognizing potential 
barriers and, thereby improve health outcomes in a pandemic. 
 
Although PMT does acknowledge the potential disruptive effect of barriers to 
action,314 these are not well codified and are not a keystone of the theory.   The 
focus on risk and efficacy perception allows for consideration of a broad range of 
key factors influencing behavioural intentions but largely overlooks additional 
psychological, social, or environmental factors which may also act as enablers or 
barriers to action.  For example, an individual’s decision to employ good respiratory 
hygiene practices (such as ‘Catch it, Bin it, Kill it’) may be primarily influenced by a 
perception of the threat or severity of a pandemic and its associated risk to them 
personally and by whether or not they perceive this behaviour to be a useful 
preventive measure.  Their decision however, may also be influenced, positively or 
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negatively, by additional factors such as social shaming associated with sneezing 
into ones’ hand or a lack of rubbish bins creating a challenge in disposing of used 
tissues.   Equally, the decision to vaccinate could be influenced by additional 
psychological factors such as concern over the potential for side effects or pain 
resulting from the vaccine.  This is why the research presented in this thesis, while 
anchored by PMT, will also incorporate elements of COM-B through the creation of 
a hybrid model (see Figure 4-3).  This will allow for a targeted focus on key PMT 
factors such as perception of risk, behaviour efficacy, and self-efficacy whilst also 
integrating additional enablers or barriers to action such as societal or 
environmental factors in a clear and structured manner. 
 
Figure 4-3 Hybrid Model 
 
 
Risk perception plays a key role in determining behavioural responses and must be 
considered when designing effective communication interventions. However, 
previous research has indicated that whilst threat appraisal predicts the taking of 
action, this does not necessarily result in protective action.315  Furthermore, 
communication interventions that are designed to influence coping appraisals are 
less likely to raise ethical issues than those aimed at influencing threat appraisals, 
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which could create undue stress and concern on the recipient).316 Consequently, 
the current study focuses particularly on factors affecting coping appraisal in order 
to identify areas where communication could be used to boost self-efficacy, 
response efficacy, and reduce response costs. The COM-B model suggests that 
capability, opportunity and motivation feed directly into behavior. However, these 
factors also identify and represent barriers to action which are not directly covered 
by the psychological drivers identified by PMT.  Therefore, these factors can help 
determine additional barriers which affect response costs.  These costs, in turn, 
influence intentions and, through this, behaviour change.  Furthermore, given this 
research is scenario driven, the results represent behaviour intention, as indicative 
of behaviour, rather than retrospectively assessing actual behavioural drivers and 
response (such as the research conducting during and post H1N1 pandemic).   
 
Although PMT has been successfully used for the development of communication 
interventions of the kind under consideration for this study, as described above it 
focuses primarily on psychological drivers. This diminishes the role of 
environmental and material constraints on behaviour.  Therefore, for this research, 
a hybrid model was developed which drew on the strengths of both PMT and COM-
B to allow both psychological and contextual barriers/enablers for behavioural 
change to be identified and taken into consideration during the development of a 
targeted communication intervention.    
 
 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter examined contemporary explanatory models of behaviour change, risk 
perception and their applicability to understanding behavioural intentions and 
actions in a pandemic context.  The research presented in this thesis will rely 
predominantly on a hybrid model derived from Protection Motivation Theory and 
COM-B.  This will allow for a primary focus on risk perception in relation to 
behavioural intentions but also allow for the inclusion of potential environmental or 
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societal barriers (or incentives) to action. Effective risk and crisis communication 
during an influenza pandemic will not only help to inform, but also to encourage 
the uptake of protective health behaviours amongst the public.  Therefore, 
understanding the factors that influence risk perception will enable targeted public 
communication to encourage behaviour choices that will lead to improved health 
outcomes during an influenza pandemic.  
 
The next chapter will describe the methods used in the interviews with older and 
younger adults presented in subsequent chapters. 
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5 Chapter V: Methodology - Interviews with Older and Younger Adults 
 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter will outline the study design and methodology used in this research 
project in order to: clarify how the study design incorporates the theoretical 
underpinnings of this thesis and answers the research questions, describe the 
methods used to gather data, and identify ethical issues associated with this thesis 
and how they have been addressed. 
 
5.2 Study Design 
This thesis employs a two-phase, scenario driven exploratory study to examine the 
perceptions of risk, behavioural intentions, and communication needs of potentially 
at-risk population groups in order to improve communication during a future 
pandemic. The first, involved both university students and older adults and used a 
scenario to explore initial information needs and behavioural intentions in response 
to the onset of an influenza pandemic.   Based on these results, a communication 
intervention was designed to test the impact of additional explanatory information 
on risk perception and behavioural intentions.  In the second phase, the scenario 
had progressed to a few months into a pandemic when a vaccine had been 
developed. The behaviours of interest selected for this study were predominantly 
non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI): handwashing, isolation, respiratory 
hygiene, and seeking medical assistance.  These behaviours were selected as they 
are all actions that could be taken at any stage of a pandemic.   In addition, NPIs are 
within the control of the individual to implement.   Vaccination intention was also 
included as a behaviour of interest, as vaccination is widely acknowledged as a key 
pillar in preventing the spread of illness317, although the timeline for 
implementation during a pandemic may vary.   
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The exploratory nature of this study has led to the use of qualitative rather than 
quantitative research methodology.  Qualitative research methods have been 
described as preferable to quantitative in circumstances where ‘there is little pre-
existing knowledge, the issues are sensitive or complex and the maximum 
opportunity for exploration and inductive hypothesis generation is desired’318.  This 
approach allows for the researcher to determine participant perceptions around 
risk and pandemic and communication needs and to explore these in greater depth 
than would be allowed by a survey or other quantifiable method.   As well, although 
there has been research on the impacts of pandemics on behaviours, this research 
has not specifically focused on older adults or other at-risk groups such as younger 
adults.  Qualitative methods are grounded in the notion of ‘seeing the social world 
from the point of view of the actor’319.  Qualitative research is also less fixed than 
quantitative and is therefore better suited to exploratory research as this enables 
investigation of novel concepts and fluidity of research plans to adapt for 
unexpected findings320.  Although qualitative methods are ideally suited to this 
study, there are limitations with this approach such as the logistical need to restrict 
sample sizes.  Quantitative research methods, such as surveys, allow access to 
greater numbers of participants in a similar time frame however qualitative 
research methods allow the researcher to explore participant answers in greater 
depth.   
 
This study relied on semi-structured individual or small group interviews with older 
adults and group interviews with younger adults (operationalised as university 
students).  The use of interviews (both individual and group) was chosen over other 
methods, such as surveys, as interviews enable participant responses to be 
explored in greater depth.321  A semi-structured interview approach was selected as 
it allows for a clear and consistent list of questions to be asked however also 
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provides a degree of flexibility depending on participant response.322  Group 
interviews were conducted with the younger adults, and individual or small group 
interviews were conducted with the older adult participants.  Given the potential 
for minor physical impairment among older adults (in particular hearing loss), older 
adult small group interviews were limited to include fewer participants per group.  
These sessions provided an opportunity to examine the awareness of pandemic 
influenza, perceptions of risk and vulnerability and willingness to engage in 
protective behaviours amongst younger and older adults.  Small group interviews 
were used because they provide a dynamic environment in which participants can 
interact thereby helping to tease out responses within a group for whom 
emergency preparedness, in particularly pandemic influenza, is unlikely to be a 
focus.  For these reasons, small group interviews with the older adult participants 
were prioritized, however, individual interviews were also offered as an option to 
older adults if they preferred.  Although most older adult participants were 
comfortable with a small group interview, several interviews were conducted as 
individual interviews due to logistical (scheduling and geographic distance) reasons.  
Whilst students were expected to attend a pre-arranged session held on the King’s 
University campus, older adult participants were given the option of either 
attending an interview at King’s or one to be held in a location more convenient to 
them.   
 
The data from each stage of the research were independently analysed with the 
results compared to better understand the perceptions of risk, willingness to 
engage in protective behaviours and communication needs of potentially at-risk 
populations.  This allowed for an examination of the needs and intentions of 
different risk groups, particularly in a situation that may feature an atypical profile 
of risk, as well as a comparison of planning assumptions and population 
expectations during an influenza pandemic.   
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5.3 Study Participants 
Older and younger adults were selected as they traditionally occupy very different 
risk profiles that may be affected depending on the strain and severity of a future 
pandemic.  Older adults are traditionally classed as at risk because of increased 
medical susceptibility and potential vulnerability but they may also possess greater 
resilience to pandemic risks than is often assumed (see Section 3, Chapter 1 for full 
details).  Younger adults are not usually viewed as at-risk or vulnerable but, in the 
event of an influenza pandemic, they may find themselves in that position 
depending on the strain of the virus and because of lifestyle factors (see Section 3, 
Chapter 1 for full details).   
 
As this study is examining two specific population groups, purposive sampling was 
used in order to obtain a sufficient range of views of the population groups being 
studied rather than a representative sample of the population at large.323  This 
allowed for the inclusion of participants with experience in the area being 
investigated; namely older adults and students.324 In recruiting participants, this 
study aimed to target gender variety, ethnicity and socio-economic variables to 
maximise variation in response, but the priority was age and residential status so 
additional factors were not controlled. 
 
All study participants (professionals, older adults and younger adults) were drawn 
from the Greater London area; defined as inside the M25.  With a population of 
over 8.5 million and a population density of 5,491 people per square kilometre325 vs 
the UK average of 266.6 per sq km326, an influenza pandemic in London has no 
shortage of opportunities to spread.    London is also an extremely diverse city with 
representation from a wide variety of cultures and ethnicities.327  Furthermore, the 
approximately 30 million journeys per day on the TfL network328 provide further 
opportunity for disease transmission. 
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Older adult participants were required to be over 70 years of age.  Although age 65 
is the current UK state pension age for men and, as of April 2015, for women as 
well329, it was felt that the inclusion of individuals between 65 and 70 years of age 
could produce results less indicative of older adult experiences as this population 
group would likely only recently have joined the ranks of ‘senior citizens’.  
Participants were also required to be resident not only in the UK, but specifically in 
London.  This restriction was designed to exclude individuals who may have 
experienced different public health communication and national norms while still 
providing the opportunity to explore different UK cultural norms.  Older adult 
participants were further limited to individuals not experiencing cognitive 
impairment as these individuals may be receiving some form of medical and social 
care support, and decisions regarding their healthcare may be made in a different 
way, and the additional challenge of conducting this research with cognitively 
impaired individuals was out of the scope of the current study. 
 
Younger adult participants were required to be between 18-25 years of age and 
enrolled in a full-time university program in London.  This age range was selected to 
ensure a group of individuals who are both within the at-risk population sector for 
several pandemic strains (such as the recent H1N1) and who are in the process of 
adapting to adulthood (and less likely to be married with children, working full-time 
permanent jobs). Whilst recognizing that not all 18-25 years olds are university 
students, limiting participants to this sector allowed for the ability to compare 
population perceptions and needs with existing pandemic planning at an 
institutional (university) level.  Further, many students live in close quarters, 
particularly in halls of residences and are at increased risk of disease transmission.  
This study initially intended to exclude EU and international students as their 
experience with public health communication and cultural norms may differ from 
the UK however, initial practitioner interviews with university administrators 
indicated that different linguistic or cultural experiences, as well as institutional 
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challenges around international students affect pandemic planning and 
preparedness.  In addition, non-UK students represent a sizeable proportion of 
many universities.  King’s College London, for example, has thousands of 
international students, representing 150 countries.330  It was therefore determined 
that, to exclude this population would represent a shortcoming of the study. 
 
While outwardly very different, these two population groups share a number of 
important commonalities.  First and foremost, neither is likely to be a primary carer 
for young or school-aged children and thus is less likely to receive public health 
information through school messaging.  Neither category is likely to be in the full-
time workforce but may still have obligations such as university classes or doctor’s 
appointments that an individual would be unwilling or unable to miss and which 
could affect the ability to engage in social isolation practices if ill.   
 
In the first phase of the research, thirteen younger adult group interviews of 
between three and seven participants were conducted, with a total of 51 
participants (See Appendix C).  Nineteen older adult interviews were conducted, 
with a total of 36 participants (See Appendix D).  Interviews, with one exception, 
had between one and four participants.  One group interview had six participants as 
previously confirmed participants brought spouses or neighbours to participate.  
This interview took place in a residential retirement community and participants 
were previously acquainted with one another and keen to go ahead with the 
research, despite the larger group.  
 
A total of 24 interviews were conducted (12 with the standard leaflet and 12 with 
the enhanced leaflet) in the second phase of the research (See Appendix E).  
Interviews had between one and four participants.  A total of 40 participants 
participated in the study with 21 receiving the standard leaflet and 19 the 
enhanced leaflet. 
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5.3.1 Recruitment of Participants 
Study participants were recruited through several routes; though the primary 
means, for both younger and older adult groups was through gatekeepers.  Several 
avenues were attempted to recruit younger adults, including putting up 
recruitment posters at universities, using the online research recruitment portal 
‘Call For Participants’, university research recruitment forums (such as the KCL 
'Fortnightly Circular: Research Volunteer Recruitment'), and word of mouth.  
Recruitment posters were, by far, the most time consuming and least effective 
means of recruitment.  Particularly given that many universities are now employing 
stricter access policies for security reasons, gaining access to the university 
premises was not always straightforward.  Additionally, some universities will not 
allow advertising of research if it is external to the university; leaving paid-for 
advertising as the only option to reach their student population.   Call for 
Participants and word of mouth were both somewhat more successful in recruiting 
participants though responses were still limited.  The most effective recruitment 
process, by far, was the use of university research recruitment forums.  Whilst it 
could be challenging to track down the appropriate contact, where successful, the 
results were overwhelming and, through this means, the majority of participants 
were recruited. 
 
Similarly, although a minority of older adult participants were recruited through 
professional or personal contacts (ie: a former co-workers’ grandparents), 
participants in this category were primarily recruited through organizational 
gatekeepers such as older adult program providers (e.g. local AgeUK groups or 
library clubs), residential communities, and community groups (such as churches).   
Once the project had been explained, these individuals were generally willing to 
circulate a notice of the research among their membership and, in two cases, 
provided the opportunity to speak directly to the membership to facilitate 
recruitment.   
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5.4 Materials and Procedure 
5.4.1 Scenario 
The decision to use a scenario to illustrate a pandemic experience was taken early 
on in the study design.  The use of a scenario has been demonstrated to be an 
effective tool in research examining ‘future uncertainties’.331   The final decision, 
however, to include a scenario in the research was the result of two Public and 
Patient Involvement (PPI) sessions with participants from the University of the Third 
Age and Age UK.  These sessions were held to discuss the research project and seek 
expert input and guidance.  The questions posed to PPI participants centred around 
two main themes: whether pandemic influenza might be upsetting to older adults 
to discuss and research design.   Memories and experiences of pandemic influenza 
varied greatly among participants however participants were unequivocal in their 
belief that discussing pandemic influenza would not be likely to cause upset to 
older adults.  On the question of the usefulness of a scenario in prompting 
discussion of pandemic influenza, participants were agreed that a scenario would 
greatly assist the discussion.  PPI sessions were beneficial to the research and 
influenced the research design not only through the inclusion of a scenario for the 
interviews but also by confirming that the planned approach was appropriate and 
likely to result in effective research and, by extension, useful policy 
impact.  Furthermore, these workshops provided an invaluable opportunity 
to better understand older adults' perceptions of risk, vulnerability and pandemic 
influenza ahead of the development of research materials. 
 
The development of the scenario itself created a challenge in determining not only 
the timing of the scenario but also the severity.  Pandemic influenza represents a 
serious risk to public health.332  It is therefore tempting to base the conditions of 
the scenario on more extreme instances, such as the 1918 Spanish Flu, to ensure 
the potential severity of a pandemic is adequately conveyed to participants.  This 
however, does a disservice, both to participants and also to the research.  First and 
foremost, this assumes that participants lack the mental capacity to understand 
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and interpret more subtle indications of severity which, if true, would be highly 
problematic for government in communicating during extreme events.  
Additionally, by participating in the study, participants are not only given the 
opportunity to contribute to improving risk and crisis communications with the 
intent of improving health outcomes in the event of an influenza pandemic but also 
to reflect on, and perhaps improve, their personal influenza preparedness planning.  
This should not include attempts to scare or to distress participants with an 
apocalyptic outcome.   This type of approach is also damaging to the research itself 
as it risks providing less accurate information regarding risk perception and 
behavioural intentions.  Worst-case scenarios can upset the balance of 
interpretation and intent with emotional overwhelming rational.333   
 
The 2009 pandemic provides an appropriate basis on which to develop a future 
pandemic scenario.  The Swine flu experience is reflective of a more globalised 
world as well as demonstrative of technological and communication advances than 
previous pandemics, for example, the ability to develop a targeted vaccine in a 
matter of months and the role of non-traditional communications such web-based 
information and social media.  Whilst less severe than initially feared, H1N1 
resulted not only in increased morbidity and mortality but also in vast amounts of 
resources to manage.334  For this research, the pandemic scenario was based on the 
Canadian experience of H1N1 (Swine Flu) in 2009. The Canadian experience of 
H1N1 is relevant for three primary reasons.  First and foremost, as Canada was 
positioned on the front-lines, geographically speaking, of the emerging pandemic, 
the full force of uncertainty around the virus, in particular severity and virulence, 
during the initial outbreak was felt.335  Further, the Canadian experience of SARS in 
2003 prompted a review of the public health response and, subsequently, 
improvements, such as increased surveillance, were made to public health 
emergency planning.   These, in turn, facilitated and improved the Canadian 
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pandemic response.336  Equally, the UK experience of the 2009 pandemic prompted 
a lessons learned review and the enactment of recommendations for improving 
public health response capability.337   
 
The scenario in the first phase was situated at the start of a pandemic.  Participants 
were provided a news article describing an emerging outbreak of a new strain of flu 
in Greece.  At this stage, there were no confirmed UK cases but the government 
considered instituting a travel ban.  After discussing their perceptions of risk and 
likely responses, participants were provided a second news article.  In this second 
article, it is now six weeks later and the WHO has declared a pandemic (see 
Appendix F for scenario materials).   
 
The second phase of the scenario took place approximately four months after the 
first and was structured around vaccination.  In this scenario, the vaccine has now 
been developed and is about to be made available in the UK.  This part of the 
scenario consisted of three injects taking place over the course of a week.  The first 
scenario inject provided the background to the pandemic situation and explained 
that a vaccine would shortly be made available, though priority would be given to 
at-risk groups.  The second scenario inject provided to participants was an ‘official’ 
leaflet providing information on the vaccination, including listing the at-risk groups.  
The final scenario inject was a news story around an older women being turned 
away from a vaccination clinic as she was not considered at-risk. (see Appendix G 
for scenario materials).   
 
5.4.2 Procedure  
Participants were provided with an information sheet detailing the study as well as 
a consent form and were required to complete this before being able to participate 
in the research. Prior to the start of the interview, all participants were asked to fill 
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out a questionnaire in order to provide general information on demographics, 
health, and information-seeking habits (see Appendix H). 
 
Participants in the first phase of the research were asked to discuss their knowledge 
and understanding of pandemic influenza and of associated risks (e.g. how to 
define it, who is vulnerable), as well as their willingness and intent to engage in 
protective behaviours (such as increased hand washing, proper disposal of used 
tissues and vaccination). They were also asked to discuss what information they 
would need during a pandemic, who they would trust to deliver this information 
and what types of mass media communication they utilise.  Furthermore, they were 
asked to think about what challenges they might encounter in a pandemic; not only 
barriers to adopting protective behaviours but also logistical challenges such as 
grocery shopping or collecting medicine (see Appendix I for Phase One interview 
schedules). 
 
In the second phase of the research, participants were again asked to discuss their 
knowledge of pandemic flu, perceptions of risk, and communication needs.  
Behavioural intentions were discussed though the focus was on vaccination.  The 
timeline of the scenario had shifted several months into the future, a pandemic was 
fully underway and a vaccine had been developed.   Participants were provided 
with three scenario injects and, at each stage of the scenario, were asked to reply 
to a short questionnaire (see Appendix J for scenario questionnaires).  
 
For the first scenario inject at phase 2, participants were given a news article 
outlining the pandemic and indicating a vaccine would shortly be made available.  
They were then asked about their perception of risk and behavioural intentions, 
particularly their intention to vaccinate.  The second scenario inject provided to 
participants was an ‘official’ leaflet providing information on the vaccination, 
including listing the at-risk groups.   
 
As pandemic influenza often affects the younger adult population, older adults 
were not included in the priority group but younger adults were.  Two versions of 
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the leaflet were developed, one with the standard wording and one with additional 
information explaining why older adults were not included.  This facilitated testing 
whether how a traditionally at-risk group would respond to a pandemic scenario 
with an atypical profile of risk as well as the effect that additional explanatory 
information would have on their perceptions and behaviour. 
 
Participants were again asked to discuss their perception of risk, intentions to 
vaccinate and information needs.  Finally, participants were given a news article in 
which an older adult had been turned away from a vaccination clinic due to not 
being a member of a priority group.  Participants were then asked to provide their 
reaction to the article and also whether they would get vaccinated once the vaccine 
was made available to them (see Appendix K for Phase two interview schedule). 
 
5.5 Data Analysis 
The individual and group interviews were recorded and then fully transcribed 
before being coded using computer assisted qualitative data analysis software 
(CAQDAS), in this case NVivo.  NVivo was selected as it was recommended by other 
researchers who had used it and found it to be a helpful tool.  Computer assisted 
coding software facilitates the organization and analysis of qualitative data.  
Researchers can use these programs to store, index and retrieve coded data.338  
 
To analyse the transcripts, this study used thematic analysis.  Thematic analysis is ‘a 
method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data’.339    
Although thematic analysis often employs a systematic coding approach, it also 
allows for a degree of flexibility or fluidity in the identification of themes which is 
not as prevalent in other analytical approaches.340  Unlike many other forms of 
analysis, thematic analysis is not tied to a particular theoretical perspective341 
which, in a cross-disciplinary study such as this, that incorporates elements from 
the fields of health psychology, risk management and security studies, allows for 
                                                        
338 Denscombe, The Good Research Guide., 278 
339 Braun and Clarke, “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology.” 
340 Braun and Clarke, “Reflecting on Reflexive Thematic Analysis.” 
341 Braun and Clarke, “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology.” 
 113 
greater flexibility in examining the topic at hand.  It should be noted however, that 
this flexibility does not absolve a researcher of the responsibility to situate the 
research within a theoretical framework.   
 
Within the rubric of thematic analysis are several approaches to addressing data.  
These include reflexive thematic analysis, framework analysis, and template 
analysis.342  These latter two have been characterised by Braun and Clarke as 
‘codebook thematic analysis’ as they utilize a more structured approach to coding 
whilst still maintaining an organic approach to analysis.343  Template analysis 
involves the development of a well-structured analytical framework which 
maintains the flexibility to adapt based on study needs and data results.  A coding 
template will initially be developed, often a priori based on the study parameters.  
The data will then be preliminarily coded and, based on this, the template will be 
adapted or refined.  Once the template is finalised, it is then applied to the data.344 
The design of this research necessitated both inductive and deductive coding as it 
did not adopt a completed grounded approach but rather a theoretical framework 
based on PMT and COM-B that was to be tested.  Additionally, given the 
exploratory nature of this research incorporating multiple populations and 
datasets, the flexibly structured approach of template analysis was considered to 
be beneficial as it would allow for the development of themes within the data 
whilst providing a framework to keep the research focused.  The successful 
application of template analysis to the data formats used in this study provided 
added impetus to employ this particular thematic analysis variant. 
 
The coding framework for this research was based on theoretical concepts from 
PMT and COM-B and was structured around the three main themes of this 
research: risk, behaviour, and communication. In developing the framework, a 
priori themes representing the central pillars of the research were identified.  As 
the initial data results were analysed, modifications to these pillars, largely through 
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the development of sub-sets within the key themes, were made.  The re-iterative 
nature of template analysis meant that, although themes related to the central 
pillars of the research were identified a priori (i.e.: risk), these were modified after 
the initial coding.  For example, the initial theme of risk was, after the initial review, 
sub-divided to better reflect the variances in perceptions of risk.  
 
Consequently, in the coding framework for this research (see Figure 5.1), risk was 
coded both as a general concept (ie: defining risk vs vulnerability, and general 
perceptions of risk in a pandemic), as well as a specific response to each stage of 
the scenario.  Additionally, perceptions or assumptions around at-risk groups were 
also specifically coded for.  Behavioural intentions were coded thematically 
according to the five specific behaviours being examined (handwashing, isolation, 
respiratory hygiene, seeking medical assistance, and vaccination) and each of these, 
in turn, were broken down based on the principles of PMT and COM-B (ie: self-
efficacy, behaviour efficacy, capability, opportunity, motivation).  Although the 
initial framework provided separate coding for each behaviour being examined, the 
final framework was modified to incorporate sub-sets for each behavioural 
‘influencer’ which allowed the data to be clearly analysed not only across 
behaviours but also across barriers or enablers to action.  Communication 
characteristics were assessed both in terms of information needs and behaviours in 
response to scenario stages, as well in more general terms.  In addition to 
communication needs vis-à-vis content, communication topics examined included 
trusted sources of information, and preferred communication methods.   
 
In the second phase of the research the coding framework was slightly altered to 
incorporate the testing of the communication intervention (see Figure 5.2).   In 
addition to the above, the framework also considered participant responses to 
three scenario-driven elements: concerns over vaccine availability, confidence in 
authorities’ approach to vaccine prioritization, and acceptability of refusal of 






























































































5.6 Research Ethics 
Ethical approval was obtained from King’s College London for all components of the 
study that involved collecting data from human participants.  Approval for the 
interviews with practitioners and students was applied for and approved (LRS-
14/15-1667) in 2015.  Ethical approval for the interviews with older adults required 
a high-risk application as older adults are considered a potentially vulnerable 
population group.  This application was successful and was approved in 2016 (HR-
16/17-2718). 
 
In addition to the standard ethical considerations when conducting research with 
human participants outlined above, research on topics such as pandemic influenza 
that have the potential to be distressing for the participants. In this case, however, 
the risk was considered to be unlikely. Even for people who have directly witnessed 
traumatic events, participating in research that asks about those events has been 
shown to have little negative impact. Two studies in particular have assessed 
whether participating in research about traumatic events caused anxiety for 
participants randomly selected from the general population. In the first, less than 
2% of residents of New York who were interviewed by telephone about their 
experiences during the 9/11 terrorist attack reported that this had left them feeling 
‘emotionally upset.’345 The second, much larger, study of 5,774 US citizens found 
that less than 1% were emotionally upset at the end of a survey concerning 
9/11346,347.  In order to further reduce risk, participants were fully informed prior to 
participating that the study involves a discussion of and a scenario involving 
pandemic influenza.  They were also advised that participation is strictly voluntary 
and they can withdraw from the interview at any time should they become 
distressed. In addition, participants were provided with the information sheet in 
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advance of their participation and data collection only proceeded after participants 
confirmed they had read and understood the information sheet and had signed 
consent forms. Further, given the use of news articles as scenario injects, 
throughout the interviews, it was repeatedly stated that these were created for the 
research and were not legitimate news articles.  Furthermore, inflammatory 
language and worst-case scenarios were avoided, as outlined in Section 1.4. 
5.6.1 Older Adults as High Risk 
Older adults have been identified as a potentially vulnerable population group due 
to the fact that physical and cognitive decline is often associated with aging.  This 
was mitigated by strict inclusion criteria and individuals with evident cognitive 
impairments were not included in this study. Furthermore, Patient and Public 
Involvement (PPI) practices were used in order to ensure that research focus and 
processes were suitable for use with this age group.  
 
Information leaflets, consent forms and other documentation used appropriate 
font size.  Additionally, there is increasing awareness that many older adults do not 
necessarily consider themselves to be ‘old’348.  As such, this study avoided using 
potentially offensive terms such as ‘elderly’ and instead used ‘older adult(s)’ or 
‘older person(s)’ to refer to participants. 
 
Participation was to be limited to individuals not suffering from evident cognitive 
impairment. Determining who might or might not fall into this category, particularly 
without requiring access to personal medical information, was a challenge.  To 
assist in this determination, liaison with an Engagement and Participation Officer at 
the Alzheimer’s Society was sought and who advised that:  
'not everyone with cognitive impairment or dementia will have a recognised 
diagnosis and/or they may not have insight into any difficulties they may 
experience.  The nature of dementia is also that there are some people who 
live with a diagnosis and would be able to participate in your focus groups.  
In other words, they could independently attend your group and participate 
in the discussions and you would be none the wiser unless they told you.'   
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For the reasons above, individuals with cognitive impairments or dementia were 
not specifically excluded but rather, the eligibility criteria on the information sheet 
required participants to be able to read and understand the information sheet, 
consent for themselves, independently attend the small group or individual 
interview and participate in discussions. Individuals who were able to engage with 
these recruitment steps were therefore deemed eligible to participate in the 
studies.  
 
5.7 Methodological Challenges 
Conducting research with an older adult population, particularly in contrast to the 
younger adult population, highlighted some specific challenges.  Although 
cognitively impaired older adults were not knowingly included in the study, some 
potential impediments emerged around the use of a realistic scenario.   Participants 
were told at the beginning that the scenario was entirely fictional and the 
documents indicated they were for research purposes only.  Despite this, in a few 
cases, it was clear from comments made that a few older adult participants had not 
grasped that the scenario was not real and had to be reminded of this, in some 
cases several times. 
 
There was also a challenge in confronting researcher bias in the second phase of 
the research.  The leaflet provided in this phase had two versions; one with 
additional explanatory information and one with basic listing of priority groups for 
vaccination.  When conducting an interview with a participant who, by virtue of 
factors such as age or gender, prompted an instinctive sense of protectiveness 
(often by reminding the researcher of her own older family members), there was an 
instinctive inclination to provide them with the more explanatory leaflet.  This 
inclination was suppressed, but was a challenge not present with research 
conducted in the student population.   
 
Coordinating logistics with this population group was also more challenging than 
with students as they tended to be less technologically active.  This meant that, 
often, if a participant was running late or was having difficulty finding their way to 
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the venue for the interview, they had no way to contact me as they were not in 
possession of a mobile phone.   Although some older adult participants were 
delayed, they were, on the whole, a very reliable population group with which to 
conduct research.   In contrast, the university students were much less consistent 
with last minute cancellations and no-shows being a regular feature of the 
recruitment process.  This contributed to the variance in interview group sizes and 
accounted for drop-outs. Interviews began to be scheduled with full capacity 
wherever possible and, in some cases, some of the larger groups occurred when all 
registered participants appeared. 
 
5.8 Chapter Summary  
This chapter examined the methods involved in the development, execution, and 
analysis of the older and younger adult interviews.  The study consisted of two-
phase, scenario-based research examining risk perception, behavioural intentions, 
and communication needs of two population groups with different profiles of risk.  
Chapters 6-8 will present the results of this research.  A detailed discussion of the 
outcomes and implications of the research is presented in Chapter 9. 
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6 Chapter VI: Perceptions of risk and behavioural responses amongst 
older adults in the face of an outbreak of pandemic influenza 
6.1 Chapter Overview 
The results of the first set of interviews with older adults (>70 years of age) are 
presented in this chapter.  These interviews were conducted in order to gain a 
better understanding of older adult perceptions and behavioural intentions with 
regard to a possible influenza pandemic.  Additionally, these interviews were 
designed to identify potential areas where improved communication would 
promote behaviour change to produce better health outcomes for older adults. 
6.2 Knowledge and Understanding of Pandemic Influenza 
When asked about their impressions of ‘pandemic influenza’, participants identified 
several key themes: historical points of reference, geographic spread, the number 
of individuals involved or affected, and the nature and nomenclature of a 
pandemic. 
 
Participants frequently referenced previous cases, or perceived cases, of pandemic, 
including Spanish flu, Avian flu, Ebola, and Plague. 
Historically Spanish flu in 1917 which killed more people, I gather, than the disaster 
of the First World War. And it affects continents not just countries, that’s how I see 
it. (Interview 4, Participant 3) 
 
Oh I think of the plague. (Interview 6, Participant 1) 
 
For a few participants, their use of the Spanish flu as a point of reference was 
influenced by personal connections. 
It reminds me of the flu that killed my grandfather in 1919, after the First World 
War, which I think killed more people, I think, than died in the War? (Interview 8, 
Participant 1) 
 
He came home on leave, he’d got Spanish flu and that was it. I never met him of 
course but. (Interview 10, Participant 3 [in reference to an uncle]) 
 
Some participants additionally referenced the pandemics of the mid-20th century; 
‘Asian flu’ (1957) and ‘Hong Kong flu’ (1968) though not necessarily with the correct 
timelines. 
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I mean there was Asian flu back in … I got flu then, I can remember I was pretty 
poorly with it, but it was in the seventies I would think, or sixties was it? It was a 
long time ago. (Interview 3, Participant 2) 
 
I’ve had Asian flu, I was quite young but I do remember passing out at assembly. 
And I was trying to work out when it was, but it was a long time ago, 1988! 
(Interview 12, Participant 1) 
 
Several participants correctly identified pandemic as being geographically 
widespread. 
 ‘Well Pandemic means it’s everywhere, presumably. From Greek. … …There’s no 
escape from its presence, certainly, whether you catch it or not’s another thing, 
but certainly will be everywhere.  You can’t travel across to Ireland or something to 
escape it. It is international, a pandemic. (Interview 3, Participant 1) 
 
I think it means pretty enormous, pretty wide covering pandemic, that’s what I 
think of first. (Interview 5, Participant 1) 
 
Within the theme of geographic spread however, there was some confusion 
regarding the difference between a ‘pandemic’ and an ‘epidemic’ both in terms of 
definition as well as perceived risk. 
Yes, it’s a new word this pandemic, isn’t it? It’s like a new word, isn’t it? (Interview 
12, Participant 5) 
 
If I’m honest, and I like to think I keep myself up to date, but if I’m honest it 
[epidemic] would get my attention more. Pandemic would be slightly dismissive I 
think. (Interview 12, Participant 1) 
 
The consideration of geographic spread and the etymology of ‘pandemic’ vs 
‘epidemic’ was effectively dismissed for some participants who either incorrectly 
identified geographic limitations for a pandemic or felt that the global nature of 
such an occurrence was largely irrelevant to them. 
I would have thought it’d mean just in this country now, not for other countries, 
no. (Interview 1, Participant 1) 
 
I mean until probably around 1980 there used to be regular sort of flu epidemics 
and I suppose I never really thought whether they came from other countries or 
whether universal, you just focussed on your own situations.  (Interview 4, 
Participant 1) 
 
The zoonotic origins and naming protocols of more recent publicized flu strains 
(Swine flu, Avian flu) also resulted in some confusion as to human transmissibility 
and susceptibility. 
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So that was swine flu you’re talking about in 2009 so it’s not necessarily human, 
things that affect humans directly? (Interview 3, Participant 2) 
 
But swine flu, you can imagine it would really only get caught by swine but it was 
more widespread than that, wasn’t it? (Interview 9, Participant 2) 
 
Several participants also felt that a pandemic would be distinguished by a 
significant number of people infected and the extent that public services would be 
severely affected.  
‘Mass illness. Mass deaths. Hospitals being…well, doctors being inundated and 
hospitals not being able to cope. And it’s not a very pleasant picture.’ (Interview 2, 
Participant 1) 
 
Seems to give me the feeling that hospitals would be closed because they would be 
so packed out with people, and everybody would be walking round wearing masks. 
I think there would be some state of high alert across the country, that perhaps 
public places would be closed. And it’s quite frightening. (Interview 2, Participant 2) 
 
Pandemic as involving a new strain of influenza, distinct from seasonal flu was not 
commonly referenced but did come up in one interview. 
I was just thinking of a new… if I mentioned new virus, I was thinking of like a 
mutation or something, so that it could be a virus we already know of but coming 
in a different form? (Interview 5, Participant 2) 
 
Participants did, however, note a distinction between the flu, as a general concept, 
not specific to seasonal or pandemic, and other illnesses, in particular, colds and a 
tendency for ‘people’ to either conflate the two or to confuse flu with other 
illnesses. 
Actually, you’re saying, ‘The flu and a cold, what’s the difference?’ Personally, I feel 
there is quite a big difference, and I think they’ve merged together as being one 
because people with bad colds are convinced they’ve got the flu. And, personally, I 
don’t think they’re the same. I think it’s like, ‘What have you done, broken your 
fingernail or broken your finger? (Interview 1, Participant 2) 
 
Right, cause obviously when somebody gets a bad cold they always say, ‘Oh, I’ve 
got the flu.’  People’s misconception, including me. I’m actually ignorant of what flu 
is. (Interview 2, Participant 1) 
 
Additionally, several participants identified that antibiotics would not be of use with 
the flu. 
And I think a lot of people muddle one with the other. Like this, ‘Let’s go back to 




My first response is since 1918 we’ve developed a whole range of antibiotics, so if 
it’s that kind of virus then … although antibiotics aren’t much good with viruses, are 
they? (Interview 5, Participant 2) 
 
Some modern conveniences were seen as potentially detrimental to flu prevention, 
with the London underground and central heating and air conditioning being 
among the factors perceived to contribute to potential future illness. 
In which case, the fact that we’re all on the underground and we’ve all got central 
heating and we’ve all got air conditioning…one person sneezes on the ground floor 
and the people on the 14th floor get their share, through the air conditioner.’  
(Interview 1, Participant 2) 
 
But again I go back to when we were young, we never had any heating, we never 
had any colds. (Interview 7, Participant 3) 
 
 
6.3 Baseline Perceptions of Risk 
6.3.1 The Lexicon of ‘Risk’ and ‘Vulnerability’ 
Whilst several participants considered the terms ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerability’ to be 
interchangeable, many participants felt that whilst linked these terms could be 
distinguished.    
I think they might be two halves of the same coin. The more vulnerable people are 
at the greater risk. (Interview 1, Participant 2) 
 
To me, vulnerable is a more serious condition than being at risk. It implies that 
there’s just a few more factors for example coming in to play that would make you 
particularly more at risk, well more risk, vulnerable than people who were just at 
risk. So you could say for example anybody over 70’s at risk. Well, OK … but if you 
said, ‘You’ve got a vulnerability …’ Let’s say I suffered badly from lung problems, 
something like that, I think I would be more vulnerable. (Interview 13, Participant 
1) 
 
Vulnerability, as opposed to risk, was also connected to a sense of helplessness or 
of being in a situation or position that makes one less able to manage it. 
I may be totally wrong … to a certain degree you could identify an at risk group.  … I 
think I know what I want to say but I … it’s not coming out very well … they became 
vulnerable because of the position, the circumstances they found themselves in. 
(Interview 5, Participant 1) 
 
Yes, I suppose vulnerability, I think as you get older you realise you are more 
vulnerable to these things and also I think you realise that potentially you may not 




A few participants questioned the prevailing assumption around vulnerability and 
older adults. 
They need more help all round, because let’s say already they’re vulnerable 
because they have a lot of medical issues, they need more help because probably 
they have a lot of psychological issues. Because some people medically are fit and 
well, but honestly, they don’t want to leave their home because they don’t have 
friends, they don’t get on with their neighbours, or they don’t go out, so they don’t 
even know who their neighbours are. So being vulnerable comes in different ways. 
(Interview 6, Participant 1) 
 
Unfortunately it’s a word that’s used and bounced about I think perhaps a little bit 
too much these days. … Everybody’s vulnerable, a child is vulnerable, a teenager’s 
vulnerable, thirty-year-olds are vulnerable, we’re all vulnerable from different 
things that happen around us and our lifestyles, especially these days when there’s 
so much around that you can buy, pick up, use, be given and stuff, in terms of 
drugs and alcohol and all that, so I think vulnerable is overused really. I think we 
need to find some other way of getting people’s attention really, rather than 
vulnerable because, as you said, we’re all suddenly vulnerable the minute you hit 
50. (Interview 12, Participant 4) 
 
6.3.2 At-Risk Groups 
Participants identified four categories of group they considered to be ‘at risk’: the 
immunocompromised, those affected by lifestyle or occupational factors, those at 
risk due to socio-economic conditions and, atypical or broader populations. By far, 
the most commonly identified group believed to be at risk or vulnerable fell into 
the immunocompromised category.   This included individuals with existing medical 
conditions that compromised their immune systems. 
If you’re already on cancer treatment and you’ve got very little immunity, that 
actually could be not three weeks in bed; that could be a death sentence (Interview 
1, Participant 2) 
 
And people that have got respiratory problems. (Interview 2, Participant 2) 
 
Older adults were included in this category as a result of age-related reduction in 
immunity. 
But I would’ve thought age would… the older you are I thought, in as much as your 
general resistance to your health declines, I would’ve thought older people would 
be… more vulnerable. (Interview 9, Participant 2) 
 
And I think older people, we are more vulnerable, your immune system as you get 
older isn’t as good as when you’re young, is it? (Interview 11, Participant 4) 
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Infants and children were also included as a risk group, largely on the grounds that 
their immune systems are not yet fully developed. 
…obviously children and young babies would be at risk because they haven’t built 
up any inbuilt resistance to that. (Interview 13, Participant 1) 
 
Maybe older age-group and the younger, both ends, both extremes. Anybody 
who’s got any … any compromised health. (Interview 5, Participant 2) 
 
In addition to potentially being compromised as a result of having less robust 
immune systems, one participant also highlighted that groups such as children and 
older adults are increasingly vulnerable due to their dependence on others. 
Why? Well, because influenza can lead onto other things if you’re not careful about 
it and I think if you particularly are old and frail one thing leads to another I’m 
afraid. Young babies simply because they don’t have a number of things you can 
build up in terms of resistance, they just don’t have life experiences, so they’re 
very, very dependent on obviously others to help out, and in a sense both of those 
people, they are … well they are both people, I think they’re groups that are more 
dependent on others. (Interview 13, Participant 1) 
 
Conversely, one participant also identified the potential benefit to older adults of 
having been previously exposed and developed immunity.   
It’s a funny question. I don’t know why, but I think when you’re at risk … it worries 
me, and probably should, but … I think perhaps older people … some older people 
anyway, who’ve had a lot of illnesses when they were young, might have a better 
immunity. I also think well older people maybe it doesn’t matter so much, we’ve 
had our lives and … I don’t know, the young ones are the worry I think. (Interview 
5, Participant 1) 
 
Lifestyle or occupational factors were also referenced as contributing to risk. 
Frequent or unavoidable exposure to germs was seen as a potential risk, such as for 
working-age people having to commute on public transit.   
I don’t feel vulnerable because I’m, how can I put it, being retired now I’m not 
generally mixing with larger parts of the community like travelling on the tube or… 
(Interview 4, Participant 1) 
 
And also I find people who commute to work on trains, because on the transport 
you’re standing there and you’re breathing in and the way those trains and busses 
are packed, I think … it affects all ages really, you can’t put an age on a child or an 
elderly person. I think it affects everybody. (Interview 11, Participant 1) 
 
Diet and exercise were also brought up, both as risk factors as well as in relation to 
activities that could reduce the chance of becoming ill.   
People with poor diets. (Interview 3, Participant 1) 
 
 127 
Or one sided diets. Too much pork or too much sugar, overweight people, people 
who won’t exercise in the fresh air, people who drive everywhere in cars or people 
who go to work on public transport every day with all the bugs floating around the 
vehicle, that could cause it as well. So nobody’s really safe. (Interview 3, Participant 
3) 
 
Additionally, socio-economic conditions such as poverty were identified as a 
potential risk factors, often phrased in terms of vulnerability.  
Vulnerable people. Through poverty, through disabilities, through very tender or 
very elderly age or through unhygienic surroundings, as we had in a film yesterday. 
(Interview 3, Participant 3) 
 
And then there’s the awful concept of social stratification, even in the older age 
group social class 1, 2 and 3 may be more vulnerable than social class 3 and 4. 
(Interview 4, Participant 3 
 
Health care workers were also identified as a population that would have greater 
exposure to the virus but the effect this would have in terms of risk was not 
universally clear as participants indicated it would be both a greater risk but also 
result in immunity development.   
But also medical people who are going to come in touch, contact with it. (Interview 
8, Participant 2) 
 
It’s one way of becoming immune is if you’re constantly exposed to it like some 
doctors and surgeons are. (Interview 3, Participant 3) 
 
While perceptions of who is at-risk were generally in line with groups routinely 
listed in seasonal flu advisories, or those individuals more reliant on social 
programs, a few participants did recognise that during a pandemic there could be 
an atypical profile of risk. 
I think the basis is we don’t know what we’re talking about. If we’re talking about 
Spanish flu, then that wiped millions out – of people that appeared to be quite 
healthy. (Interview 1, Participant 2) 
 
I’ve heard somewhere, but when things like this do happen, healthy people are 
more likely to catch it than people that have been previously ill and have been 
treated. (Interview 7, Participant 3) 
 
Consequently, some participants felt that there wouldn’t be divisions around at-risk 
groups as the entire population would be at risk. 
When you say, ‘at risk’, I think this would apply to the whole population. If you’re 
talking about a flu pandemic, then ‘at risk’ would be the whole population, 
wouldn’t it? (Interview 2, Participant 1) 
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Everybody would be at risk. (Interview 7, Participant 1) 
 
6.3.3 Challenges for Older Adults 
In identifying aspects of an influenza pandemic that might prove particularly 
challenging for older adults, responses broadly clustered around the themes of 
coping challenges and communication challenges.  Additionally, some participants 
expressed the view that, not only would there not be any challenges particular to 
older adults, but older adults would be as capable as the rest of the population in 
dealing with a pandemic. 
Yeah, and I think older people as well are a bit more fatalistic about it, they’ve gone 
through a lot in their lives and then there’s a pandemic, well this is another 
problem to cope with but we’re not gonna stop living a normal life, we’re still 
coming over here to play golf and do that sort of thing. (Interview 4, Participant 2) 
 
Yes, because if you are elderly and you’re reasonably fit, then you’re just carrying 
on like everybody else, aren’t you, aren’t we? I mean there are things like… the fact 
that I don’t bother with social media, but I know a lot of older people do because 
they like to keep in touch with their families that way. But apart from that I feel I’m 
fairly connected to the world and maybe… I’m not quite as strong or don’t have 
quite the stamina that I used to have but I don’t see that that would make much 
difference really. (Interview 5, Participant 2) 
 
6.3.3.1  Coping Challenges 
Participants frequently identified solitary living as a potential challenge for older 
adults.   
There must be a whole swathe of people who have little or nothing in the way of 
support, ‘cause they live on their own. (Interview 1, Participant 2) 
 
If you’ve got a 80 odd year old lady living on her own, she’s got flu, if nobody 
knows, she could be in there with no food and no nothing. (Interview 7, Participant 
1) 
 
When asked about the concept of “flu friends”, most participants indicated the 
term was unfamiliar to them.  However, whilst the lexicon may not be known, the 
idea behind ‘flu friends’ was quite familiar to participants and, in many cases, 
already in action with several participants indicating they were either already 
looking in on an older neighbor or were confident their friends and neighbour 
would be there to help in the event of a pandemic. 
 
Well, I think these instances of these people who need this kind of help are very 
few, you know, it’s amazing the neighbourness that’s still around in neighbours. I 
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mean we did have a 90-year-old man living next door to us, his wife died and my 
wife and the lady opposite I know kept a constant eye on him. (Interview 9, 
Participant 1) 
 
Well I think most of us have families who ring us or friends, and I mean if they don’t 
see you for a day they’re knocking to see if you’re alright or phoning you up, aren’t 
they? (Interview 12, Participant 5) 
 
While none of the participants directly identified that they would have difficulty in 
finding a ‘flu friend’, several did express a sense that societal changes could make 
this a more difficult prospect in general. 
As well, I mean, the population are… People are becoming more insular, in a way, 
when you’re living hours and hours like that. They are, unfortunately. I’d say that 
people move so often that…especially with rented accommodation, they’re in, 
maybe, for three or four months… … and then they moved on, they moved on. So 
you’re never that close to your neighbours. (Interview 1, Participant 1) 
 
Yeah, people should make sure that old people are looked after by somebody, if 
not family. (Interview 7, Participant 1) 
Care in the community has completely gone now. (Interview 7, Participant 3 
It’s gone. (Interview 7, Participant 2) 
Nobody cares anymore. (Interview 7, Participant 3) 
We don’t have that like we used to have, I don’t think. I mean a lot of people, they 
don’t even know their next-door neighbour. (Interview 7, Participant 1) 
 
Additionally, some participants felt that accessing food and care could prove 
challenging for some older adults. 
I’d be thinking it could be quite challenging because if people are frightened. We 
were saying about supermarkets, people could be trying to stockpile food and 
groceries of any sort. And I wouldn’t like to be in the way of people trying to 
stockpile as they’re rushing round the supermarkets and grabbing things. I think it 
could be rather nasty because some older people are able to still push people out 
the way, but others aren’t. (Interview 2, Participant 2) 
 
Well, no, providing you’re mobile and you can get to a doctor I don’t think there’s 
any problem, but if you’re housebound I doubt whether there’s the resources at 
your local GP surgery for someone to come out and give you a flu jab. (Interview 9, 
Participant 1) 
	
6.3.3.2 Communication Challenges 
Accessibility and comprehension of information were identified as communication 
challenges particular to older adults.  The increase in societal and governmental 
reliance on technology for the acquisition and dissemination of information as well 
as the provision of services was seen to be potentially detrimental to older adults. 
But I suppose there’s a lot of old people who don’t even have internet access and 
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so on, we’re assuming that we can all have that communication, which is really, by 
far, the best sort of communication and also it can be reliable if it’s from the Health 
Department. But I suppose with a lot of people who don’t have access to 
computers are dependent on somebody actually physically knocking on their door 
and telling them what’s what. (Interview 4, Participant 2) 
 
And a lot of people over eighty don’t do ordering food online, including me. 
(Interview 8, Participant 1) 
 
Older adults were also viewed by their peers as potentially having difficulty in 
understanding and acting on information provided, such as recommendations 
around what to do in the event of a pandemic. 
When you get older, it takes longer for things to sink in, unfortunately. And if 
people have been by themselves, they get out the habit of communication. 
(Interview 2, Participant 2) 
 
But you need to… not necessarily from a personal level but from a global UK level 
you would need to be aware of whether the rest of the age group was interpreting 
the facts properly and taking precautions.(Interview 4, Participant 3) 
 
Whilst several of the perceived challenges identified by participants are not 
necessarily restricted to older adults, such as individuals living alone with little to no 
support, these may be more prevalent amongst the older adult population.  
Additionally, perceived challenges around access to information in an increasingly 
technological-reliant world, was a recurring theme with this age group. 
 
6.4 Risk Perception in response to the Scenario 
6.4.1 Stage One: On the Cusp of an Outbreak 
In Stage One of the scenario, participants were shown a newspaper article 
reporting on an outbreak of influenza in Greece.  Although it had yet to reach UK 
shores, or be declared a pandemic, the government was considering a travel ban 
due to the severity. Participant responses to the first stage of the scenario were not 
consistent. Some expressed concern for their future wellbeing whilst others 
indicated the outbreak in Greece wouldn’t really resonate with them.  Regardless of 
whether they were concerned or ambivalent about the perceived risk, participants 
were broadly in agreement on one matter: geography.  The fact that the outbreak 
was not taking place in the UK meant that it was or could be perceived as less of a 
threat. 
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I think you are inclined to think, ‘Oh, it’s happening out there. It’s not happening 
here.’ (Interview 11, Participant 4) 
It’s not happening here so why worry about it.(Interview 11, Participant 2) 
Yeah, I think that’s the general view.(Interview 11, Participant 1) 
 
I wouldn’t really respond to this sort of article because I’d read it and it’s like every 
other story you read, next week it’ll be something else. And alright, it may be if I 
had a holiday planned to Greece I might consider it but living in London and there’s 
little outbreak of flu in Greece I’d say really no, no it’s not… I’d just read it and say, 
‘That’s interesting’, but until it got worse or until it was something else I wouldn’t 
take any notice of it. (Interview 4, Participant 2) 
 
In considering the geographical distance and its related effect on threat 
perceptions, several participants seemed not to take into account the nature and 
potential spread of influenza, with one participant comparing the situation to an 
earthquake. 
Turn to the next page. Not impressive really from my point of view. It’s this part of 
the world it’s happened. And I don’t think I’d really think about it that much. Like 
an earthquake killing millions in China …( Interview 3, Participant 1) 
 
I would be thinking, ‘I’m grateful for the English Channel.’ (Interview 2, Participant 
2) 
 
The number of individuals suspected to be infected in the UK also influenced 
perceptions of risk. 
… but three people … now we have a population of about 64 million so statistically 
the chances of me touching any of those, or even if it was double that, is extremely 
remote. So I say look, I have much more chance of being knocked down by a 
number 19 bus as I do actually … ‘cause they’re the busses where I live, than this 
affecting me. (Interview 13, Participant 1) 
 
Oh no, if it was just three people I wouldn’t even think about it. (Interview 12, 
Participant 4) 
 
Many participants also communicated a high level of acceptance of risk.  
 
Yeah, I think it’s when you get older you kind of… you’ve only got a few years left - 
you don’t spend it worrying about things, do you? (Interview 4, Participant 2) 
Yeah, certainly. I was just thinking that… I mean tomorrow we’re going to a 
fabulous concert and I don’t think anything would prevent me from going into 
town for that. (Interview 4, Participant 1) 
 
Do you know what? Nobody is free of risk. I will see myself as being at risk, but 
being me, not my neighbour or my friend, I know that I will not panic. I know that 
even without an influenza or plague, or whatever, in the air, I take reasonable 
precautions anyway. It just means that for somebody like me, I will review the 
precautions I take and if I have to beef up some of them, I will, definitely. But I will 
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not panic, because at the end of the day, life has to go on - that’s me being positive 
- and they will need people who are fit and well and have taken good precautions 
for all hands to be on deck to help the others, so that… we cannot at the end of the 
day leave everything to the medical professionals. (Interview 6, Participant 1) 
 
Some participants attributed their resilience to risk in relation to their wartime 
experiences.  
But all these disasters and all these panics, you slot it away as that’s happening to 
someone else, that’s not actually affecting me so you don’t take any reaction, you 
don’t do anything about it. (Interview 9, Participant 1) 
Like the war, oh that bomb’s on somebody else, next one... (Interview 9, 
Participant 2) 
 
Not really because I mean we lived during the war, I mean there was bombs going 
off but we still went to dances and pictures (Interview 10, Participant 3) 
 
6.4.2 Stage Two: Pandemic is Declared 
In Stage Two of the scenario participants were given a second article to read which 
brought the pandemic scenario forward several weeks to a point where deaths had 
occurred in the UK and the WHO had declared a pandemic.  Participants were then 
asked to comment on their reaction to it; whether they felt at risk and whether 
they would change anything in their day-to-day routine.   Risk perceptions 
increased in the second half of the scenario though many of the themes from the 
first stage continued to be present. 
 
Geography continued to play an important role in affecting participant perceptions 
of risk.  Although the virus had now reached the UK, many participants expressed 
the view that the pandemic needed to be felt at a more local level to resonate. 
London is a very large place, and if it was in west London, I think I’d feel, ‘We’re OK; 
we’re in east London. All right, maybe not such a big worry.’ But if it turned out to 
be east London, Tower Hamlets, Newham, you’d think, ‘Mm, it’s getting a bit 
close.’ (Interview 2, Participant 1) 
 
I think that would be my reaction, you know, what you’ve said in this particular 
article is raising the temperature, as it were, of the whole thing a bit compared 
with the previous article, isn’t it, and that’s the object no doubt?  But it’s still not… I 
mean if your next one says 12 people dropped dead in the street yesterday in 
Ealing Broadway, you know, then this is coming close to home. (Interview 9, 
Participant 2) 
 
In concert with locality, the statistics of the outbreak vis-à-vis morbidity/mortality 
also affected perceptions of risk.  
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The problem about all these numbers though is that I don’t know and I don’t think 
many people would know how many people die every day in this country anyway 
and it’s very hard to do the calculation out of 60 million of… it’s like how many 
people get killed in road accidents, very tragically, is a lot more than got killed by 
London Bridge, the statistics… (Interview 8, Participant 1) 
 
I think really the second paragraph about the 5,000 cases in the UK, that really 
made me sit up, and 12 fatalities. I thought wow, I would be taking care. I think I 
would be trying to get hold of some mask to put on if I had to go … certainly if I had 
to go into town on the tube or something. (Interview 5, Participant 2) 
 
Additionally, the sense of increased scope of the pandemic influenced intentions to 
adopt protective behaviours. 
This is quite different for me, because this is real and there’s a death. We don’t 
know enough about that. There’s information coming from the Chief Medical 
Officer about vaccines and work is being done so this … the number of cases … 
there’s a huge number of cases reported and there’ve been deaths so I’d go into a 
little bit of action and I would then think of … look at myself, my family, I mean if I 
had a flu vaccination, I had other vaccinations, what else is there available? 
(Interview 5, Participant 1) 
 
For me 12 people … it’s got to be thousands I think. And it’s got to be around for 
me to start thinking well perhaps I should start doing something now. If I was 
travelling up to London and there’d been some deaths up in London I might be a bit 
more careful about … I might wear gloves or something, or take my wipes and be a 
bit more careful what I touch. (Interview 12, Participant 4) 
	
6.5 Behavioural Intentions 
This section will present the behavioural intentions of older adult participants in the 
event of pandemic.  After going through the scenario, participants were specifically 
asked to comment on the behaviours of interest; hand hygiene, isolation, 
respiratory hygiene, seeking medical assistance, and vaccination. It was not unusual 
for participants to have spontaneously referenced these behaviours at a prior stage 
of the interview. 
 
6.5.1 Hand Hygiene 
Handwashing was broadly viewed as an effective behaviour to prevent the spread 
of illness.   
And also it’s very annoying, because if people don’t wash their hands, they might 
give themselves something and they’re diverting services away from others while 
they get cured. I think it’s very selfish and it’s horrible. (Interview 2, Participant 2) 
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Well it’s [handwashing] eminently sensible and highly doable. (Interview 13, 
Participant 1) 
 
Some participants also identified this behaviour as being specifically useful with 
regards to not picking up germs and preventing infection by touching one’s face. 
I would wipe my hands. You know, I would take personal precautions, definitely. 
Because as we say, if you wipe your hands often, keep them clean, depending on 
which surfaces you touch, there is less possibility that you will touch something and 
then go like this [touching one’s face], or you know, even doing this [touching one’s 
face] to protect yourself, others, from coughing, you’re transferring some germs to 
yourself. (Interview 6, Participant 1) 
 
Well it’s about transmission of germs, disease, bacteria, anything that is 
contractable and you can pick it up and pass it round and if you’ve got it yourself 
you can pass it on. It’s just one of … it’s interesting, as you mention it, I suppose in 
the older generation that was probably made slightly clearer. It was one of those 
things that was just drummed into you, picking up germs, don’t pass on germs, that 
sort of thing. I wouldn’t go into too much technical detail about that. I would just 
get the strapline, wash your hands, don’t you know there’s a war on. (Interview 13, 
Participant 1) 
 
Uncertainty over infection transmission routes did, however, raise questions in the 
minds of a few participants around the effectiveness of handwashing. 
I don’t think there’s anything you can do about it ‘cause I mean it’s in the air 
whether you wash your hands and pick your nose doesn’t make any difference. It’s 
around you. You’re basically in the hands of the gods. (Interview 3, Participant 1) 
 
I’m in favour of washing hands and using isopropyl gel as an antiseptic, but I’m not 
sure how important that would be with influenza, ‘cause most of the spread I think 
is droplet spread in the air and the inhalation, you don’t absorb very much 
influenza virus through the skin, as far as I know. (Interview 4, Participant 3) 
 
A number of participants indicated that they made, or in the case of a pandemic, 
would make, a point of either washing hands or using hand sanitizing gel or wipes.  
In many cases this was an activity they would either actively plan for or one that 
had become habit. 
And so if this did happen, definitely one of the things I would do is check out if 
there had there been any extra vaccines, one. Two, I would carry this, I would carry 
extra wipes, so that wherever I go, I touch thing. (Interview 6, Participant 1) 
 
Another thing I also… ‘cause I go into London a lot, I always make sure I wash my 
hands, whether that’s silly or not but I always do if I go to a restaurant or theatre or 
somewhere I always go wash my hands and my partner, she carries around one of 




Hand gels were considered to be a functional and cost-effective way to promote 
hand hygiene. 
Yes, I think if it became an epidemic, or pandemic, yes, then you might be 
worthwhile because you’re going out touching things and people are not as 
hygienic as they should be. At the end of the day we’re all guilty of that I would 
think, so yes, I would just be a little bit more careful. You know that hand gel stuff? 
Well when I’ve walked the dog I always clean my hands and the car keys, because 
I’ve touched the car keys to get in the car to get the gel if I’ve been handling the 
dog’s ball ‘cause I never know what’s gonna be on that ball when he picks, when I 
pick it up and throw it. So stuff, hand gels, they’re so cheap, everyone should have 
a couple of those. (Interview 12, Participant 4) 
 
My grandchildren, when they were younger and they used to come and stay, they 
wouldn’t wash their – would come out the toilet and not wash their hands, so what 
I always kept was that hand, that’s a brilliant idea, the hand sanitizer. Since they 
brought that out, and people can carry them in their pocket. (Interview 11, 
Participant 1) 
 
Several participants made reference to hand gel stations in public areas but 
indicated there was more work to be done in promoting the use and proliferation 
of hand gel. 
But I think the ones on the walls are very good. And again, we saw – I know we’re 
diverting… We’re very involved with our doctor’s surgery. We’re on the Patient 
Participation Group, and one of the things we do keep an eye on is the hand-
washes on the wall. And if ever they’re empty, we do always bring it to the practice 
manager’s attention. It’s been quite – not bad, recently. (Interview 2, Participant 1) 
 
I think it would be like if you go into hospitals now you’re used to hand washes, you 
know, gels and I think that’s becoming more and more accepted – public toilets 
really should have gels. That’s something that’s so very simple and very basic, so 
something like that. I think older people, because they’ve got a bit more time, they 
haven’t got to rush around so much so, they’ve got time to gel their hands and do 
them things. I think some of the people who will take that on board they realise 
that if they want a certain quality of life for their remaining years you’ve got to be 
careful and look after yourself, so I think they would take it on. (Interview 4, 
Participant 2) 
 
Similarly, participants expressed concerns that, whilst they were diligent about 
handwashing, other members of society were not necessarily as vigilant or were 
less aware of the proper process. 
I’ve been into the toilets when some people come out and walk straight out. 
(Interview 10, Participant 1) 
Don’t even wash their hands. (Interview 10, Participant 2) 
You know, you can’t do that. (Interview 10, Participant 1) 
You can’t… (Interview 10, Participant 3) 
You can’t win. (Interview 10, Participant 2) 
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Yes, how do people wash their hands? How do you wash your hands? Sorry, I 
meant sort of part of the question, isn’t it? Well the answer is ten seconds … I think 
it’s probably a ditty or something you can … is it happy birthday? Something like 
that anyway, it’s one of those. Now it may seem silly but I would never assume 
people know how to wash their hands in this time, ‘cause if you’re giving that as 
advice but you’d have to say, ‘Think about it, I know it’s obvious, but the evidence 
is you just need to do perhaps a bit longer than you think and a little bit more 
thoroughly than you think.’ (Interview 13, Participant 1) 
 
6.5.2 Isolation 
Voluntary isolation was independently identified by a few participants as a primary 
means of avoiding illness.  
Well, you’d isolate yourself really. (Interview 10, Participant 2) 
Yeah, you would really. (Interview 10, Participant 3) 
Tell the family not to come round for a while until it’s sorted out, yeah. (Interview 
10, Participant 2) 
 
To avoid getting sick? Stay at home. (Interview 5, Participant 1) 
 
A few participants also indicated they would consider stocking up on non-
perishable items in preparation for social isolation. 
But I don’t know, I think I would carry on going out, but I would be nervous and I’d 
be following the news very closely and I’d also probably be beginning to get a few 
things into the house. I’d be bringing back some water and some tins of food and 
things <chuckles>, and thinking about what’s coming. Not in a huge way but I’d do 
a bit of that I think. (Interview 1, Participant 2) 
 
But also people might want extra tissues, loo paper, paracetamol, and that’s a good 
thing to publicise if it’s coming on. (Interview 8, Participant 2) 
To get that stuff in ahead of time. (Interview 8, Participant 1) 
Either to have it in because it keeps and also other people can drop that in, the sort 
of basic things like that. (Interview 8, Participant 2) 
 
Several challenges, however, were also identified in staying home, including the 
need to run day-to-day errands. 
Keep away, yeah. And marketplaces too, you wouldn’t go anywhere where it’s 
busy. (Interview 11, Participant 4) 
 
But you’d still have to go out and get shopping. (Interview 11, Participant 2) 
 
Participants often used a cost-benefit analysis in their consideration of whether to 
limit social interactions weighing their perceived need or desire to go out against 
the perceived risk or threat. 
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I might not be so keen to dash off up the pictures or somewhere unnecessary. Not 
at this stage, at a later stage I might be thinking, ‘Perhaps I won’t go to such 
crowded places.’ It’s a lifestyle thing. (Interview 1, Participant 2) 
 
Yeah, in some ways…yeah, how bad it gets. When you see in any part of the world 
we live in… It all depends how a pandemic… Obviously it’d be serious if it’s in the 
area, but if it’s in the country, I would still have to go out in the morning – I go 
walking, I go to the shops. I have to go to the shops. (Interview 1, Participant 1) 
 
6.5.3 Respiratory Hygiene 
Several participants indicated (and demonstrated) they were prepared for coughs 
and sneezes and carry around tissues or handkerchiefs.  
Tissue en route – well, I’ve always got tissues on me. (Interview 2, Participant 1) 
 
Or use one of these [handkerchief] (Interview 12, Participant 2) 
 
Although respiratory hygiene was viewed as an effective means of preventing 
illness, some potential barriers did emerge such as challenge of having a tissue at 
the ready. 
Yes, if you can get your handkerchief or your tissue out in time, before you cough 
and sneeze. (Interview 3, Participant 3) 
Yeah. (Interview 3, Participant 1) 
Not always possible because sneezing and coughing are often spontaneous 
(Interview 3, Participant 3) 
 
But also sneezing and coughing and getting a hanky out, that sort of thing … I feel 
quite strongly about that anyway. My husband infuriates me because he sneezes 
and just does it, just sneezes and … I always manage, almost always manage to get 
there first with a hanky so I think … probably the majority of people are more like 
my husband and wouldn’t really bother, but I should think that would be important 
if you could possibly persuade people to have hankies with them and also wash 
their hands a lot and … (Interview 5, Participant 2) 
 
Additionally, one participant underlined the challenge of disposing of tissues as a 
potential barrier to use. 
And paper handkerchiefs are widely available at a reasonable price, it’s the disposal 
of them if you’re out and about. The wonderful sniffle stations of the Canadian ski 
resorts, the concept of hiding all the waste paper bins ‘cause you’re afraid of 
terrorists putting bombs in them –…No, no seriously, would have to be overcome 
and would have to be a reasonable site to dispose of the paper handkerchiefs. 
(Interview 4, Participant 3) 
 
As with handwashing, some participants expressed a perception that members of 
the general public did not, perhaps, recognise the importance of good respiratory 
hygiene. 
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Well and also, don’t you think, no disrespect to anybody ‘cause I’m in the same 
age-group but do you not think most people are now too set in their ways to 
change their ways. If they’re not using their tissues and they’re not washing their 
hands, they’re not gonna start now, in their seventies, eighties and nineties.. … So 
it’s the young ones, like my grandchildren, if they cough or sneeze I say, ‘Put your 
hand over your mouth and go and wash your hands’. (Interview 12, Participant 4) 
 
I would say they [respiratory hygiene measures] were helpful… but you’re talking 
to two middleclass suburban men where you’ve been brought up to a certain 
hygiene standard at home and at school and at work and so on and a lot of it is 
automatic, you know, when you get flu or the start of a cold the first thing you do is 
to go out and buy tissues, men-sized tissues, and that sits on the table there all the 
time for anybody to take it and that’s used and binned. That’s ingrained in you, 
isn’t it? (Interview 9, Participant 1) 
 
While most participants discussed the efforts they consciously take to practice what 
they perceive as good respiratory hygiene, the notion of ‘sneezing into your sleeve’ 
was not generally well regarded.  This reluctance to ‘sneeze into your sleeve’ often 
resulted from a sense it would be unhygienic. 
But then you’re coughing the germs onto that [sleeve] and it’s going to pass onto 
the next person. (Interview 7, Participant 1) 
 
Because the germs are still there, aren’t they? (Interview 10, Participant 1) 
 
One participant, however, indicated his reluctance to use his arm or elbow (rather 
than a tissue or hand) stemmed more from a concern over societal approbation.  
If I cough, I usually cough into my hands. I don’t look aside and I don’t go like 
that, ’cause everybody’d think I might be wiping my nose on my sleeve. I don’t 
know. (Interview 2, Participant 2) 
 
6.5.4 Seeking Medical Assistance 
Participant motivations for going to or avoiding the GP were based on several 
factors including risk of infection, trust in their GP, and logistical challenges.  The 
risk of infection (either catching or spreading) was expressed by a few participants 
as a factor in seeking medical assistance. 
Well with our GP I’m afraid if I ring in the morning and ask for a home call, phone 
call, they ring me. I just tell them how I was and take advice on that. I wouldn’t go 
running to a surgery because that’s where you’re walking into germs and bugs. 
(Interview 7, Participant 1) 
 
A phone-call to the doctor, because if you’re ill they don’t want you in the surgery 
anyway, if you’re really ill. (Interview 12, Participant 1) 
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For many participants, going to see a doctor appeared to be an almost automatic 
response to the emerging health outbreak. 
Go and see the quack … the doctor. (Interview 3, Participant 1) 
Phone the doctor I would think. (Interview 3, Participant 2) 
Yeah. See the doctor. (Interview 3, Participant 4) 
 
No, as I’ve said, my first port of call is always the GP, I wouldn’t look it up, I 
probably wouldn’t understand half of the words anyway. (Interview 9, Participant 
1) 
 
Additionally, some participants felt that it was important for them to personally see 
a physician because their GP would be more aware of their medical history and 
potential health complications. 
Well I can’t [rely on an alternative means such as National Pandemic Flu Service] 
because I have to be careful what I take. I’d have to actually go and see a doctor. 
(Interview 7, Participant 4) 
 
You would take advice, wouldn’t you? If you worried, if you were worried and I’m 
saying we are very complacent and I think we two are quite typical, but if you were 
worried about it you’d go down to your doctor, surely, and say, ‘What must I do?’ 
You know my history, I’ve got sinus trouble and sometimes I get asthma and blah, 
blah, blah… and he will say, ‘Keep taking…’ (Interview 9, Participant 1) 
 
Participant intent or willingness to visit a GP office appeared to be influenced in 
part by logistics around whether the office would be accessible. 
 
So I’m not going to go to a GP, because there’s going to be queues, with everyone 
going there, for a start. (Interview 1, Participant 1) 
 
I don’t think I’d bother with the surgery, at first; I think I’d call 111. I might try the 
surgery, as well, but as you will probably know, it’s quite difficult sometimes to get 
through to practices. (Interview 2, Participant 2) 
 
While the GP appears to be the primary port-of-call for most participants for 
medical assistance, some suggested that the GP would be unable to do very much 
to assist in the event of an influenza pandemic. 
I’m saying yes but I think that in normal circumstances if it was like a feverish 
situation I would probably think that the GP wouldn’t be able to do much about it 
and I’d probably see how it went, but obviously if I deteriorated significantly at that 
juncture I would seek advice. (Interview 4, Participant 1) 
 
I think my worry would be, with the pandemic, as there’s no vaccine available, as 
you were saying by this, if you do contact the authorities, I think you’re just gonna 
get the advice: ‘Stay in bed and tuck up.’ (Interview 2, Participant 1) 
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When asked about the National Pandemic Flu Service, most participants thought a 
flu service would be helpful in the event of a pandemic; as long as it worked 
properly. 
A designated phone line? Yeah, I think it would be useful. Yes. (Interview 3, 
Participant 2) 
Yes. Does that still exist? I think it does. (Interview 3, Participant 3) 
‘cause then people wouldn’t panic, they’d think, ‘Oh, I’ve got this number I can ring 
and get the help.’ (Interview 3, Participant 2) 
 
Yeah, ‘cause even a phone-in service, if there was a pandemic we wouldn’t have 
confidence that the phones were gonna be answered and even websites could 
collapse, couldn’t they, there could be sort of volume. So, like you say, you’ve gotta 
have the information there 24 hours a day and it’s as accessible as you can make it. 
But yeah, certainly if there is an expert at the end of the phone I think most people 
now are quite used to ringing up helplines, but we’re also used to the fact that 
you’re number 59 in the queue. (Interview 4, Participant 2) 
 
One participant, though, was quite adamant in his disinclination to use this type of 
service, preferring to visit the GP. 
No, and that’s generational. I’m sure my children would immediately go on the 
web, I know my daughter-in-law would but me, I would go to the GP. (Interview 9, 
Participant 1) 
 
While a few participants expressed a preference for the website, there was a 
marked preference for using a phone-line.   Furthermore, even participants who 
indicated a first preference for the website, often indicated they would follow this 




Well, old people can’t use the website, that’s a known fact, I can’t. But when you 
phone and you get press this one, press that – (Interview 10, Participant 1) 
I think that’s a bit – (Interview 10, Participant 2) 
And that’s no good. (Interview 10, Participant 3) 
- that drives you up the wall. (Interview 10, Participant 2) 
No one wants to talk to you anymore. (Interview 10, Participant 1) 
No, they don’t. (Interview 10, Participant 2) 
You want to contact a person, a human being and not a voice thing, yeah, a human 
being, yes. (Interview 10, Participant 1) 
 




Additionally, the desire to speak and to interact with a human being was seen as 
paramount for some participants. 
I think I might go to the website to find the information and then I’d probably try 
the phone. But also it’s important to have local numbers for people to phone; not 
some number up in…there’s a call centre in Bangladesh; we would like a local 
number. (Interview 2, Participant 2) 
 
You can’t ask a website questions. (Interview 3, Participant 3) 
 
6.5.5 Vaccination 
For many participants, vaccination against seasonal flu has become a habitual 
action. Consequently, they would also be inclined to be vaccinated during a 
pandemic if this was advised: 
Apart from the government, if they did then get a vaccine and you were advised to 
take it, I would take it. I would do. Same as flu vaccination – I go for it every year. 
(Interview 1, Participant 1) 
 
Yeah. Well, the way I look at it, you can’t be much worse off with a vaccine, 
although we do have the flu vaccines every year. (Interview 2, Participant 1) 
 
This is supported by the large number of participants who indicated that they had 
taken the seasonal flu vaccine in the last year.  Of thirty-six participants, all but five 
indicated they had received the seasonal flu vaccine. Amongst the participants who 
had not received the vaccine, there was no consistency in reasons given.  Some said 
that they had not got into the habit of receiving the flu vaccine, whilst others felt 
that the seasonal flu vaccine was not effective as it did not cover all strains of flu.   
I’ve never had a flu jab. Never ever. I don’t know if I’d have one now. (Interview 12, 
Participant 5) 
 
But you see then everybody has a flu jab and then another type of flu crops up 
which isn’t covered by that jab. (Interview 9, Participant 2) 
The relative ease of receiving the seasonal flu vaccination, with GPs contacting 
patients and a variety of locations to get the vaccine, was referenced as an enabler 
to vaccination.  
My GP sends us a text saying … vaccine available from such a date. I just make an 
appointment to go. (Interview 7, Participant 3) 
 
Well, you can get flu jabs in the chemist these days or the GP but it’s been made 
more easily available for one thing, I think, and it’s been widely mentioned and 
talked about and everybody knows now about flu jabs. Some people still don’t take 
them but that’s not the point, they know about it and if they don’t take them then 
that’s their fault. (Interview 9, Participant 2) 
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Some participants expressed that, while they were in favour of the vaccine, they 
understood that others were not due to fears over vaccine safety. 
It didn’t occur to me that people would turn down or refuse to be vaccinated for 
something like this. If it’s going to save your life I think … it would be the best thing. 
I don’t know so much about it as you. I don’t know that people refuse. I mean I 
know things like measles and mumps, there’s been a huge discussion about that, 
but for flu, is that the same thing? (Interview 5, Participant 2) 
 
Well … I do know people who… and the flu vaccination doesn’t have a 100% 
uptake, does it, and I do know of people who should know better I think, but it’s 
nothing to do with me. Some people see vaccination as … introducing bugs into 
their system and it’s like people believe, some people readily believe that the flu 
vaccination gives them flu. (Interview 5, Participant 1) 
 
Additionally, one participant’s previous adverse reaction to a flu vaccine created a 
barrier to vaccination for that person. 
No, I was a carer and I had a flu injection, we had to have to A, the B, the C, 
whatever they are and the flu injection, but I had a very bad reaction, my arm 
swelled up and I’ve never had it since. (Interview 11, Participant 1) 
 
A few participants indicated that, though they would not normally be in favour of a 
vaccine, in the event of a pandemic, they would be prepared to reconsider their 
position. 
As much as I’m resistant to these sort of things, and I won’t expand on that, but I 
have life experience of suffering from immunisation. I think if something came out 
and we were all urged to have a jab I would go along and have it, because I think 
this is now escalating to something that is potentially very serious for the nation. 
(Interview 4, Participant 1) 
 
I’m not convinced about immunisation, alright certainly if it’s a pandemic it’s got to 
be, but for normal flu for instance I haven’t bothered with having a jab because I 
haven’t had flu since I was a kid. (Interview 4, Participant 2) 
6.5.6 Other Behaviours 
Participants identified several behaviours, other than the ones focused on for this 
research, that they felt might be beneficial in preventing illness.  A recurring theme 
was the need to avoid particular places or regions in order to prevent exposure to 
illness. 
But if it’s that serious I would say that the government should be putting out a 




Well, if I had a trip booked, to go to Greece, honestly, as a sensible person, I would 
pause and consider. I would look at my dates, and read all this that I have just read 
now, and think, ‘OK, maybe by the time my trip is coming up, something would 
have been done.’ Or if they’re offering extra vaccines, I would take it. But if, let’s 
say the trip was almost immediate, and this came out, honestly, I may lose money 
but I would think of the longer term first, and lose the money, but at least stay 
well, and fit, and take other holidays. (Interview 6, Participant 1) 
 
Many participants also identified the wearing of masks as a useful protective 
measure. 
I think I’d be inclined to go outdoors wearing a mask, particularly when I was on 
the trains, on public transport, ’cause flu does spread very quickly and it’s very 
debilitating very quickly. … I think it would be a good idea to wear a mask because 
not everybody covers their nose and mouth, and they cough and splutter all over 
you in the same carriage. (Interview 2, Participant 2) 
 
We’d probably end up like Japan. They all walk about the masks. (Interview 11, 
Participant 4 
Yeah. Got the right idea though, haven’t they? They put them little masks on them 
and they go out. (Interview 11, Participant 1) 
 
Participants also identified a number of behaviours loosely associated with lifestyle 
as factors that might affect susceptibility to pandemic influenza.  In particular, 
participants were supportive of healthy living efforts. 
I might go for longer walks in parks where the air’s better or I might go out of 
London, take an early holiday or something. (Interview 3, Participant 3) 
 
Well to eat healthily I think is probably one of them. …I think if you eat healthily 
you feel that you’re … able to fight against these things. (Interview 7, Participant 3) 
 
One participant also indicated she would (and does) alter the way she takes 
communion for reasons of hygiene. 
I serve wine in church, so I serve the host, depending on what rota I’m put on. But I 
will never, I will never, ever drink from that wine if I’m not serving, because I see 
people, they go, by the time they are leaving they have dropped some sputum in 
there, you know… etc. (Interview 6, Participant 1) 
6.6 Communication 
6.6.1 Information Needs 
In discussing their information needs, participants indicated that they would want 
to have clear, concise and honest information; details about what pandemic 
influenza is, information on the situation and what steps they can take to protect 
themselves.  Foundational, or basic background information was frequently 
highlighted as initially important. 
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The first question is well how can you get it, and where do you get it from? The 
logic questions. (Interview 12, Participant 4) 
 
A helpline would definitely…yeah. But leaflets instructing people what to do, a 
number to ring… …And symptoms, ’cause you’re maybe not aware of what the 
symptoms are. (Interview 11, Participant 2) 
 
Additionally, participants wanted to have information around actions they could 
take presented in a clear format. 
I should think the main thing in a pandemic is to ensure that people don’t panic. To 
spread this is the situation and this is what we can do about it, but don’t panic… Mr 
Mainwaring. (Interview 3, Participant 2) 
 
And this is where I come back to my own view is that there must be some very 
clear crisp sort of government warning that, as has been said, is visual and it’s 
being repeated and repeated so that people change their mindsets. (Interview 4, 
Participant 1) 
 
Several participants identified geographic spread as a topic about which they would 
want to be kept informed, which is in keeping with the role geographic proximity 
played vis-à-vis risk. 
I wouldn’t do anything more than I had already done by I would keep a much closer 
eye on the story as it develops, to see whether there’s any pattern of the people 
who contracted it with the things that I personally do. (Interview 13, Participant 1) 
 
I’d want to know where these 5,000 cases were, what part … where in the British 
Isles? (Interview 5, Participant 2) 
 
Whilst participants identified specific areas where they would want more 
information, several participants felt that there could be a risk of information 
overload which could prove confusing and frightening. 
I think in fairness too much information can be confusing, especially if you’re 
somebody that’s fickle-minded and you will panic at every little thing. But 
controlled information can be good. And then not just controlled but you have 
maybe places where people can go, and it’s explained to them. (Interview 6, 
Participant 1) 
 
In a way, but I think sometimes the more information you get, the more frightened 
you get.(Interview 11, Participant 3) 
 
6.6.2 Trusted Sources of Information 
Participant responses in pre-discussion questionnaires indicates a marked 
preference for traditional news sources (ie: television and radio) over new media 
(See Figure 6-1).  In addition, health care professionals were overwhelmingly the 
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most frequented source of medical information amongst participants (see Figure 6-
2). 




Figure 6-2 Medical Information Sources-Older Adults (Phase One)
 
In discussing communication needs, participant views reinforced the preferences 
expressed in the questionnaire. Participants indicated that the use of online and 
social media platforms to deliver news and medical information could prove 
challenging to many older adults. 
I’m not saying it shouldn’t be on the computer, because so many people are very 
on the computer all day. All I’m saying is that shouldn’t be the main way; the main 
way should be the radio, the television. (Interview 1, Participant 2) 
 
You wouldn’t go on the internet and ask for advice and things like that? (Interview 
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I haven’t got a computer. (Interview 11, Participant 1) 
No, I haven’t. (Interview 11, Participant 3) 
 
The credibility of particular form of media sources was discussed by a few 
participants though, without consensus. 
All I’m saying is that shouldn’t be the main way; the main way should be the radio, 
the television –… …I don’t trust the newspapers. See, seven people cough and it’s a 
pandemic. I wouldn’t trust anything I read in the newspaper, really, without 
carefully filtering it. (Interview 1, Participant 2) 
 
I watch the television – television’s not a particularly good source because it can 
never go into anything in any detail, and they tend to sensationalise everything. 
Newspapers don’t have to sensationalise, they can just write about … they’re not 
trying to make an impact in my view. So I would tend to trust the newspapers more 
than I would there. (Interview 13, Participant 1) 
 
This mistrust of certain forms of media also extended to perceived biases and 
credibility challenges with particular media outlets or sources. 
Yes, I’m equally somewhat cynical about anything in the media and I often feel that 
the media- although I would have more regard to statements from the Department 
of Health, but I think they’re very much influenced by the media as well in terms of 
the media drive them to say you’re not protecting the population so then they 
come out with some placebo or whatever and everyone has to have an injection 
and blah, blah, blah. So I’m a great cynic on these things but I think if it was from 
the Department of Health saying that this particular pandemic had got a grip across 
the world and we really needed to safeguard ourselves I’d probably be more alert. 
(Interview 4, Participant 1) 
 
I think, also, who is telling you you’re at risk? That’s the thing. If The Sun 
newspaper had a banner heading, ‘You’re at risk,’ I’d go, ‘Yeah, aren’t we all.’  If on 
News at Ten it came up two or three nights running, I’d be thinking, ‘There is 
something in that.’ (Interview 1, Participant 2) 
 
Several participants recommended other forms of communication such as 
community groups or public access points like transit. 
And I think accessing all the groups, associations who are geared to older people. 
Let’s say U3A’s one, over 50’s forums, national pensioners whatever associations 
and whatever federations and whatever they are, a whole range of different 
agencies, they should be information sharing, but communication basically. 
(Interview 5, Participant 1) 
 
And that is a good way to contact people too. Yesterday I was on the underground 
and there was the notice saying, ‘It is going to be hot this week, don’t forget to 
carry water and if you feel ill, get off at the next stop.’ And people may not be 
listening to it but it gets in somewhere. And they can put things on buses too…’ 
(Interview 8, Participant 2) 
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Though participants tended to comment more on the message and medium of 
communication, participants also addressed the issue of who they would see as a 
trusted source to deliver information during an influenza pandemic.  Whilst 
participants generally saw the government as a trusted source of information, 
many made a point to distinguish ‘government’ and ‘politicians’ with the latter 
category being considered much less trustworthy due to the nature of their role. 
If I can come back on that, I still think that our local MP would be saying the party 
line or the government line. ‘Cause I think the idea of govern…this is why I don’t 
trust the government. I think that they wanna stop panic and if they told the truth, 
we’d all be panicking, so they’ll say, ‘Oh, there’s nothing to worry about.’ And that 
would worry me when they say, ‘Nothing to worry about.’ So I don’t trust the 
authorities, really, to tell us the truth of what’s happening. (Interview 2, Participant 
1) 
 
Ah, yes. The Minister of Health is a politician and I said earlier, I don’t trust them as 
much. So yes, if it was from an official in the Public Health England I would believe 
it more than if it was let us say the Minister of State for Public Health. That’s not, in 
a sense, a criticism because politicians have to manage the news. I mean that’s part 
of the art of being a good politician, but if you said do I believe it, that’s a different 
matter. You want the white coats up there, to put it bluntly. They’re the people 
that usually the public trusts more. And you need probably a person of mature 
years, male or female doesn’t matter, a pleasant smile, looks authoritative, exudes 
confidence and expertise. (Interview 13, Participant 1) 
  
Medical authorities were broadly seen not only as a trusted source but also as a 
primary contact. 
The GPs, I’m thinking, give you a lot of advice if anything like that starts, if they 
have the mind to do it. (Interview 7, Participant 1) 
 
I think the first step would be your doctors really. ‘Cause he should know really. 
(Interview 10, Participant 1) 
 
6.7 Discussion 
Interviewees were, broadly, able to identify several key components to a pandemic; 
most notably the geographic distribution, proximity and the potential for high 
morbidity and mortality.  Furthermore, several participants also felt that public 
services would be severely affected during a pandemic due to resource strain.  This 
may indicate an area where public health communication could be used to address 
underlying assumptions which, whilst not necessarily incorrect, could cause either 
undue concern (at the outset of a pandemic) or complacency (should the pandemic, 
as with H1N1, not be as severe as assumed).  
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The nature of pandemic influenza as a novel virus, distinct from seasonal flu, was 
not, however, generally recognized.  This may be an area to address in improved 
communication as older adults may, for example, consider themselves to be safe if 
they have had the seasonal flu vaccine not recognizing that pandemic influenza is 
an altogether different illness.  Improved communication may also be beneficial 
with regards to the origin and spread of pandemic influenza to clarify that the 
nomenclature does not necessarily mean the virus is limited to the species 
mentioned, but rather that the virus originated in the specified animal population. 
Although there are areas where older adult knowledge of pandemic influenza could 
be improved, these results correspond to those of previous studies which found 
that older adults tend to have higher knowledge or understanding of pandemic 
influenza;349 this may be due to experience with older adults having lived through 
previous pandemics. 
 
Geography, or proximity, was a primary factor affecting perceptions of risk amongst 
older adult participants.  In the first stage of the scenario, the very fact that the 
influenza was in Greece and had not yet reached UK shores was cited by several 
participants as lowering their level of concern.  Even in the second stage, with a 
pandemic declared and several fatalities in the UK, some participants still felt that 
their risk was comparatively low and they would not be overly concerned unless 
morbidity and mortality increased in their immediate area (often defined by 
borough).  The finding that participants were likely to consider proximity as a 
determinant of risk is in keeping with previous research during the early stages of 
the 2009 H1N1 pandemic which found that levels of concern (and willingness to 
adopt protective behaviour) were influenced by proximity of the pandemic.350  The 
role of proximity in affective public perceptions of risk has also been identified in 
research on other public health issues.  A German study on mobile phone base 
stations found that concerns about, and attribution of ill health was connected to 
                                                        
349 Tooher et al., “Community Knowledge, Behaviours and Attitudes about the 2009 H1N1 Influenza 
Pandemic: A Systematic Review.” 
350 Tooher et al. 
 149 
residential proximity.351  Additionally, the use of high morbidity and mortality as a 
descriptor or characteristic of pandemic influenza is in keeping with the overall 
experience of pandemics however, may create a challenge for practitioners as the 
recent H1N1 pandemic (2009) was less virulent than initially feared. 352  This, in 
turn, is likely to affect public perceptions of the severity of future pandemics as 
research has shown that experience will affect perceptions of risk.353 
 
Perceptions of at-risk groups were generally static and largely reflected the priority 
vaccination groups for seasonal influenza.354  This assumption around risk applying 
to traditional profile groups such as older adults, children, pregnant women, and 
immunocompromised individuals, represents an area where communication may 
be required to counter existing beliefs.  In the event that a pandemic presents with 
an atypical risk profile (such as younger adults instead of older), pre-existing 
assumptions around risk will likely need to be addressed.  This represents an area 
that has not been broadly researched as most pandemic risk-related literature 
examines personal or situational (i.e.: overall pandemic) perceptions of risk rather 
than exploring perceptions, or assumptions, of at-risk groups. 
 
Perceptions of behavioural efficacy regarding the five target behaviours was largely 
positive.  Handwashing or the use of hand gels to improve (or maintain) hand 
hygiene, respiratory hygiene practices and, vaccination were all felt to be effective 
ways to prevent the spread of illness.  The use of the National Pandemic Flu Service 
phone line was felt to be a potentially useful way to gain information but, it could 
be hampered by excessive wait times.  Isolation was also considered to be effective 
as a behaviour but doubts were raised regarding the ability or willingness of 
participants to fully adopt this practice.  These overall positive perceptions of 
efficacy and the correlated willingness to adopt (largely) is in line with previous 
                                                        
351 Blettner et al., “Mobile Phone Base Stations and Adverse Health Effects: Phase 1 of a Population-
Based, Cross-Sectional Study in Germany.” 
352 Crosier, McVey, and French, “By Failing to Prepare You Are Preparing to Fail’: Lessons from the 
2009 H1N1 ‘swine Flu’ Pandemic.” 
353 Taylor et al., “Crying Wolf? Impact of the H1N1 2009 Influenza Pandemic on Anticipated Public 
Response to a Future Pandemic.” 
354 NHS, “Who Should Have the Flu Vaccine?” 
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research which has found perceptions of behavioural or response efficacy to be key 
in determining willingness to adopt protective behaviours such as improved 
hygiene and voluntary isolation during a pandemic.355 
 
 
Although isolation was felt to be an efficacious behaviour, as a general practice, the 
ability of participants to implement it was discussed.  Even if participants were 
willing to isolate, the need to run day-to-day errands was highlighted as a barrier to 
action.  In contrast, self-efficacy barriers to hand hygiene or respiratory hygiene 
were not identified by participants; and, in many cases, these practices were 
already being undertaken. Participants did not indicate that they would have any 
issues around going to get vaccinated though some questioned whether or not they 
would.  The perceived difficulty in adopting isolation as a preventive behaviour is in 
keeping with the existing literature which has found, across the public, that this 
behaviour is frequently seen as challenging to implement.356  Within this particular 
age group, the results on isolation are somewhat more nuanced.  Although the 
overall indication is that older adults are as willing to comply with isolation as the 
general public, there has been some research that indicated that older adults may 
be less inclined to support social distancing measures than younger populations.357  
Unlike Hilyard, older adult participants in this study veered more toward being 
supportive, though particular challenges around day-to-day living were often 
identified and may indicate an area for policy consideration in the development of 
pandemic preparedness plans.  The policy implications of this research will be 
further discussed in Chapter IX. 
 
Capability factors, whether physical or psychological, were not identified as key 
barriers or enablers to action, with two exceptions.  One participant indicated that 
they would not vaccinate due to a previous adverse reaction. As well, whilst many 
                                                        
355 Gaygisiz et al., “Individual Differences in Behavioral Reactions to H1N1 during a Later Stage of the 
Epidemic.” 
356 Baum, Jacobsen, and Goold, “‘Listen to the People’: Public Deliberation about Social Distancing 
Measures in a Pandemic.” 
357 Hilyard et al., “The Vagaries of Public Support for Government Actions in Case of a Pandemic.” 
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participants were already practicing good respiratory hygiene, the need to get to a 
tissue in time when coughing or sneezing was referenced as a potential difficulty.  
This is in keeping with previous research which identified practical considerations 
such as tissue access as potential barriers to the adoption of protective behaviour in 
a pandemic.  This research suggested that communication interventions be 
considered to address potential barriers to uptake of protective behaviour.358  
 
Motivational factors played a significant role in participant determination of 
whether they would intend to isolate during a pandemic.  Although isolation was 
acknowledged as an effective behaviour and one which participants would be more 
or less able to adopt, some participants indicated that their willingness to isolate 
would depend on their perceived sense of risk or threat balanced against what they 
were being asked to give up.  Therefore, a trip to the cinema might be foregone but 
a morning walk would continue.  Some participants also identified vaccination 
(seasonal flu) as a habit which would facilitate their intent to vaccinate during a 
pandemic.  This finding supports the need to improve seasonal flu vaccination rates 
amongst older adults (a designated priority group) which, although largely 
successful in the UK, vary widely across Europe.359 Finally, although not applied to 
them personally, several participants felt that societal pressures and norms were 
not universally applied (in terms of age, culture, or socio-economics) when it came 
to matters of hand or respiratory hygiene.  
 
Opportunity costs were generally not seen as severe, much less insurmountable.  
The most significant opportunity barrier identified was around seeking medical 
assistance or information using means other than the GP.  The use, and sometimes 
reliance, on technological based platforms creates a challenge for some older 
adults who may not have access to the internet or who lack the knowledge to 
navigate.  This age-based disparity vis-à-vis internet access and/or literacy has been 
                                                        
358 Morrison and Yardley, “What Infection Control Measures Will People Carry out to Reduce 
Transmission of Pandemic Influenza? A Focus Group Study.” 
359 Kovacs et al., “Medical and Economic Burden of Influenza in the Elderly Population in Central and 
Eastern European Countries.” 
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identified in the literature360 and also by practitioners.361 The presence of hand gel 
stations in public areas was viewed as a positive step toward encouraging uptake of 
hand hygiene however, it was expressed that these are not as prolific as they 
should be be and, is in keeping with Morrison’s research findings around practical 
barriers to action which suggested practical steps be taken to improve awareness of 
and remove barriers to uptake of protective behaviours.362.   
 
Overall, the results of this study indicate that older adults are generally accepting of 
and engaging in the type of health protective behaviour that would be 
recommended during an influenza pandemic.  However, the issue of opportunity; 
where the number of public handwashing and hand gel stations could be increased, 
where confidence in the ability to reach a medical advisor (ie: through the National 
Pandemic Flu Service) could be improved and where bins to dispose of tissues could 
be more readily available.  Older adults, writ large, appear to have confidence in 
both the efficacy of recommended behaviours as well as in their ability to adopt 
said behaviours.   
 
Previous research has found that public information preferences centre around 
clear, informative, and constructive information363 and, participants in this study 
were no different.  Advice around what measures individuals could take to protect 
themselves as well as information on morbidity and mortality rates, particularly vis-
à-vis geographic proximity was highly valued.  Receiving this information from a 
trusted source was also a consideration.  Traditional news sources were greatly 
preferred by older adults with radio and television slightly outpacing newspapers.  
This result is consistent with previous research conducted in the United States364 
                                                        
360 Jehn et al., “Community Knowledge, Risk Perception, and Preparedness for the 2009 Influenza 
A/H1N1 Pandemic.” 
361 Chapter 3, Section 5, Subsection 3 
362 Morrison and Yardley, “What Infection Control Measures Will People Carry out to Reduce 
Transmission of Pandemic Influenza? A Focus Group Study.” 
363 Barry et al., “Respiratory Hygiene Practices by the Public during the 2009 Influenza Pandemic: An 
Observational Study.” 
364 Jehn et al., “Community Knowledge, Risk Perception, and Preparedness for the 2009 Influenza 
A/H1N1 Pandemic.” 
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and Australia365 which found the primary source of information, amongst the 
general public, was television. The use of alternative information forums such as 
posters on public transport or dissemination of information through community 
groups was advocated. The comparative lack of familiarity with and access to 
technology-based information sources does present a challenge to emergency 
planners to ensure that this segment of the population is kept informed.  In 
addition, the breadth of traditional media outlets, both in terms of type (print, 
radio, television) and subsection (variety of outlets and programmes) coupled with 
the lack of consistent views regarding the credibility of each creates an additional 
hurdle for communicators attempting to ensure this population is kept informed 
during a pandemic.   
Whilst older adult participants demonstrated awareness of influenza pandemic and 
intent to adopt protective behaviours, this research identified a few areas where 
communication, or policy, could be used to address knowledge gaps and reduce 
barriers in order to improve update of protective behaviour in a future pandemic.  
Although aware of pandemic, many older adults expressed misperceptions around 
the nature and spread of pandemic influenza.  Improving awareness of pandemic 
influenza may help to forestall future communication challenges such as confusion 
between seasonal and pandemic flu vaccines. 
 
Participants were supportive of the recommended behaviours though, opportunity 
costs were raised in relation to both seeking medical assistance and voluntary 
isolation.  Many participants indicated that they would not seek medical assistance 
(either in person or through a Pandemic Flu service) if the wait times were 
considered to be prohibitive.  Additionally, although older adults were open to 
isolation and, indeed, many indicated this would be easier for their population 
group to employ as opposed to the general public, several participants raised the 
challenge of day-to-day requirements such as groceries or medication as impeding 
their ability to isolate.  This suggests areas where government, working with both 
                                                        
365 Marshall et al., “Awareness, Anxiety, Compliance: Community Perceptions and Response to the 
Threat and Reality of an Influenza Pandemic.” 
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public and private sector partners, could examine ways to reduce opportunity costs 
associated with the uptake of these behaviours. 
 
Information needs for older adults in this scenario were consistent and in keeping 
with previous research on public information preferences.  Participants expressed a 
strong preference for clear, factual, actionable information which would inform 
them about the pandemic and steps they could take to protect themselves.  In 
keeping with the views expressed by Emergency Planning practitioners in Chapter 
Three, section 5.3, participants also expressed a preference for traditional media 
sources rather than digital and also recommended the use of public advertisement 
(such as on the side of buses) and dissemination of information through community 
groups.  This suggests that current planning assumptions around the information 
needs of older adults reflect the stated needs of this population group. 
 
6.8 Chapter Summary  
This chapter examined the results from the first phase interviews with older adults.  
This consisted of a two-part scenario examining risk perception, behavioural 
intentions, and communication needs of older adults during a pandemic.  The 
results of this study indicate that older adults, for the most part, are engaging in 
recommended protective behaviours however their perceptions of at-risk groups 
tend to be quite static and do not take into account the potential for atypical risk 
profiles during an influenza pandemic.  Therefore, for the second phase of data 
collection, the scenario was advanced to a stage when vaccination would be 
available to priority groups.  This allowed for the testing of older adult information 
needs and behavioural intentions in a situation where their perception of risk is 
challenged.  The next chapter will present the results of the first phase group 
interviews with younger adults. 
  
 155 
7 Chapter VII: Perceptions of Risk and Behavioural Responses Amongst 
Younger Adults in the Face of an Outbreak of Pandemic Influenza 
7.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the results of interviews that were conducted with university 
students aged 18-25 in order to (a) gain a better understanding of younger adult 
knowledge and understanding of pandemic influenza, (b) identify the types of 
behaviours that younger adults may exhibit during an outbreak, (c) explore younger 
adult views on recommended health behaviours, and (d) identify information needs 
and preferred sources of communication amongst this group.  
7.2 Knowledge and Understanding of Pandemic Influenza 
Participant knowledge and understanding of pandemic influenza was not consistent 
and tended to focus on the impact of an outbreak rather than its nature or 
characteristics.  Whilst a few individuals correctly identified the emergence of a 
new virus as a condition of pandemic influenza, most categorized it based on either 
perceived threat, the potential spread, or influenza itself. 
 
In describing a pandemic, participants would often equate it to a crisis or global 
threat. 
A pandemic is a crisis of sorts or when a disease a health matter spreads very 
quickly across geographical lines. (Interview 7, Participant 3) 
 
I think the word pandemic influenza makes it sound like it’s a really big problem, 
and I don’t know whether it’s like Ebola or whatever, but it just makes me think 
‘cause the word pandemic, it sounds really scary I guess, versus a normal flu and 
everything, yeah. (Interview 8, Participant 2) 
 
This sense of crisis was frequently referenced in the context of historical examples, 
such as the 1918 Spanish flu.  
Kind of makes me feel like lots of people dying. Probably ‘cause I think that was the 
Spain example – some time ago it happened and the amount of people that died 
was like similar to world wars actually. (Interview 7, Participant 1) 
 
I think of the Spanish flu and of an article in National Geographic I read about 
illnesses and it spreading like wildfire and it killed more than the Bubonic Plague 
was it? So I guess something really serious if you don’t do anything to stop it. 
(Interview 1, Participant 1) 
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For several participants, the term ‘pandemic’ brought to mind, not necessarily 
crisis, but rather a perception of danger. 
Yes, it makes me think about the, a diseases spreading widely in the world and you 
are, like, in danger. (Interview 1, Participant 3) 
 
Yeah because I think to me a pandemic can be any disease, it could be something 
very dangerous like Ebola or SARS and I’m more concerned with my own health 
and so the flu is probably gonna kill off people who are either very, very young or 
older, but like a pandemic can be diseases that can kill anyone and so I guess that’s 
the kind of distinction. (Interview 8, Participant 3) 
 
Although the majority of participants felt that a pandemic was something to be 
concerned about, a few individuals expressed the view that the term ‘pandemic’ 
could prompt scaremongering or hysteria and result in people overreacting to the 
threat. 
But also when I hear this term I think of a bit of panicking going on, about this 
sometimes people overreact and the media coverage is a bit biased sometimes. 
(Interview 4, Participant 3) 
 
So when I hear pandemic, to me it just sounds like mass hysteria, but something I 
don’t think I have ever been personally concerned with, and I think maybe that’s 
partly because I’ve been privileged to always live in a country that had universal 
healthcare so I always knew that I could get help if I needed it, but also the 
privilege of not seeing people around me die from it. So no, I’ve never been 
concerned with it and I don’t think I would be. (Interview 5, Participant 4) 
 
A few participants also referenced the differences, or confusion, in identifying a 
pandemic rather than an epidemic and how the different labels could prompt 
different levels of concern. 
I also try to remember the differentiation between a pandemic and an epidemic, 
because I’m much more … my fears are quelled of a pandemic influenza but then if 
I hear of an epidemic influenza I’m like oh, that’s really bad, that’s like world-
wide … if I’m getting those terms right. But I always think about how it’s a 
pandemic and it’s bad but it could be worse, because it could be an epidemic. 
(Interview 7, Participant 6) 
 
I’m not sure the difference between… because there’s still just like pandemic and 
epidemic and endemic, so I don’t know how serious it is but obviously it’s 
something that happens at a large scale and it’s not yet contained I think. That’s my 
opinion.  (Interview 8, Participant 1) 
 
The role of contagion was brought up by several participants, not only in reference 
to an increased likelihood of self-isolating but also as a general characteristic of 
pandemic influenza. 
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I think if you have a word like flu it makes a difference because you immediately 
think that it’s contagious, whereas if you have another name, even if it is 
contagious, it’s not the first thing that comes to mind. (Interview 4, Participant 3) 
 
It seems like a very contagious … condition which is quite dangerous for people 
who are affected by it. (Interview 5, Participant 6) 
 
Several participants associated contagion with the visible and notable spread of the 
illness.  It was also identified that this spread would not be confined to one nation 
or region. 
Yes, it makes me think about the diseases spreading widely in the world and you 
are, like, in danger. (Interview 1, Participant 3) 
 
Widespread influenza, something that’s across countries and internationally. 
(Interview 9, Participant 1) 
 
In defining pandemic influenza, participants were divided between those who 
focused more on the ‘flu’ aspect and rather than ‘pandemic’. Participants who 
focused on ‘influenza’ tended to express a somewhat more laissez-faire 
perspective. 
I just think of common flu, pandemic influenza. I don’t know if that’s what it is but 
that’s what I think of. (Interview 6, Participant 1) 
 
This is where I see it’s needing to contain that speed of the spread of the 
contamination or the disease or whatever is in question, and flu as in flu to me is 
the common cold, flu symptoms like temperature, fever, that’s the flu to me. 
(Interview 7, Participant 3) 
 
Conversely, those participants who focused on ‘pandemic’ were more likely to view 
an influenza pandemic as a matter of grave concern,  
Pandemic makes me worry a bit ‘cause it’s like such a big outbreak, I think, and the 
flu is quite a dangerous virus, so it can mutate and that mutation might be really 
dangerous and wipe out lots of people. (Interview 2, Participant 3) 
 
I think you associate it with quite like a serious thing, but it could be not as bad as it 
sounds maybe. Like when you say ‘the flu’, oh, that’s fine, but pandemic influenza 
sounds really … so it’s just we’re not used to it, to hear that, said in that way I 
mean. When you speak of flu or hear about it, it’s always kind of, ‘Oh, it’s the flu.’ 
(Interview 5, Participant 1) 
 
When questioned about a possible distinction between colds and flu, participants 
broadly expressed the view that, not only is there a difference vis-à-vis severity but, 
that this sense of severity altered their willingness to adopt precautionary or 
recuperative measures. 
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I was going to say it does sound more serious ‘cause a cold could be just anything, I 
mean I have a runny nose, I have a cold, I have laryngitis, I have a cold, you know. 
Whereas when you say it’s pandemic influenza, you know what it is. It’s usually 
more serious as well and I think more about taking care of myself better and trying 
to …get better, if I had this than if I just had a cold. Don’t just think no, I’ll drink tea. 
(Interview 5, Participant 6) 
 
I think there’s also an element of contagiousness, so if I’ve got the flu I’m allowed 
to stay at home ‘cause it could be contagious and it’s not good to spread but the 
common cold is the common cold and if you don’t get it you’re probably weird, you 
know … But I know they are used interchangeably here but back home where I’m 
from they would ask you if you had a cold or if you had flu, there was a 
differentiation between the two terms, because if you did have the flu then it was 
fair for you to go to the doctor and check that in, but if you just had a cold it was 
like OK, yeah, you have a cold, that’s fine. (Interview 7, Participant 6) 
 
A few participants also correctly identified not only that an influenza pandemic 
would involve a new virus but also that this, in turn, could create a serious public 
health challenge. 
Pandemic makes me worry a bit ‘cause it’s like such a big outbreak, I think, and the 
flu is quite a dangerous virus, so it can mutate and that mutation might be really 
dangerous and wipe out lots of people. (Interview 2, Participant 3) 
 
I’d say it’s very widespread and there’s no quick remedy to it so I feel like most of 
the time it seems like you’re researching always a new strain of virus and you need 
to find new solution for it, stuff like that. (Interview 7, Participant 5) 
 
Participants were asked if they had any experience with pandemic influenza and, 
whilst the majority of participants had not, a sizeable minority indicated either 
personal, familial, or societal experience via the 2009 H1N1 (Swine Flu) pandemic.  
One had direct personal experience having contracted and been treated for H1N1. 
I contracted swine flu once…. …I mean like I said, in the UK they have like Tamiflu 
which are the tablets that get rid of it within three/four days; I was fine within 
three/four days but in other countries you can see the death toll rising and rising. I 
think my mum was slightly worried but I felt fine after like three days (Interview 4, 
Participant 6) 
 
Amongst the recollections of those individuals who had experience with pandemic 
influenza, the key theme that emerged was the disruption of normal life through 
service limitation, quarantine and additional measures in public places to prevent 
the spread of infection.  A few participants felt the effect of the pandemic via the 
shut-down of schools as a precautionary measure. 
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I don’t really have experience of pandemic per se, but I have experienced, not me 
personally but Swine flu, around the Southeast Asian region. I knew it was a big 
problem, even though it didn’t affect me. Somebody at my school got infected and 
there was a public announcement and we stopped school for a few days just in 
case anybody else had the same problem, but ultimately it turned out not to be, so 
it was fine, but I don’t think it was on the scale of a pandemic flu. (Interview 1, 
Participant 1) 
 
Yeah, well I am back in Mexico City in 2009, … … we had this pandemic influenza 
and then the school stopped and we had a lot of different measures to protect 
from the disease. (Interview 1, Participant 3) 
 
For some participants with prior experience of pandemic, the aspect that was 
mentioned most was the implementation of quarantine. 
 
People at my camp caught one of them, I think it was H1N1, yeah and they had to 
be quarantined.  (Interview 3, Participant 2) 
 
It’s not exactly my personal experience but someone very close to me had H1N1 
and their mother was the first pregnant woman to ever get it, or something like 
that, it was in South America where I’m from. Yeah people had to be in quarantine 
for a very long time, they had no idea how to deal with that case at the moment, 
could be very scary I guess. (Interview 3, Participant 3) 
  
Still other participants remembered the measures taken at airports to reduce the 
spread. 
 
I’ve never been affected by it personally, but definitely when I was growing up in 
Malaysia as I was telling you earlier, so our schools were shut down for maybe one 
week, a few days ‘cause… I think it was SARS, I’m not even sure whether that’s an 
influenza or H1N1 to be honest, but yeah, it was definitely a bit of a concern and 
then when you walked through airports they always had screenings there, but I 
think that’s probably the extent that I’ve been affected by it.  (Interview 9, 
Participant 1) 
 
It was the same in my country as well, most recently is the H1N1 virus and all the 
airports had quarantined zones that you had to go through and you had … other 
than that I don’t have any experiences of it.  (Interview 9, Participant 3) 
 
7.3 Baseline Perceptions of Risk  
Prior to introducing participants to the scenario, participants were asked to discuss 
their views of ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerability’ as well as who they think would be at risk in a 
pandemic.  At each stage of the scenario, participants were asked to discuss 
whether they would consider themselves to be at risk and why.   
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7.3.1 The Lexicon of ‘Risk’ and ‘Vulnerability’ 
For many participants, ’risk’ and ‘vulnerability’ are treated as interchangeable 
terms. 
I think if I heard those two in a news context about a pandemic influenza, I 
wouldn’t think differently. I think in my mind they would be pretty 
interchangeable. (Interview 5, Participant 4) 
 
I would probably interpret it like I think it’s quite mutually interchangeable, that 
context, like vulnerable usually you say… I mean when people say you’re at risk of 
something, necessarily it does mean that you are more vulnerable to contracting 
certain diseases. So I don’t see it… like if I read that in a pamphlet I wouldn’t see 
the difference.  (Interview 8, Participant 1) 
 
Two participants did, however, indicate that whilst the words are effectively 
synonyms, there may be different emotion attached to each. 
I think both are pretty similar, I guess in terms of which one will affect like more 
and have more impact, probably vulnerability ‘cause like risk, we can just throw the 
word risk anytime, but then it’s like oh it’s really vulnerable, it’s more deep, it’s 
intense like we really need to take focus more on it. (Interview 4, Participant 5) 
 
In terms of my emotional reaction to the term it’s much more emotive, 
vulnerability, than risk. I mean … because the way I see risk is more scientific or 
based on physical analysis, whereas vulnerability maybe to do with emotional state 
and I always feel, react to it very differently if I would see it in a newspaper article, 
for instance I think maybe it would grab my attention much more, vulnerability. It 
seems like it’s a more emotive term.  (Interview 7, Participant 3) 
 
Amongst the participants who felt the terms were not wholly interchangeable, 
vulnerability was characterised more negatively than risk. 
I feel think when I hear the word risk I feel like there is a difference because risk 
has a positive outcome in certain circumstances, whereas vulnerability is just a 
negative word, there’s no like… if you leave yourself vulnerable then you can only 
have a negative consequence, whereas a risk, you can take risk, for example, you 
can have risk and reward, risk and consequence and I think that changes the way 
the world is seen. So risk can have a positive impact in some circumstances, 
whereas vulnerability you have no kind of positive outcome out of it. (Interview 4, 
Participant 6) 
 
I think when you say risk you can be low risk or high risk, whereas vulnerable kind 
of just indicates weakness or like straightaway someone’s vulnerable, means your 
probability of harm or possibility of harm is quite high, whereas if you’re talking 
about at risk you could be low risk or high risk, so yeah, so not as strong as 
vulnerable.  (Interview 9, Participant 1) 
 
Vulnerability was also described as a more innate characteristic than risk, and one 
over which people would have less control. 
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Yeah, I think it’s like vulnerability’s more internal, like oneself, whereas risk’s 
external. … …Of course vulnerability might also be affected by the external 
environment but it comes from a more micro perspective, we’re talking about a 
person or a group, instead of like the general environment. (Interview 6, 
Participant 2) 
 
I think to be vulnerable is more like initial susceptibility whereas risk is something 
that I put onto it myself, so when I go into work I’m putting myself at risk at group 
level, but if I’m just a vulnerable population I’m by definition more susceptible, so I 
would say the children and elderly are vulnerable because they’re by definition 
susceptible, but at risk individuals are ones that live in cities for example because 
they’re around more people so I would say one you can control and one you 
couldn’t maybe, to a certain degree (Interview 7, Participant 6) 
 
In a similar vein, vulnerability was associated with a loss of control around avoiding 
threat. 
I think that with risk you can avoid it, whereas with vulnerability it’s not as 
avoidable as when you’re at risk. If it’s risky you would for example not go on the 
tube, whereas vulnerability means that you would change your diet or get a flu 
vaccine. (Interview 6, Participant 4) 
 
It seems that I have less power to avoid it [being told you were vulnerable rather 
than at risk], but that’s how I feel about the words, the different translations. 
(Interview 7, Participant 5) 
  
Finally, vulnerability, rather than risk, was seen to be strongly linked to the impact 
of an influenza pandemic. 
I think risk is something that might be applied more properly whereas vulnerable, I 
guess, identifies a specific subset of the population, at least if we are using it in the 
context of pandemics. So if you tell me that elderly people and babies are at risk of 
contracting this, I would think to myself everyone probably have roughly similar 
risks of doing so, but I think vulnerability focuses a lot more on the impact on these 
individuals, given that they have contracted that. Because it’s not just about them 
contracting it, it’s also about the severity of health impacts, yeah. (Interview 4, 
Participant 1) 
 
I think for me ‘at risk’ would go more towards how likely you are to contract it, and 
vulnerability would be how severely you’d be affected if you are, so going back to 
the elderly people… (Interview 5, Participant 6) 
7.3.2 At-risk groups 
Participants identified older adults, children, immune compromised people and 
pregnant women as most likely to be at risk during a pandemic influenza outbreak.   
This was attributed to these groups having weaker immune systems. 
I’d say babies, pregnant women, old people. … …They’re more sensitive in the 
sense that they’re weaker, so for example, babies don’t have… haven’t built an 
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immunity system the same as we have for example, or old people tend to get 
illnesses more frequently than we do. (Interview 4, Participant 3) 
 
In the high-risk category? Well immunocompromised people are more susceptible 
to getting things, and then the elderly are as well just because they’re generally a 
bit more frail and a bit more weak and the very young just don’t have the full 
immune system, so if I come into contact with it I like to think I’m fairly healthy and 
immune sound, so I could have the potential to fight it off, whereas someone 
who’s very frail or young or ill, their immune systems are already struggling anyway 
so it’s harder for them to fight it off, so if they come into contact with the carrier 
they’re a lot more likely to be struck down by it. – Interview 5, Participant 1) 
 
One participant also singled out children, not on the grounds of weaker immune 
systems but rather, as a result of poorer hygiene practices and contact. 
I think more the young ‘cause they are not so aware of the hygiene, the way they 
play together there is high risk of spreading the flu among them. (Interview 9, 
Participant 2) 
 
A few participants indicated they felt that everyone would be at risk, though often 
with the caveat that certain groups might be slightly more at risk. 
I guess everybody would be at risk but those are the people that you think more so, 
more concerned for. (Interview 1, Participant 2) 
 
Everyone, in that I don’t think there’s a specific target, obviously I think more 
vulnerable people generally like older people or really young people like babies or 
whatever are more at risk, but I think no one’s completely safe from it. So that’s 
how I think pandemic means.  (Interview 8, Participant 1) 
 
Environment was also seen to play a role, with exposure to higher density areas 
considered to be a risk factor. 
Urban areas, where people tend to live in clusters close together or interact in a 
small geographic area, so the risk of spreading is much quicker. (Interview 7, 
Participant 3) 
 
But also groups of people that commonly interact in large groups I suppose, you 
come into contact with a lot of other people and if it’s contagious disease you’d be 
at a higher risk of contracting it as well. (Interview 5, Participant 2) 
 
This, in turn, led to students being spontaneously identified in one Interview as 
potentially at-risk. 
Probably students. … …‘Cause they’re in a school with like hundreds of other 
people all day, flu would spread easily. (Interview 3, Participant 2) 
 
And a lot of students live together in shared accommodation so then it would be 
easier to catch it when they’re like at home or whatever. (Interview 3, Participant 
4) 
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When asked how they would respond if they were told that 20-40 year olds were at 
risk, participant responses ranged from quite concerned to unconcerned.   Often 
those individuals who felt less at risk, did so because of a perceived disconnect 
between age or health status and susceptibility to flu and a perceived sense of 
invulnerability. 
I guess I would take it more seriously if it’s really targeted to me than if it’s just 
general population kind of warning. But I think I’d also, wouldn’t think I’m 
particularly vulnerable even if I’m at risk of getting it. Probably in my mind I’m sure 
even if I do get it, I’ll be fine, I’ll survive! (Interview 5, Participant 2) 
 
I think diseases are not normally targeted to young adults, so I’d probably like … oh 
is this an STD or something!  (Interview 5, Participant 3) 
 
When it was drawn to their attention that they might be in at-risk group, a 
recurring theme amongst participants was a desire for more information, 
particularly explanatory information. 
I’d wonder why and then I guess the most logical explanation for that would be I 
guess we have increased social interaction so I’d factor that into my plans …I guess. 
(Interview 5, Participant 6) 
 
I’d question how they came to that conclusion – what measurement they used, 
what factors they looked at and determined me as having come to that conclusion 
that I was at risk. I’d probably question it, yeah.  (Interview 7, Participant 3) 
 
Acceptance of being in an at-risk group was strongly linked to intent to actively 
engage in health protective behaviours. 
I would try and find out the percentage, is it necessarily higher than the general 
population and what does that mean, what kind of lifestyle changes would I have 
to make to lower my percentage of risk. (Interview 8, Participant 1) 
 
I would be so anxious! I would do everything that I can to prevent getting being 
infected, because that’s, I guess that’s just what I … if I don’t feel … it’s like there is 
a bar and if the risk is over that bar then I would put so much effort in but if this is 
less than that then I wouldn’t care that much. If I heard some news about my age 
people, my age really is prone to getting infected more, then I would put so much 
effort, much more effort. (Interview 9, Participant 3) 
 
Socio-economic factors were suggested as having an effect on risk both from a 
state perspective as well as individual. 
Less developed countries, they often lack the infrastructure systems to cope with 
these pandemics, like referring back to Ebola, most of the pandemic actually 
happens in just a few West African countries and those country are relatively some 
of the least develop in the world so they lack the infrastructure and the entire 
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medical healthcare service to cope them through the pandemic, whereas say here 
in the UK we already have an established medical system so the chances of having 
a pandemic outbreak is less likely. (Interview 4, Participant 4) 
 
People who live in like the poor areas. If you didn’t get no sanitations and like clean 
water and stuff. (Interview 5, Participant 7) 
 
Although only identified by one individual, healthcare workers were mentioned as a 
potential risk group, given their frequent contact with illness. 
And I think healthcare professionals as well, because obviously they come into 
contact with people that are ill all the time and of course there’s procedures and 
try to be as safe as possibly but I’m guessing it would be an issue if you’re a doctor 
and you see people with the flu all day long. But I’m not sure if we’re talking about 
more about the vulnerability or the likelihood to catch it, which is quite different. 
(Interview 5, Participant 6) 
 
7.4 Risk Perception in the Scenario 
7.4.1 Stage One: On the Cusp of an Outbreak 
In the initial stage of the scenario, the fact that the outbreak was taking place in 
Greece influenced risk perception both positively and negatively, depending on 
perceived proximity of the outbreak.  For several participants, Greece was deemed 
to be enough of a distance away from the UK that the outbreak was not an 
immediate threat.  
Since it’s happening in Greece it doesn’t feel like… I don’t feel like there’s anything 
that I should do because it’s not happening here and I wouldn’t feel at risk of 
catching it because it’s not here.  (Interview 3, Participant 4) 
 
The story, when I just read it, I thought immediately well there is something going 
on, but then when you think about it more you realise that it’s very far away and 
you should not be too worried, so I guess I wouldn’t do anything. (Interview 6, 
Participant 4) 
 
Other participants expressed the view that, whilst the flu originated in Greece, in 
geographic terms, this was still relatively close and, thus, did not greatly reduce the 
risk. 
The fact that it’s contagious and it’s heard that it affected many people in Greece 
so why not spread in the rest of the EU countries as well? And there was a 
comparison with a Spanish virus I think, which was quite a big deal, so if it’s a 
similar situation I would be worried. (Interview 4, Participant 3) 
 
I agree though that to me Greece is quite near, and that’s just because I used to 
live in the United States, so when I did live there it was like oh, Greece and Europe 
is far, but now that I live in Europe I’m like ah, everything’s close, but I think that’s 
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just my perspective, being from a place that is quite distant. (Interview 7, 
Participant 6) 
 
Similarly, several participants expressed perceptions of risk around travelling to the 
affected area. 
I most probably wouldn’t think … I’m adopting a wait and see approach because, as 
the article says it’s still early days. So it might be very infectious but we know that 
certain strains are infectious but they’re not very fatal. It might turn out to be one 
of them or it could turn out to be both, like highly infectious and highly fatal, so I 
would adopt a very cautious approach like not travel there, advice against friends 
and family going there, like you said. Prevention is the best cure. (Interview 1, 
Participant 1) 
 
I think for me the first thing I would do is to not travel to Greece. (Interview 4, 
Participant 1) 
 
For others, their perception of the severity of the situation was increased by the 
proposed UK government travel ban. 
I think that if you are banning travel because it’s happening something serious, so if 
I have a trip obviously I will cancel it and I will think, if my family and friends tell me 
they are going to … to recommend them to see the news and have a second 
thought about their trip. And I will do some research about what is happening. 
(Interview 1, Participant 3) 
 
If the UK government are considering a travel ban then perhaps you would … I 
mean I get the impression that it’s quite bad and be quite … I feel quite reassured 
that they’re taking measures to contain it. (Interview 5, Participant 2) 
 
Further concerns around travel emerged in the context of London as a global city 
with a higher associated risk of infection. 
Living in London probably puts us at some kind of risk ‘cause there is lots of global 
travel with Heathrow and Gatwick here, and so many people. It probably puts us at 
some kind of risk but not anything imminent or anything to worry about too much. 
(Interview 1, Participant 4) 
 
Exactly. Plus I have friends that are from Greece so that’s one of the first things 
that comes to my mind. People at universities are … and this is a multicultural 
community, there are people from almost any country here, so we are at high 
risk. … …I mean the probability of someone being ill is much higher than probably 
in a small city that not many people travel too, like some small village in England. 
(Interview 7, Participant 4) 
 
 The reference in the scenario to the 1918 Spanish flu did not seem to prompt great 
concern around risk or vulnerability.  Some individuals indicated the comparison 
was unsettling but the general consensus was that, over the past hundred years, 
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medical science had advanced considerably rendering the comparison much less 
concerning. 
Yeah, the comparison to Spanish flu is, I suppose, a scary one, but then considering 
that was one-hundred years ago you tend to assume that medical science has 
evolved somewhat. (Interview 3, Participant 1) 
 
I’d say there’s nothing much that we can do at this point because there might be 
chances that UK people would get affected in the near future, but I think that our 
medical technology nowadays could probably find a fix to it a lot sooner than when 
it was in 1918, so I don’t think there’s much that we can do but I would also pay 
attention more to people who are coughing or sneezing around me, just to stay 
away. (Interview 6, Participant 2) 
 
In addition to medical science advances, one participant also highlighted 
advancements in hygiene conditions since the Spanish flu. 
I guess I’d probably be a bit worried. Probably check the news every day but I do 
that already now so it’s more just regular keep up with doing that. As to the 
seriousness of it, It does seem that it could be as bad as Spanish flu, which is really 
bad, but then again conditions like hygiene conditions back then and things like 
that probably weren’t as good as it is now so I probably wouldn’t be that worried.  
(Interview 9, Participant 1) 
 
A few participants indicated that they would be more inclined to engage in 
information seeking behaviour, even if they were disinclined to alter their day-to-
day lives in any substantive way. 
I don’t think I’d do anything different actively, but I do think if I were … so mainly 
I’d probably listen to the news through the radio. I’d probably just … my ears would 
be more attuned to listening out for that but I don’t think I’d then go away and 
Google it and find out more. I think … I don’t know, I think maybe if it is really 
important it will … be reported and the more frequently it’s reported, the more 
then I will listen and think OK, this is serious. But I don’t think I’d actively do much 
different. (Interview 1, Participant 2) 
 
I didn’t feel that vulnerable but I felt slightly at risk and risk of getting infected by it 
and also I thought that, my immediate thought was that I should follow the news 
about this influenza more frequently and try and find out more information about 
it. (Interview 9, Participant 3) 
7.4.2 Stage Two: Pandemic is Declared 
Stage Two of the scenario prompted greater concern than at Stage One, as the 
presence of the flu in the UK indicated a more proximal threat. 
Also, because it’s in Britain now, so it’s like… before when it was in Greece, I was 
like, ‘Oh, that’s fine,’ but now it has spread to Britain, then you know you definitely 
could get it, potentially. (Interview 2, Participant 3) 
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There are casualties, actual deaths and the figures and it’s also affected the UK so 
it’s not just a problem in Greece, it’s something that’s already happening in the UK 
and the fact that someone in London died, it’s the whole proximity thing so it could 
happen to any one of you. (Interview 8, Participant 1) 
 
Living in London continued to be viewed by some to be a risk factor in, and of itself.  
I definitely feel like if I were in a city like London where everyone is on the tube, 
touching stuff or, you know, breathing the same air in an enclosed space or just 
going down Oxford Street for example, just all these things would make me feel 
very nervous about … like I said, we don’t know … where the 5,000 cases are, what 
if it’s the person that’s next to you on the tube, I feel very unsafe in that sense. 
(Interview 3, Participant 4) 
 
I think I’m at a high level of risk compared to other people in the UK because 
whether there’s more airports and more travel as well so a higher risk of spreading 
the virus.  (Interview 9, Participant 2) 
 
For many participants, the fact that fatalities had now occurred resulted in a 
greater sense of risk than before. 
I think this time I’m a bit more alarmed because there have been reported some 
deaths from the influenza, so I would be a bit more alarmed than reading the first 
newspaper article. I’d be more scared about it. (Interview 2, Participant 1) 
 
I think that somehow 12 fatalities sounds a lot more menacing than 5,000 British 
cases of the flu, so the former makes me somewhat worried, the latter just makes 
it more distant. (Interview 3, Participant 1) 
 
For some this concern was exacerbated by the reported death of an otherwise 
healthy young woman.   
Yeah, like the fact that it’s in Britain now and also that… because at the beginning I 
was thinking, ‘Oh, I’m a healthy young person, it won’t affect me,’ but then they 
put in the story of a young, healthy woman in my demographic, that got the flu and 
died, so that’s really worrying. (Interview 2, Participant 3) 
 
Probably a bit more worried than the last article since it’s in England now and also 
the case with the 24-year-old and she’s in London. So that would be more 
worrying, especially because she was completely healthy and a young adult which 
means she should be one of the more healthy people in the population and she’s 
died from it. I think that would be quite worrying for me. (Interview 3, Participant 
4) 
 
However, others questioned whether the victim was actually ‘otherwise healthy’. 
From that woman who got it and died, yeah, I’m thinking more now that I’d be at 
risk but again, I’m still thinking not as at risk as other demographics, like immune 
compromised people, old people, babies. (Interview 2, Participant 3) 
 
I agree. I think this particular case is worrying but not alarming. Like I said, it says 
that she was healthy and everything but we also don’t have all the information. It 
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could be this was just one case and that’s why it’s hard to gauge if it’s something 
that might happen to me, or if it just happened to her. (Interview 6, Participant 1) 
 
Furthermore, others were reassured by the relatively low mortality rates. 
I think it’s almost reassuring in a way, the fact that so many people have been 
affected but not that many, fortunately, have died, it does show that we do have 
good treatment or ways of managing it, so although it’s a scary concept it doesn’t 
feel like it’s something we can’t manage at all. (Interview 2, Participant 2) 
 
I think I would be more concerned just due to the geographical proximity ‘cause 
they’re saying someone in London has died but at the same time the ratio of 
deaths to those who actually get infected is really quite low. So I think I would take 
measures but wouldn’t be – I don’t think I would change my lifestyle too much in 
response. (Interview 5, Participant 4) 
 
For some participants, despite the targeted fatality and presence of the flu in the 
UK, their perception of risk remained comparatively low. 
I don’t think I’d be at risk more than anyone else really, I think I’d probably have 
equal risk with most people to getting the flu and substantially less risk of dying 
from it.  (Interview 3, Participant 1) 
 
Yeah, more at risk but slightly … ‘cause before I pretty much wasn’t at risk at all, so 
the risk is still low, very low, I feel like it is for me anyway. (Interview 5, Participant 
1) 
I think it’s just like the terror attacks. Like if it happens to you then you’re just really 
unlucky. You can’t really super prevent it I guess, you can avoid crowds, but …  
(Interview 5, Participant 3) 
All it takes is a tiny droplet or whatever getting on you, so you can’t live in a 
bubble. If it happens, it happens. (Interview 5, Participant 1) 
 
This lower perception of risk was attributed to the sense that the scenario would 
still be unlikely to have a direct effect on their lives. 
I wouldn’t really think about risk unless my best friend has it, or my family member, 
I feel invincible… …That’s just how I feel about everything, I never feel like… I’m 
going to be affected by risks. It’s a bad attitude probably. (Interview 3, Participant 
2) 
 
So I feel like even though there are 12 fatalities, one based in London, I feel it’s not 
like a huge deal. If it was at my university, at Kings, then I would probably be 
worried but other than that London’s such a large place it could literally be 
anywhere. (Interview 4, Participant 6) 
 
Participants identified additional factors such as lifestyle and vaccine development 
as influencing their perception of risk.  The close quarters in which many students 
reside was identified by few participants with one commenting specifically that risk 
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due to environment would be much less concerning than risk due to inherent 
characteristics. 
Yeah, if you think about freshers’ flu over the last few weeks, I think nearly 
everyone I know ended up with freshers’ flu, it spread really quickly, so something 
like this, if it did come to the uni or anything, I think that would spread quite 
quickly too. Being in London … puts us at risk, but there’s always a level of risk. 
(Interview 1, Participant 4) 
 
Yeah, I’d definitely ask why, I wouldn’t take it at face value because it runs against 
broad consensus about vulnerability of certain groups of people. And it might not 
be a biological reason that we are somehow more vulnerable but it’s just that 
maybe 24 year olds and younger people tend to go to high density places more 
often, so that’s not a problem with me personally but something I can do 
something about. But I would definitely be wondering if it’s somehow biologically 
younger people are pre-disposed to contracting this more, that would be… but I 
would … the concept that were presented to me in the first place, but if they were 
true I think it would be a lot more alarming. Yeah, because if it’s about young 
people going to high density places that’s something I can do something about it. 
(Interview 4, Participant 1) 
 
A few participants also identified concerns around agricultural risk and food safety.  
Definitely more alarming. There’s a chance that it’s going to spread even further, 
because I think in this country there are a lot of lambs, ‘cause it’s ovine flu, so 
potentially it might get quite big in this country, so it does feel alarming after 
reading this. (Interview 6, Participant 2) 
 
I think even though I have the same demographic, pretty much composition as her, 
profile as her, I wasn’t super-bothered just ‘cause it was one individual, but what 
bothered me more was the infected lambs in Greece because there was a mad cow 
disease outbreak in the States and so that’s what I related more to with food, like 
oh, the E. coli outbreak … what foods should I be avoiding, what things should I be 
avoiding versus this woman just had bad luck it seems. (Interview 7, Participant 6) 
 
Finally, the timeline for development of the vaccine, in particular the gap between 
a pandemic being declared and the vaccine being made available increased 
perceptions of risk or susceptibility amongst a few participants. 
I think there are several words in your article that would if you would like to be 
really afraid, like the WHO, ‘cause it’s like a really big organisation, the word 
pandemic, also the case of a girl 24 years that is mostly our age, and about the 
vaccine – they say they are going to take it until May so the news is for January so 
there are still five months until getting the vaccine so there will be people that it’s 
going to be not really useful, because they will be already dead. So yeah, it’s scary. 
(Interview 1, Participant 3) 
 
It seems like the vaccine’s only in May but now it’s January and it’s kind of far away 
so probably by then it would have died down and I would say I feel more 
susceptible to getting the flu but I don’t think I would die from it, so … probably a 
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7.5 Behavioural Intentions 
7.5.1 Hand Hygiene 
Handwashing was supported by nearly all participants as an effective way to 
prevent illness, though rationales provided to explain this varied somewhat.  A few 
participants felt it would be an effective protective behaviour as it is a currently 
recommended public health practice.  
That’s what we’ve been told. (Interview 5, Participant 4) 
 
Having been in hospital environments it’s really something that they stress so much 
that I’d feel well it’s really important, not cure me but … to prevent. (Interview 5, 
Participant 6) 
 
Other participants identified touch as a potential mode of transmission of the 
illness and therefore, supported handwashing as a means to reduce the likelihood 
of infection. 
Because you put your hands in your mouth and if you’ve got dirty hands then the 
stuff that’s on your hands goes into your mouth and it could get into your body 
that way I suppose. (Interview 5, Participant 1) 
 
Because when I think of an illness that just the first thing that comes around is that 
if people get it through your hands, so I just do that, to wash my hands to at least 
try to … yeah. (Interview 9, Participant 3) 
 
The use of public transit was specifically highlighted as a potential impetus to 
handwashing. 
I think I might start washing my hands more after using public transport and also 
do some research online just in case, because you don’t know who’s been back 
from Greece and got infected, they might carry something, so I guess I would start 
to be a little more hygienic after going out in public. (Interview 1, Participant 3) 
 
I might be more careful, like washing my hands a bit, like after going on the tube or 
something, try to keep myself to myself, not touching lots of objects! (Interview 2, 
Participant 3) 
 
Consequently, handwashing was viewed as an effective way to kill bacteria and 
germs that might cause illness. 
Always have a feeling that it kills bacteria even though I know that not always it 
does but … it’s just you want to wash your hands if you’re after the tube or using 
public transport in particular, you just … you know that you don’t want to then 
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cook food and you are touching … on the tube and so on. (Interview 6, Participant 
4) 
 
Wash their hands! … …People touch everything <laughs>, like I’m touching this 
pen, you might need to borrow it, it’s just germs are … most contact goes through 
hands, and doors, people don’t clean door handles but everyone’s touching every 
door handle that you can find.(Interview 7, Participant 6) 
 
Whilst the majority of participants were in accord over the effectiveness of 
handwashing as a protective health behaviour in general, a few participants were 
doubtful about its specific usefulness in preventing flu. 
I think hand washing protects against a lot of things. This flu … I’m not quite sure. 
But I think it’s just generally good practice to, for your health anyway, ‘cause if your 
immune system’s already compromised then if you did come near someone with 
the flu I think it would increase your risk of being infected. So I’d encourage hand 
washing. (Interview 1, Participant 4) 
 
Even if it doesn’t though, it’s relatively … low-cost measure to take. It doesn’t take 
much more effort to wash your hands a bit more, and if it does stop it then great, if 
it doesn’t actually make a difference you’ve not really changed your life drastically 
to prevent … (Interview 5, Participant 1) 
…I agree with what you said, low cost, you don’t wanna get the flu and go, ‘Damn, I 
should have washed my hand, like that was so easy.’ (Interview 5, Participant 4) 
 
A few participants also highlighted handwashing as a non-challenging or non-
disruptive behaviour to adopt, particularly for students. 
I think it’s [handwashing] probably the simplest way to tackle this problem, I mean 
telling students to again, stop socialising or stop going out would be a big problem 
because most of the time they wouldn’t even respond to that or even follow that 
advice, but probably more advice which looks at the health thing, so clean your 
hands and so on, would probably be the best way.  (Interview 2, Participant 1) 
 
Well, unless a pandemic gets so bad that 1,000 people have died in London, then 
definitely, but if it’s at the stage that we read about I’d probably go for the easy 
things. That would be more like wash your hands, make sure that you drink lots of 
fluid and stuff like that. Stuff that’s in general. But not drastic behavioural changes 
on my part. (Interview 5, Participant 2) 
 
Financial costs associated with handwashing were, for the most part, deemed to be 
negligible and not considered to pose a barrier to adoption of the behaviour. 
Yeah, although again, like hand sanitizing gels would be pretty cheap. (Interview 2, 
Participant 3) 
 
Yeah, there’s like literally zero cost in washing, like you just go and press it. 
(Interview 4, Participant 1) 
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Despite this, a few participants did suggest uptake of handwashing (via the use of 
hand sanitizer) could be increased if free samples were provided. 
Maybe like a way the government could, as I say, I don’t know, give hand sanitizer 
to unis to distribute or something…. …If it’s free you want to grab it!  (Interview 2, 
Participant 2) 
 
I’m just thinking, university gives out a lot of freebies so when you give the 
students free hand gel I think they would use it.  (Interview 9, Participant 2) 
 
Although the prevailing sentiment was that the financial costs would not prove a 
deterrent to handwashing, one participant expressed the opinion that the 
prevalence of pay toilets could discourage use. 
The bathrooms … they charge for you to use the bathroom in this country, so the 
public bathrooms, you have to pay 20p or something to get in. It’s kind of like 
deterring people to use the bathroom anyways, I think.  (Interview 6, Participant 2) 
 
Accessibility, or availability, was seen as both a deterrent and an encouragement 
depending on whether the focus was handwashing (sink and water) or use of hand 
sanitizer.  A lack of facilities or knowledge as to location was viewed as a potential 
deterrent to traditional handwashing. 
Convenience, they’d have to be near a sink or somewhere with soap or with hand 
sanitizer.  (Interview 3, Participant 1) 
 
You don’t know where the toilets are in this building, I guess, like if you’re new to a 
building, your lecture changed…  (Interview 5, Participant 4) 
 
Infrastructure challenges in public washrooms were highlighted by a number of 
participants as potential barriers to hand washing.  One recurring complaint was 
around a lack of soap. 
And sometimes they don’t have soap. … …They just put water when you really can 
take out the germs with soap. (Interview 6, Participant 3) 
 
No, I think the sort of only barrier would be like if you’re on a train, a very dungy 
train or like a bus and the toilet there doesn’t have soap, for example, then you 
have to just compromise and just not wash your hands with soap for that one time. 
(Interview 8, Participant 2) 
 
Additionally poor bathroom design could disincentivise handwashing. 
Yeah, and the same thing, I think some of the taps here are like ridiculous and 
hard! The faucets! You boil your hands when you wash! (Interview 6, Participant 2) 
 
I think although people try to wash their hands, there’ll always be some possibility 
or there will always be a situation where they touch the door handle so … this 
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would be much more, for me to wash the hands to prevent myself. I don’t think I 
can prevent the door handle from being not covered with germs. (Interview 7, 
Participant 4) 
 
Conversely, the portability and perceived general availability of hand gels was 
considered to enable handwashing. 
I always have a hand gel and wet wipes with me, just because I’m always out and 
touching things and probably I’m at the point like I’m in the middle of the street, I 
don’t have access to a hand wash like bathroom. (Interview 4, Participant 5) 
 
They have those things in a school at Southampton, my friend’s primary school the 
other day, ‘cause she’s a teacher there and throughout the whole school they have 
those things which are also in the NHS, put the hand out and they have the anti-
bac, and I’m like … you just need that everywhere.  (Interview 7, Participant 2 
We had it at my undergrad university as well and it was very much a common thing 
to just do it before you went into class or if you were leaving class.  (Interview 7, 
Participant 6) 
 
Some participants also expressed the view that time or effort costs could deter 
people from handwashing. 
Some people are just lazy. (Interview 4, Participant 6) 
 
Just as maybe they don’t do it properly because it requires… like you need to do it 
for 20 seconds, singing happy birthday twice, something like that.  Yeah, I don’t 
know, that is some way and maybe people just don’t have time and can’t be 
bothered to do this when they go out of the toilet and they have to rush that. 
(Interview 4, Participant 3) 
 
A few participants indicated the need for people to develop the habit of 
handwashing. 
I think it’s a habitual thing because most places have soap and have water, so even 
if you don’t have soap you can probably wash your hands. I think people who don’t 
wash their hands it’s just because they’re habitually not used to it. (Interview 4, 
Participant 1) 
 
Also habits, so if you’re not used to thinking about it you might find it really hard to 
drill it into your head every time you go out. You need to wash your hands…. 
(Interview 5, Participant 6) 
 
Finally, social pressure was acknowledged as a potential motivator to encourage 
handwashing both through creating opportunities and stigmatizing negative 
behaviour. 
I carry a little bottle of hand sanitizer but I took it out of my backpack. I may even 
put it back in! It’s very easy. Or maybe someone else, like my friends take it out and 
then everyone else wants some. If one person does it then lots of people will. 
(Interview 3, Participant 3) 
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Sometimes some people don’t … doesn’t have the same awareness to for example 
diseases or something like that, so therefore they don’t take actions that you 
expect them to do. But if that’s the case then I think that you should just …because 
since this is a really serious issue then you should just let them know that what 
they are doing is not right. Because it’s the health of all the public. When it was 
in…if it is not that important they should not be that assertive, but if it’s a really 
widespread flu then I would be … assertive around just trying to be more cautious.  
(Interview 9, Participant 3) 
7.5.2 Isolation 
Participant responses to the idea of limiting social contact during a pandemic were 
somewhat varied, though the majority did not feel this was a behaviour they would 
be particularly inclined to adopt.   Participant responses fell along a continuum 
between willing to avoid all but necessary outings and those who felt the benefits 
of staying home did not outweigh the need or desire to go out.  At one end, some 
participants felt that the risk/reward calculus to staying in did not favour isolation. 
I wouldn’t do that. I think ultimately you can … I have lived with flu in the same 
house as other people who haven’t got it, and maybe it’s just because I don’t know 
enough, but I really don’t think it’s as simple as if you do this, or if you avoid this … I 
don’t think it would be worth the hassle of changing my pattern to that extent. I 
think we just don’t know why some people will get flu and why they won’t, and 
maybe that is a simplistic answer, maybe it’s because I don’t know much about the 
science behind it, but I don’t think it would ever cause me to stay in or go 
somewhere specifically.  (Interview 1, Participant 2) 
 
Because it’s too much effort. There are little things that you can do but limiting 
places that you go is really going to affect my life significantly so … it’s too much to 
ask. The trade-off is large then I guess for what you get out of it. (Interview 6, 
Participant 4) 
 
At the opposite end, a few participants indicated they would severely limit their 
external activities and refrain from going out unless required. 
I would cut down travelling drastically, only go to class. I wouldn’t go out for fun. 
I’d go to class, buy some necessities and go back.  (Interview 1, Participant 1) 
 
Yeah, I think I would, well, not go out, I wouldn’t completely stay at home but I’d 
try to limit the timeout and stuff like that, so not go out that often and just cut it 
down a bit but not completely stay at home.  (Interview 8, Participant 1) 
 
Most participants fell somewhere in the middle, being prepared to accept some 
limitations but not many. 
There’s ways… like probably go out once or twice a week rather than three or four 
times a week would be realistic or just like if you’re not set on going out then stay 
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at home instead but I don’t… if you’ve got stuff planned you don’t want to…  
(Interview 2, Participant 3) 
 
It depends where. Like I said, going down Oxford Street I’d avoid but going out with 
my friends to a pub… I don’t know if that’s really reasonable. (Interview 3, 
Participant 3) 
 
Avoiding crowded areas was also suggested as a way to minimize potential 
exposure to the virus. 
I would, like, avoid the crowds and stay inside, stay at home more. Try to get less 
contact with people because if I’m more vulnerable to the disease that this is, so 
walk to work might be a good choice and also take care of my sanitation, hygiene 
and stuff, and also I would search the internet and look for how to prevent flu or 
something like that. (Interview 5, Participant 7) 
 
I wouldn’t go to Oxford Street that much. … …There are so many people there! It’s 
one of the most congested streets in London I guess! (Interview 7, Participant 5) 
 
Likewise, a few participants identified public transit as something to be avoided. 
It’s just that if I noticed that I was really tired or maybe I felt a bit unwell, other 
days I might have come to the university but if I had just read this I would be like oh 
maybe I should stay home just to make sure that I don’t have something that 
would be contagious for other people, or I would use public transport less, if it 
wasn’t necessary I would prefer to walk instead of being in crowded places. 
(Interview 4, Participant 3) 
 
I think I would avoid taking the tube for example, but in general I don’t really like 
taking the tube ‘cause I feel like it’s very closed, it’s very closed environment … I 
feel like these kind of things can spread more easily for some reason. (Interview 5, 
Participant 5) 
 
For many participants, isolation was not viewed as feasible due to unavoidable 
commitments such as work or university, and social pressures.   
Things like commuting at peak times, if you’ve got a job or something you can’t 
really be like, ‘I don’t wanna come in at this time because I don’t want to be on a 
busy train.’ Your boss isn’t going to be like, ‘Yeah, that’s fine. Just come in 
whenever!’ Or at least my boss wouldn’t be. She’d be like, ‘No, we’re busy. You 
need to come in.’ So I don’t think I’d stop. I think I wouldn’t just pop out for the 
sake of it. If I was really worried I wouldn’t be, ‘Let’s just go out’ but if I had plans 
or at work or uni I wouldn’t not go. I’d still go. (Interview 5, Participant 1) 
 
I think I would only change my life if it didn’t really affect the fundamental parts of 
my life. Like I’d still go to work, I’d still go to school but maybe I won’t go out on a 
Friday night … to a club, but I’d still go to a restaurant.  (Interview 5, Participant 4) 
 
University, in particular, was frequently cited as an unavoidable commitment for 
many students.   When asked about the option of using Lecture Capture or a similar 
 176 
system, participants were divided.  A key factor was whether they find they learn 
better in the physical classroom environment. 
I definitely learn better when I’m not in the classroom so I would probably be on 
Lecture Capture. (Interview 5, Participant 6) 
 
For me, I just can’t learn through lecture capture…  (Interview 5, Participant 4) 
 
A few participants also indicated the perception that the risk of flu would be fairly 
minimal and not worth the sacrifice of missing classes. 
For me it would be balancing pros and cons as to the pros of going to classes and 
getting that one-to-one contact with the professor or teacher, and seminars 
especially … I have many, many seminars, I think it’s more worth it, more value to 
me going to class than the risk of me being affected by this flu, so there are more 
pros to going to class than not, and the risk of illness is so small that it’s just in the 
end more worth going to class.  (Interview 7, Participant 3) 
 
And also, people get the flu all the time, I’m not … what’s the worst that’s going to 
happen? I’m going to get the flu. More likely than not I’m not gonna die from it, so 
I would be willing to take that risk, like you said, to ensure that I am getting to 
class. If there was another email that said we strongly discourage you … they’re not 
gonna say ‘We discourage you from coming to class’ but if they’re like, ‘We’re 
really OK if you don’t come to class’ then I would consider it. If they’re that worried 
about me not coming into class, then maybe I should consider not going. But 
otherwise I would probably continue to go because to me it’s like what’s the worst 
that’s going to happen? (Interview 7, Participant 6) 
 
A few participants identified social pressures as a deterrent to staying in, 
particularly not wanting to present an image of being scared. 
I’d fear … not judgement per se but maybe the perception that I was over-reacting 
if I didn’t go – that’s the reason I go if I’m going to lectures, maybe that’s one 
reason in reality! If I gave people the idea I’m worried about this pandemic … I feel 
like they just … it would be quite funny … you know … (Interview 7, Participant 3) 
 
No, I don’t think I’d sort of limit myself socially because it’s just the way I see this is 
just like… it’s like anything with terrorism as well, like just because nightclubs are 
being attacked doesn’t mean you don’t go out anymore, right? So I think the same 
thing as well, if there is an epidemic going on then just be more careful when 
you’re going out but I wouldn’t change a thing.  (Interview 8, Participant 2) 
 
Willingness to self-isolate was increased when participants were asked if they 
would stay home when ill.  Most participants indicated they would, for a mix of 
reasons including personal wellbeing and minimizing potential spread,  
I think if I was unwell my decision to stay somewhere would probably be on how I 
was feeling rather than the issue of other people, which I don’t know maybe 
sounds a bit selfish … but I’d … yeah, I think I just wanted to specify that, that it 
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would be … I wouldn’t not go somewhere because I thought I could catch flu there, 
but yes, if I had flu then that would probably … probably just be out of my capacity 
to function enough to get out. (Interview 1, Participant 2) 
 
I agree with that. I think I would just try to build up my immune system with like 
multivitamins, like ColdFX, I would stay home if I felt unwell, ‘cause normally I go 
out and just power through it, but I think I would stay home if I didn’t feel well and 
I’d also avoid unnecessary crowds. Like I wouldn’t stop my regular life, but if I 
was … I wouldn’t book to go to a really crowded concert or something… unless I 
really wanted to see them! (Interview 5, Participant 4) 
 
However, one participant did indicate intent to continue on as usual if at all 
possible. 
Well, this is gonna sound bad, but if I’m ill I’ll still want to go to my lectures and 
classes, I’m not going to just stop going. If I’m not gonna die I’ll still go, irrespective 
of the risk to other people. But if it was dangerous and you hadn’t got it but there’s 
a good chance that you could catch it if you went to campus then maybe stay at 
home, watch your lecture online, don’t go to classes and just try and do stuff on 
your own. I think that might be an easier way ‘cause you can do most of the course 
at home anyway if you really had to. (Interview 8, Participant 3) 
 
7.5.3  Respiratory Hygiene 
Participants were generally supportive of the employment of good respiratory 
hygiene practices, or cough and sneeze etiquette. 
And I think I read a statistic somewhere where if you sneeze on one end of a tube 
the bacteria or the germs can get to the other side of the tube. So if you did 
manage to catch the pathogens in some kind of way it would be better than … like 
even if you sneeze into your hand I feel like they could still go into the air. 
(Interview 1, Participant 4) 
 
It’s logical to think that doing it into a tissue is better than spraying it out into the 
air. (Interview 5, Participant 1) 
 
Discrepancies arose however, during consideration of the best method to use; 
hand, tissue or elbow (sleeve).  A few participants felt that using one’s hand to 
cover a cough or sneeze could, in turn, spread the virus when that hand then 
touched something else. 
That [using a tissue or sleeve] definitely would be better than the hand washing, 
because you are having a barrier to the virus to the other side, otherwise you’d be 
using it in your hand and you’re like sticking on stuff, so yes, that would help. 
(Interview 1, Participant 3) 
 
I think I agree [that most people in the UK cover coughs and sneezes] but then the 
danger is that people do that, maybe they’ll use their hand but then what do they 
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do? Oh they go and open a door or they go and touch a handle and then the 
problem continues anyway. (Interview 8, Participant 3) 
 
A few participants indicated they would use their hands though one indicated this 
due to a lack of tissues at the ready. 
I just cover my mouth with a hand. I never use the sleeve.  (Interview 7, Participant 
4) 
 
Guilty of using my hands. Probably just try to bring a tissue more!  (Interview 9, 
Participant 1) 
 
The suggestion of ‘sneeze into your sleeve’ was met with two distinct, but opposing 
responses.  Those against expressed concerns over perceived hygienic risks 
associated with this behaviour. 
But I think it’s easier to wash your hands than it is to wash your sleeve. I think the 
infection will stay around longer, potentially… if you’re diligent … if I sneezed I 
think the chances are I would then go to wash my hands, whereas if I sneezed into 
my sleeve then that could be easily there rubbing off on other things. It’s much 
harder for me to go and put my sleeve under the sink. (Interview 1, Participant 2) 
 
I think everyone does that anyway. I don’t know if that’s just … everyone does that 
anyway so I don’t think it’s really … I think people just need to be reminded. Say if I 
sneezed on my jacket, I’d be so … worried about it the whole day that I’d have to 
go and put it into the wash! So I prefer the tissue idea ‘cause that way you can 
actually bin it and kill it, rather than killing your jacket! (Interview 7, Participant 2) 
 
In contrast, those who were more positive about this suggestion felt that ‘sneeze 
into your sleeve’ was an effective way to prevent the spread of illness. 
Also a lot of people cover up with their hands and then go and touch things, so 
then it’s not actually super-effective in not spreading it. It’s better to cough into 
your elbow but lots of people don’t do that and then … yeah. (Interview 3, 
Participant 4) 
 
I think it’s quite easy to do. I use my sleeve just ‘cause I don’t remember to bring 
tissues, but … people often don’t do that because they think it’s gross but it 
actually dies just as quickly, the germs. (Interview 7, Participant 6) 
 
Several participants expressed the view that a social norm exists and should be 
supported around adequately covering one’s mouth to cough or sneeze. 
I feel it’s weird if you don’t cover your mouth if you sneeze or cough, like a tissue… 
I don’t always have them on me but if I feel like… I will carry tissues around to catch 
it and stuff.  (Interview 2, Participant 3) 
 
I think peer pressure would be very effective, in that sense that if you cough into 
your hands and two people or three people are around just looking at you, ‘What 
are you doing? We can all get sick because of you!’ I think that would be very … I 
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think peer pressure and social responsibility very important with that. (Interview 3, 
Participant 2) 
 
Several potential challenges or barriers to respiratory hygiene were identified by 
participants such as the need to have tissues on hand.   While, by no means 
insurmountable, this challenge requires people to remember to re-stock and carry 
them, particularly when they go out. 
I think it’s probably a bit more inconvenient than washing your hands because you 
need to remember having a tissue around. I usually carry a pack with me but if I’m 
ill and I have to continually bring it along with me I might forget or something, 
because I don’t usually use it a lot, so it’s like an occasional you feel kind of thing. I 
think it might be a bit more inconvenient than hand washing.  (Interview 4, 
Participant 1) 
 
I’d just make sure I had tissues on me. I’d just buy extra supplies of them and … just 
be more aware, especially on public transport.  (Interview 7, Participant 3) 
 
Participants also mentioned the related challenge of accessibility suggesting that 
public areas could be better stocked with tissues or provide them free of charge. 
Yeah, I think they could. Maybe in this event having a more plentiful supply of 
tissues kind of around hallways or something like that to just make you constantly 
see them, you’re constantly aware, and if you ever need to sneeze and you’ve not 
got any tissues on you, you know there’s going to be some that aren’t too far away 
that you can go and get. So I don’t think tissues would be too much of a problem.  
(Interview 8, Participant 4) 
 
Yeah, I agree, like just provide basic tissues just the way you provide sexual health 
products type thing, you just give it out for free or make it widely available would 
be good.  (Interview 8, Participant 1) 
 
A further challenge identified by participants was the spontaneity of coughs and 
sneezes. 
I don’t know, I guess because sneezing is a spontaneous thing, you don’t always 
know when you’re gonna need a tissue. But it is sensible to just have it anyway and 
maybe if it was … regarded as a really sensible, wise thing, and necessary thing to 
do, I think that would be very easy. (Interview 1, Participant 2) 
 
Yeah, especially coughing is a bit difficult to do with a tissue because it just… 
sometimes they come and you don’t have time to get up and get a tissue but 
definitely sneezing. (Interview 2, Participant 1) 
 
In discussing respiratory hygiene behaviours, cost was not frequently mentioned 
however, when referenced, participants disagreed on the potential for financial 
cost to be a barrier to action. 
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I think it’s quite hard to change ingrained behaviours like that especially around 
students. They like to penny pinch on things like tissues, so … I think if they don’t 
already, it’s going to be quite difficult to get them to start doing that unless you’re 
actively giving out things like tissues. (Interview 3, Participant 1) 
 
And again they’re low-cost measures to take, so if they do work it’s great, but if not 
then it’s like well, it’s a shame but … could have been worse. Kind of at least I didn’t 
stop going out and still get it or … (Interview 5, Participant 1) 
 
7.5.4 Seeking Medical Assistance 
Most participants indicated that they would seek medical assistance if they were ill 
during an influenza pandemic.  Participants who expressed a reluctance to seek 
medical assistance usually did so from a sense that there wouldn’t be much the GP 
could do to assist with flu. 
Especially with viral diseases, not much you can do.  (Interview 4, Participant 3) 
 
If it wasn’t too serious, if it was like similar to flu then I wouldn’t bother going to 
the doctors or doing anything, I’d just stay at home. But if it was then I’d have a 
look, I’d do some research and see what the NHS is saying you should do, because 
it might just be the case that they’re saying, ‘Just isolate yourself, there’s not really 
anything that we can do for you’. ‘Cause a lot of these cases, when people go into 
the doctors and they go, ‘Oh I’ve got the flu’, they go, ‘Oh, that’s not very good for 
you but we can’t do anything for you, we’ve got nothing for you’, and so usually 
you go home with nothing. So you’d look at what they said that they would do. If 
they said, ‘We can offer you this that will relieve symptoms’, then maybe I’d go in 
and get it, but otherwise I would stay at home. (Interview 8, Participant 3) 
 
Disinclination to seek medical assistance was also influenced, to a lesser extent, by 
convenience.  
I’m lazy  (Interview 4, Participant 6) 
 
Depends. Not the biggest fan of doctors. I won’t go to the doctor’s unless I’m 
really, really ill ‘cause the wait in the hospital and everything is just too much 
effort. (Interview 6, Participant 2) 
 
Participants who expressed intent to seek medical assistance tended to cite 
symptoms, severity and/or duration as the driving factors behind their decision.  If 
the symptoms an individual was experiencing matched those connected to flu, the 
participant would then feel inclined to seek medical assistance. 
I think I’d probably read up on line medical symptoms of the flu before I 




Yeah, I think so. It depends how ill I was. If I was ill and I looked at the symptoms 
and they correlated with these symptoms, then yeah, I’d probably go to the local 
GP, although that in itself might be a bit of a challenge because my local GP would 
be back home, in northern England. So I’d have to, I don’t know, sort out 
registering for a temporary drop-in session in London or going back up home to the 
GP and getting checked there.  (Interview 8, Participant 4) 
 
Furthermore, if the illness was present for more than a day or two, participants 
indicated their intent to seek out medical help. 
It depends what it is, ‘cause isn’t there quite a lot of strain on the A&E already, so 
you’re not going to go there if you’ve got like a common cold but it depends how 
long the symptoms persist for. So if it was more than three days then maybe go see 
your GP. But other than that I just think a flu is a flu. (Interview 7, Participant 2) 
 
For me it would also be self-medication for three days, to look whether that 
actually impacts my health and if it’s better then I just don’t worry about it and if it 
wouldn’t get better I’d probably visit the doctor. (Interview 7, Participant 1) 
 
Lastly, if there was a perception of severity (either in the individual case or the 
general health environment), participants were more likely to contact a medical 
professional. 
Yeah, I think the same as everyone else, check the symptoms and wait a day or 
two, but if it gets really serious I think like if an epidemic happens, usually there’s 
usually hospitals have got special sections and things, and if you think you have 
SARS just come in here so it’s contained. (Interview 8, Participant 2) 
 
I usually don’t go to the doctor unless it gets very serious, I don’t visit the doctor. 
(Interview 7, Participant 5) 
 
Participants were not generally in favour of A&E as an initial medical resource, with 
the GP and 111 being the most referenced sources of help. 
I’d go to my local GP. (Interview 4, Participant 2) 
 
I would probably call 111, ‘cause I do that a lot <laughs> and ask them because I 
think that going to the GP takes too long, like often you have to wait a week or so 
to get an appointment which I find frustrating, so calling 111 is quick and easy.  
(Interview 7, Participant 6) 
 
Whilst only mentioned in one group, pharmacies were also cited as a well-regarded 
source of medical information and assistance. 
I feel like pharmacies are also becoming the new thing as well. My parents recently, 
‘cause they’re over 60 or 50 and the whole flu jab is now recommended, they got 
their flu jab from the pharmacy. So I feel like the pharmacy is becoming like a 
second medical outlet in the UK. (Interview 7, Participant 2) 
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Certainly advice giving, very, very useful. I always ask someone, they have great 
advice and know what exactly I need. Replacement for a GP sometimes even. 
(Interview 7, Participant 3) 
 
Ease of access was identified as a potential barrier to seeking medical treatment, 
with long wait times acting as a deterrent. 
… yeah, whenever I call the NHS or whenever I went to the hospital it made my 
case so much worse than when I tried to self-treatment. Because they had me 
standing in the line for like two or three hours and then I didn’t even see a GP, I 
saw a nurse and she said, ‘Well take this leaflet and go home and do whatever it 
says.’ So it wasn’t helpful, and the same happened when I called them and this 
happened twice, and then the third time I decided just to self-treatment and it 
worked fine. (Interview 4, Participant 3) 
 
I would probably go to my GP or call them and ‘Got the flu!’ They’d probably be on 
high alert shouldn’t take like three weeks like it normally does!  (Interview 9, 
Participant 1) 
 
Some participants also discussed a reluctance to go to a GP office out of concern 
around contagion. 
But then doctors’ places don’t want people to go in with flu a lot of the time 
because then it will spread to other patients. So I’d be thinking about that, I’d be 
like, ‘Oh, do I really want to go into a place that has loads of ill people and the flu,’ 
so I’d feel a bit bad going. (Interview 2, Participant 3) 
 
It depends what they’re recommending you do. A lot of times in things like this 
they’re like, ‘If you think you’ve got it, don’t go to your GP,’ because you’re gonna 
be around other people who are ill, so if everyone that thinks they have the flu or 
whatever goes in and one person has it, they could potentially just spread it to 
everyone else in the room who might not even have it. So it depends what they’re 
recommending we do ‘cause a lot of times they just say stay home and ride it out 
unless you’ve got other health complications, or ring an out of hours doctor or – 
(Interview 5, Participant 1) 
 
When asked about the National Pandemic Flu Service, participants were supportive 
of the existence of such a program and its ability to provide an alternative to 
existing medical infrastructure (largely GPs). 
Yeah, and there’d be such a strain on the already strained resources, so if they 
added an extra facility it would take a lot of the pressure off [GP]. (Interview 5, 
Participant 1) 
 
Yeah, definitely. If I get flu then I didn’t know there is something like that, so when 
I get the flu first of all I would just call that line, and ask them if … ask them if I had 
flu or something and they would probably make me go to my GP anyway. So I 
would first do that and after just … go to them. And that would be a really good 
source of information as well, even if I did not have the flu I would just check that 
site. (Interview 9, Participant 3) 
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Most participants indicated they would prefer to access the flu service via the 
website option.  In some cases this was due to a dislike of using phones. 
Maybe if they’re more than just phoning though, maybe like texting as well, ‘cause 
sometimes you don’t want to pick up the phone.  (Interview 2, Participant 3) 
 
I hate talking to people!  (Interview 6, Participant 2) 
Me too!  (Interview 6, Participant 3) 
Yeah, probably you’re on hold for 45 minutes before you can get to someone. And 
you need to explain a lot and it’s just annoying.  (Interview 6, Participant 2) 
 
Several participants indicated that they found websites to be more convenient. 
And they should be like an online thing that you can sign on for 10 minutes, if you 
don’t want to go (Interview 2, Participant 1) 
 
It’s really convenient if it’s a website because you can do it from anywhere, you 
don’t have to move, you don’t have to interact with anyone. (Interview 4, 
Participant 3) 
 
Additionally, some participants felt the information on the website would be more 
precise and/or consistent than the phone line. 
And it’s like very specific, it’s targeted exactly to that pandemic flu and so all of the 
information available on the website is what someone who’s curious, you know 
about the pandemic flu would need it. (Interview 4, Participant 5) 
 
Sometimes I feel like the websites are better than people as well. And that’s 
because everything’s in black and white, so for me it’s like it can’t go wrong 
because otherwise people would be suing them right now. I just feel like ‘cause it’s 
in writing it’s just more concrete, the advice. (Interview 7, Participant 2) 
 
While the majority of participants expressed a preference for the website, a few 
individuals indicated they would prefer the phone as it provided a more interactive 
experience. 
I think website is not a real person confirming for me. I often need that 
confirmation, I’m not a doctor, I can’t diagnose myself but if I’m on the phone and 
I’m getting advice from somebody else and they are a health professional then they 
can oftentimes affirm if I think I have something, whereas a website can’t do that 
for me. (Interview 7, Participant 6) 
 
 ‘cause I guess it’s just you wanna talk to someone … I mean unless you’re saying 
it’s online in the sense that someone types you a response, rather than just a series 
of questions that are tick-boxes. So basically I want someone, an actual person, to 
tell me what I should be doing. So if it’s an email then that’s fine but if it’s a phone 
call versus an automatic machine or computer-generated system then probably 
phone call. (Interview 9, Participant 1) 
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Although the use of a phone line was preferred by some participants, others 
identified barriers which would limit or preclude their use of this medium.  A few 
participants expressed worry around imposing. 
Sure. I think if … I would only talk to the person if I couldn’t find something that I 
could read online, ‘cause if it’s too obvious I would probably be like, ‘I don’t wanna 
waste your time anyways.’ (Interview 6, Participant 2) 
 
Yeah, it’s just like calling in just to ask a few things, you feel like you’re bothering 
someone for something that’s not serious. Unless it’s something that’s really 
serious I’d phone, but most likely I’d just use the website.  (Interview 8, Participant 
1) 
 
Several participants also brought up the challenge around efficiency and potential 
wait times to speak with someone. 
And if you are just calling, ‘cause you might end up in a queue which is hours long, 
so it’s like an online thing and it’s like five minutes slot, you just booked it in, went 
in, got your jab, got some information or whatever, it’s easy.  (Interview 2, 
Participant 3) 
 
Phoning is so inconvenient, they always make you push buttons and wait for ever 
and then I always hang up before I get to talk to someone. (Interview 3, Participant 
2) 
 
While the participants who preferred the phone option wanted a responsive 
conversation, a few participants expressed that they would find it challenging to 
accurately describe symptoms over the phone. 
It’s very hard on the phone to explain properly, especially when … I recently talked 
to a lot of doctors and nurses on the phone and it was just really horrible every 
time, it was very hard to get through to them and find the right person to talk to 
and getting everything across. It’s just difficult. (Interview 6, Participant 1) 
 
Yes and no, it depends because you’re gonna have trouble describing the 
symptoms, I don’t know, like check your temperature, check your blood pressure, I 
don’t know how you’d do that over the telephone to tell someone so in that 
respect you would need to go into a doctor, GP, A&E. But on the plus side of that if 
you did get medication over the telephone you wouldn’t have to wait around 
queuing in GPs, A&E, so you’d save yourself time in that sense to get the 
medication quicker but you’d have to be sure that you had the influenza in the first 
place, which you can’t really be unless you go in and get everything checked. 
(Interview 8, Participant 4) 
 
7.5.5  Vaccination 
Vaccination was broadly viewed by participants as an effective means to prevent 
the spread of illness.   
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As many people as they can vaccinate the better.  (Interview 2, Participant 3) 
 
Because I thought it would be the best way to prevent yourself or reduce your 
chances of catching the flu, but then you’d have to do other things as well, so keep 
your personal hygiene at a good level and then maybe not go on public transport 
as often because that can be quite, I guess, susceptible to germs and picking up 
loads of diseases. So I’d probably get a vaccine just to be on the safe side. 
(Interview 4, Participant 2) 
 
Several participants indicated they would seek out the vaccine as a means to 
protect both themselves and others. 
I would definitely get it. …see if I can still get the flu shot just because I strongly 
believe in herd immunity and I feel like if I can do my part to ensure that I’m part of 
the 80% that gets the shot then so be it.  (Interview 7, Participant 6) 
 
Yeah, as long as it’s free then yeah, no real cost to me and there should be a 
benefit for me and for everyone else.  (Interview 8, Participant 4) 
 
For a few participants, intention to vaccinate was predicated on medical advice 
and/or inclusion in an at-risk group. 
I think I only would get it if I have some problem or was pregnant or something, but 
if I was healthy I wouldn’t apply the vaccine for myself. (Interview 1, Participant 3) 
 
If I got told to get it I would, like if my GP was like ‘You should get it’ then I would, 
but I wouldn’t go out of my way to go ask for it, ‘cause I’d probably think other 
people should get it first and then if I’m one of the people that should be getting it 
I would go get it, but apart from that I don’t think I would. (Interview 3, Participant 
4) 
 
Several potential barriers to adoption of vaccination were identified by participants, 
including financial cost. 
I think if I were told by my doctor for a reason, given a reason, this is why you 
should take it, you specifically … but I wouldn’t pay for it. (Interview 1, Participant 
2) 
 
A good question. I don’t know if it costs money. (Interview 3, Participant 2) 
 
Ease of access was also considered by some participants to be a determining factor 
in whether they would consider vaccination. 
Make it really accessible, so like maybe go to a uni have a bit of a clinic (Interview 
2, Participant 3) 
 




While the principle of vaccination was broadly supported, the time frame required 
for the development of vaccine was identified as a potential barrier.  For the 
participants who raised this concern, there was a sense that, by the time a vaccine 
was made available, the need for it would have diminished. 
Oh right… I wasn’t gonna take it because I’m me but in general if it takes like six 
months to develop a vaccine most of the panic has kind of gone, so for me I just 
feel like it wouldn’t be necessary. If someone said there’s an Ebola vaccine today I 
wouldn’t take it because it’s just been so long. And I think that goes for a lot of the 
pandemics, I mean I didn’t even know there was ever a vaccine for swine flu – 
there may have been but if there was I didn’t take it. So I feel like if it takes six 
months to develop a vaccine… after six months you don’t wanna take it. (Interview 
4, Participant 6) 
 
Yeah, I agree, I would only if they suggested that for me it would be a good idea, 
but then with the vaccines, they often say that they’re gonna make one then by the 
time the pandemic’s over no one’s actually received anything half the time.  
(Interview 8, Participant 3) 
 
Equally, the timeline as well as the circumstances around the development of a 
pandemic influenza vaccine led some to express scepticism around the potential 
efficacy of vaccination in this context. 
She said that it depends on how much we pay, sometimes in some countries it’s 
free and in others, like in my home country we actually have to pay for this and so 
when we have to pay for this we tend to be more reluctant to get the vaccine and if 
it’s free I believe the government should be promoting this. And also another 
factor is how effective the vaccine is, because some vaccines virtually has not much 
real use basically, others are… so it depends on how effective it is and how 
expensive it is.  (Interview 4, Participant 4) 
 
For me I generally believe in vaccines, I think the science behind it is well 
established but I would be cautious because if we’re talking about six months’ time 
frame, like what she said, it’s a relatively short time and I would not be too 
confident about how reliable it is because it’s at like testing, exploratory phase so I 
might wait a little longer before getting it. But as long as there is like sufficiently 
credible and reasonable… preventive functions of the vaccine I will be sure to get it. 
(Interview 4, Participant 1) 
 
Likewise, vaccine safety was listed by a few participants as a possible deterrent to 
vaccination, particularly when the vaccine is first introduced. 
I would do the vaccines that are tested and I’m sure that they’re safe, but I 
wouldn’t do a new vaccine that I don’t know the consequences of, because it’s still 
part of the virus getting into your body so I don’t feel safe if it’s not very crucial and 
if the vaccine is not 100% safe. … …So I wouldn’t really do it if it wasn’t 100% 
necessary and safe.  (Interview 4, Participant 3) 
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I’d see how the first batch of people were reacting to it! ‘cause there are times 
when the vaccine might cause some side effects that are undesirable. I would 
probably just stay home, watch and see if it goes down well, and if it doesn’t then I 
would just not get it. (Interview 6, Participant 2) 
 
Participants who felt they were not at risk or less at risk also tended to be 
disinclined to seek out vaccination. 
I still don’t think I’m particularly at risk, I just don’t really see the point. (Interview 
5, Participant 1) 
 
I don’t think so. Probably not because I don’t feel like I would be in any of the 




7.6.1  Information needs 
When considering communication in the context of a pandemic, participants 
expressed a desire for factual, informative details.  Three main themes emerged vis-
à-vis participant information needs: medical information, protective measures and 
risk. 
 
Several participants expressed a desire for what could be classified as general 
medical information.   For some, their primary perceived knowledge gap was 
around the signs and symptoms of the ‘ovine flu’. 
Yeah, like you were saying with the symptoms, how do you know if you have 
influenza, how do you know if someone you know has it, how do you know what 
you’re meant to do if you do have flu? (Interview 2, Participant 1) 
 
So that space on a major newspaper would be much better spent saying, ‘Do you 
have these symptoms? If so go to a doctor,’ instead of trying to be overly dramatic 
about it, just be straight to the point. (Interview 2, Participant 2) 
 
Information about the means of transmission of the virus was also in demand 
amongst a few participants. 
I think the means of transmission is very important –whether it’s airborne or 
physical contact, things like this. It’s probably airborne since it’s 5,000 people but 
maybe I would put on a mask if it becomes really urgent or if it’s recommended. 
(Interview 4, Participant 1) 
 




Information needs around background or medical information was often paired 
with protective behaviours and participants wanted to know how they could detect 
and prevent illness. 
Yeah, again with the symptoms, of exactly how we can avoid getting the flu and 
stuff like that, like what we can do to reduce our risk of getting it and what to do 
when we do get it.  (Interview 2, Participant 3) 
 
Definitely seek out more information. Learn more about the disease, more about 
how you can spot it, different various issues, what actions you can take if you do 
notice any symptoms, for myself and people around me. Also try to reconcile it 
with my own experience; do I know anyone who’s been affected, do I see active 
measures being taken like masks being given out, hand sanitisers installed and all 
this. (Interview 5, Participant 2) 
 
Several participants expressed an interest in having more information around what 
protective measures they could take to avoid becoming ill. 
I think I would try and read from some more sources to see how other newspapers 
or websites or any other news outlets talked about the story to see if there aren’t 
any more practical detail or some more specific information. And then after that I 
would probably see if I can actually do something, so start taking some medication 
for just a little bit. (Interview 5, Participant 5) 
 
It also mentions the government response. I’d be on the lookout for anything I’d 
have to do, whether I have to go for a flu jab or a vaccine or something, if there’s a 
policy implementation which I have to do something for as a citizen. (Interview 7, 
Participant 3) 
 
A further theme that emerged was risk.  Several participants wanted to have more 
information on who would be most at-risk, with this information potentially 
affecting their intent to adopt protective behaviours. 
A bit more about how it’s spread, how it affects people who get it, how serious it is, 
who’s at risk, what the symptoms are. (Interview 5, Participant 1) 
 
I would also be interested in knowing who the highest risk individuals or groups 
are, so if they’re saying women and children should be more careful, I’ll think about 
being more careful, but if they were like … healthy young people from the ages of 
20 to 35 have the lowest risk, I’m probably not going to be very worried. (Interview 
7, Participant 6) 
 
Whilst not commonly brought up, a few participants did raise the issue of 
knowledge around government action. One participant indicated they would want 
to know more about what measures the government was taking and another 
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indicated they would not be particularly interested in government measures but 
rather would want to know what the medical community was advising. 
I would definitely be worried but I would also like more information and I think, for 
example, this article is very much focussed on the government and what the 
government would do, but at this point I wouldn’t really care, I would prefer to 
have some more specific medical advice rather than people telling me stay calm 
when there’s been a death in London. (Interview 4, Participant 3) 
 
What is their plan, pandemic influenza response plan. Like she said earlier, what 
are the causes of death and also where are the cases reported, so is it like all across 
the UK, is it particularly London ‘cause it’s more metropolitan. (Interview 9, 
Participant 1) 
7.6.2 Trusted sources of information 
Participant responses in pre-discussion questionnaires indicates a marked 
preference for new media sources rather than traditional (see Figure 7-1).   As with 
the first phase older adults, health care professionals were overwhelmingly the 
most frequented source of medical information amongst participants (see Figure 7-
2). 
 







































































Where Do You Go For Day-to-Day News?
Yes No
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Figure 7-2 Medical Information Sources-Younger Adults 
 
In discussing their information and communication needs, participants supported 
the views expressed in the questionnaire, particularly with regards medical 
authorities as a trusted and primary source of information during a pandemic.  A 
few participants indicated that they would be inclined to seek information from 
either their own GP or any physicians they might know personally. 
I think if I knew any doctors and they were like, ‘Actually this is a problem’  
(Interview 5, Participant 1) 
 
Yeah. I would just try to get information from official government departments and 
also maybe my local GP. (Interview 9, Participant 3) 
 
National and global medical organisations were a consistent point of reference for 
many as perceived pandemic experts. 
I would probably rely on the World Health Organisation or the NHS. … …I just feel 
this way, I feel it’s more, I don’t know, they are more reliable sources and more 
trustworthy when it comes to medical issues rather than the news. (Interview 4, 
Participant 3) 
 
I would go to like NHS website, possibly if there’s a similar medical authority within 
the EU, which I trust would be reliable, so more independent medical authorities 
and possibly the World Health Organisation websites. … …‘Cause I trust them to be 
the medical authority, like they represent the medical community and they are 
always the ones who are communicating with lay people like us. So a lot of the 
information that you find on the website you can understand the language as 
opposed to trying to find out what’s really going on, you probably won’t 
understand or get too much information. Yeah, I think I tend to trust medical 
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Several participants saw family, particularly parents, as a trusted and reliable 
source of information in a pandemic. 
I’d trust family members, like mum or something, ask her, say, ‘I’m feeling down, 
I’ve got a cold, I’ve got a cough, what should I do?’ then if she tells me I have flu 
based on what I’ve told her, then I’ll believe her. – Interview 2, Participant 3) 
 
Yeah, I think the first person I would probably tell would probably be my parents 
and hopefully I would hope that they know about the influenza and so they could 
probably tell me, ‘Go to the doctor,’ or do that or do that. (Interview 2, Participant 
1) 
 
News sources were not generally perceived to be preferred or trusted sources of 
information with many participants expressing concerns over biased or inconsistent 
reporting. 
There’s a conflict of interest. If you ask a newspaper, if you ask different 
newspapers they might give you a different answer ‘cause they have different 
news sources and probably it ties with some businesses that don’t want this to be a 
big thing. (Interview 6, Participant 2) 
 
I would just trust the WHO’s advice more than I would The Independent. So I’m 
willing to think that the WHO is going to talk about it in a more scientific but a 
more unbiased way whereas the newspapers are quite … they do what they wanna 
do. (Interview 7, Participant 6) 
 
Despite this scepticism, some considered the BBC to be a trusted source of 
information.  
BBC, yeah I think when the NHS releases a press statement the BBC will probably 
report on it, and I trust they report on things actually accurately and I don’t really 
go onto the NHS website, I would … just want the BBC to feed it to me so 
(Interview 4, Participant 1) 
 
The BBC, I think I’d trust if it came from the BBC. … …I suppose reputation, like I’ve 
never had… it’s difficult because I’ve not been in this kind of scenario with it 
affecting London and things like this or while I’ve been here. But if I’ve ever 
received important breaking information from the BBC News it’s been true so I 
have that… not re… well, kind of respect, that I respect what information they 
would send out is something that would be verifiable.  (Interview 8, Participant 4 
Yeah, I agree. I think BBC is obviously politically neutral so it’s like I would trust it 
and obviously if they say this information comes directly from the NHS or a medical 
authority then I would trust it. I mean I think in that case it would most likely… 
pretty much every major publication would relay the same message I think, maybe 
some would exaggerate more than others but I think they usually fall back to the 
BBC.  (Interview 8, Participant 1) 
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Governments were, on the whole, considered to be a trusted and credible source of 
information.  A few participants indicated they would be inclined to make use of 
government websites as a reliable source of information about the pandemic. 
Government websites, so I want more formal data instead of newspaper 
columnists or journalists. I think they’re more credible, the government. (Interview 
6, Participant 2) 
 
Probably from a course that has been done by government official, department of 
the government, and mostly something that is … officially done and something, 
some source that I can trust. Probably not internet! Not Wikipedia! (Interview 9, 
Participant 3) 
 
Universities were also considered by most participants to be a trusted source of 
information due to a perceived interest in student wellbeing. 
Also they’re [universities] meant to look out for their students. They’re relatively 
big on pastoral care and that’s part of making sure that we’re healthy so they’re 
not gonna be like, ‘No, you still need to come in, but by the way you might get 
really ill’ so I would trust them to do what is best for us ultimately. (Interview 5, 
Participant 1) 
 
Yeah, I reckon they’re [universities] probably more overcautious than us probably 
so I would probably trust them because they’d probably wanna take the measures 
to make sure that they’re keeping the staff and students safe so I would probably 
trust them. (Interview 8, Participant 2) 
 
Although participants indicated they were quite active on social media, this was not 
identified as a trusted source of information. However, one younger adult did bring 
up the potential utility of social media as a portal to external information sources. 
I agree, but I feel like we are more daily linked to this type of thing, for example 
when checking Facebook or something, so we check the news so maybe like a link 
or something that takes me to that official information data or something, ‘cause I 
probably wouldn’t Google how lethal is it or something like that, to get to this 
specific, official information. So kind of networking between both types of 




Younger adult initial perceptions of pandemic influenza often focused on either 
‘pandemic’ or ‘influenza’.  Participants who focused on the former were more likely 
to describe an influenza pandemic as a serious threat than those who associated it 
more with seasonal flu.  Many participants felt that spread would be a pertinent 
factor and one that they would need more information about in order to adopt 
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protective behaviours.  Prior experience of pandemic influenza affected younger 
adults understanding of pandemic influenza.  This was particularly noticeable with 
students from the Americas and South-East Asia where experience of pandemics 
has been more conspicuous in recent years (ie: Avian flu, H1N1, SARS).  Several 
participants expressed that they had been indirectly affected during the 2009 H1N1 
(Swine Flu) pandemic and one participant had contracted the illness.  The role of 
experience in influencing perceptions of pandemic influenza was also identified in a 
Canadian study which found lower levels of concern around the H1N1 pandemic; 
likely the result of fatigue regarding recent similar threats.366 This perception, 
coupled with the experience of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, with a less virulent strain 
of influenza367, would indicate an area where targeted or enhanced communication 
may be useful in addressing perceptions of risk in order to avoid misperceptions. 
 
 
In addition to personal experience with Swine flu, several participants used the 
1918 Spanish flu as a reference point for understanding pandemics, along with 
Ebola and SARS.   Although many participants were aware of the detrimental 
effects of the 1918 flu, and expressed concerns about the reference to this in the 
scenario, several felt that this was a false comparison due to advances in medicine 
and hygiene conditions.   Whilst the Spanish flu is often referenced as a potential 
‘worst case scenario’ for pandemic planning, these interview responses suggest 
that comparisons with historic influenza pandemics may not have a great effect in 
influencing risk perceptions in a younger population due to assumptions around 
technological and societal shifts. 
 
Several of the factors that influenced risk perceptions in these groups, such as 
development time for a vaccine, suggest further areas where communication could 
be used to reduce anxiety and encourage adoption of health protective behaviour. 
                                                        
366 Taha, Matheson, and Anisman, “The 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic: The Role of Threat, Coping, 
and Media Trust on Vaccination Intentions in Canada.” 
367 Crosier, McVey, and French, “By Failing to Prepare You Are Preparing to Fail’: Lessons from the 
2009 H1N1 ‘swine Flu’ Pandemic.” 
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Additionally, concerns around food contamination and agricultural production 
highlights an area where misunderstanding, or confusion, around transmission 
routes can potentially be a burden on resources.  Participants in this study who 
expressed uncertainty around the connection between the influenza virus and the 
zoonotic origin would often indicate they would avoid related animal products (ie: 
eating lamb or wearing wool) and would stay away from farms as illness prevention 
measures.  This confusion over influenza nomenclature was also identified in a 2010 
study which found university students, whilst broadly understanding infection 
routes, were confused by the animal role (pigs) in the H1N1/Swine flu pandemic.368  
One possible approach to addressing this challenge can be seen in the Canadian 
response to the 2009 pandemic.  In this case, during the 2009 pandemic, a 
concerted effort was made to refer to the virus as H1N1 and not Swine flu with the 
Chief Public Health Officer announcing this shift in May 2009.369  This was done, not 
only to avoid confusion over flu transmission routes370 but also to avoid potential 
economic knock-on effects to the Canadian agricultural sector and associated costs, 
both in resources and time.371   
 
Younger adult participants were not in agreement regarding the use of the terms 
‘risk’ and ‘vulnerability’ with some participants feeling they could be used 
interchangeably and others labelling them as distinct terms.  This would suggest 
that, from a communicating with the public perspective, formally distinguishing 
between ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerability’ is not a priority.  Nevertheless, consistent 
application of the terms may yet prove beneficial to improve clarity of 
communication; particularly in a situation with an atypical risk perspective.  The 
potential for a future pandemic to feature atypical risk profiles presents a challenge 
for policymakers and health professionals. Younger adult participants were more 
likely to identify traditional groups (i.e.: older adults, children, individuals with 
                                                        
368 Seale et al., “Examining the Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of Domestic and International 
University Students towards Seasonal and Pandemic Influenza.” 
369 Public Health Agency of Canada, “Lessons Learned Review: Public Health Agency of Canada and 
Health Canada Response to the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic.”13 
370 Fitzpatrick, “15 New Cases of Swine Flu Confirmed in Canada.” 
371 Author’s experience as senior political advisor to the Canadian Minister of Health during this 
time. 
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compromised immune systems) as being most at risk in a pandemic.  Where 
student risk was considered, it was far more likely to be considered either in the 
context of environmental factors (i.e.: being in high-density conditions such as 
university) or because ‘everyone would be at risk’.  Furthermore, when asked their 
reactions to being told they would be at-risk, many students were inclined to doubt 
the guidance due to perceptions that their personal health status would reduce 
susceptibility.  This echoes the findings of previous studies with young adults which 
found perceptions of higher risk among traditional at-risk groups, a view that 
overall physical and social health in younger adults would reduce risk, and a 
prevailing sense of invincibility or invulnerability in this age group.372 
 
Participants’ perceptions of response efficacy with regards to the recommended 
actions studied were generally high.  Handwashing and respiratory hygiene were 
the most highly regarded in terms of efficacy with participants being overall 
supportive of these measures.  This is encouraging from a public health perspective 
as previous research has found a strong link between the belief in response efficacy 
and the adoption of said behaviour.373  Although most participants were not against 
vaccination per se, there was less support for a vaccine specific to pandemic 
influenza, largely due to concerns over the timeline for delivery, the effectiveness 
of this particular vaccine, and safety-given the novel nature of the vaccine.  
Concerns of vaccine safety have also been identified in previous research with this 
population group, which linked low uptake of vaccination to concerns over side 
effects374 and health outcomes375. Seeking medical assistance if ill was also 
generally supported as a useful behaviour though some participants expressed 
                                                        
372 Agarwal, “A/H1N1 Vaccine Intentions in College Students: An Application of the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour”; Seale et al., “Examining the Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of Domestic 
and International University Students towards Seasonal and Pandemic Influenza”; Van et al., 
“University Life and Pandemic Influenza: Attitudes and Intended Behaviour of Staff and Students 
towards Pandemic (H1N1) 2009”; Taha, Matheson, and Anisman, “The 2009 H1N1 Influenza 
Pandemic: The Role of Threat, Coping, and Media Trust on Vaccination Intentions in Canada.” 
373 Gaygisiz et al., “Individual Differences in Behavioral Reactions to H1N1 during a Later Stage of the 
Epidemic.” 
374 Rodas et al., “Exploring Predictors Influencing Intended and Actual Acceptability of the A/H1N1 
Pandemic Vaccine: A Cohort Study of University Students in Hong Kong.” 
375 Wilson and Huttlinger, “Pandemic Flu Knowledge among Dormitory Housed University Students: 
A Need for Informal Social Support and Social Networking Strategies.” 
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doubts as to the ability of physicians to cure flu and felt they would likely be 
advised by their GP to take the same measures, such as staying home and taking 
over-the-counter pain medication, that they would have taken without medical 
advice.  This indicates a potential area for communication intervention in the event 
of a pandemic, as participants were not generally aware of medical interventions 
such as anti-virals.  Isolation, as a preventive measure, was viewed as potentially 
useful but ultimately not practical. 
 
With the exception of isolation, perceptions of self-efficacy were high for the 
recommended behaviours that were presented to participants.  Handwashing and 
respiratory hygiene were both deemed to be easy, non-intrusive and relatively low-
cost measures that they could implement to reduce the likelihood of becoming ill 
and limit the spread of the illness.  This result is in line with previous research which 
found that hand washing and respiratory hygiene were more likely to be adopted 
than other measures such as social distancing due to ease in implementing.376  
Seeking medical assistance and vaccination were both reported by participants to 
be high in terms of self-efficacy, or the ability of the participants to carry out these 
actions.  However, some participants were reluctant to adopt these measures due 
to a sense of perceived cost, either time or financial.  Although a few participants 
indicated they felt they would be able to dramatically reduce their time out-of-
doors, many felt this behaviour was not one they would be able or willing to adopt.  
Reasons for this varied from obligations such as university or work that were 
considered to be unavoidable or a general disinclination to curtail extra-curricular 
activities, often due to a perception that their personal level of risk was not high 
enough to demand such drastic measures.  The comparatively low intent to engage 
in voluntary isolation, as compared to other protective measures is also in keeping 
with the results of other studies.  In determining their willingness to voluntarily 
isolate, participants often distinguished between professional (ie: university or 
employment) and social activities. Although participants in this research did not 
                                                        
376 Seale et al., “Examining the Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of Domestic and International 
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agree on which set of activities would be prioritized, a previous study found greater 
willingness to forego academic obligations over social interactions.377  Conversely, 
an Australian study on university students found a comparatively high number of 
participants were disinclined to absent themselves from university not only as a 
preventive measure but also if experiencing influenza-like illness (ILI).378  Taken 
together, these results suggest that isolation is less likely to be voluntarily adopted 
than other protective behaviours and, furthermore, there appears to be a lack of 
consensus around prioritization of activities which may create additional challenges 
in encouraging uptake of this behaviour in future. 
 
Opportunity costs (or conversely, lack thereof) were the most frequently cited 
barriers or enablers to adopting the recommended behaviours that were discussed, 
with the exception of respiratory hygiene.  Although handwashing received broad 
support, challenges in accessing facilities was highlighted as a barrier to traditional 
handwashing though, conversely, the portability and relative low-cost of hand 
sanitizer was seen as a way to cleanse hands by other means.  The role of hand 
sanitizer was also referenced in a previous study which found that participants who 
expressed negative views about their willingness to adopt recommended protective 
behaviours would often propose behaviours, such as the use of hand gel, which 
seemed ‘easier’.379  Taken together, the perception of hand-gel as an easy, low-
cost, portable option suggests it may provide an alternative in promoting hand 
hygiene amongst individuals who would not otherwise be likely to engage in this 
behaviour.  In addition to the barriers identified in the literature, this study found a 
lack of easy access, largely vis-à-vis wait times, was also considered a potential 
barrier to seeking medical assistance.  Equally, ease of access as well as potential 
financial costs were raised as factors that might diminish participant inclination to 
vaccinate against pandemic. 
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Although the barriers to practicing good respiratory hygiene were primarily 
motivational, several participants mentioned the unplanned nature of a cough or 
sneeze, and the potential inability to access a tissue in time, as a potential physical 
capability challenge.   These types of practical difficulties were identified in a 
previous study with participants also identifying the unpredictability of coughs and 
sneezes, along with the potential lack of disposal options for used tissues as 
barriers to action.380 Perceived motivational barriers varied somewhat depending 
whether participants were inclined to use their hand, a tissue or their sleeve, 
however the need to plan ahead in order to be carrying tissues was cited as a 
potential challenge.  Additionally, several participants expressed an instinctive 
distaste for using a sleeve as they perceived it to be less hygienic.  Motivational 
factors were also seen with handwashing and vaccination.  A few participants 
expressed the need for social pressure to promote handwashing and for individuals 
to develop the habit of washing their hands properly.  Contributing to herd 
immunity and protecting others was referenced by a few participants as a factor 
that would incentivize vaccination for them. 
 
As with seeking medical assistance (in general), ease of access was a recurring 
theme for younger adult participants when asked about their willingness to use a 
National Pandemic Flu Service.  The medium in which they could access the flu 
service was also important with the overwhelming majority of participants 
preferring an online option over a phone line.  Using a phone line was felt by many 
participants to be a much less comfortable experience with several indicating they 
felt the information received over the phone would be less credible than that on a 
website.  The few participants to indicate a preference for the phone line were 
clear about wanting or needing to receive the information via an interactive, 
responsive process in order to feel confident in its accuracy.  These concerns over 
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accuracy, or reliability, were identified in a prior study which found participants 
were not comfortable being asked to recognise symptoms and self-diagnose.381   
 
Information needs throughout the scenario tended to centre around factual or 
actionable information.  The number of participants wanting more information 
increased as the scenario progressed. However, the nature of the information 
requested remained relatively consistent with most expressing a desire for medical 
information regarding risk, symptoms and preventive measures. This is in keeping 
with the results of a Dutch study which found that information around recognizing 
symptoms and ways to protect oneself was the communication participants were 
most keen to receive.382 This preference for clear and actionable information also 
reinforces existing guidance by both the WHO and EU which suggests this type of 
messaging be prioritized.383 Preferred information sources were fairly consistent, 
with the NHS and medical authorities seen as a key trusted source of information; 
which echoes previous research that has identified medical professionals as a 
trusted source of information in a pandemic.384  .  On the whole, participants were 
much more inclined to put their trust in traditional authorities (government and 
medical experts) over news media sources, with the occasional exception of the 
BBC.  This may perhaps be due to a greater level of education and associated 
confidence in parsing official texts or dealing with primary sources.   The frequent 
reference to WHO as a trusted source may also be a reflection of the more 
international, globalized nature of the Interview participants.  
 
Knowledge of pandemic influenza amongst younger adult participants was 
influenced by experience with younger adults frequently relying on the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic as a frame of reference.  Additionally, younger adults were less likely 
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than their older counterparts to immediately assume worst-case scenarios, such as 
the 1919 Spanish Flu.  Given the 2009 pandemic featured a less-virulent strain, this 
may affect risk perception amongst this population group in the event of a future 
pandemic. 
 
Overall, younger adults expressed the intent to adopt recommended protective 
behaviours.  Hand and respiratory hygiene were not only seen as efficacious but 
also frequently referenced as habitual behaviours in day-to-day life.  As habit has 
been shown to have a strong influence on hygiene behaviour,385 the current self-
reported uptake of these behaviours in this population group suggests these 
behaviours will be continued during a future pandemic.  Whilst broadly supportive 
of vaccination, several participants expressed concerns around the safety and 
efficacy of vaccine as a result of the short timeline and novel nature.  This suggests 
an area where public health communication could be used to address, and reduce, 
these concerns.  Finally, voluntary isolation was, for many participants, not 
considered to be feasible unless absolutely mandatory.  Some participants were 
unwilling to forego social activities and many expressed that the financial and 
education implications of university and employment were such that these 
activities could not be avoided.  These types of considerations must be taken into 
account by emergency planners, as well as partners in the public and private sector, 
in developing pandemic plans as the potential duration and virulence of a pandemic 
may increase its disruptiveness.  
 
Information needs for younger adults, vis-à-vis content, are similar to those of their 
older counterparts with study participants expressing a desire for clear, 
informative, and fact-based information which advises on the nature and spread of 
the pandemic as well as recommended protective behaviours.  Younger adult 
participants were prepared to accept they may be at risk but many indicated they 
would need to be provided with explanatory information as to why they were at 
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risk as well.  Where younger adults differed noticeably from older adults was 
around medium of communication.  Whilst many younger adults do seek 
information from traditional media sources, they expressed an overwhelming 
preference for digital based media.  Taken together, this research suggests that 
younger adults are either already engaging in, or would intend to engage, in 
recommended protective behaviours however, there remain some areas where 
communication, and policy, could be directed to improve uptake of protective 
behaviours 
7.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter examined the results of the first phase interviews with younger adults.  
This consisted of a two-part scenario examining risk perception, behavioural 
intentions, and communication needs of younger adults during a pandemic.  The 
next chapter will present the results of the second phase Interviews with older 
adults, testing a newly designed communication intervention designed to address 
some of the key issues identified in Phase 1 (Chapter 6).  
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8 Chapter VIII: Perceptions of Risk and Behavioural Responses 
Amongst Older Adults to a Novel Communication Intervention 
During an Outbreak of Pandemic Influenza 
8.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter will present the results of the second phase of interviews with older 
adults.  The second phase of interviews with older adults was designed to build on 
the findings of the first phase of the research by testing a novel communication 
intervention concerning vaccination priority groups where older adults are not 
included, to better understand older adult information needs and behavioural 
intentions.  Participants were divided between those who received the standard 
leaflet (A) and those who received the leaflet with additional information on at-risk 
groups (B).  As well, this phase of the research looked to increase understanding of 
older adult perceptions of risk and communication needs in the event of a 
pandemic.  A full description of the intervention and methods for this study are 
included in Chapter 5. 
 
8.2 Knowledge and Perceptions of Pandemic Influenza 
As with Phase One interviews, the key themes participants identified around 
knowledge of pandemic influenza were spread, reference to past pandemics, and 
potential confusion around the terminology. Several participants identified a 
pandemic as being a global event. 
That it stretches right across thousands of people, you know, an overall thing, 
everybody. Different countries, countries and everything. (Interview 3, Participant 
2 (B) )   
 
Perhaps even worldwide, I suppose, the extreme of things, yeah. (Interview 13, 
Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
In some cases, participants had a sense that a pandemic was a foreign problem. 
If it doesn’t happen here it’s usually abroad, Africa or somewhere else so I wouldn’t 
worry about it. (Interview 23, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Asian flu ‘cause I had it in ’57. I suppose that’s the first thing that comes in and 
then I assume a similar sort of phenomenon as such, but it always seem to come 
from the East (Interview 6, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
The potential scope and human cost of a pandemic was also identified with 
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participants considering that a pandemic would be likely to result in high rates of 
morbidity and mortality. 
It makes me think of a disease which is spreading rapidly from person to person 
(Interview 22, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
I think it’s like, when you said it, which means so many people have the influenza, 
it’s a pandemic so many, many, many people and this means the hospitals are 
overloaded.  (Interview 12, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Participants frequently identified previous pandemics, particularly the 1918 Spanish 
Flu, as a frame of reference though other, more recent health events such as bird 
flu and Ebola were also mentioned. 
I mean there has not been, I think, influenza pandemics for many years, at least not 
in Western countries, it was something like a 100 years’ ago, wasn’t it, about the 
time of the Great War, there was a huge one?  Yeah, probably more people died 
from that than died in the War, so it is that sort of scale of mortality that I’d 
associate it with.  (Interview 2, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
It makes me think of something similar to all the health scares we’ve had in the 
past, Asian flu, Hong Kong flu, latterly bird flu, that and HN virus and so on, and 
possibly stuff like Ebola. (Interview 17, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Despite general perceptions around the potential mortality rates of a pandemic, as 
well as the references to the devastating 1918 Spanish Flu, a few participants 
expressed a sense that an influenza pandemic was not actually a threat in this day 
and age. 
When I hear this word pandemic, for me it sounds like they are scaring people 
because I don’t really believe that there is such a thing. My mind goes to this 
Middle Ages pandemics, real pandemics. They have the resources to avoid any 
pandemic I suppose, so maybe I am not fair saying this but I think the status quo, 
the matrix of the, they are scaring people. (Interview 11, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
Influenza is a disease and is quite common, a virus disease, and occasionally the 
incidence of the disease reach such a high degree within society that there are 
these…I’m trying to avoid the word panic… but it has a social movement which 
goes beyond the rational and becomes irrational in people’s minds. (Interview 18, 
Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Some participants did indicate a lack of certainty around the distinction between 
‘epidemic’ and ‘pandemic’ though with the sense that ‘pandemic’ was a more 
concerning turn of phrase. 
Yeah. I think it is, I think pandemic is a much more scary term versus a…you know 
you get an epidemic of some sort of childhood disease and all the schools are 
getting it, but it’s not… epidemic feels far more localized, you would think about 
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there was an epidemic of so and so in a northeast region or there was an epidemic 
going round the schools in a particular borough of London or whatever. But 
pandemic has got this sort of sweep feeling to it. (Interview 6, Participant 1 (B) )  
 
International problems of a disease spreading rather than just a local breakout. I’m 
not sure of the difference between epidemic and pandemic but pandemic sounds 
pretty grim. (Interview 7, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
As with Phase One participants, the naming conventions for zoonotic origin flu 
strains (such as the recent Swine flu or Avian flu) caused confusion for scenario 
participants who were unsure as to how the virus might spread and, in a real-life 
situation, could potentially result in either a misperception of risk or the adoption 
of ineffective or potentially detrimental behaviours. 
That might be fed by… actually contact with meat…lamb products. Mind you, wool 
might be there, wool might be a problem as well because lambs are covered in 
wool? (Interview 17, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
I suppose I would expect this to be a much more rural thing, would it not? I mean, I 
don’t know? I think, again I would depend on the advice… I would be interested to 
know what people said about it but if it was just down to me I would say it would 
be more likely if in my former life I was still living in the country in Australia with all 
the animals and stuff. (Interview 4, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
 
8.3 Baseline Perceptions of Risk 
8.3.1 The Lexicon of ‘Risk’ and ‘Vulnerability’ 
As seen with Phase One older adult participants, older adult participants were not 
in agreement about the potential distinctions between risk and vulnerability though 
a few trends were observed.  Vulnerability appears to have a less clear or consistent 
definition in the minds of participants.  It was variously described as synonymous, 
distinct, more personal, and less significant than risk.  Many participants felt that 
there was no differentiation between the terms. 
It’s the same thing, isn’t it? (Interview 2, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
Well, vulnerable and at risk are practically synonyms. (Interview 17, Participant 1 
(A) ) 
For some, vulnerability was considered to be a characteristic conferred by age. 
I would assume with anything like that, that once you get to a certain age you are 
vulnerable anyway! (Interview 24, Participant 3 (A) ) 
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… ‘cause being elderly, presumably you are vulnerable anyway so you’re better to 
stay away from people. (Interview 9, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
For other participants, the concepts were distinguished in relation to breath and 
strength of meaning. 
Vulnerable I don’t think means as much to people as at risk, at risk is more… Yeah, 
you’re at risk, you’re at risk of dying or something like that but vulnerable is a 
softer… I don’t think it’s…You know, you say at risk, you’re at risk of catching this 
because… that would be more helpful. (Interview 22, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
I don’t think so, not to me, they both mean the same sort of thing, one perhaps 
means it more than the other, but I don’t know which? Oh, except that maybe 
vulnerable applies more to age bands and at risk is a wider term, perhaps? 
(Interview 15, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Finally, vulnerability was described as having a more personal connotation. 
Vulnerable has different connotations to being at risk. It’s definitely a different… in 
perception it does mean something different and it is certainly a more… I suppose 
really if it’s put in this context if you say vulnerable you sort of think, oh, there’s a 
high chance that I might get it because I’m vulnerable. If I’m at risk, well, there’s a 
possibility, I’m at risk of getting it but there’s a bit more of a but factor in at risk; 
vulnerable has definitely got particular connotations. (Interview 6, Participant 1 
(B) ) 
Yeah. It’s personal. (Interview 6, Participant 2 (B) ) 
 
Yeah, If you’re saying to somebody you’re vulnerable, you know? What’s the 
difference between at risk and vulnerable, vulnerable sounds like something to do 
with me, somebody has detected something in me that makes me more at risk, 
that’s what I would assume vulnerable meant (Interview 10, Participant 1 (B) )   
 
8.3.2  At-Risk Groups 
As with Phase 1 participants, most participants at Phase 2 held views of risk in line 
with traditional medical recommendations regarding seasonal flu as well as policy 
guidelines on emergency planning and vulnerability.  When asked who would be 
most at risk during an influenza pandemic, answers frequently included older 
adults, children and individuals with compromised immune systems or chronic 
health conditions. 
Who would be at risk? I would think older people, babies and the children. Those 
who had some kind of continuing illness, particularly breathing. They have less 
resistance, I suppose, they are weaker, I suppose the youngest ones are less well-
nourished, people who have… Yeah, people who have breathing problems or 
obviously they haven’t got the resistance and things may make them more 
susceptible. (Interview 4, Participant 1 (A) ) 
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Anybody with a lowered autoimmune system and usually the elderly, anybody 
that’s got a long-term health condition, babies and young children, and anybody 
that doesn’t have a fully developed immune system. (Interview 17, Participant 1 
(A) ) 
 
While older adults were typically included as being at-risk due to weakened health 
or immune systems, one group posited that older adults were, in fact, healthier 
than their younger counterparts due to life experience. 
Anybody who lived through the war is far healthier than anybody who lived after.  I 
mean look at us, we’re not obese at all… we’re not really the junk food generation 
are we? This is the thing. We’re not. (Interview 8, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Individuals who were unable to isolate themselves during a pandemic were also 
identified as being potentially at risk due to their inability to avoid exposure. 
Nine times out of ten, if you go to work and you’re self-employed, you’ve gotta go 
to work, ain’t you? So then you’re self-employed, wherever you go, if there’s a lot 
of people there, whatever you’ve got you’re gonna pass it on to them, ain’t you? So 
they’re the ones who really matter is the ones who go to work. (Interview 8, 
Participant 3 (A) ) 
 
…people who travel in crowded trains, buses, which I don’t do nowadays (Interview 
13, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
As with the first set of older adult interviews, poverty was identified as a potential 
risk factor. 
And I would have thought people who lived in poor housing conditions. They’re 
probably more vulnerable. Maybe the basic health is not that good in the first 
place, to enable them to resist that kind of thing. (Interview 24, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
The elderly, the very young and the poor, poverty is a great spreader of disease. 
(Interview 7, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Lastly, two participants did identify the potential risk to younger adults due to a 
lack of previous exposure to the flu strain. 
And that was an interesting, I believe in some of the pandemics it’s the younger 
people who are most at risk because they haven’t had the flu through their lifetime 
but then again, when you’re older you’re very susceptible to respiratory and 
obviously pneumonia which, do you carry that around with you? (Interview 22, 
Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
I sort of get this occasionally with these fluey things, I remember one of these 
things where there was going to be a possibility and then they said it was related to 
Asian flu, so I thought right, my generation would be alright because we’d got the 
immunity having had it in flu ‘cause there was definitely one strain that they said 
was related to it and in fact older people weren’t getting it because we’d picked up 
an immunity when we were children. I think certainly you do think of the…if it’s a 
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completely new strain you do think of people who are less healthy, older and you 
get certain… certain targeted groups, people like diabetics are always told to get 
their flu jab. I don’t think you think of… you think of children getting it but sort of 
bouncing up again. (Interview 6, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
8.3.3 Challenges for Older Adults 
8.3.3.1  Coping Challenges 
As at Phase 1, loneliness and, consequently, lacking the support structure to assist if 
ill, was identified as a primary challenge for older adults’.   
Yes, the fact that you might be on your own and if you’re already having problems 
with movement because of existing medical conditions, you might have problems 
getting to the surgery, to be helped. (Interview 17, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
I think accessibility, so hence if someone’s lonely or on their own who doesn’t have 
anything they could just die. There’s more people on their own, older people that 
are on their own, whereas if it was younger people they’ve usually got family or 
friends around that they could call on. (Interview 9, Participant 2 (B) ) 
 
In addition to living alone, mobility was also suggested by participants as an area in 
which some older adults might struggle, particularly with regards to accessing 
vaccination. 
Well, those that are unable to access getting the vaccine if their mobility is such, I 
don’t know how that will be offered to them otherwise if they couldn’t get to a 
clinic or whatever. (Interview 20, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Getting to places where vaccinations can be given and people don’t always have 
again family to get essential comestibles for them or things that they need 
although pharmacists these days do deliver, we have an excellent pharmacy. 
(Interview 7, Participant 2 (B) ) 
 
There was also a sense that a breakdown in systemic or societal structure such as 
long queues at A&E, crowding in supermarkets or public services being shut down 
due to illness could have an adverse effect on older adults. 
Well, if you’re fighting to get in the supermarket or to the A&E, that would be a 
challenge. I know I wouldn’t want to be standing around waiting for… my legs 
would start to hurt after an hour or so, but that would be worrying. If one had to 
fight to get stuff out of a supermarket and the shelves were empty, then that 
would be very difficult for an older person because I know young people would just 
come in and push you aside. (Interview 22, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Yes, lots because if people are falling ill then they’re not able to run the various 
services that we need; where would all the nurses come from, and the hospitals 
and the doctors; how would the food come in?  (Interview 23, Participant 1 (B) ) 
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8.3.3.2 Communication Challenges 
Several participants identified a challenge relating to the perception of ‘older’, 
highlighting the breadth of ages which fall within the classification of ‘old’.    
It is very true because it is that fact that if you say pensioners, older people, 
whatever you sort of call us and now it’s about 30/40-year spans. 60 to 100… I 
mean you’ve got two generations within there now. (Interview 6, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
The health circumstances, that range from 65 to 100… you know… is incredible! I 
mean we have a neighbour who will be 100 next year, and he’s… (Interview 24, 
Participant 2 (A) ) 
And he’s fitter than us! (Interview 24, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Some participants found it difficult to instinctively consider themselves as being in 
an ‘older’ category. 
Yes, I think it [communication] needs to be more nuanced because that’s quite, 
well, in my case sort of 26 years, it’s quite as I say, I consider my mum’s health very 
fragile now but I don’t consider that mine is fragile. (Interview 6, Participant 2 (B) ) 
 
I find it very hard to accept that I’m in the elderly range now, I’m 73, and it’s really 
hard to come to terms with it ‘cause in my head I’m 40. I know I’m not when I get 
up and go to walk but I’m still 40 in my head, although I know I’m not. (Interview 
15, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
This in turn contributed to a potential skepticism of public health guidance aimed at 
older adults as it could be interpreted not to be personally relevant. 
It’s sort of crying wolf if you see what I mean, saying… yeah, crying wolf and crying 
fire, you know, saying you’re at risk, you’re at risk, you're at risk and neither you 
nor anybody you… none of my contemporaries are getting these things you think, 
well, they’re saying all the time we’re at risk when it seems we’re not. So I think 
they should pull back a bit and if people… well, no you cannot say that everybody 
over 64… there’s no longer a compulsory retirement age at 65 or anything else and 
people have got healthier, the population has got generally healthier and longer 
lived. And I know part of the extended lifespan is not necessarily in good health, 
but nevertheless I think they need to take account of greater longevity and better 
healthcare and better health and think a bit harder about who is really at greater 
risk. And of course there are people my age who have been unlucky and would be 
presumably at greater risk, people with compromised immune systems for 
whatever reason, etc. etc. of course there are. But I wouldn’t have thought it was 
true to say that people my age generally are more at risk than people in their 50s, 
but what do I know? (Interview 1, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Yes, because otherwise one might tend, depending on…to ignore it, to say, ‘They’re 
always saying this,’ and it’s a big ageism, because there’s a huge cate… I’m very, 
very fortunate in that at the moment I’m fit and well and not disabled in any way, 
but there are other people that are my age who are and have been ill for some 
time. So it’s like anything, you feel if it doesn’t apply to you that…Well, you feel it 
doesn’t apply to you, so the danger then is that you might not take any notice, 
which is a danger, so an explanation about why you’re vulnerable would be 
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helpful ’cause it would make me think, ‘I need to take note of this,’ whereas just 
having a box and ticking it or having something through the post, unless there’s an 
explanation I think, ‘Well, that won’t apply to me,’  ‘cause I haven’t got used to 
thinking of myself like that. (Interview 20, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
 
8.4 Stage One: Vaccine Developed 
In stage one of the phase two scenario, participants were provided with a mock 
newspaper article describing the pandemic which had been underway for a few 
months.  Central to the story was that a vaccine had now been developed and was, 
shortly, to be made available to the public.  At-risk groups would be prioritized with 
the general public gaining access at a later point.   At this stage of the scenario, 
both groups received identical information.  Participants were also asked to fill out 
a short questionnaire and answer whether they felt they would be part of an at-risk 
group and whether they intended to receive the vaccine at his time. 
8.4.1 Risk Perception 
In the first stage of the scenario, participant responses to the questionnaire 
indicated a lack of consensus in their perceptions of personal risk with more than 
half believing they would be part of an at-risk group (see Figure 8-1).  
Figure 8-1 Participant Questionnaire Responses-Perception of Belonging to an At-Risk Group-Scenario Stage 1 
  
In the discussion, several participants expressed the sense that due to age they 
would consider themselves to be at risk.  
Yeah.  Because we are of an age group where resistance is generally lower than 
when you’re younger, that’s the only reason. (Interview 7, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
‘Cause of my age, that’s what they tell you.  If you’re older you’re at risk. (Interview 
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Health was a consistent factor influencing participant perceptions of risk.  
Definitely, because age and general health and also having gone down with… If 
there’s anything going round I tend to catch it anyway (Interview 17, Participant 1 
(A) ) 
 
No. I don’t think so. I strongly believe if you’re healthy you have a good chance. It’s 
the people who are ill, who have illnesses, yes. (Interview 12, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Along with health, lifestyle was identified by participants as a risk factor.  
Yes, I think so. ‘cause I also live a life where I go out and about and mix with people 
at various social situations, where even coming up to town and things like that, 
public transport, yeah, and also this age is a factor. So yeah. I think I would be more 
at risk. (Interview 24, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
I don’t think so. I don’t have any asthma or anything like that, my blood pressure is 
good, I exercise, we eat properly, lots of fresh fruit, fruit and vegetables, so I 
wouldn’t have thought I was at risk. In five years’ time who knows! (Interview 22, 
Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Several participants struggled with the question as they found the parameters 
around risk were difficult to determine given the information provided at this point. 
Perhaps there are others who more at risk than us, other groups?  But nevertheless 
we would be, yes.  (Interview 7, Participant 2 (B) ) 
 
Well, I don’t think, even in that article, there’s enough information about ovine flu 
to know who is at risk and who isn’t, so it’s your own subjective attitudes to 
whether you would be at risk or not.  (Interview 19, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Additionally, there was a sense that risk could not necessarily be categorized along 
simple yes/no definitive terms. 
Yes. Everyone’s at risk really, yes. (Interview 23, Participant 1 (B) ): 
 
Well, no… there’s not at risk and risk, there’s a continuum, I presume and I don’t 
think I’m very far up it. OK, I’m over seventy but I’m in pretty good health 
otherwise, so… At risk and not at risk assumes some hard barrier which I don’t feel 
comfortable with but I assume I’m at the lower end of the spectrum.’ (Interview 
10, Participant 1 (B) ) 
	
8.4.2 Intentions to Vaccinate 
At this stage of the scenario, half of Group A participants and three-quarters of 
Group B participants were either likely or very likely to vaccinate.  Furthermore, 
approximately a quarter of Group A participants and a tenth of Group B participants 
either unlikely or very unlikely to receive the vaccination (see Figure 8-2). 
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Figure 8-2 Participant Questionnaire Responses-Intent to Vaccinate-Scenario Stage 1 
  
Intent to vaccinate was driven in large part by whether participants considered the 
vaccine to be effective.  In the discussion, several participants expressed confidence 
in the effectiveness of vaccination as a preventive measure. 
I always think it’s better to protect than it is not to protect.  (Interview 3, 
Participant 2 (B) )  
 
I’m a believer in vaccines in helping to fight all sorts of infections and nasty illnesses 
all around the world… (Interview 15, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
In a similar vein, several participants also expressed a view that, while they weren’t 
certain if the vaccine would necessarily be effective, they felt that, equally, it would 
do no harm. 
Well that’s the feeling that perhaps it’s a bit late by then [after a pandemic has 
started]. But I would probably, yeah, on the grounds that it won’t do any harm.  
(Interview 6, Participant 2 (B) ) 
 
Yeah, no harm in taking injection. (Interview 16, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Conversely, for some participants, the effectiveness of vaccination was in doubt 
and this, in turn, would affect their willingness or intent to vaccinate against a 
pandemic influenza. 
Well, probably not but I’d need to know how effective it was. If I was told it was 
100% effective, which I think you wouldn’t be told, but if you were then yeah, sure, 
if I was offered it. (Interview 1, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Because I don’t think they particularly work! (Interview 8, Participant 2 (A) ) 
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Additionally, concern over the safety of the vaccine and the potential for adverse 
effects, particularly when contrasted with the perception of limited effectiveness, 
was mentioned as a potential deterrent to vaccination. 
I don’t think I should get the vaccination because when I had this injection, I didn’t 
feel anything special except my arm was… my arm was not as flexible as… but it 
was for some moments. (Interview 11, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
No, I don’t believe in that. Because like I just said this year they had this flu thing, 
injection, and they found out that it’s actually not enough for that virus what they 
have. So it’s useless! So why should I go and get injected with something? The last 
time I got very ill, I put myself at risk to get ill. (Interview 12, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
A sense of personal risk or potential susceptibility was identified as an influencing 
factor in the decision to get vaccinated, particularly in comparison to concerns over 
safety and efficacy. 
And if I was vulnerable or there’s a risk I would take the vaccine. (Interview 22, 
Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Not unless there was a high risk. I’d also be interested in the history of the vaccine, 
I was thinking when our children were little, they didn’t have this triple whatever it 
was that kids have? … …So I would like to know a bit more about the origins of the 
vaccine and the history of the vaccine, whether it was considered completely safe 
or whether it was a question of… Well, what is more at risk? You dying of this thing 
or you contracting something else, depending on what it is. (Interview 4, 
Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
The role of medical authorities in influencing intent to vaccinate was also 
referenced by a few participants as a factor in their decision to vaccinate. 
I suppose I still trust the NHS, just about, so I’d want to be precautionary, I don’t 
want to get ill but I don’t want to be stupid really, if that’s the advice, unless 
there’s good reason why I shouldn’t then I would get it, yes. (Interview 20, 
Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Yeah, well I’ve got it already this year; every year the doctor writes to me, ‘Come 
and take the flu vaccine’, I go and take my flu injection. Yeah, no harm in taking 
injection.. (Interview 16, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
8.4.3 Information needs  
As with Phase 1, participants expressed a desire for general information relating to 
the nature of the pandemic and protective measures.  A few participants indicated 




What are the symptoms, what is the difference, how to tell the difference and how 
to know whether you need start taking antiviral or not? (Interview 14, Participant 2 
(A) ) 
 
When they use the word pandemic are they using it in a… it’s prevalent in a 
particular place or it is common or everybody has it or every other person has it; 
what do they mean really by pandemic?  (Interview 23, Participant 2 (B) ) 
 
Several participants wanted to have more information on what measures they 
could take to reduce the spread and avoid becoming ill. 
Best precautions to take and what to avoid. And possible sources of infection or 
contamination.  For example, if it’s an ovine pandemic they might say avoid eating 
lamb or mutton products and they might also say avoid buying anything new made 
with wool, because it could be spread on the fleeces. (Interview 17, Participant 1 
(A) ) 
 
My first reaction, is this ignorance I have about what people mean by pandemic 
and whether they’re just using it as a sort of scare word over and above epidemic 
or is it just that nobody talks about epidemic anymore and they just talk about 
pandemic? … …Pleased that the government was doing something about it; 
wondering about how effective the vaccine will be; wondering about the difference 
between that vaccine and the one I’ve already had; wondering how to go about 
getting the vaccine and whether I… whether it’s gonna be long queues and 
whether I should let people more at risk than me go before me? (Interview 10, 
Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Finally, although participants were relatively consistent in their information needs, 
there were discrepancies in their preferred information sources. 
Yeah, I’d look for the government… … If it said Daily Mail, I wouldn’t even bother 
looking at it, you know! (Interview 10, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
No, I wouldn’t daily or weekly go online to see what the position is with this, you 
rely on the television news or radio news or newspapers to tell you, or friends and 
family. Interview 13, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
 
8.5 Stage Two: Vaccine Priority Lists 
In the second stage of the scenario, participants were provided a leaflet on the 
pandemic vaccine.  The leaflet included general information on the vaccine 
including vaccine safety as well as a list of priority groups with a brief explanation of 
the rationale behind the prioritization.  An enhanced version of the leaflet was 
provided to half the participants (Group B). This enhanced leaflet also provided 
additional information specifically explaining why older adults were not included as 
part of the priority group.  As at Stage One, participants were asked to complete a 
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short questionnaire on their intention to vaccinate and perceptions of risk at this 
stage. 
 
8.5.1 Risk Perception  
In the second stage of the scenario, participant responses to the questionnaire 
indicated their perceptions of whether they would be in an at-risk group decreased.  
Across both groups, less than half of participants indicated they would be at-risk 
and an increased number of participants felt they were not at risk (see Figure 8-3). 
 
Figure 8-3 Participant Questionnaire Responses -Perception of Belonging to an At-Risk Group-Scenario Stage 2 
  
In the discussion, several participants in both Group A and B were accepting of 
official advice regarding their risk.  
Well, I have no medical expertise whatsoever, so you have to accept it at face value 
and if it says that those are the people most at risk, I find it odd, but if it says that 
they are…well, it’s not that odd actually. (Interview 1, Participant 1 (A) )  
 
I thought it’d be reassuring really. I think that’s it, I mean you’ve got to… unless you 
assume that the only thing that’s come out is that they’re lying to you…you’ve got 
to basically take on that, well they say over 65 unless you’re vulnerable so you’re 
less at risk. (Interview 6, Participant 2 (B) ) 
 
For a few participants being excluded from the at-risk groups would create a lower 
sense of concern on their part and could reduce uptake of protective behaviours. 
Surprise and relief, I suppose and therefore I’d be unlikely to get a vaccine at that 
point, very unlikely. (Interview 2, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
Interesting, as it tells me that I am not likely to be affected, I downgrade my 
sensory perception of it and obviously you’d have to be careful if somebody close 
to you did catch flu but otherwise I think I would be relatively savoir faire.  
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Conversely, a few participants expressed a sense that the recommendation was 
based less on risk and more on capacity and capability and that, there was the 
potential that older adults were simply being excluded.  Although this view was 
expressed in both groups, it was more prevalent in Group A. 
Well, it is slightly odd, yes, but if they’re not that’s great. I mean maybe they just 
don’t mind us all dying off but that’s fine too. (Interview 1, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
If you’re looking at futures for the population for the planet for existence, if you’re 
looking at futures like that then… what [Interview 14, Participant 1 (A) )]’s come 
out with is that the protection of the young is actually almost more important than 
somebody who is vulnerable, dependent on it. I mean let’s say the government is 
really, really looking nastily at… without compassion, without empathy, without 
feeling for survival, if they’re really looking at survival, then OK, pregnant women, 
yes; anyone under 24, yep, that’s part of it. Now, if I’ve got a compromised 
immune system, which I have, I’m gonna wanna be looked after but I’m actually 
not gonna be much help if I’ve got a compromised immune system and we’ve got a 
diminished population, our services are completely stretched, no one can really 
look after me… …It really, really would be quite hard to make those decisions. I 
suppose you’ve got to preserve the illusion of looking after the very elderly and 
vulnerable, but some others might say, ‘Let them go’. (Interview 14, Participant 2 
(A) ) 
 
Whilst the advice provided indicated that older adults were less at risk, some 
participants still felt that they would be in a higher risk category due to pre-existing 
medical conditions. 
‘The risk of infection… a person aged 65 or older is less… than the risk of the 
younger’. But I’d still… because of my illnesses, I would still… (Interview 3, 
Participant 2 (B) )  
 
Well, no, ‘cause it says it’s more likely to be younger groups, but I’d put that I could 
be at risk ‘cause I have asthma, I mean very… I don’t have it now… cause I take 
medication but because it’s respiratory I would feel that I was at risk. (Interview 9, 
Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
8.5.2 Intention to Vaccinate 
Participant responses to the questionnaire demonstrated a reduced intention to 
vaccinate across both groups as compared to Stage One of the scenario.  The 
number of participants who indicated they were either likely or very likely to 
vaccinate was approximately halved (see Figure 8-4). 
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Figure 8-4 Participant Questionnaire Responses- Intent to Vaccinate-Scenario Stage Two 
  
 
The information provided in the leaflet, in particular an understanding and 
acceptance of risk groups, was referenced by several participants as a key factor in 
the decision to seek vaccination at this time.   
I would go for it but it sounds as though I wouldn’t get it because I wouldn’t be part 
of the at risk group, would I? (Interview 22, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Well, we’re gonna have to be unlikely ‘cause we’re outside the age group and 
we’re more resistant. (Interview 7, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Some participants in Group B indicated they had specific medical challenges which 
influenced perception of risk as associated intent to vaccinate.   
Oh, right. Well, after reading that, I don’t know you see, because I have got those 
illnesses, would I still need it being over 64 and got these complaints, should it be 
something I should be thinking about because this is saying you don’t get it so 
much? (Interview 3, Participant 2 (B) )  
 
See, I’d have to have it because of the respiratory things, so I’d have to. (Interview 
3, Participant 1 (B) )  
 
A few participants also felt that, whilst they weren’t feeling desperate to vaccinate, 
they would consider vaccination as long as it was made available to them without 
barriers.  A recurring potential barrier for vaccination was cost.  
Because I mean if I had to pay for it I wouldn’t take it whereas if it was free… 
(Interview 2, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
If it was offered to me, yes, but I might equally be prepared to pay for it if it was a 
really bad pandemic, epidemic.  (Interview 7, Participant 2 (B) ) 
 
8

























Intent to Vaccinate (Group A) 
- Scenario Stage 2
0

























Intent to Vaccinate (Group B) 
- Scenario Stage 2
 217 
Ease of access (or lack thereof) was also identified by one participant as a potential 
barrier to vaccination. 
Half and half, you know, if I could phone up the doctor and get an appointment and 
go or walk into the chemist and get one and know it was easy; if I had to keep 
phoning the doctor I’d think, ‘Oh, sod it, I’m alright.’ (Interview 10, Participant 1 
(B) ) 
 
8.5.3 Information Needs 
Participant information needs at stage two of the scenario focused on risk and 
process. Where additional information was felt necessary, participants expressed 
interest in clarification around how the determination of risk was made, the vaccine 
development process, and vaccine safety.  A few participants indicated that they 
either personally would want or would consider it beneficial to provide further 
information regarding the decision-making process or rationale behind risk 
assessments relative to vaccine priority. 
I think given that one accepts information from authorities like this, you know, 
you’re not so suspicious, you don’t believe anything because they make it up for 
their own benefit, given you accept that, it would be interesting, I wouldn’t need it 
but it would be interesting to have a link or something to further information. I 
mean this must be based on information about the progress of the pandemic in 
Spain or wherever it is? No, Greece, it was Greece, but just like a link going to a 
website, say, which shows you the date, a few graphs and things.  Because this is to 
me counter-intuitive that I am not in the at risk group, so one would just like to see 
the data behind it. (Interview 2, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
They should write it, because of this and that, we did not or we have not… that we 
have not included this people, this pregnant one whatever. Blah blah. Because it 
could, it could affect.. reactions between the tablets or the medicine which those 
people have. Mm. They should write that. (Interview 12, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Several participants in Group B, despite having received the enhanced leaflet, were 
interested in having additional information explaining why older adults were 
considered to be less at risk from this particular flu. 
I’d like to know, bearing in mind the experience we have with being at risk for any 
different flu, why they’ve decided that this particular flu is less attacking those of 
the older age groups, it doesn’t seem to conform to common sense. (Interview 7, 
Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Possibly, yeah. I mean why is that the case, why is it over 65s have been excluded 
from this? (Interview 23, Participant 1 (B) ) 
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One participant felt that there was a lack of clarity around the definition of risk in 
the leaflet. 
Yeah, but it doesn’t say, ‘cause it wouldn’t be part of an at risk group, it doesn’t 
define at risk in terms of severity or likelihood, it just says at risk. Well, I’m at risk 
‘cause I might get on the train and someone sneezes all over me in a cinema or 
whatever, ‘cause that puts you at risk, you know? (Interview 13, Participant 1 (B) ) 
	
Effectiveness and safety of the vaccine was highlighted as an area for which some 
participants would want to have additional information or reassurances. 
I think the effectiveness of the vaccine, and it would be interesting to know why 
they think babies from 0-6 months and older people over 64 are not at risk. 
(Interview 1, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
But it’s just that, you know, are we automatically giving everybody this vaccine, is it 
like the flu vaccine or is this an extra one? They’ve got no mention of what happens 
if I’ve already had a flu virus jab this year. Does it say it? OK, got it, but is there any 
interaction, is there any problem with the two together? (Interview 14, Participant 
2 (A) ) 
 
Additionally, some participants indicated they would want to the reasons behind 
the need for a priority list in the first place and when older adults would be able to 
receive the vaccine. 
There would have to be some kind of advice for older people as to why they are 
not there and when they would be able to be included. (Interview 14, Participant 1 
(A) ) 
 
I think I’d want to know the rationale behind the priorities. I also, as I said before, 
how available it is, are they rationing it because there’s a shortage or is it just a 
time thing, how many people they can get through? So yes, a little bit more 
information? (Interview 24, Participant 3 (A) ) 
 
Finally, although the leaflet was focused on vaccination, a few participants 
expressed an interest in receiving additional information regarding the features of 
the pandemic strain and it’s spread. 
And so some way… if there were a few clear indications, markers, that you’d got flu 
and not just something else, that would be very useful, ‘cause how do you know 
you’ve got flu and you just haven’t got a rotten cold?  (Interview 10, Participant 1 
(B) ) 
 
There’s a lot of statistical stuff supporting these contentions here, I’d be interested 
in the demographics, I’d be interested in the geography, I’d be interested in the 
size of the thing.  (Interview 18, Participant 1 (B) ) 
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8.6 Stage Three: Older Adult Turned Away from Vaccination 
In the third stage of the scenario, participants in both groups were provided with a 
newspaper article.  In this article, an older adult had been turned away from a 
vaccination clinic as she was not on the priority list.  Participants were also asked to 
respond to a short questionnaire on their intentions to vaccinate once it became 
available to them and the acceptability of the decision to exclude older adults from 
vaccination initially. 
8.6.1 Risk Perception 
In the third stage of the scenario, several participants indicated that they would feel 
positively about the risk-based approach to vaccination, as expressed in the leaflet. 
Well, quite confident, yes. I don’t suppose it’s ever 100% certain that the strategy is 
the right one. I think that’s a very difficult thing for anybody to know or even to 
prove, certainly without the benefit of hindsight. But I think you would think they 
were doing their best. (Interview 1, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
I’m sure the government would have done due diligence on what they were about 
to do for what they’re giving out… (Interview 22, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Despite this, there was, however, an increase from stage two, in the number of 
participants in Group A who attributed the decision to exclude over-65’s less on 
medical assessment of risk and more on capability or capacity.  
And maybe sometimes they have… they probably think that you’re over 65 and 
that you have had your days, you know, sort of thing!  It doesn’t matter if you’re 
dying early because people are living a lot longer than…a lot longer now and it’s 
costing the NHS a lot of money because people are living a lot older now, so they 
get rid of them!  (Interview 2, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
They say it’s more at risk, but apparently they explain it’s more at risk there, but for 
me it’s that’s just between the lines I read OK, they need it more because they 
have still a long journey in front of them. I’m cynical about that but I think it’s, 
there is a lot because I am more at risk, the metabolisms ... people over 65 and 
their metabolism are not as strong as the… from about risk they are as much at risk 
as the younger ones, but they don’t need it as much. They’re on a journey. We 
have to be a community so we think of them, for the vaccine it’s like OK, if I have to 
die my son or I, let me die first, because I believe… yeah, that’s my philosophy of 
life. (Interview 11, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
This perception of a utilitarian-based decision making process, provoked a sense of 
resignation around being excluded for some participants. 
Well, if younger people are more susceptible because they haven’t had things and 
younger people are the ones who are going to be growing and paying the taxes to 
keep those in government well paid and for those extremely generous pension 
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schemes that they have, it’s the government who sets it so I can see why they 
would do that, because they’d pick on the ones who will be working, the future 
generations and the workers, who are paying taxes, so if you’re retired then…  
(Interview 22, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
It’s never explicitly stated but it is there, and that would just reflect that, when you 
get to a certain age then you can expect a reduction in the treatment that you 
might expect if you’re younger. (Interview 24, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
Additionally, whilst many participants were accepting or, at least, resigned to a 
perceived utility-driven decision-making process, a few participants took a very 
negative view of the exclusion criteria. 
And maybe sometimes they have… they probably think that you’re over 65 and 
that you have had your days, you know, sort of thing!  It doesn’t matter if you’re 
dying early because people are living a lot longer than… a lot longer now and it’s 
costing the NHS a lot of money because people are living a lot older now, so they 
get rid of them! (Interview 2, Participant 1 (A) )  
 
I would feel extremely insulted because I’d feel undervalued.  (Interview 17, 
Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
As with Group A, several participants in Group B expressed their support for the 
risk-based approach to vaccination, as outlined in the leaflet. 
I thought it’d be reassuring really. I think that’s it, I mean you’ve got to unless you 
assume that the only thing that’s come out is that they’re lying to you (Interview 6, 
Participant 2 (B) ) 
 
Yeah, it is more than reasonable, it’s the only morally correct thing to do if you 
haven’t got enough you have to give it to the high risk people. That’s stronger than 
reasonable, isn’t it, it’s what ought to have done. (Interview 10, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Although many participants in Group B perceived the decision to be based on risk, a 
few still had questions, and opposition to the vaccine priority list tended to be 
framed in the context of questioning the medical validity of the information 
provided. 
No, I think it’s unreasonable because it goes contrary to all evidence that we’ve 
been presented with in terms of taking our annual flu jab and while the ovine flu or 
whatever they’re talking about may well be in pandemic form, flu is flu. (Interview 
7, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
I was explaining that I thought it would be detrimental to the health service not to 
protect the very elderly because they wouldn’t have enough beds to cope, they 




Conversely, for a few participants, support of the decision was framed within the 
context of either external advice or, as in Group A, a sense of acceptance of a 
utilitarian approach. 
Yeah. Yes, I think so. This would all be done through my GP so I would try and get 
his support or find out what his support of it was on that. (Interview 19, Participant 
1 (B) ) 
 
- and it’s important that this group get them because they're young and growing 
and that lot had a go, you know? (Interview 23, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Some participants also expressed a sense that the risk for younger adults was, 
perhaps, the result of lifestyle rather than medical risk.  
I think perhaps less people get it because they don’t tend to go out and mix as 
much in the same way that younger people do, if you’re going to clubs and dancing 
and dancing around and moving around, I think you’re far more likely to catch 
something than just sitting in a little meeting for older people where nobody gets 
up and moves and not so many people go.  (Interview 15, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
…but I certainly think a pensioner of any age should have got a greater… possibly, 
probably, even, more likely to catch flu than teenagers. But having said that, I know 
this lady is… you see, people in their 80s aren’t as likely to be going on crowded 
trains, crowded underground, crowded buses, that reduces the risk on them. But 
an old lady with flu compared to the 20-year-old with flu she might be… she’s just 
as likely to get over the…perhaps less likely to get over the flu than a much younger 
person having it, I think.  (Interview 13, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
8.6.2 Acceptability of Government Decision Not To Prioritize Over-65’s 
In the third stage of the scenario, participants were asked respond to a 
questionnaire indicating whether they felt it was acceptable that older adults were 
initially excluded from the vaccination programme.  A majority of participants in 
both groups expressed that this was acceptable though, despite having received the 
enhanced leaflet, participants in Group B were less likely to view this as acceptable 
(See Figure 8-5). 
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Figure 8-5  Participant Questionnaire Responses- Acceptability of Initial Exclusion of Older Adults from 
Vaccination 
 
For many participants in Group A, the underlying assumption was that the decision 
to not to provide the vaccine to over 65-year olds was based less on medical advice 
around risk and more from a pragmatic, resource based approach.  This was quite 
distressing to some participants. 
I think that’s outrageous because they’re quick enough to take money off us for 
bills and taxes, and you don’t get a free TV licence until you’re over 75, so if they’re 
still charging us for a TV licence and they’re still charging us for all the utilities and 
we’re trying to make ends meet on pensions and we’re trying to economise, plus 
we’re actually valuable members of the community because we’re living, historical 
sources, making us feel that we don’t matter is not the right way to make us go out 
to the ballot box and vote. And we’re the ones most likely to vote, besides which, 
bearing in mind our head of state and her consort happen to be in their nineties… 
I’m sure there’ll be a flu jab available for them, so why shouldn’t we get the same 
treatment? (Interview 17, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
The article I think is not acceptable and it shouldn’t mean refusing anyone over 
that age, that age bracket, they shouldn’t refuse to give them the vaccine once 
they’ve turned up for it.  (Interview 2, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Conversely, several participants expressed the view that they were accepting, if not 
supportive, of the policy, due to pragmatic reasons around limited resources and 
the resulting need to make difficult decisions. 
It’s a simple case of there’s not enough to go round so you have to ration it. If she 
gets it somebody else is not getting it, so who are you going to put… She might be 
getting it, she’s only got a few years to live perhaps, whereas a child of five with 
their whole life ahead of them might not get it because she’s had it. (Interview 22, 
Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Because it’s limited and so I think it is more important that children get it and 
working adults. So you’ve got to have the emergency services, after the children, 
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So the economy and the rest of the country keeps going because we are 
expendable. (Interview 24, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
A few Group A participants did assess the acceptability of the vaccine restriction on 
the grounds of risk as outlined in the leaflet and reinforced in quotes from the news 
article provided at the third stage. 
I’m very trusting, I think it’s because they’re not at risk or they’re less at risk. 
(Interview 4, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Yeah, if what they’re [information provided on the leaflet] saying is correct and the 
government agree with it, yeah, I would see no problem on going that route. 
(Interview 22, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Although a lower number of participants in Group B (53%) felt it was acceptable 
that over-65’s were not initially offered the vaccine the reasons many participants 
gave for not finding this acceptable seemed to centre less on perceptions of risk or 
utility and more on the issue of compassion.   
Well, I’m horrified by the lack of decision or the perceived lack of decision of an old 
lady who feels she’s at risk and is effectively given the brush off both locally and by 
the health service… (Interview 7, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
That’s rubbish!  No, if an old person goes into any place looking for a vaccination 
for something, then my assumption is that they would be given it because I don’t 
think anyone, any reasonable person, would assume that you’d be getting queues 
10 miles long of people aged 65 looking for a vaccination for something. And the 
numbers… she’s obviously got a thing about becoming ill with Spanish flu and so 
on, so she’s got concerns which are unusual and medical services should be flexible 
enough to deal with that, they’d just give her the vaccination. (Interview 18, 
Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Support for the position tended to be based in confidence that the decision was 
medically sound, or that there would be some flexibility within the position.   
No, that’s a fair comment, obviously they’ve done the research on it, on their little 
mice and everything else that they do and obviously seen that for the older mice it 
wasn’t really necessary and they can see that what’s happening will affect certain 
age groups. And there’s some other things they’ve done for younger ones in the 
past where it’s been not for the older people, for the younger ones, maybe 
because we’ve got the good ‘ol immunes in us… (Interview 9, Participant 2 (B) ) 
 
I think so, if they think it’s only really the young ones that need to have it then I 
think that’s fine. I think if you were over 65 and your GP felt you needed to have 
it… you could ask and if he felt you needed to have it because of any other 





8.6.3 Intention to Vaccinate-Once a Vaccine Becomes Available 
As with previous stages of the scenario, participants were given a questionnaire to 
determine their intention to vaccinate, in this case, once a vaccine became 
available.  In both groups, intent to vaccinate increased as compared to stage two.  
The number of participants indicating they would be likely or very likely to 
vaccinate returned to stage one levels (See Figure 8-6). 
 
Figure 8-6 Participant Questionnaire Responses- Intent to Vaccinate-Once Available -Stage Three 
 
Effectiveness, perceived risk and medical advice were the main commented-upon 
drivers for Group A participants in the decision to seek vaccination at this time.  
Effectiveness, in this context, refers to both the effectiveness of vaccination writ 
large as well as the perceived effectiveness of the particular pandemic vaccine. 
Well, that’s what I’m uncertain, again, it would depend very much on the 
effectiveness. (Interview 1, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Well, common sense, if there’s a pandemic and there’s a vaccine available, better 
to be safe than sorry, especially when you’re in an at risk category. (Interview 17, 
Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Risk continued to be viewed as a deciding factor in opting for vaccination however, 
unlike the first stage where a higher perception of risk was likely to prompt 
individuals to act, at this third stage, some participants felt their risk to 
reward/effort calculation might fall more firmly on the side of skipping the 
vaccination. 
I’m not sure whether I would if I wasn’t at risk? I’m not that keen on vaccine and 
dosing yourself up with stuff if you don’t need, I think it’s best not to take it. It’s 
better to eat healthily and to look after yourself. If there is a risk, yeah, but would I 
do it, I dunno, I might, but I wouldn’t be desperate to. (Interview 4, Participant 1 
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As long as there was no restriction on it, yes I would. Unless I thought well I’ve 
gone six months now, picking my grandchildren up, I haven’t caught it … (Interview 
24, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Finally, some participants indicated they would be swayed by the advice of their GP 
or by other medical experts. 
If the doctor was that that way you would… I mean I know my doctor would if he 
would say, you go and have it. Whatever your doctor would say, innit? It’ s all down 
to the medical… It’s not down to us really. (Interview 8, Participant 3 (A) ) 
 
Yes…if they come to me…There are plenty of vaccines so lets can people of all ages. 
Uncertain, maybe I would go, a bit later, for that. (Interview 11, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
As with Group A participants, a primary motivation behind the desire to vaccinate 
for Group B participants was the sense that vaccination was an effective means of 
preventing illness or, at least, reducing the likelihood of becoming ill. 
I think I probably would, again, it’s that thing of well if I don’t and I got it then I’d 
think, you know…it’s a bit like I always panic about taking out holiday insurance, 
because if I did end up in hospital or had to be repatri…. I think it is literally of the 
same model as insurance, that you start actually worrying that, well, if I don’t do it 
and I got it and then… (Interview 6, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Yeah, probably, if it was easy. … …Same answer as before, to reduce my probability 
of getting the disease and a little bit of thinking I’d done the right thing, sort of not 
procrastinating. It’s not about the outcome, it’s about me, it’s about I’ve actually 
gone and done what I ought to do, I’ve done my duty kind of thing! (Interview 10, 
Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
In addition, participants expressed a sense of confidence in their decision making 
around health, commenting that if the vaccine was being offered, this was probably 
with good reason. 
Well, if they're good enough to offer it then you should have it. (Interview 9, 
Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Because I believe the government strategy, if they are offering vaccine to 
somebody who’s over 65 that suggests that it should be of use to them.  (Interview 
19, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Conversely, for a few participants the decision to not have the vaccine was driven 
by a sense that the vaccine would serve no real purpose and confer no particular 
health benefit. 
It’s a soft data situation, the vaccination itself can cause you a problem and it might 
not protect you at all from the invasive agent that it’s supposed to act against. It’s a 
very difficult area. (Interview 6, Participant 3 (B) )  
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I think that my personal system of preventing myself getting infected has worked 
pretty well for 77 years, I don’t expect it to stop working unless I’m… If I’m 
hospitalised then I’d probably accept vaccination because hospitals are… They’re 
full of sick people, have you noticed that?! (Interview 18, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
8.6.4 Information Needs 
In the third stage of the scenario, Group A participant information needs were 
heavily focused around a desire for additional information relating to the vaccine 
priority list and the initial exclusion of older adults. 
Yes, I think you do need more information, it would be good to know why, I mean 
as we said before, why they think that people over 64 are not at higher risk than 
the average member of the population. But I don’t have a problem with rationing 
as such, you know, there’s no money tree, the NHS doesn’t have unlimited 
resources and nor do they ever have unlimited flu vaccine. So I think rationing is a 
perfectly reasonable way to deal with it.-  (Interview 1, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
It is a tremendous generalisation and I wouldn’t know why really, what research 
they’ve done, that comes to that conclusion. Some people don’t go out much 
‘cause they’re more housebound, as you get older you get more housebound, so 
therefore you probably would be less at risk ‘cause you’re not mingling with 
people. If you can keep your own little sterile area then…so you’re not going out 
every day, on public transport every day and mingling with people at work and so 
on, so from that point of view I think they would be less at risk, except that if you 
were in contact with small children, then you’re not, because they tend to give you 
thing! So it is a bit of a generalisation but I’d want to know more information about 
why they said that. (Interview 20, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
As with Group A participants and, as in the previous scenario stage, a few 
participants in Group B expressed an interest in receiving greater clarification as to 
how the risk groups were determined. 
It’s the same as the other one, they need more information about why over-65s 
are at less risk, it just says that they are but it needs to be a bit more than that, 
because we’ve always been told that that’s the age at which you’re elderly and at 
risk of everything, so…except flu! It doesn’t seem that likely, does it, really? 
(Interview 15, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
And figure it out, to what extent it’s a… price… no, a precise kind of division of at 
risk. You know, you’ve lived 65, does something magic happen after that? Why not 
64 or… just a pensioner, 65 for a pensioner, so I suppose…? (Interview 13, 
Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Although the type of information requested by participants in both groups was 
consistent, Group A participants were more likely to express a desire for this 
information than Group B participants. 
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8.7 Behavioural Intentions other than Vaccination 
As in the first phase of the scenario, participants were asked to discuss their 
perspectives on the behaviours being studied (hand hygiene, isolation, respiratory 
hygiene, seeking medical assistance, and vaccination).   As the scenario revolved 
around vaccination, participant views on these behaviours were covered 
throughout the discussion of the scenario.  
8.7.1 Hand Hygiene 
Handwashing and the use of gels was predominantly viewed as an effective means 
to prevent infection. 
Your hands catch all sorts of things off the objects that you have touched, so… 
bacteria can go through your hands and so you have then washed, where if you 
touch your eyes or something… I suppose to get infected or something. (Interview 
11, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
Why wash the hands? Well, I think… I understand that even if it’s in cold water it 
removes a lot of the stuff which is on the surface so that’s what I’d probably do 
(Interview 4, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
However, despite this, one participant did express doubts in the usefulness of hand 
gels.  
I used to [carry gel] but I always assumed it didn’t really do any good. They even 
say the hospital gels aren’t particularly… (Interview 24, Participant 3 (A) ) 
 
Despite this, many participants identified the use of hand gels as a way to keep 
their hands clean even when outside the home or away from a sink, though 
perhaps one which could be expanded. 
Yeah, handwashing, again make sure you have some at home and if you go out 
make sure that you wash your hands and you use the antibacterial gel.(Interview 2, 
Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
We’ve been on lots of cruises, that’s our fun thing now, and they had hand wipes at 
every possible station; they were very diligent with that and the captain said at the 
end, ‘We’ve been very successful on this trip, nobody has caught anything’, and 
what not and he put it down to the hands. And that’s obviously a thing that could 
be…I don’t know how you’d introduce a thing like that in shops and things? But it 
did seem to work because everything you touch, money, paper, anything... 
(Interview 23, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Participants did not express concern that there would be particular barriers to 
handwashing or using hand gel. 
It’s hands, I think, this is the thing I’m most concerned about, I’d wash my hands 
more than I do and I’d avoid touching things, particularly public transport… 
(Interview 10, Participant 1 (B) ) 
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You have to hand wash every time, the bacteria and things, because you touching 
doors, you’re touching the bus when you go in, you’re touching the seat. Other 
people have that…it is spreading everywhere. So if it’s an epidemic you have to be 
really careful. (Interview 12, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Similarly, participants expressed the view that handwashing is a behaviour that is 
already being done and, something that should be done regardless of a potential 
pandemic. 
People should already be… hand washing we should already be doing really, since it 
should be a habit. Really people do need reminding (Interview 6, Participant 2 (B) ) 
 
Of course, but you do that anyway. I mean if you wash your hands anyway there’s 
no point in washing them twice, if you see what I mean? (Interview 1, Participant 1 
(A) ) 
 
Some participants also identified the role that public health guidance could play in 
encouraging the adoption of hand washing behaviour in a pandemic. 
If I were advised I would but is not influenza transmitted through sneezing and 
breathing in rather than touching anyone? (Interview 2, Participant 2 (A) ) 
No, but if there are public health practices which say do that, then I guess I’d be 
frightened enough to do it, not frightened but concerned enough. (Interview 2, 
Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
I think… apart from the everyday routine, people should be asked to wash their 
hands every five minutes (Interview 11, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
Participant responses in Phase two of the research echo those of Phase one older 
adult participants who felt that handwashing was an efficacious behaviour with 
relatively few barriers to adoption. 
8.7.2 Isolation 
Participants were generally positively predisposed to isolation, in so far as possible, 
in that, for most, there was a sense that this would be a behaviour they could 
adopt. 
Eat sensibly, not going in contact with people that you know are unwell and as I 
said before, be a bit circumspect about public transport. I certainly would curtail 
my activities if it was really bad, not be swanning off on buses and tubes quite so 
much, initially anyway, to see what was going on, so it’s that sort of thing. 
(Interview 20, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Well…I will not make too much contact where so many peoples are, I wouldn’t go 
to crowded places, I would stay away, and keep warm, stay more or less in my 
house, just do the most necessary things, go shopping, go here, but I wouldn’t mix 
with so many people. (Interview 12, Participant 1 (A) ) 
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Several participants felt that, by nature of being older and, consequently, retired, 
they would be in a better position to avoid unnecessary exposure to crowds and 
potentially larger numbers of infected individuals. 
Well, I suppose if you can you could avoid going on crowded buses and tubes 
where everybody coughs and sneezes in your face, but it’s quite easy for me to 
avoid, I can walk most places… it’s not a problem for me personally. And for the 
people who can’t avoid it… what can they do? I mean you might marginally change 
your behaviour but most people are not in a position to change their behaviour 
entirely I don’t think. (Interview 1, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Well, the main one is to avoid crowds if you can, but if you have to go to work, for 
instance, on the train or bus that’s a problem ‘cause the trains and buses are, I 
think, probably where you catch things. But if you’re retired like us you would 
probably stay at home, as much as you can. (Interview 23, Participant 2 (B) ) 
 
Many participants did, however, indicate that they would take steps and plan in 
order to avoid areas that might present more of a risk of exposure.  
Avoiding crowds of people, avoid going on the trains or underground in rush hours. 
Just those things really, just try and avoid crowds ‘cause you don’t know who’s got 
it!  (Interview 13, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
It might make a difference in the company I kept, I’d keep away from crowds, 
things like the underground I think are very bad, well, the trains can be bad but I 
know… One reason at the moment I think, as I’m… well, I’ve stopped going on 
trains for the moment. The place I first stopped going on trains was Holborn 
because when you get off the train it’s so crowded when you get up those stairs 
and places like that, and you can only go slowly and that’s a no-no situation for me. 
I’d keep away from people who are sneezing or people showing any signs; it’s not 
just a runny nose, it’s coughing and sneezing you have to watch, isn’t it? (Interview 
15, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
This however, did not apply universally as one participant indicated that existing 
commitments coupled with financial constraints would affect his ability to isolate 
himself. 
Well, it depends how much it might be influencing what my commitments were 
over the next month or so. I mean I’ve said I’m retired but musicians never retire, 
you know? I’m playing for services every Sunday morning so that’s… no, and I still 
teach and I play for a carol service on Monday so it depends. If it would stop me 
going to mix with a congregation of three or four-hundred, as I did on Monday 
morning, I don’t think it would stop me going into that sort of…if I knew enough in 
advance about it to wear a face mask like people did in Hong Kong then I might be 
tempted to do that, but I don’t think it would make me cancel all my engagements, 
because I’m still dependent on an income, I’m not financially secure to just do 
nothing. (Interview 19, Participant 1 (B) ) 
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As in the first phase of the research, older adult participants continued to indicate 
measured support for isolation as a preventive measure though challenges were 
identified around curtailing regular activities such as financial commitments or 
shopping. 
8.7.3 Respiratory Hygiene 
Participants supported the view that exercising proper respiratory hygiene is an 
effective way to prevent the spread of illness.  Additionally, for some, there was 
also a sense that, the failure to adopt this behavior would be impolite. 
Alright, I wasn’t in the War but I remember the adverts saying, spitting spreads 
diseases…  sneezing and all that, it’s drummed into us, do this to protect yourself, 
but kids aren’t taught anything like that. (Interview 3, Participant 2 (B) )  
 
But someone that happened to be on the crowded half-past-seven train from 
Worcester Park to London or whatever, you know, you’re likely, possibly to be next 
to somebody and lots of people don’t bother to get out a handkerchief and just 
sneeze. (Interview 13, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Although there was a broad sense amongst participants that respiratory hygiene 
was a helpful and protective behaviour, participants were divided between those 
who were confident in their current actions and those who felt that more 
precaution could be required during a pandemic. 
Well, of course, but you would do that anyway. (Interview 1, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Yeah. I should be more careful of all of that and I should always carry a tissue and 
be careful if I come… I don’t know, to be honest, if I am that good about all that, I’ll 
always try and prevent spreading it. (Interview 4, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Several participants expressed the view that a cultural or generational shift had 
occurred wherein the ‘other’ were much less likely to use proper respiratory 
hygiene. 
I think when I was young the health service or whatever would put advertisements 
on the television like, coughs and sneezes spread diseases, and our parents… it 
came down as a cultural view where you don’t sneeze in the open. Nowadays I see 
people sneeze openly and I don’t see any advertising of any sort that says this is 
not a good thing. I was disgusted the other day when I saw somebody leaning over 
the food stored in the supermarket… then going achoo. I’m absolutely amazed that 
anyone would not think that this is not a good thing. (Interview 22, Participant 1 
(A) ) 
 
No, but the thing is you see so many people, don’t you, on buses and things, and 
they sit there and cough, without hands, you know, no hands or anything… 
(Interview 3, Participant 1 (B) )  
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Accessibility of tissues or handkerchiefs was reiterated as something that 
individuals need to be prepared. 
You can never get to a paper unless you’re sitting with a pile of things by your 
hand, I might use my hand but I wouldn’t use my sleeve, I don’t think, and then 
obviously try and wash them as soon as you can, and be extra careful about 
washing hands generally… (Interview 15, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
I’m aware of that campaign [Catch it, Bin it, Kill it] and I agree with that campaign 
and I try to remember to observe that campaign. I personally carry a handkerchief 
but I make sure that the handkerchief that I’ve been using goes into the 
appropriate place for washing and cleaning and I’ve got another one in the other 
pocket which I now can use, so if need a handkerchief I’d just take it out and give 
you a clean handkerchief, which I can always do. Tissues tend to just get thrown all 
over the place, although I would prefer people to be sneezing into a tissue rather 
than covering me with their germs. (Interview 18, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Older adult participants in this phase were in line with those of Phase One.  
Participants were supportive of the behaviour as a means to prevent the 
transmission of disease but also expressed the view that ‘others’ were less likely to 
adopt this measure.  Practical challenges around preparedness (ie: having a tissue 
at the ready) were identified, as with the participants in the earlier studies. 
8.7.4 Seeking Medical Assistance 
When asked if they would seek medical assistance if ill, participants were largely in 
agreement that they would, however, the process of doing so varied greatly.  For 
some participants the GP remained the primary port-of-call. 
Most definitely, yes, and if there was something going about of course you would 
be alerted by it, so make sure that you go to your doctor, you can ask him 
questions… because the doctor will give you the necessary information. (Interview 
2, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Yeah, if I felt I was really ill, yes and they need to deal with the symptoms, because 
presumably that’s how people end up in hospital ‘cause the symptoms need to be 
treated and things like being hydrated. (Interview 6, Participant 2 (B) ) 
 
The severity of illness was considered by some participants to be a determining 
factor in whether to seek medical assistance. 
Probably not immediately unless I thought it was that, if I thought it was that I 
would. But I might… it could be anything, it could be just ordinary flu, it could be 
just a cold, because that happens even now, but if I thought it was I certainly would 
seek medical assistance, yeah.  (Interview 4, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Depending on how ill you were. (Interview 3, Participant 1 (B) )  
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A recurring theme was the potential inability of medical services to keep up, with 
some participants expressing concern that, despite contacting the GP, they would 
be left waiting. 
Yeah, you turn to the doctor but whether you’d get any response, that’s another 
thing. (Interview 8, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
The GPs are overloaded as it is and they will not be able to cope and it would be 
unadvisable for people to go to hospital at the moment. Hospitals are known as 
places of infection. And the GP surgery will become a place of infection. (Interview 
14, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
Finally, some participants expressed the view that they would already be aware of 
what the advice would be so there would simply be no point in contacting the 
medical authorities. 
Not sure what they can do for flu. (Interview 24, Participant 3 (A) )  
They advise you not to, don’t they, with flu? I mean their advice is basically stay at 
home, keep warm, go to bed. (Interview 24, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
I might do, but there probably would’ve been so much publicity already about what 
to do: stay indoors; drink plenty of fluids; take paracetamol. So you probably 
wouldn’t need to ring the GP. (Interview 9, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Participants were generally open to the idea of using a National Pandemic Flu 
Service.  Participants who were more positive about the service commented less on 
the Flu Service itself and more on their desire to have all possible information in the 
event of a pandemic. 
Yeah, I’d take the opportunity, anything that is open, any advice they tell you to 
take I’d take it and take the necessary precautions. (Interview 2, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
If I had reason to think that either myself or my partner were suffering that 
particular disorder then I would use anything to get more information, so if I knew 
there was a website dedicated to that, then I would use it straightaway. (Interview 
18, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
On the other hand, individuals who were less inclined to use the service pointed to 
concerns over efficiency and effectiveness. 
I might, yes, I would look online. The only trouble with a lot of those things, 
especially government services, is you might spend quarter-of-an-hour, 20 minutes, 
just going through the waiting stages, they’re usually badly manned, they’re not 
sufficiently manned… (Interview 22, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Probably not, ‘cause I’ve been around a long time so I know what flu is, so no, I 
wouldn’t. (Interview 13, Participant 1 (B) ) 
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Although some participants expressed a willingness to use an internet-based 
service, there was a marked preference toward the use of a phone line.  Reasons 
for this centered around a lack of technological access or capacity and a desire to 
speak to someone. 
Well the dedicated website is fine but [FGOA-08-01] hasn’t got a computer. You’ve 
got to realise that not everybody has got a computer. (Interview 8, Participant 2 
(A) ) 
 
I think I’d prefer to use the phone line but if it was a long wait I’d use the website. I 
mean I usually prefer to talk to somebody when I can. (Interview 1, Participant 1 
(A) ) 
 
Wait times, as referenced above, were singled out as a particular deterrent to the 
use of the phone line, with two participants specifically referencing being put on 
hold, as barrier to use. 
I might well use the telephone one, as I say, if it were sort of… because you’d think 
getting a GP’s appointment, forget it, you know?  So I think the telephone one 
might providing they’re not playing Vivaldi at you for ten minutes while you’re 
waiting to get through (Interview 6, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
They dial, use the telephone, dial whatever the number is, they’re played Vivaldi’s 
Four Seasons for hours on end, they get fed up, and so in a sense their ability to get 
access to that information could be … not saying it would be but it could be very, 
very difficult.  (Interview 24, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
The use of a website as a sole means of contact was preferred by a few participants 
due to the comparative ease of access along with the ability to take the time to fully 
comprehend the information. 
Oh no, the website, mind you I’m pretty damn good on technology, but on a 
pandemic the phones would be blocked, wouldn’t they? Mind you, so would the 
other one. So I don’t know. A good question. I’d most probably have to go through 
the internet, try and find out what to do. (Interview 22, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
…you’ve got the information to read at your own leisure, read through the 
symptoms rather than on the end of a phone, you can only take in bits and pieces. 
(Interview 9, Participant 3 (B) ) 
 
Conversely, several participants indicated they would be keen to use a combination 
of the website and phone as this would allow them to get all the information 
necessary to formulate targeted questions while on the phone with someone.  
Probably the website first, ‘cause then you could sort of read through and think, 
‘What didn’t I understand about this and what do I need to ask?’ so that when you 
had a phone conversation you could ask the questions you really wanted to ask. 
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(Interview 10, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
I can use a website quite easily but I like to be able to speak to someone, especially 
something like that, ‘cause there’s always a little thing, you think, ‘Does that mean 
this or does it mean that?’ and if you speak to someone personally you can do that. 
I would quite often look on a website first and then follow it up but sometimes you 
can get the information that you need off there and you don’t need to phone. 
(Interview 15, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Participant views on seeking medical assistance mirror those of their Phase One 
counterparts.  The instinctive choice of a GP as primary contact was also referenced 
in the earlier studies.  Willingness to use a National Pandemic Flu Service was also 
similar though slightly more participants in the second phase of research indicated 




8.8.1 Trusted Sources 
As with the first phase of older adult interviews, participant responses in pre-
discussion questionnaires indicate a preference for traditional news sources (ie: 
television and radio) over new media though participants in the second phase were 
much more inclined to use online sources of information.  Similarly, health care 
professionals were overwhelmingly the most frequently cited source of medical 
information amongst participants (See Figure 8-7). 
 
Figure 8-7 Day-to-Day News Sources- Older Adults (Phase Two) 
  




































































Figure 8-8 Medical Information Sources-Older Adults (Phase Two) 
 
Veracity or reliability of information was identified as a potential communication 
issue.  Traditional news media and government information were often perceived 
to be fairly reliable however, with online news or information sources, there 
remains a challenge in determining what may or may not be reliable or credible. 
It’s the same for me, in the reputable press and reputable broadcasting 
organisations, one would expect a reasonably neutral view of the reality, but on 
top of that one would expect things like NHS websites to have extensive material, 
you know, more than you can get out of even a newspaper article.  (Interview 2, 
Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
The internet, on the gov thing, you know, that… you can go on the government 
thing? You should be able to find out about it there. (Interview 3, Participant 1 (B) ) 
 
Some participants identified that, with online news or information sources, there 
remains a challenge in determining what may or may not be reliable or credible. 
So now we come to fake news, OK, and how people would know, especially elderly 
people, if it’s fake news or not (Interview 14, Participant 2 (A) ) 
 
It depends because Wikipedia tends to be general information, perhaps not 
immediately up to the minute, so I would type in the influenza of the day and see 
what comes up and it could be NHS, it could be websites relating thereto, and then 
I would investigate them in more detail and see who’s trying to sell me flu 
medicines and who’s actually giving information. (Interview 7, Participant 1 (B) )  
 
In the discussion, participants were divided as to whether government would be 





































Where do you get your medical/health information? 
Yes No
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concerns around credibility were centred on the distinction between politicians and 
the government at large. 
Well, that’s tricky, that’s very tricky- who can you trust? I think we kind of have to 
trust the government sources, assuming that they have the resources to come up 
with the best answers knowing that the best answers may not be always the right 
answers. But I guess they’re in a better position than, I don’t know… who else can 
do the research that would need to be done? (Interview 1, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
I mean it is actually the responsibility of government, to be honest and 
straightforward, but we all know what politicians are like! (Interview 24, Participant 
2 (A) ) 
 
As with government, confidence in the media varied depending on the source. 
Several participants indicated that they would perceive newspapers as somewhat 
less reliable due to a tendency to sensationalise. 
Yes, but immediately I would believe things differently if I saw it from a tabloid like 
The Sun, there would be some sort of sensationalism in my mind. (Interview 20, 
Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Some newspapers in particular, you see the headlines and they can be quite 
hysterical.  (Interview 24, Participant 3 (A) )  
Looking at the BBC website the other day I clicked on what the newspapers front-
pages are and there was big hysterical front page on the Daily Express about flu 
from Australia is going to hit Britain kind of thing. And I thought… (Interview 24, 
Participant 2 (A) )  
Is that before or after the big freeze or another Diana conspiracy? (Interview 24, 
Participant 3 (A) ) 
 
GPs, in contrast, were broadly considered to be a trusted source of authority as well 
as a first contact in the event of an emergency. 
The doctor would be my choice really. Not having even thought about this my first 
choice would be my nephew is a doctor, to phone him up or to talk to a doctor or 
my local doctor or to a clinic to say, ‘Hey, what do I do from here?’ (Interview 22, 
Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
They know you and they know what’s wrong with you, in your case, and they will 
give you information that is good, I think. (Interview 3, Participant 2 (B) )  
 
For others, whilst the GP might be a preferred source of information, logistical 
constraints might prompt an alternative approach such as the chemist or A&E. 
Well, my GP is a bus ride away so I’d either phone up the surgery or go to the 
chemist. The chemist is nearby so it’s easy, go and see your pharmacist rather than 
go all the way and bother the doctor.  (Interview 17, Participant 1 (A) ) 
 
Well, there’s two ways that we would do it, we would go to our doctor in the first 
instance, if we found that the doctor was overwhelmed we would probably go to 
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A&E because we’ve got a local hospital with an A&E here, A&E department. 




Participant perceptions of pandemic influenza were heavily affected by notions of 
the spread of the disease.  This referred to both geographical spread and numbers 
of individuals affected (both in terms of morbidity and mortality).  Other illnesses 
were often used as points of reference. Spanish flu, in particular, was mentioned 
but also more recent health events like Ebola or Avian Flu. Participants also 
expressed a sense that a pandemic would be something foreign (with particular 
reference to ‘the East’ and Africa as source points).   In a similar vein, a few 
participants expressed the view that a pandemic wouldn’t be a threat either due to 
medical advances and resources or because flu is quite a common illness.  As with 
the first phase older adult participants, confusion between the terms epidemic and 
pandemic was expressed, though most participants had the sense that a pandemic 
was a more concerning event.   
 
Confusion over terminology was also observed with the zoonotic naming of some 
flu strains (i.e. Avian flu, Swine flu).  With the fictional scenario featuring Ovine flu, 
some participants observed that they would expect the flu to be a more rural thing 
or that they would avoid sheep or lamb products to prevent becoming ill.  A 
systematic literature review, conducted between 2011 and 2013 found that older 
adults demonstrated higher levels of pandemic knowledge or awareness than the 
general public386 however, the findings of the current research suggest there are 
nonetheless knowledge gaps among this age group that need to be addressed . 
Given that assumptions around pandemic may influence risk perception, ensuring 
that the relevant characteristics of a pandemic are better understood, particularly 
with regards to confusion over routes of transmission and perceptions that a 
pandemic is a ‘foreign’ problem may result in in greater uptake of protective 
behaviours and, ultimately, improved health outcomes in a future pandemic. 
                                                        
386 Tooher et al., “Community Knowledge, Behaviours and Attitudes about the 2009 H1N1 Influenza 
Pandemic: A Systematic Review.” 
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As with the first phase of older adult interviews, participants in these interviews 
identified older adults, children, individuals with chronic illness or compromised 
immune systems as their perceived at-risk groups.  Older adults were largely 
deemed to be at risk due to having less effective immune systems though, a few 
participants felt that older adults, by virtue of life experience, were possibly 
healthier than other population groups.  Two participants did identify younger 
adults as being more at risk in a pandemic, and a few participants also identified 
younger population categories by virtue of an inability to isolate due to work 
commitments.  As with previous participant groups, the prevailing concept of at-risk 
groups was quite static though there was some openness to alternate risk profiles.  
As identified in a 2011 review, previous research has found strong connection 
between perception of personal risk and willingness to engage in protective 
behaviours, in this case, vaccination during a pandemic.  Several studies identified 
that individuals who considered their personal risk to be low were less likely to 
vaccinate.387  This identifies an area that policymakers and health professionals 
should look to address in pandemic preparedness planning as this research strongly 
suggests that pre-existing assumptions around risk groups are quite set and may 
not be appropriate in a pandemic where the risk profile often includes atypical 
population groups. 
 
When faced with public communications indicating that older adults would be less 
at risk, many participants were accepting of this however the combination of 
atypical risk profile with typically at-risk populations raised a question around risk 
classifications.  Whilst all study participants would, in the course of seasonal 
influenza for example, be considered at-risk due to age, many participants did not 
feel that they properly fit the ‘at-risk’ category as they were, personally, in good 
health.  Conversely, within the pandemic scenario, several participants, whilst 
accepting that older adults might not be at-risk, felt that they, personally, would be 
                                                        
387 Bish et al., “Factors Associated with Uptake of Vaccination against Pandemic Influenza: A 
Systematic Review.” 
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due to underlying health conditions.  This research indicates that perceptions of risk 
are not unidimensional and that personal circumstances can affect risk perception 
irrespective of public health categorization. 
 
 
Risk perception amongst participants varied throughout the scenario however, in 
the first stage of the scenario, risk perceptions among the two groups were 
consistent though participants in Group A were more inclined to consider 
themselves at risk. The lower number of participants in Group B who identified 
themselves as at risk reflects a higher number of participants in this group who 
were uncertain.  This is due to several participants struggling to define, or 
categorize risk.  Several challenges to this presented including a sense that other, or 
larger, swathes of the population might also be affected, a sense that they were 
relatively healthy and therefore not high-risk, and a need for additional information 
to make the determination. 
 
Risk perceptions amongst participants in both groups dropped dramatically in the 
second stage of the scenario.  Although the number of individuals who felt they 
would be at risk in Group B was lower than Group A; these numbers were also 
lower in the first stage of the scenario.  Nonetheless, this does represent a 
willingness on the part of both groups to accept public health advice; even if 
somewhat counterintuitive.  Pre-existing health complications, however, affected 
perceptions of risk for a few participants in Group B who indicated that, despite 
what they were being told, they would still consider themselves at risk due to 
existing illness (e.g. asthma).  In both groups, some participants expressed a sense 
of relief that they were not listed as at-risk as this would lower their levels of 
concern around the pandemic.  Equally, a few participants in Group A, expressed a 
sense that the recommendation was based less on risk and more on utility, and so 
older adults were being excluded.  
 
In the third stage of the scenario, participant perceptions of risk, vis-a-vis the 
decision to exclude older adults, differed.  Participants in Group A were often 
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inclined to perceive the decision to exclude over-65’s from the vaccine as being for 
utilitarian reasons rather than medical assessment of risk.  In contrast, Group B 
participants, whilst not completely convinced by the medical risk argument, were 
more accepting of a higher risk for younger adults but also often attributed this to 
lifestyle or occupation factors.  This suggests that providing clear explanatory 
information to the public may make them more inclined to accept, or at least 
tolerate, policy decisions that could otherwise seem counterintuitive and is 
consistent with the literature around risk communication which stresses the 
importance of reducing uncertainty and explaining why as well as what needs to be 
done.388 
 
In the first stage of the scenario, rates of participants intending to vaccinate varied 
greatly between the groups with half the participants in Group A intending to 
vaccinate, compared with three-quarters in Group B.  In both groups, the perceived 
efficacy of the vaccine was an enabler to action however, several Group A 
participants also highlighted concerns around vaccine safety as affecting their 
motivation to vaccinate.  This was offset, to some extent, by a perception that if an 
individual was considered at risk, they would receive the vaccine.  Group B 
participants, in contrast, were far more likely to get the vaccine as a preventive 
measure with the view that, even if not effective, it would not do any harm. 
 
Intention to vaccinate fell amongst participants in both groups though, as with the 
first stage, intention to vaccinate in Group B was higher than Group A.  As with risk 
perceptions, pre-existing medical conditions affected intentions to vaccinate with 
some participants intending to vaccinate due to factors other than age.  This 
highlights a potential source of confusion and an area for consideration in the 
development of communication materials to take into account individuals who may 
be at-risk for more than one reason.  Participants in both groups indicated that 
their intention to vaccinate would be affected by potential barriers such as cost or 
convenience.  This demonstrates how uptake of protective behaviour can be 
                                                        
388 Reynolds and Seegar, “Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication as an Integrative Model.” 
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affected not only by psychological drivers such as perception of risk and but also by 
external or environemental barriers such as opportunity.  The leaflet, and exclusion 
of older adults from the priority vaccination groups, was identified by participants 
in both groups as affecting their intention to vaccinate.   
 
In the third stage of the scenario, intention to vaccinate amongst both groups 
returned to first stage scenario levels.  The intention to vaccinate in both groups 
was affected by perceptions around vaccine efficacy.  In addition, motivational 
factors such as recommendation by a trusted authority (GP or Government) had a 
positive effect on vaccine intent.  A lower perception of risk affected the intent of 
some Group A participants to vaccinate as they felt that, several months into the 
pandemic, the risk/reward calculation, may not be high enough for them to have 
the vaccine. 
 
These results echo the findings of previous research which identified efficacy, in 
particular behavioural or response efficacy, as being strongly linked to intention to 
vaccinate.389  Several participants in the current study also identified perceptions of 
personal risk as influencing their intention to vaccinate.  This is in keeping with the 
results of a review which also identified personal risk as contributing to overall 
perceptions of threat and, subsequently, willingness to adopt protective 
behaviours.390 
 
In the first stage of the scenario, information needs for both groups were 
indistinguishable.  Information relating to the nature of the pandemic such as what 
it is, how it spreads, and what the symptoms are was sought.  Participants in both 
groups also indicated a need for information around recommended protective 
behaviours to prevent becoming ill. 
 
                                                        
389 Myers and Goodwin, “Determinents of Adults’ Intention to Vaccinate against Pandemic Swine 
Flu.” 
390 Bish and Michie, “Demographic and Attitudinal Determinants of Protective Behaviours during a 
Pandemic: A Review.” 
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Despite being generally willing to accept not being in a priority group for the 
vaccination, participants in both groups indicated a desire for additional 
information regarding the decision-making process and the rationale for the 
decision.  Participants in Group A also wanted information around why a vaccine 
priority list was required in the first place and when older adults would be eligible 
to receive the vaccine.   Concerns over the safety of the vaccine were also 
highlighted by Group A participants.   Although the enhanced leaflet did not result 
in a dramatic difference in vaccine intentions and perceptions of risk as compared 
to the standard information, participants comments indicated that open and 
transparent decision-making coupled with ensuring information is available 
regarding issues such as decision-making rationales, vaccine safety, and timelines, 
could assist in promoting vaccination during a pandemic by addressing potential 
barriers around behavioural efficacy and trust. 
 
In the third stage of the scenario, information needs amongst both groups reflected 
the concerns expressed in the second stage of the scenario.  Both groups were still 
keen to receive additional information explaining the rationale behind why older 
adults were not included as at-risk.   Acceptability of the decision not to include 
over 65-year olds for priority vaccination varied between the groups with three-
quarters of Group A supporting the decision and half of Group B.  Participants in 
both groups expressed support for the risk-based rationale as presented in the 
leaflet, though participants in Group B were slightly more inclined to list risk 
assessment as a reason for why they considered decision acceptable.  Several 
participants in Group A expressed the view that the prioritization was due to utility 
rather than risk factors.  This assumption formed the main point of contention with 
the policy, though a few participants not only accepted, but supported this 
assumption feeling it was better that younger populations (and the economy) be 
allowed to thrive.  Although Group B participants were less accepting of the 
decision, opposition to the policy tended to be based less on risk and utilitarian 
assumptions and more on the grounds of compassion in relation to the scenario.  
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The question of vaccine safety has been identified in previous research which found 
concerns around safety were linked to lower uptake of pandemic influenza 
vaccination and also identified that individuals who relied on healthcare or public 
health officials for information were more likely to perceive the vaccine as safe. 391   
The role of trust in encouraging the adoption of protective behaviours is a 
repeating motif within the literature and, trust in government and media has been 
connected to adoption of protective health behaviours, including vaccination.392  
Participants in both Group A and B, indicated a desire for information explaining 
the decision making process as well as what protective measures could be taken.  
This suggests that older adults’ communication needs in a pandemic are, broadly at 
least, in keeping with those of the general population as other studies have also 
identified clear, actionable information393 and transparency394 as important aspects 
to public communication. 
 
Preferred information sources for older adults in the second phase were broadly 
similar to participants in the first phase.  Traditional media sources such as radio, 
television and print news (national) were the preferred sources for day-to-day 
news.  Online sources, however, were used at greater levels than first phase 
participants.  This does demonstrate that, whilst traditional media sources should 
continue to form a key part of any future pandemic communication campaign, the 
older population is quite diverse and assumptions around this population must take 
this into account.   These results are in keeping with other studies, examining media 
sources and usage, which have identified diversity in media sources used across the 
general population395 but with a trend amongst older adults to traditional media 
                                                        
391 Maurer, Uscher-Pines, and Harris, “Perceived Seriousness of Seasonal and A(H1N1) Influenzas, 
Attitudes toward Vaccination, and Vaccine Uptake among U.S. Adults: Does the Source of 
Information Matter?” 
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393 Kok et al., “Behavioural Intentions in Response to an Influenza Pandemic.” 
394 Mowbray et al., “Communicating to Increase Public Uptake of Pandemic Flu Vaccination in the 
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395 Marshall et al., “Awareness, Anxiety, Compliance: Community Perceptions and Response to the 
Threat and Reality of an Influenza Pandemic.” 
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sources.396  As with previous chapters, preferred health information sources were, 
far and away, healthcare professionals, demonstrating the important role the 
medical establishment can play in communicating with the public, and in particular 
communicating risk, during an influenza pandemic. 
 
Handwashing and the use of hand gels were broadly viewed as useful precautionary 
measures.  As with hand hygiene, respiratory hygiene was something participants 
felt would be effective to prevent the spread of illness.  Most participants felt that 
seeking medical assistance when concerned about illness would be a productive 
course of action; with the GP being the preferred source. Whilst most participants 
indicated they would seek medical assistance if they believed themselves to be ill, a 
previous study, which examined not only intent but also timing, suggested that 
older adults may be inclined to wait before seeking medical assistance which could 
negatively affect the efficacy of treatment.397 
 
Perceptions of self-efficacy were not broadly seen to be an impediment amongst 
participants adopting any of the recommended non-pharmaceutical behaviours 
(hand hygiene, isolation, respiratory hygiene, and seeking medical assistance).  
Many participants identified that hand and respiratory hygiene actions (such as 
using tissues to cover a cough or sneeze) were already being done.  In addition, 
isolation was acknowledged generally as a behaviour they felt they could do; if not 
in full, at least in part by minimising their external contact. Although participants in 
this study were broadly supportive of isolation as a protective measure, an 
American study found that older adult participants were less supportive of social 
distancing measures than younger adults.  Researchers hypothesized this may be 
due to either generational differences around work ethic or that older adults are 
less inclined to give up social activities due to loneliness.398 
 
                                                        
396 Jehn et al., “Community Knowledge, Risk Perception, and Preparedness for the 2009 Influenza 
A/H1N1 Pandemic.” 
397 Fleming and Elliot, “The Impact of Influenza on the Health and Health Care Utilisation of Elderly 
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Several participants expressed motivational factors in employing respiratory 
hygiene with the view that not to employ good practices would be discourteous to 
others and potential place them at risk.  As well, as with the first phase older adult 
participants, there was a sense expressed that ‘other’ people were not be as 
meticulous in employing good respiratory hygiene. Severity of illness was identified 
by some participants as affecting their intention to seek medical assistance with a 
more severe illness being linked to increased intention to seek assistance. 
 
The use of hand gels when away from home or not near soap and water was 
identified as an enabler to hand hygiene.  Most participants also felt that being 
older and retired presented an opportunity which would make it easier to isolate, 
though one participant indicated employment commitments and financial would 
still require him to be away.  This reinforces that planning challenge that not all 
older adults are the same and the diversity within the population must be 
accounted for.  Logistical considerations such as convenience or ease of access, 
affected intent to seek medical assistance with some participants considering non-
GP options such as the local chemist.  The potential for environmental factors such 
as convenience to affect the intention to adopt protective behaviour, either 
positively or negatively, is in keeping with prior research.399 Further, participants 
identified opportunity concerns as potentially negatively affecting their intentions 
to seek assistance.  Participants were generally supportive of using a National 
Pandemic Flu Service with a marked preference for the use of a phone line over 
website.  Concerns around access to medical assistance as well as willingness to 
adopt alternative methods of contacting health staff (such as the phone) suggests 
that a National Pandemic Flu Service could assist greatly in providing medical 
assistance to individuals and, in so doing, alleviate pressures on the existing health 
infrastructure. 
 
This research suggests that older adult participants are broadly supportive of non-
pharmaceutical protective behaviours though further research may be beneficial to 
                                                        
399 Morrison and Yardley, “What Infection Control Measures Will People Carry out to Reduce 
Transmission of Pandemic Influenza? A Focus Group Study.” 
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determine the extent to which these may be adopted or effectively implemented.  
Perceptions of response efficacy and risk were linked to intention to vaccinate.  
Conversely, concerns around vaccine safety reduced participants willingness to 
vaccinate.  These results suggest that, vis-a-vis vaccination, older adults do not 
differ markedly from the general population. 
 
As with the younger adults (see Chapter VII), there was general acceptance for an 
atypical risk profile, and associated policies, however several participants expressed 
a desire for additional explanatory information.  This study strongly suggests that, 
whilst the public may accept public health guidance which appears counterintuitive, 
it is essential that they be provided not only with the ‘what’ (i.e.: what to do, what 
it is) but also the ‘why’.  Information needs amongst older adults appear in line with 
those of the younger population suggesting that there may not be a need to create 
population-specific message content. The preferred media of communication 
amongst older adult does differ from the younger population however, with older 
adults generally preferring traditional information sources such as television, radio, 
or newspapers over digital channels. 
 
8.10 Chapter Summary  
This chapter examined the results of the second phase interviews with older adults.  
This consisted of a three-part scenario examining risk perception, behavioural 
intent, and communication needs of older adults during a pandemic.  This phase 
also used a novel communication-based intervention (leaflet) to test how a typically 
at-risk group would respond to an atypical profile of risk in a pandemic scenario, 
and the effect that additional explanatory information would have on their risk 
perceptions, intention to vaccinate, and communication needs.  Chapter 9 will 
discuss the outcomes and implications arising from this research. 
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9 Chapter IX: Discussion 
9.1 Chapter Overview	
This chapter will review the findings of the research presented in this thesis, with 
respect to their implications for theory and practice. It will also explore the 
limitations of these studies, and provide recommendations for future research. 
 
9.2 Aim and Structure of the Research 
The aim of this thesis was to more fully understand the perceptions, behavioural 
intentions and communication needs of at-risk population groups during an 
influenza pandemic and how this, in turn, can lead to better communication with 
these groups to encourage the adoption of protective behaviours and improved 
health outcomes.   This research focused on a London perspective and examined 
two potentially at-risk population groups: older adults (>70 years of age) and 
younger adults (operationalized as university students).  Interviews were also 
conducted with UK practitioners responsible for pandemic planning at a national, 
local, and institutional level to gain a better understanding of existing practice and 
challenges around pandemic preparedness.  These interviews were supplemented 
with a review of international, national, and local pandemic planning guidance.   
 
A series of interviews (individual and group) were conducted with members of the 
target populations to determine risk perceptions, behavioural intentions and 
information needs in response to a pandemic scenario.  The results of this first 
phase of research led to the development and testing of a communication 
intervention with older adult participants that was designed to examine their 
willingness to follow public health advice that challenges typical perceptions of risk 
during a pandemic.  Specifically, the pandemic scenario was moved forward several 
months in order to test participant responses to risk-based pandemic guidance 
around vaccination priority groups, in this case de-prioritizing older adults.  
Participants were provided with an information leaflet on vaccination and priority 
groups, with one half receiving a standard leaflet whilst the other half received a 
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leaflet with additional explanatory information regarding the selection of at-risk 
population groups. 
 
The research employed a model based on Protection Motivation Theory and COM-B 
to identify areas where communication with at-risk or vulnerable populations could 
improve health outcomes during a pandemic.  PMT was well suited to this research 
as it considers the effect that risk perception and coping appraisals have on 
behavioural intentions.  However, while PMT references possible barriers to action 
such as cost, these are not clearly codified within the theory. Consequently, the 
research also used the COM-B model as a supplementary framework to incorporate 
additional opportunity barriers.  This approach allowed for a targeted focus on the 
impact of risk perception, and coping appraisals on behavioural intentions whilst 




9.3 Summary Research Findings 
9.3.1 Identifying Those Who Are ‘At Risk’ or ‘Vulnerable’ to Pandemic Influenza 
One area highlighted by the emergency planners that were interviewed, is the need 
to find ways to reach lonely or socially isolated older adults.  This was also 
referenced by older adult interviewees who felt that a pandemic could create 
particular challenges for individuals who were living alone or who were 
housebound.  Although it is likely that many of these individuals would be already 
known to the authorities due to receipt of benefits or social care, practitioners 
highlighted a challenge in identifying individuals who would be vulnerable but 
whose needs are not yet great enough to be in receipt of aid.  This challenge has 
been identified in the London Borough of Bexley emergency planning documents 
which highlighted the lack of, and difficulty in assembling, a single list of hard-to-
reach populations due to the number of agencies involved and privacy concerns.400  
An additional difficulty for older adults that could increase their vulnerability is an 
                                                        
400 Emergency Planning and Business Continuity Team, “London Borough of Bexley: Major 
Emergency Plan.” 
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increased societal reliance on technology, not only as a source of information but 
also for service delivery; such as online grocery shopping.  Although convenient and 
effective, this move toward technological dependence risks disadvantaging older 
adults who may lack physical access, knowledge, or capacity to use these services. 
 
Participants from across both older and younger adults population groups 
expressed similar assumptions and perceptions of at-risk groups in a pandemic; 
largely mirroring seasonal influenza vaccination recommendations.  Individuals with 
weaker or compromised immune systems such as older adults, children, and people 
with chronic health conditions were the most cited group for risk in a pandemic.  
This was followed by individuals affected by life factors such as pregnancy, living in 
a high-density area, poor diet or exercise, and working age adults due to their 
inability to isolate.  This latter group also encompassed health care workers due 
their ongoing exposure to illness.  To a lesser extent, socio-economic conditions, 
mainly poverty, were also listed as risk factors.  A few participants also identified 
either ‘everyone’ as being at-risk or, more selectively, younger adults due to higher 
susceptibility.  .  This tendency amongst participants to assume that those most at-
risk in a pandemic would be the traditional groups thought of as at-risk (i.e. those 
groups prioritized for seasonal influenza vaccination) was also identified in a study 
on university student awareness of pandemic where younger adults also identified 
traditional risk groups as being most susceptible to pandemic influenza.401  Given 
that experience has been shown to affect risk, it is interesting that most older 
adults, despite having had experience of influenza pandemics did not make more 
accurate assessments of at-risk groups than younger adult participants. 
 
The diversity of the older adult population can affect perceptions of personal risk.  
This can create a communication barrier which, in turn, may negatively influence 
the adoption of protective behaviours.  Ranging in age from 65 to 112 years402, this 
population easily encompasses at least two generations.  Though many older adults 
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are retired, some are still employed.  Equally, there is a diverse range of 
characteristics within this population covering aspects of health, mobility, 
intellectual capacity, technological familiarity, to name but a few.  The diversity 
within the older adult population was also highlighted in a review of older adults in 
extreme events with age not necessarily equating to vulnerability given the varied 
health, capability, and experience of the older adult population.403 Consequently, 
planning must not only include the vulnerable older adult population, it must also 
consider how to communicate effectively with the broader older adult population.  
This challenge was referenced by participants in the second older adult group.  
Participants in this group expressed that, although of an age where they are 
considered older, they do not feel the label necessarily applies to them and, as a 
result, are less likely to follow public health guidance aimed at older adults.  The 
findings of this study suggest that the diversity in the older adult population will 
affect how they will respond to communication directed to them. 
 
Similarly, younger adults’ acceptance of the extent to which they would be 
personally at risk was affected by their perceptions of themselves.  Participants 
who expressed that they would not feel at risk, tended to cite their age, health, or 
an associated sense of invulnerability, as protective factors against their 
susceptibility to influenza.  These results echo previous research in this area which 
found that younger adults may be less likely to consider themselves at risk.404  This 
is an area that should be considered vis-à-vis communication as amongst younger 
adult participants, acceptance of being at-risk was linked to willingness and intent 
to adopt protective behaviours. 
 
Whilst ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerability’ in the context of pandemic lack clear and consistent 
definition across planning guidance documents, emergency planners indicated they 
do tend to consider these as separate entities.  In contrast, there was no consensus 
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around the definition of the terms ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerability’ amongst younger or 
older adult participants.  Whether the terms were similar or disparate and, if so to 
what extent, varied greatly amongst participants.  Where, however, the terms were 
distinguished, vulnerability was generally considered to be more personal, 
associated with a sense of helplessness, and linked to the severity of health impact 
once ill (as opposed to the likelihood of becoming ill).  In addition, some older adult 
participants opposed the notion that older adults (as a group) are necessarily 
vulnerable as there are a number of factors that affect vulnerability, and age isn’t 
necessarily the determining factor. 
 
Perceptions of at-risk populations amongst both age groups were consistent with 
the populations identified for seasonal influenza and highlight an area where 
communication may be needed in the event of an extreme event with atypical risk; 
such as a pandemic.  Misperceptions around risk may negatively impact public 
adherence to medical guidance and, in particular, result in a lower uptake of 
protective behaviour amongst younger adults, who would not normally consider 
themselves at risk. 
9.3.2 Knowledge of Pandemic Influenza 
The initial points of reference for most participants in considering a pandemic were 
consistent across all three research phases.  The 1918 Spanish flu was frequently 
referenced along with Ebola and Avian Flu.  A few younger adults also referred to 
examples from popular culture such as zombie films.  When asked about personal 
experience of pandemic influenza, a clear generational divide occurred.  Where 
experience existed amongst older adults, it was either of ‘Asian flu’ (which was 
used to refer to both the 1957 or 1968 pandemics) or of having lost older family 
members in the 1918 pandemic.   Younger adult participants, on the other hand, 
solely referred to their personal experience of the 2009 H1N1 (Swine flu) pandemic.  
These experiences were described not only in terms of becoming ill but also the 
disruption of normal life, for example containment measures such as checks at 
airports or school closures.  The use by younger adults of H1N1 as a point of 
reference may highlight a communication challenge in a future pandemic given the 
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lower-than-anticipated severity of the 2009 pandemic and the role of past 
experience in shaping perceptions of threat.  This challenge has been identified in 
other research including a Canadian study on H1N1 found that perceptions of 
threat were affected by the national experience of SARS which had not been as 
severe as predicted.405   
 
Participants in all groups identified wide geographic spread as a defining 
characteristic of a future pandemic, although there was some generational 
disparity.  Whilst younger adult descriptions of a pandemic tended to focus on it 
being widespread from a geographical perspective, some older adults in both 
phases considered the numbers of individuals affected to be as important. The 
identification of geographic spread as a pandemic characteristic is interesting given 
how proximity was seen to affect perceptions of risk in the first phase of the 
research where participants in both age groups indicated they would be more 
concerned, and feel more at-risk, if pandemic cases were identified within an area 
they considered geographically close (whether that was London, the UK, or 
Europe). 
 
All participants were aware that flu is more severe than a cold. However, they were 
less clear on the distinction between seasonal and pandemic influenza. 
Furthermore, amongst younger adult participants, those who focused more on 
‘pandemic’ were more likely to consider an influenza pandemic as something to be 
concerned about then those who focused on ‘influenza’.   Differentiation between 
pandemic flu and seasonal flu in terms of strain rather than spread, particularly pre-
scenario, was limited. Only one participant in the first phase older adult groups 
identified that a pandemic would involve an alternative strain of influenza, although 
several younger adult participants were aware of this fact.  The confusion over 
seasonal and pandemic flu may have affected participant perceptions of at-risk 
groups with participants assuming there would be no distinction between the two.  
                                                        
405 Taha, Matheson, and Anisman, “The 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic: The Role of Threat, Coping, 
and Media Trust on Vaccination Intentions in Canada.” 
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This supports the need to clearly communicate with the public and provide 
explanatory information to correct misperceptions as these may affect perceptions 
of risk and willingness to adopt protective measures. 
 
The naming conventions around pandemic influenza were seen to cause some 
confusion.  Participants in all three studies expressed uncertainty over the 
distinction between an epidemic and a pandemic.  Furthermore, the tendency to 
name pandemic flu strains after their zoonotic origin also created confusion around 
risk, transmissibility and, consequently, protective behaviours.  For example, some 
participants in both age groups indicated they would consider avoiding lamb or 
wool as a means to prevent illness when presented with an ‘ovine flu’ scenario.  
These results support previous research conducted with university students, in 
which many study participants expressed confusion over the role that pigs played in 
infection transmission relating to the 2009 H1N1 (Swine) flu.406   Taken together, 
this suggests that reducing public misperceptions around origins and spread of 
pandemic influenza may not only encourage the adoption of recommended 
protective behaviours but may also discourage the uptake of behaviours which are 
either not helpful or potentially harmful.  In Canada, for example, during the 2009 
pandemic, a deliberate effort was made to refer to the virus as H1N1 and not Swine 
flu.  This was done to reduce public confusion around transmission routes407 and 
also to avoid the risk of unwarranted economic effects to the agricultural sector, 
and future costs, both in resources and time, of correcting established 
misperceptions.408 
 
Although the study did not identify any consistent and severe misunderstandings in 
public knowledge of pandemics, it did identify several areas where improved 
communication could provide clarity to underlying assumptions or confusions 
around pandemic influenza. Previous research has identified greater knowledge 
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407 Fitzpatrick, “15 New Cases of Swine Flu Confirmed in Canada.” 
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around pandemic, particularly around the nature and spread, as being positively 
linked to uptake of protective behaviours.409  This study identified gaps in 
knowledge and understanding amongst participants where communication could 
be beneficial in improving public knowledge and awareness including defining a 
pandemic versus an epidemic; providing greater explanation of the naming 
conventions; and outlining the differences between pandemic and seasonal 
influenza.  Correcting baseline perceptions of pandemic influenza would not only 
improve public understanding of pandemic influenza, it could also affect public 
perceptions of risk which, in turn, may increase the uptake of protective behaviours 
during a pandemic. 
9.3.3 Risk Perception 
Proximity played an important role in the first stage of the scenario when discussing 
risk perception, though with variations amongst the population groups.  
Geographical distance of the outbreak tended to reduce perceived risk across both 
groups. The role of proximity in affecting risk perceptions was also observed by 
Tooher.410  Some younger adult participants, however, suggested that, although 
Greece was far away, it was not necessarily far enough away for them to discount 
the risk.  The sense that diseases can easily cross borders was largely ignored 
amongst the older adults, with participants citing the protective benefit of the 
English Channel and, in one case, comparing the outbreak to an earthquake.   The 
number of people affected also influenced perceptions of risk, particularly amongst 
older adult participants.    Younger adults were less likely to highlight numbers 
affected but did reference the population density of London as being something 
they would be concerned about should the Ovine flu reach UK shores.  The role of 
proximity and severity in affecting risk perception and, consequently, uptake of 
protective behaviours has been identified in previous research which found 
disparities between survey participants in the UK and in Mexico during H1N1.  UK 
participants indicated lower uptake of protective behaviours which researchers 
                                                        
409 Bish and Michie, “Demographic and Attitudinal Determinants of Protective Behaviours during a 
Pandemic: A Review.” 
410 Tooher et al., “Community Knowledge, Behaviours and Attitudes about the 2009 H1N1 Influenza 
Pandemic: A Systematic Review.” 
 255 
linked to timing as, when the surveys were conducted, the pandemic was well 
underway in Mexico whilst the UK had yet to experience its first H1N1 related 
death.411 
 
As participants moved to the second stage of the scenario, risk perception factors 
remained thematically consistent for both younger and older adults.  Geographic 
distribution of cases affected participants’ perceptions of risk, with greater 
proximity linked to higher risk perception.  Differences, however, emerged between 
the age groups with respect to where the location of cases needed to be to prompt 
higher levels of concern.  Older adults often expressed a view that, whilst 
concerned about UK cases, they would be more affected by morbidity and mortality 
rates in their local area whereas younger adults were more inclined to consider the 
fact of UK cases writ large as a cause for concern.  As in the first stage of the 
scenario, this represents a generational shift in perceptions of locality with younger 
adults being more inclined to view ‘their’ world in broader geographic terms than 
older adults. As at the first stage, population statistics were an influencing factor for 
risk perception in both groups.  The increased scope of the pandemic and presence 
of fatalities in the UK prompted older adults to say they intended to adopt 
protective behaviours.  Students continued to view living in London as a risk factor 
and the occurrence of fatalities, particularly that of an otherwise healthy young 
woman, increased their perception of risk though this was tempered somewhat by 
the comparatively low number of deaths at this point. 
 
With the first scenario inject in the second phase of the study, proximity was no 
longer discussed as a risk factor given in this scenario the pandemic was well 
underway and established in the UK.  Instead, risk perceptions were based more on 
assessment of personal characteristics such as health or lifestyle.  Risk perceptions 
were broadly consistent though some participants struggled to define their 
personal risk in relation to a pandemic.  This was due to a sense that their 
population group would not be at great risk and/or that they considered 
                                                        
411 Tooher et al. 
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themselves to be healthy and thus would be less at-risk.  This uncertainty led 
several participants to indicate they would need additional information to make a 
proper determination of whether they were at-risk. 
 
After receiving the second inject in the second phase of the study, risk perceptions 
dropped significantly amongst participants, regardless of which leaflet they 
received.  Personal characteristics continued to influence risk perception with some 
participants basing their assessment on factors other than their age, such as pre-
existing health conditions.  Several participants across both groups were fully 
prepared to accept at face value the guidance that they were not at risk and 
expressed relief or lower levels of concern around the pandemic.  There were, 
however, a few participants who received standard information (Group A) for 
whom the information provided did nothing to alleviate or alter their perceptions 
as they felt the decision not to prioritise older adults was based on utility rather 
than risk – i.e. that younger adults were prioritised due to societal or economic 
reasons rather than because they were are greater risk.  When presented with the 
third scenario inject, the trend toward assumptions of utility over risk continued to 
be expressed.  Group A participants often assumed the decision to exclude older 
adults from the priority vaccine list was based in utilitarian motives. Group B 
participants were more likely to cite risk factors in prioritizing younger adults, 
though often more a case of risk from lifestyle or occupational factors rather than 
medical risk. 
 
This research suggests that factors influencing risk perception are likely to change 
over the course of a pandemic.  In the initial days, before it has taken hold, extrinsic 
factors like geography and population statistics or probabilities may be more 
influential.  Once a pandemic is well underway, intrinsic characteristics, coupled 
with trust in authorities, and clarity of information, may be more pertinent in 
determining perceptions of risk, particularly amongst older adults. Additionally, 
past experience may affect risk perception, and, in turn, behaviour response.  The 
evolution of risk throughout a pandemic has been identified in prior research 
conducted during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic which found that, as the pandemic 
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progressed, an increasing number of study participants expressed the view that the 
threat was being exaggerated and that it was simply something one ‘had to live 
with’.412  Taken together, this suggests that public health communication during a 
pandemic must be able to respond to a fluid situation to ensure that public 
information needs are responsibly and effectively met in order to counter 
misperceptions and encourage uptake of protective behaviours. 
9.3.4 Factors Influencing Behavioural Intention 
Participants’ intention to adopt, the five recommended behaviours examined (hand 
hygiene, respiratory hygiene, seeking medical assistance, voluntary isolation, and 
vaccination) were assessed through a framework based on Protection Motivation 
Theory (PMT) and COM-B.  This clarified how coping appraisals, capability, 
opportunity and motivation influenced behavioural intentions in response to a 
pandemic influenza scenario. 
 
The perceived efficacy of the five recommended behaviours was high for both 
younger and older adults.  Despite self-efficacy barriers to isolation, participants in 
both groups were largely in agreement that it would be a useful behaviour to 
prevent the spread of illness.  Hand and respiratory hygiene practices were also 
widely acknowledged as efficacious in reducing infection spread.  Vaccination was 
considered to be a useful way to avoid becoming ill. However, support for this 
behaviour was tempered by a few participants in both the older and younger adult 
groups who mentioned concerns over vaccine safety.  Furthermore, younger adult 
participants expressed doubt over the effectiveness of this particular vaccine given 
the comparatively short timeline for development.   
 
Capability factors did not feature heavily in reported behavioural intentions and 
associated barriers or enablers to action.  The two behaviours where physical 
capability was raised were respiratory hygiene and vaccination.   The challenge of 
anticipating a cough or sneeze to ensure a tissue was at the ready was referenced 
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by both younger and older adults.  This challenge was also identified in previous 
research on responses to pandemics.413  Additionally, some younger adult 
participants indicated that carrying around tissues would be a potential challenge 
for them. Capability barriers to vaccination were not mentioned by younger adult 
participants however, a limited number of older adult participants referenced 
previous adverse reactions to vaccination as a potential barrier to future 
vaccination in the event of a pandemic. 
 
Opportunity factors influenced the intended uptake of all the recommended 
behaviours under examination.  Although lack of access to soap and water when 
away from home was identified as a barrier to handwashing, participants were also 
quick to mention that the use of hand gels to clean hands would provide a suitable 
alternative option.  Cost and convenience affected intention to vaccinate with 
participants indicating that they would be less likely to receive a vaccine if they had 
to pay for it and that the price of the vaccine would also be an influencing factor.   
Several older adult participants highlighted that the location of vaccination services 
would also be important, with the ability to receive vaccinations at the local 
chemist encouraging vaccine uptake.   
	
Wait times, whether at the GP, A&E, or with a flu service were felt by both younger 
and older participants to be a deterrent for seeking medical assistance.  In addition, 
older adults expressed concern that an overreliance on technological platforms to 
disseminate medical information would create a barrier to access for many older 
people.  Voluntary isolation was demonstrably a stronger opportunity barrier for 
younger adult participants than for the older adults that were interviewed.   The 
older adults expressed the view that it would be easier for them to isolate as they 
were older and retired.  In contrast, the younger adults cited ongoing commitments 
such as university and work as barriers to isolation.  For many of the younger 
adults, even if university planners were to make adjustments such as facilitating 
online learning or cancelling classes, work commitments coupled with financial 
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requirements would still necessitate regular external contact. For other younger 
adults, social commitments were considered paramount.  Finally, although lack of 
opportunity to practice respiratory hygiene was only mentioned by one older adult 
participant, a lack of bins in public areas, was raised by several participants as a 
barrier to effectively disposing of used tissues.  Public health messaging 
recommends individuals ‘Catch it, bin it, kill it’.  The challenge in enacting the first 
part of the advice falls to capability but the second requires opportunity. 
 
Overall, willingness to undertake the recommended behaviours was largely 
influenced by two considerations: risk perception and societal expectations.  Both 
older and younger adults identified their perception of personal risk as affecting 
their willingness to isolate, particularly in regard to social activities.  A lower 
perception of risk was associated with a disinclination to curtail voluntary social 
activities.  Risk perception was also apparent around vaccination with higher 
perception of risk, especially when coupled with pre-existing medical conditions, 
linked to increased intention to vaccinate.  Social expectation or perceptions 
around courtesy affected willingness to adopt hand and respiratory hygiene 
measures for both younger and older adults.  Although many participants indicated 
they were prepared to adopt these measures, they also tended to indicate these 
were activities they were already undertaking.  However, participants in both age 
groups also suggested that these values are not necessarily universally shared.   
Accepted modes of respiratory hygiene were also influenced by social norms.  For 
example, the use of the crook of one’s elbow to cover a cough or a sneeze was 
emphatically not supported by older adults, although younger participants found 
this a less objectionable suggestion.  The common rationale for opposing this 
measure was the perception that this would be unhygienic and concern over social 
opprobrium.  
 
Additional motivational factors were referenced around vaccination, but these 
differed between age group.  Some older adults suggested that their existing habit 
of vaccination for seasonal flu would contribute to their likelihood of receiving a 
pandemic vaccination.  Others commented that if a recommendation came from a 
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trusted authority, such as their GP, they would be more inclined to vaccinate.  For 
younger adults, the perceived responsibility of protecting others by contributing to 
herd immunity was an incentive to vaccinate. 
 
Perceived self-efficacy was high for both age groups for all recommended 
behaviours except voluntary isolation. Hand and respiratory hygiene were deemed 
to be non-intrusive and relatively low-cost measures that participants could easily 
implement.  In fact, most indicated that not only did they feel they could adopt 
these behaviours in a pandemic but they were already employing them on a day-to-
day basis.   Participants were similarly broadly supportive of seeking medical 
assistance when ill, although ability to contact a medical authority (whether GP or 
flu service) was often called into question.  The one area where participants did 
express some level of concern about their ability was around voluntary isolation.  
Older adults were more likely to feel they would be willing and able to reduce social 
contact.  However, very few felt they would be able to isolate themselves 
completely.  Young adult participants, in contrast, frequently referenced 
‘unavoidable’ obligations such as university or work as preventing them being 
willing or able to consider socially isolating themselves during a pandemic. 
 
Through the inclusion of a suite of protective behaviours, rather than focusing on 
one or two, this research was able to compare not only behavioural intentions but 
also to examine the enablers or barriers to action amongst study participants in two 
potentially at-risk population groups.  Overall, participants in both groups 
expressed support for and intention to adopt the recommended protective 
behaviours.  Response efficacy was high for all behaviours and, indeed, participants 
often spontaneously identified these as helpful actions to take to reduce the spread 
of illness.  The one area where concerns arose was around vaccine safety and 
efficacy.  These concerns were occasionally expressed either as an overall mistrust 
of vaccines but, more often where the result either of past experience with adverse 
reactions or, more commonly prompted by the timeline for vaccine delivery, the 
rapidity of which was seen to raise questions around whether testing had been fully 
done to ensure both safety and efficacy.  Concerns around safety and, to a lesser 
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extent, efficacy were also identified by a Greek study conducted during the H1N1 
pandemic (August 2009) which found low intent to vaccinate amongst the 
population; predominately due to concerns over safety but also due to low 
perceptions of vaccine efficacy and severity of the pandemic.414 
 
With the exception of voluntary isolation, participants were strongly of the view 
that these would be behaviours they would be able to adopt, and in many cases, 
were behaviours they were already employing.  Isolation was identified by both 
older and younger adults in this study as potentially problematic though; younger 
adults were far more likely to express an inability to enact this behaviour unless 
required to (via university shutdown or government quarantine).  This was due to 
prior commitments, often a disinclination to miss university, as well as financial 
commitments which would necessitate going to work.  The question of financial 
consideration disincentivising isolation has also been identified in research in the 
general population which found a lower number of participants willing to stay 
home if this would result in a loss of income.415  This suggests not only that 
institutions such as universities should examine alternative service delivery 
mechanisms but also that pandemic planning should consider the challenge of 
personal financial implications of a pandemic, particularly for individuals in insecure 
or non-standard employment. 
 
Whilst the recommended behaviours were largely viewed to be efficacious amongst 
both population groups, potential opportunity barriers (or if addressed, enablers) 
to action commonly identified centred around cost and convenience.  In both age 
groups, though more so for the younger adults, some participants indicated that if 
the vaccine was associated with personal financial cost this would act as a barrier 
and would either reduce or altogether eliminate their intention to vaccinate. 
Convenience was a repeated motif across the recommended behaviours with 
access to handwashing facilities or remembering to carry hand gel, having tissues to 




hand, low-or-no wait times for medical assistance, and easily accessible locations 
for vaccination clinics identified as particular considerations. The influence of 
environmental factors (such as effort, time, and access to facilities) was also 
identified in previous research.416  This demonstrates an area where accessibility 
can either promote or impede uptake of protective behaviours.  Ensuring rapid 
access to medical treatment, including antivirals, is addressed in the UK Pandemic 
Preparedness Strategy417 however, improving access barriers to other protective 
behaviours could be further addressed either at a government or institutional level 
(i.e. the provision of hand gel stations in public areas). 
 
9.3.5 Communication 
Information needs in response to the evolving pandemic scenario were generally 
consistent across age groups and were also consistent with planning assumptions 
identified in interviews with practitioners.   Practitioners working in university 
settings, for example, felt that younger adults would require clear information 
detailing general medical facts including symptoms and suggestions around 
preventive behaviours.  This assumption was supported by the responses of 
younger adult participants who indicated that during a pandemic they would want 
general medical information (ie: what it is, symptoms, how it spreads, number of 
cases), with a particular focus on what steps they could take to protect themselves.  
Older adult participants echoed the desire for clear, informative, and constructive 
information relating to the pandemic.  This corresponds with planning assumptions 
around the type of information the authorities will need to provide to the general 
public.  rthermore, a study of older adults affected by flooding advised the use of 
‘ordinary’ language418 and, research has shown that 50% of residents in Veterans 
Affairs nursing homes affected by Hurricane Katrina and Rita suffered from some 
type of cognitive difficulty.419  This further reinforces the need to use clear 
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communication with the public and to tailor communication strategies to ensure 
they are audience-appropriate.  Providing specific medical information, however, 
can create a communication challenge for emergency planners at the outset of a 
pandemic as the unpredictable nature of a novel strain may require policy makers 
to communicate uncertainty to a public which expects action. Although this may 
present a challenge, it also presents an opportunity to keep the public informed 
about steps they can take to protect themselves and to build trust between the 
public and health authorities.420 
  
When confronted with an atypical profile of risk, or one that challenged 
conventional expectations participants across both age groups expressed a desire 
for additional explanatory information.  This was more strongly observed with the 
younger adult and second phase older adult groups as the risk, or effect of it, was 
more directly linked to them.   In the case of younger adults, when they were 
presented with the death of a member of their age cohort and in the case of older 
adults, when they were told that they were excluded from the vaccine priority list.  
Nonetheless, both younger adults and older adults were prepared to trust the 
assertion that their risk profile was altered. However, participants in both age 
groups expressed a need for additional information to clarify the rationale behind 
this.  This is in line with previous research on communicating with the public during 
a pandemic, which suggested that evidence-based information be provided in a 
transparent manner.421 This desire for additional explanatory information also 
included older adult participants who had received the enhanced leaflet that 
contained additional information. This is, in part, attributable to the information 
provided not being sufficient to allay concerns amongst all participants but is also 
due to individuals having read but not retained the information.  This underscores a 
communication challenge that must be accounted for in planning as the assumption 
must be made that despite making information available, it will either a) not be 
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deemed sufficient or b) not register with a proportion of the population.  Previous 
research on public engagement with protective behaviours during a pandemic has 
also found that, even when information is provided to the public, it should not be 
assumed that this will be either sufficiently clear or achieve message saturation.422   
Public health messaging will need to be reiterated and communication strategies 
will have to be prepared to adapt frequently and rapidly. 
 
A further element to communication with at-risk populations, and indeed the public 
at large, is the challenge around ensuring appropriate media are used to ensure 
message saturation.  Differences between the responses given by the older and 
younger adults that were interviewed were most apparent with respect to 
preferred communication methods.  The older adults expressed a marked 
preference for traditional media sources (radio, television, and newspapers) whilst 
the younger adults preferred new media sources, such as the internet.  These 
distinctions were not absolute and there was some within-group variance. For 
example, some of the older adults were computer literate and some of the younger 
adults cited television as a preferred information source. Despite this, there is a 
clear distinction between older and younger adult media consumption, reinforced 
by a 2009 study examining public awareness and behaviour during the H1N1 
pandemic.  This study  also identified an age disparity between the use of 
traditional and digital media.423  However, the distinction was clear.  Ideally 
communication should therefore be distributed through all media but, if that is not 
logistically possible it would then become necessary to determine which media 
platforms would reach the public at large and, within each platform, which 
subsections to use.  This was identified by university planners as a challenge to 
targeting communications as they must first ascertain which social media forums 
students are involved in and, consider whether or not students are engaged with or 
accessible to the university on particular platforms. 
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Participants across both age groups expressed high levels of trust in the authorities.  
Medical authorities, in particular GPs, were considered to be a reliable source of 
information in the event of a pandemic.  This trust, coupled with the high rates of 
intention to seek medical assistance, demonstrates the importance of the medical 
establishment in helping to communicate during a pandemic.   Government was 
also considered to be a trusted source of information in a pandemic, although some 
older adult participants distinguished between ‘government’ which was 
trustworthy and ‘politicians’ who were less so.   This echoed assumptions made by 
London local authority emergency planners who felt that, in the event of a 
pandemic, the authorities would be considered a trusted source due the public 
health nature of the event.  While most university administrators felt that ‘the 
university’ would be considered a trusted source of information, one practitioner 
expressed concern that students may be less accepting of official communication 
due to an existing anti-establishment bias.  Younger adult participants did, 
however, indicate that they considered the university a trusted source of 
information and did not tend toward anti-establishment views.  Given that trust in 
authorities has been linked to intention to adopt protective behaviours during a 
pandemic, notably vaccination424, the relatively high levels of trust in authorities 
expressed by both population groups suggests that public health guidance is likely 
to be positively received. 
 
From a practitioner standpoint, Public Health England (PHE) was considered the 
lead agency with regard to management of an influenza pandemic and both 
emergency planners and university administrators indicated that they would expect 
to receive communication materials and advice from them.  This support for and 
acknowledgement of PHE as the primary lead would also be beneficial in ensuring 
that different levels of government, or authorities are using consistent messaging in 
their communications.   Consistency in messaging was highlighted by university 
administrators as an important consideration in communicating with students as 
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well as the need to collaborate with other area universities.  It is unrealistic to 
expect that students from one university would not interact with colleagues from 
another establishment, particularly in a city like London that has many universities.  
Universities, therefore, should aim to ensure consistent messages are conveyed to 
their student populations. 
 
9.4 Implications of the Research 
The findings of this research suggest that perceptions of response and self-efficacy 
around recommended protective behaviours are consistently high amongst older 
and younger adults.  The five behaviours examined were routinely considered 
useful in either preventing personal illness or preventing the spread of illness 
during an influenza pandemic.  Social isolation however, was consistently 
highlighted as a more challenging behaviour for both age groups, and, in particular, 
younger adults.  This was also a finding from previous research425 and suggests that, 
of the recommended protective behaviours, social isolation may present a specific 
policy and communication challenge during a pandemic. Overall, however, these 
findings suggest that the public would not face significant challenges around 
perceptions of efficacy vis-à-vis implementation of protective behaviours during a 
pandemic.  
 
Of the remaining barriers or enablers to action identified in this research, 
opportunity represents a key area that needs to be addressed.  These largely fall 
under the mantle of public convenience and could be addressed through policy 
guidance.  Voluntary isolation, however, remains a challenging prospect, 
particularly for a younger population with well established external commitments.  
The findings of this research would suggest that isolation, whilst effective in 
preventing the spread of illness would be very difficult to enact outside of a formal 
imposition of quarantine.  Encouraging institutions such as universities, or 
employers, to consider alternative operations wherever possible, during a 
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pandemic could contribute to limiting public exposure.  This behaviour does, 
however, demonstrate how generational differences can result in important 
nuances even within a particular barrier.  Both older and younger adults indicated 
that it would be impossible to fully isolate due to existing requirements.  For the 
younger population this can be extrapolated as university or work commitments.  
Given previous comments around limitations on older adult technological facility, 
older adults may still be more reliant of the use of bricks and mortar services (such 
as needing to go to the store rather than order groceries online).  Both populations 
have opportunity limits on their ability to isolate but this manifests differently in 
each population. 
 
Motivational barriers or enablers were a consistent feature of the behaviours 
studied and emerged amongst all three participant groups.   Motivation to adopt 
protective behaviours is greatly affected by risk perception and social expectations.   
This underscores the importance of risk perception in promoting behaviour change.   
Social norms can have a positive influence on behaviour, such as the expectation 
that one will cover a cough or a sneeze but can also negatively affect behavioural 
intentions, such as a lack of willingness to ‘sneeze into your sleeve’ out of concerns 
this would be “looked down on” or not be socially acceptable. 
 
Barriers to capability were limited and restricted to the physical challenge of pre-
empting a cough or sneeze with a tissue at hand and the experience of adverse 
physical reactions to a past vaccination.   Although capability only affected two 
target behaviours, the barriers were observed across population groups. The 
challenges related to these barriers are individual, and rest with the individual, 
nevertheless, that the physical effects, decreased control, or ability to counter 
them, represents a rather significant barrier that requires further study to identify 
communication needs.  The findings of this research would suggest that, although 
there are some areas which could be improved, public acceptance of protective 
behaviours during a pandemic, ability to adopt these behaviours, and intent to do 
so is high across all behaviours examined and within both demographic populations 
studied.   
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Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) was selected for this study because of its focus 
on risk perception, behaviour efficacy, and self-efficacy. Although PMT does allow 
for the inclusion of additional barriers to action, these are not well codified within 
the theory.  The COM-B model, in contrast, attempts to provide a holistic approach 
to behaviour change.  This high-level perspective allows for the inclusion of virtually 
all potential variables with a view to aiding practitioners in the development of 
interventions. This high-level approach, however, whilst inclusive, does not always 
lend itself to a clear classification of specific variables as these can straddle the line 
between general category definitions, which increases the subjectivity of the 
analysis.  With this research, this was particularly noticeable with 
risk perception and perceptions of response efficacy. 
 
The use, therefore, of a hybrid model, specifically with the inclusion of COM-B 
factors, allowed for the consideration of elements other than perception of risk and 
efficacy.  In particular, this provided the opportunity to clearly incorporate external 
factors that affect an individual’s ability to translate behavioural intentions into 
behaviour. This is crucial as, understanding the practical or environmental factors 
which may affect behaviour can greatly assist in adjusting policies and planning to 
better account for these variables.  Additionally, identifying immovable barriers to 
action can influence communication strategies to target resources and deliver 
practical and actionable messages in order to improve health outcomes during a 
pandemic.   This can be illustrated with the example of respiratory hygiene and the 
choice between using tissues (Catch It, Bin It, Kill It) and the crook of one’s arm 
(‘Sneeze into your sleeve’).  The former policy results in the potential for 
opportunity barriers to action (due to availability of tissues) whilst the second 
creates a motivational barrier (social norms).  With this in mind, pandemic planners 
can then assess which barriers are most insurmountable and, from this base of 
knowledge, develop policy, and target communications to address public concerns 
and promote preventive health behaviours. 
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The use of a modified theoretical approach does, however, highlight the challenge 
of finding the correct balance between theories, particularly considering the 
proliferation of theories of behaviour change.  Given the importance of ensuring 
the theoretical and analytical framework used is the most appropriate to any given 
study, the use of a modified PMT structure allowed for a ‘best of both worlds’ 
approach.  Similar to previous studies which used the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
but incorporated additional elements, the use of a modified (or enhanced) PMT, in 
this research allowed for greater explanatory power through the consideration of 
additional factors whilst still maintaining a focused approach. 
 
Of the two population groups studied, information needs vis-a-vis content in the 
event of a pandemic did not vary noticeably between the population groups and 
were also consistent with practitioner assumptions, captured in the interviews.   
Additionally, the needs of younger and older adults are in line with planning 
assumptions around communication with the public in general.  In the event of a 
pandemic, study participants expressed a desire for clear, concise, practical 
information.  This would suggest that existing communication messaging is 
appropriate for these population groups.   
 
Differences in communication needs arose, however, on the subject of media 
rather than message.  Younger adults indicated a preference for new media 
methods whilst older adults leaned more heavily toward traditional media.  This 
suggests that any successful communication campaign will need to rely on several 
approaches to reach the whole population.  This generational divide on 
technological engagement and consumption was also apparent in National 
Pandemic Flu service preferences.  Whilst not as stark a divide as public health 
communication, older adults expressed a marked preference for a phone line and 
younger adults, a website.  Although the use of online platforms provides a rapid, 
cost-effective and easily amendable means of communication, the disparity 
between preferred communication sources amongst different population sub-sets 
demonstrates the need for a multi-forum, multi-platform approach in 
communicating and interacting with the public during a pandemic. 
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In addition to ensuring the necessary information is conveyed through the right 
medium, communication should also consider who is delivering the message as 
research has shown that trust can have an impact on behaviour.426  Across 
demographic lines, participants expressed a relatively high level of trust in the 
authorities though certain sectors were seen as more reliable than others.  Medical 
personnel, particularly doctors, were seen as reliable and, were often cited as a first 
port of call for information.  Although ‘government’ was generally considered 
trustworthy, participants often expressed that ‘government’ is not monolithic and 
their trust is not absolute.   Within the government rubric, therefore, public health 
authorities were seen as far more trustworthy than politicians. 
 
The results of this research suggest several challenges, and opportunities for policy 
makers in preparing for, and managing, a future pandemic.  Although further study 
may be required to determine the extent to which these results are applicable to 
other population groups and whether they are applicable outside the Greater 
London area, this research has identified seven key recommendations (see Figure 
9.1). 
 
Figure 9-1 Recommendations for Practitioners 
Recommendations for Practitioners 
1. Ensure communication with the public, especially public health guidance, is 
clear, consistent, actionable. 
Study participants overwhelmingly expressed a desire for fact-based, 
explanatory guidance which would provide advise on the state of the 
pandemic and provide guidance vis-à-vis protective measures.  Consistency 
in messaging will reduce the potential for confusion and avoiding mixed 
messages will support trust in the authorities.  Over the course of the 
pandemic, public health communication must be able to respond to a fluid 
situation and ensure that public information needs are responsibly and 
                                                        
426 Siegrist and Zingg, “The Role of Public Trust During Pandemics Implications for Crisis 
Communication.” 
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effectively met in order to counter misperceptions and encourage uptake of 
protective behaviour 
2. Identify and address potential public misperceptions around pandemic 
influenza 
Correcting misperceptions and improving awareness of pandemic influenza 
will not only support the uptake of protective behaviours but may also 
eliminate or alleviate potential strains on resources.  Improved public 
understanding of transmission routes, for example, may not only encourage 
the uptake of recommended protective behaviours but also reduce the 
adoption of unhelpful behaviours.  Additionally, recognizing the distinction 
between seasonal and pandemic influenza could reduce confusion over the 
need for two flu vaccines and, thus, encourage uptake. 
3. Public communications during a pandemic must provide explanations as well 
as advice  
This research suggests that, in a pandemic, the public would seek 
information from the authorities around protective measures that could be 
taken.  Providing explanatory information allows the public to understand 
the context in which advice is given.  This is particularly relevant if public 
health guidance, such as around at-risk groups, may seem counterintuitive.  
Study participants were prepared to accept this but most indicated a desire 
for additional information; they wanted to be told not only ‘what’ but also 
‘why’. 
4. Ensure communication with the public is disseminated through a variety of 
media. 
Population groups will seem information through different media formats.  
In the context of this study, younger adults displayed a marked preference 
for digital media whilst older adults were more inclined toward traditional 
media.  A variety of media options must therefore be used to ensure 
message spread.  Furthermore, to insure message saturation, public health 
communication will need to be reiterated. 
5. Be prepared to address preconceptions around risk and at-risk groups 
This research suggest that older and younger adult perception of at-risk 
groups are consistent with established risk groups for seasonal influenza.  As 
pandemic influenza often results in atypical risk; given the tendency to 
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affect younger adults, preconceptions around risk and at-risk groups will 
need to be addressed as misperceptions around risk may negatively impact 
public adherence to medical guidance.  Risk, however, is not always 
unidimensional; many people in priority groups may not consider 
themselves to be at-risk given their own personal health whilst other 
individuals may be considered at-risk due to more than one condition.   
6. Work with partners (both public and private sector) to identify ways to reduce 
potential response barriers. 
Whilst study participants in both population groups indicated high intent to 
adopt protective behaviour, several barriers were identified which, if 
addressed, could engage uptake.  Reducing opportunity barriers and, 
improving accessibility, such as by establishing hand gel stations in public 
facilities and reducing wait times for medical assistance, would encourage 
the adoption of these behaviours.  Whilst intent to vaccinate was high, 
concerns around the safety and efficacy of a pandemic vaccine were cited as 
a barrier.  Addressing this type of concern, through communication, could 
reduce public anxiety and encourage uptake.  Finally, voluntary isolation 
was the most problematic of the recommended behaviours with either day-
to-day requirements (such as grocery shopping), existing commitments 
(either social or academic), and financial considerations (ie: the need to be 
employed) affecting participant ability and willingness to isolate.  
Government, in tandem with public and private sector partners, should 
examine options to encourage alternatives where possible (ie: remote 
working), and support mitigation measures where necessary. 
 
 
9.5 Limitations of the Research 
As with any study, there are limitations to this research.  This research was 
exploratory in nature, geographically focused, and specific to two potentially at-risk 
population groups.  The conclusions, therefore, of this study are specific to these 
conditions. 
 
As this research was exploratory, qualitative research methods, specifically semi-
structured individual and group interviews, were employed.  This allowed for an in-
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depth and responsive investigation into the risk perceptions, behavioural 
intentions, and communication needs of the target populations.  Conversely, 
however, this also imposed a logistical limitation on the size of the population 
sample.   As the population sample was drawn exclusively from the Greater London 
area, the results of this study are also geographically bounded.  The characteristics 
which make London an interesting area of study from a pandemic planning 
perspective (ie: demographics, transit) can also have an effect on its residents.  
Londoners are more likely to be reliant on public transit, for example, than 
residents of Land’s End.   
 
Although this research is focused on older and younger adults, for the purposes of 
this study, younger adults were operationalized as university students in full-time 
study.  It is therefore not possible to say that the younger adult results in this study 
are applicable to all individuals in this demographic as university students may not 
be fully representative of this cohort.  Students are, for example, less likely to have 
children of their own and may have different responsibilities and schedules than 
someone in regular employment.  Furthermore, the very nature of university could 
indicate that participants in this study may have a different level of education or 
public engagement than their peers.  The older adult participants in this study, 
whilst not drawn from any one sector, were all recruited through gatekeepers such 
as older adult activity centres, local libraries and churches, and residential 
communities.  Older adult participants, therefore, were all involved to some extent 
in their local community and were not part of the ‘hard to reach’ older adult 
population. Finally, as all study participants were volunteers, they also represent a 
somewhat self-selecting profile as individuals who were interested in engaging with 
the research. 
 
This study has provided an indicative baseline of younger and older adult responses 
and needs in the event of a pandemic but further research would be required to 
confirm broader applicability or transferability. 
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9.6 Reflections on Future Research 
This research was exploratory in nature and several themes that would benefit 
from further research emerged from the findings. 
 
This research employed a modified Protection Motivation Theory approach which, 
by incorporating COM-B elements into PMT, allowed for a targeted assessment of 
perceptions of risk and efficacy whilst also including additional barriers or enablers 
to action, particularly environmental or societal factors.  This wider model worked 
well in this research as it facilitated the examination of additional factors affecting 
intent to adopt protective behaviours across two population groups. There is merit 
in assessing whether this enhanced model would be as beneficial in other research.  
 
The findings of this research indicate that, whilst initial public perceptions of at-risk 
groups are entrenched around traditional risk profiles, older and younger adults are 
both willing to accept atypical risk profiles during a pandemic, provided explanatory 
information is provided.  Future research could build on this by testing acceptability 
of atypical risk with other at-risk or vulnerable populations as well as within the 
general public.  This could also be tested with different threats which feature 
atypical or counter-intuitive risk profiles. 
 
The terms ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerability’ whilst used throughout planning guidance and by 
practitioners, do not have standardized definitions and, thus, are not always used in 
the same way.  This applies not only between countries or localities but also within.  
Although the lack of consistent use suggests this is not a planning priority, 
distinguishing between these terms may prove helpful in both planning and 
communicating with the public during an event with atypical risk profiles.  In the 
case of a pandemic, although older adults may not be as at-risk, they may be more 
vulnerable due to a host of reasons such as a reliance on carers.  The potential 
utility in clarifying these terms for professional purposes may indicate a topic that 
would be better served by future study and examination.    
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Whilst participants indicated general intention to adopt protective behaviours 
during a pandemic, voluntary isolation received the least support and significant 
barriers were raised to this behaviour.  Further research focusing on isolation, 
rather than the other non-pharmaceutical behaviours and vaccination could expand 
on this study and identify specific ways to reduce barriers, improve communication, 
and increase behavioural uptake in the event of a pandemic. 
 
Finally, this research examined two potentially at-risk population groups however, 
there are many other groups that could also be greatly affected in the event of a 
pandemic.   Although this research suggests that older and younger adult 
communication needs are largely in line with the perceived needs of the general 
public, that may apply to other at-risk or vulnerable groups.  Further research could 
examine whether risk perception, behavioural intentions, and communication 
needs remain consistent across other at-risk populations.  
	
9.7 Final Conclusions  
Recognizing the risk of and potential threat posed by a future pandemic, this 
research aimed to provide a better understanding of the perceptions, behavioural 
intentions and likely communication needs of potentially at-risk groups in order to 
improve health outcomes during a future influenza pandemic.  Through interviews 
with practitioners and a review of pandemic planning guidance, practical 
considerations and challenges in pandemic planning were identified.  Practitioners 
must take into account broad population and demographic characteristics in 
planning, whilst also recognizing that certain groups may have specific needs (ie: 
health or communication challenges) which must be addressed to the extent 
possible given time and resources.  Authorities must also take into account business 
continuity challenges during a pandemic as a loss of staff and a need for additional 
resources may not only affect pandemic response capability but also impede day-
to-day operations.  Communicating with the public was identified both by 
practitioners and in planning guidance as a crucial component of pandemic 
response.  Ensuring that both the message and the media are appropriate is 
necessary for effective communication.  It is assumed the public will want clear, 
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concise information such as the nature of the pandemic and practical advice around 
protective measures.   The use of a variety of media incorporating both new and 
traditional forms of media is viewed as the best way to reach the population as a 
whole.  
 
Practitioner assumptions around population communication needs appear to be 
broadly consistent with the views expressed by older and younger adult 
participants.  Information needs in relation to content were consistent across both 
demographic groups with participants wanting medical information (ie: symptoms, 
transmission routes, recommended protective behaviours) delivered in a clear and 
comprehensible fashion.  Methods or preferred media for communication varied 
greatly between demographic groups with older adults preferring traditional media 
and younger adults preferring new media sources.   
 
Participant knowledge of pandemic influenza was fairly consistent across all three 
study groups and based largely in the notion of pandemics involving diseases with a 
wide impact; both in terms of geography and numbers of individuals affected.  
Some confusion around risk and transmission routes arose over the tendency to 
name the flu after it’s zoonotic origin.  In addition, the distinction between 
epidemic and pandemic was not always clearly understood.   The findings of this 
research suggest that, in the early stage of a pandemic, older and younger adult 
perceptions of risk would be heavily influenced by perception of geographic 
separation, or proximity, and of morbidity/mortality rates.  Once a pandemic is 
underway, however, perceptions of risk shifted to more personal or individual 
characteristics such as age, health, and lifestyle.  Although very few participants 
initially identified the potential for pandemic influenza to skew young in its risk 
profile, most participants were willing to accept that populations not usually 
affected by seasonal influenza might be at risk in a pandemic.  In phase two of the 
research, a majority of participants were willing to accept that older adults might 
not be a priority group for vaccination but many struggled to accept that older 
adults might be at lower risk than other population groups.  Participants in this 
phase of the research frequently indicated a desire for additional explanatory 
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information around the determination of risk, regardless of whether they had 
received the enhanced information leaflet. 
 
Perceptions of behavioural efficacy across all five target behaviours, and across all 
three study groups, was high.  Self-efficacy was supported for all behaviours though 
isolation did not rank nearly so high.  Capability barriers to action were limited and 
only affected two behaviours (respiratory hygiene and vaccination), however, they 
represented physical challenges which would be difficult to rapidly overcome.  
Several opportunity barriers to action were identified though they fell mainly into 
the category of public convenience and could be dealt with or addressed without 
too much difficulty.  Lastly, motivational influencers to behaviour change centred 
around risk perception and social norms. 
 
The findings of this study suggest areas where continued research would be 
beneficial.  Areas of particular note include further testing of the enhanced PMT 
model, perceptions of risk and acceptance of atypical risk profiles amongst 
populations other than younger and older adults, and methods to promote or 
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PROA-01 Administrator of older adult activity program 
PROA-02 Estate manager, older adult residence 
PROA-03 London- adult social services officer 
PROA-04 London- Emergency Planner  
PROA-05 London - Emergency Planner  
PROA-06 London - Emergency Planner  
PROA-07 London - Emergency Planner  
PROA-08 London - Emergency Planner  
PROA-09 London- Public Health Specialist 
PROA-10 London - Emergency Planner  
PROA-11 London - Emergency Planner  
PROA-12 National (UK)-Emergency Planner 
PROA-13 National (UK)-Emergency Planner 
PRYA-01 University administrator responsible for emergency planning 
PRYA-02 University administrator responsible for emergency planning 
PRYA-03 University administrator responsible for emergency planning 
PRYA-04 University administrator responsible for emergency planning 
PRYA-05 University administrator responsible for emergency planning 
PRYA-06 University administrator responsible for emergency planning 
PRYA-07 University administrator responsible for emergency planning 
PRYA-08 University administrator responsible for emergency planning 
PRYA-09 University administrator responsible for emergency planning 
PRYA-10 University administrator responsible for emergency planning 
PRYA-11 University administrator responsible for emergency planning 
PRYA-12 University administrator responsible for emergency planning 




Appendix B: Practitioner Interview Schedules 
Appendix B1: Older Adult Practitioner Interview Schedule 
1. In your role as ______ , what sort of emergencies do you see most affecting 
your facility? 
2. Does your facility have emergency plans in place? (Fire, natural disasters, 
terrorism, infectious disease) 
2a. If so, could you provide some examples of emergencies that these plans 
cover? 
2b. If so, are there processes in place for reviewing and updating these 
emergency plans? 
3. In terms of emergency preparedness, do your programme participants have 
particular needs or characteristics that must be taken into account in the 
planning stage?  
3a. If so, how are these taken into account in emergency planning? 
4. Do you currently communicate preparedness information to programme 
participants pre-event?  (Fire drill procedure, vaccination campaigns, 
communicable disease prevention and/or domestic violence.) 
4a. If so, how is this information communicated? 
5. Is there a situation where emergency communications were particularly 
effective?  
6. Were you in your current role (or a similar one) during the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic? 
6a. If so, what was your experience in managing the H1N1 pandemic from a 
programme perspective, particularly regarding communication? 
6b. If you were in the same role, has your facility/programme’s approach to 
managing and communicating emergency situations changed since then? 
 
Pandemic Scenario (for questions 11-19) 
As you know, we are specifically interested in responding and communicating 
during an influenza pandemic.  If we were at the start of a breaking pandemic, not 
dissimilar to the recent H1N1 where, to begin with, the severity of the pandemic 
was uncertain…  
7. How would your facility respond to this situation? 
7a. At what stage would you respond? (news reports of increased illness, 
WHO raises the alert, when Cabinet members are photographed leaving a 
COBRA meeting, WHO declares it a pandemic) 
7b. What would prompt you to respond? 
8. Are there particular challenges for your programme/facility in managing a 
pandemic? 
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9. Would you communicate with your programme participants in the event of 
a pandemic? 
9a. If so, at what stage in the unfolding pandemic would you communicate 
with them? 
9b. If so, how would you communicate with them 
10. Where would you, in your capacity as JOB TITLE go to for information about 
the unfolding pandemic? 
11. How do you think your programme participants would respond to a flu 
pandemic? 
12. What type of information do you think your programme participants would 
need in the early weeks of a pandemic? 
13. Do you think their information needs would change over the course of the 
pandemic,  
13a. If so, in what way would they change? 
13b. How would affect your communications with the participants? 
14. What are the key challenges for communicating with programme 
participants during a pandemic scenario? 
14a. Are there ways to alleviate these challenges? 
15. What do you think programme participants would expect from you in terms 
of communication? 
15a. How do you think programme participants would respond to your 
communications? 
15b. Who do you think your programme participants would view as trusted 
sources? 
16. Are there external or internal resources that would assist in the 
implementation of your pandemic response? 
16a. Are there shared best practice forums across programmes/facilities? 
16b. If not, how useful do you think it would it be to have shared best 
practice forums? 
16c. Do you have partnerships (such as information sharing) with medical 
professionals and/or government agencies? 
16d. If not, how useful do you think it would it be to have these types of 
partnerships? 
17. Do you have any further thoughts on issues relating to communicating 
about pandemic influenza with older adults? 
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Appendix B2: Local Government Practitioner Interview Schedule 
1. What are the priority risks or emergencies for this Borough?  Is the risk of a 
‘flu emergency one of them?  
2. To what extent do you rely, for major emergencies which are expected to 
have widespread effect, on national emergency plans (like the national ‘flu 
emergency strategy)?  To what extent do you adapt these national 
emergency preparedness plans to the specific situation in your Borough? 
2a. which of your emergency preparedness plans are reviewed or tested? 
2b. how do you decide which plans should be reviewed/tested?  (eg: 
regularly scheduled, response to an incident) 
2c. If so, how are they reviewed/tested? (ie: tabletop exercises, etc) 
3. What are the general arrangements for warning and informing the 
population in the local area in the event of an emergency?  
3a. What avenues do you use to communicate? (ie: rely on national media;  
local media;  local government website; leaflets;  all of the above) 
3b.  Do you target communications to different population groups? 
4. In terms of emergency planning, how are risk and vulnerability defined? 
4a. Do these definitions change based on the emergency/situation? 
5. Are vulnerable populations, in particular older adults, taken into account in 
the emergency planning and communication planning processes 
5a. If so, how are the vulnerable groups identified?    
5b. If so, are they or those responsible for their welfare, consulted during 
the planning process? 
5c. If so, how are issues of privacy/confidentiality dealt with? 
6. Do you have a specific pandemic preparedness plan? 
6a. If so, is it accessible to the public? 
7. Were you in your current role (or a similar one) during the 2009 H1N1 
(Swine Flu) pandemic? 
7a. If so, what was your experience in managing the H1N1 pandemic, 
particularly regarding communication? 
7b. If so, has the experience of H1N1 changed the Borough’s response to 
dealing with an influenza pandemic? 
 
Pandemic Scenario (for questions 11-19) 
As you know, I am specifically interested in responding and communicating during 
an influenza pandemic.  If we were at the start of a breaking pandemic, not 
dissimilar to the 2009 H1N1 (Swine Flu) where, to begin with, the severity of the 
pandemic was uncertain…  
8. How would the local government respond to this situation? 
8a. What would initially prompt you to respond? (news reports of increased 
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illness, WHO raises the alert, when Cabinet members are photographed 
leaving a COBRA meeting, WHO declares it a pandemic) 
9. Where would you, in your professional capacity, go to for information about 
the unfolding pandemic? 
9a. If national government level, to what extent would you need to adapt 
national information (or communication materials) for a local level? 
9b. If not national government level, where (and why not)? 
10. Are there particular challenges or advantages for you, at a local government 
level, in managing a pandemic? 
10a. Are there any challenges or advantages that might be unique to 
BOROUGH NAME? 
11. How would you communicate with residents in the event of a pandemic? 
12. Would you communicate with community groups, businesses, etc? 
12a. How would you communicate with these types of organizations?  
12b. What type of information would you be expected to provide? 
13. How do you think the people of BOROUGH NAME, especially older adults, 
would respond to a flu pandemic?  Is there evidence from 2009 to base this 
view on? 
14. What type of information do you think your residents would require in the 
early stages of a pandemic? 
15. Do you think their information needs would change over the course of the 
pandemic? 
15a. If so, in what way would they change?  How would you respond to 
these changing needs? 
16. How do you think residents will respond to your communications? 
16a. Do you think the council is a trusted source of information? 
16b. Do you foresee a challenge around competing streams of information? 
(ie: ‘fake news’, needing to feed a 24hr news cycle, the proliferation of 
‘experts’ through social media, etc) 
17. Do you evaluate your emergency plans and communications post-event? 
17a. If so, how? 
17b. If so, are community groups and representatives from vulnerable 
populations involved in the review process? 
17c. If no, why not?  
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18. Do you have any further thoughts on issues relating to preparing for and 









Appendix B3: University Practitioner Interview Schedule 
 
1. In your role as job title, what sort of emergencies do you see most affecting 
your students? 
2. Does your university have general emergency-preparedness plans, situation-
specific plans or a combination? (Fire, natural disasters, terrorism, infectious 
disease) 
2a. Could you provide some examples of emergencies that these plans 
cover? 
3. In terms of emergency preparedness, do your students have particular 
needs or characteristics that must be taken into account in the planning 
stage? 
3a. If so, how are these taken into account in emergency planning? 
4. Are your emergency plans reviewed and altered?   
4a. If so, what prompts a review?  (Regularly scheduled, statutory 
requirement, response to an incident) 
4b.  If so, how frequently? 
5. Do you currently communicate preparedness information pre-event to 
students?  (Fire drill procedure, vaccination campaigns, communicable 
disease prevention and/or domestic violence.) 
5a. If so, how is this information communicated? 
6. Is there a situation where a university-run emergency communications 
campaign has been particularly effective? 
7. Were you in your current role (or a similar one) during the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic? 
7a. If so, what was your experience in managing the H1N1 pandemic from a 
university perspective, particularly regarding communication? 
7b. If you were in the same role, has your university’s approach to 
communicating changed since then? 
Pandemic Scenario (for questions 11-19) 
As you know, we are specifically interested in responding and communicating 
during an influenza pandemic.  If we were at the start of a breaking pandemic, not 
dissimilar to the recent H1N1 where, to begin with, the severity of the pandemic 
was uncertain…  
8. How would your university respond to this situation? 
8a. At what stage would you respond? (news reports of increased illness, 
WHO raises the alert, when Cabinet members are photographed leaving a 
COBRA meeting, WHO declares it a pandemic) 
8b. What would prompt you to respond? 
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9. Where would you, in your professional capacity, go to for information about 
the unfolding pandemic? 
10. Would you communicate with your students in the event of a pandemic? 
10a. If so, at what stage in the unfolding pandemic would you communicate 
with your students? 
10b. If so, how would you communicate with your students  
11. What are the particular challenges for a university in managing a pandemic? 
11a. Are there any challenges that might be unique to your university in 
managing an influenza pandemic? 
12. Your university also manages student residential accommodation.  Does this 
create an additional challenge or responsibility in communicating with 
students? 
12a. How is this dealt with? 
13. How do you think your students would respond to a flu pandemic? 
14. What type of information do you think your students would need in the 
early weeks of a pandemic? 
15. Do you think their information needs would change over the course of the 
pandemic? 
15a. If so, in what way would they change?  How would you respond to 
these changing needs? 
16. When thinking about communicating with your students during a pandemic 
scenario such as the one I’ve described, what are the key challenges for 
communicating with students during a pandemic scenario? 
16a. Is there anything that makes this easier? 
17. How do you think students will respond to your communications? 
17a. Do you think the university is a trusted source of information? 
17b. Where do you think your students would go for information?  
18. What external or internal resources would assist the implementation of your 
pandemic response? 
18a. Are there shared best practice forums across academic institutions? 
18b. If not, how useful do you think it would it be to have shared best 
practice forums? 
18c. Do you have partnerships (such as information sharing) with medical 
professionals and/or government agencies? 
18d. If not, how useful do you think it would it be to have these types of 
partnerships? 
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19. Do you evaluate your emergency communications with your students? 
19a. If so, how? 
19b. If so, are students involved in a review process? 
19c. If no, why not?  
20. Do you have any further thoughts on issues relating to communicating 
about pandemic influenza with your students? 
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Appendix C: Younger Adult Participants-First Phase 
PARTICIPANT AGE GENDER UNIVERSITY STUDENT STATUS LIVE IN STUDENT HALLS PROGRAM OF STUDY 
CHRONIC CONDITION 




Interview 1, Participant 1 20 Female King's College London Overseas Not this year but previously Arts and Humanities No No 
Interview 1, Participant 2 19 Female King's College London Home Not this year but previously Health and Medicine No No 
Interview 1, Participant 3 25 Female King's College London Overseas No Health and Medicine No No 
Interview 1, Participant 4 19 Female King's College London Home Yes Health and Medicine No No 
Interview 2, Participant 1 20 Female King's College London EU Not this year but previously Psychology/Psychiatry No No 
Interview 2, Participant 2 19 Female King's College London Home Not this year but previously Health and Medicine No No 
Interview 2, Participant 3 20 Female King's College London Home Not this year but previously Arts and Humanities No No 
Interview 3, Participant 1 20 Male King's College London Overseas Not this year but previously Arts and Humanities No No 
Interview 3, Participant 2 18 Female King's College London Home Yes Natural Sciences and Mathematics No No 
Interview 3, Participant 3 20 Female King's College London Overseas Yes Social Sciences No No 
Interview 3, Participant 4 23 Female LSHTM Overseas Yes Psychology/Psychiatry Yes Yes 
Interview 4, Participant 1 20 Male King's College London Home Not this year but previously Arts and Humanities No No 
Interview 4, Participant 2 20 Male LSE Home No Social Sciences No Yes 
Interview 4, Participant 3 21 Female King's College London EU Yes Arts and Humanities No No 
Interview 4, Participant 4 18 Male LSE Overseas Yes Social Sciences No No 
Interview 4, Participant 5   Male LSE Overseas Not this year but previously Social Sciences No No 
Interview 4, Participant 6 19 Female Coventry London Overseas No Social Sciences No No 
Interview 5, Participant 1 24 Female King's College London Home No Health and Medicine No No 
Interview 5, Participant 2 20 Female LSE Overseas Not this year but previously Social Sciences No No 
Interview 5, Participant 3 22 Female UCL Overseas Not this year but previously Social Sciences No No 
Interview 5, Participant 4 20 Female LSE Overseas Not this year but previously Social Sciences No No 
Interview 5, Participant 5 20 Female City, University of London EU Not this year but previously Arts and Humanities No No 
Interview 5, Participant 6 23 Male King's College London EU No Health and Medicine Prefer not to answer No 
Interview 5, Participant 7 23 Female UCL Overseas Not this year but previously Other No No 
Interview 6, Participant 1 21 Female Westminster EU No Arts and Humanities Yes No 
Interview 6, Participant 2 23 Male LSE Overseas Yes Other No No 
Interview 6, Participant 3 23 Female LSE Overseas Yes Social Sciences No No 
Interview 6, Participant 4 25 Female UCL EU Not this year but previously Other No No 
Interview 7, Participant 1 22 Male LSE EU Yes Other No No 
Interview 7, Participant 2 23 Female LSE Home No Psychology/Psychiatry No No 
Interview 7, Participant 3 21 Female LSE EU No Natural Sciences and Mathematics No No 
Interview 7, Participant 4 23 Female King's College London Home Not this year but previously Social Sciences No No 
Interview 7, Participant 5 21 Female LSE Overseas Not this year but previously Social Sciences No No 
Interview 7, Participant 6 24 Female LSE Overseas No Health and Medicine No No 
Interview 8, Participant 1 23 Female City, University of London Overseas No Social Sciences No No 
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Interview 8, Participant 2 20 Male LSE Overseas Not this year but previously Arts and Humanities No Yes 
Interview 8, Participant 3   Male LSE Home Not this year but previously Social Sciences No No 
Interview 8, Participant 4 20 Male LSE Home Not this year but previously Other No No 
Interview 9, Participant 1 24 Female BPP University Overseas Not this year but previously Law No No 
Interview 9, Participant 2 20 Female King's College London Overseas Not this year but previously Natural Sciences and Mathematics No No 
Interview 9, Participant 3 22 Male City, University of London Overseas No Natural Sciences and Mathematics No No 
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Appendix D: Older Adult Participants-First Phase 
PARTICIPANT AGE GENDER EDUCATION OCCUPATION BOROUGH OF RESIDENCE LIVING ARRANGEMENT HEALTH FLU VACCINE 
Interview 1, Participant 1 70-75 Male A Levels Bank Messenger Enfield With family or friends Good Yes 
Interview 1, Participant 2 70-75 Female No formal qualifications Art Technician Waltham Forest With family or friends Good No 
Interview 2, Participant 1 70-75 Male No formal qualifications Taxi Driver Redbridge With family or friends Good Yes 
Interview 2, Participant 2 70-75 Female A Levels Office Worker Redbridge With family or friends Good Yes 
Interview 3, Participant 1 70-75 Male A Levels English Language Teacher Camden With family or friends Fair Yes 
Interview 3, Participant 2 75-80 Female O Levels Various Clerical Posts Camden Near family or friends but on your own Very good Yes 
Interview 3, Participant 3 80-85 Male Degree or higher   Camden With family or friends Very good Yes 
Interview 3, Participant 4 70-75 Female   Language teacher Camden With family or friends Good Yes 
Interview 4, Participant 1 75-80 Male A Levels Government Service Ealing With family or friends Very good Yes 
Interview 4, Participant 2 70-75 Male A Levels Insurance Ealing With family or friends Good No 
Interview 4, Participant 3 75-80 Male Degree or higher Anaethetist Ealing With family or friends Good Yes 
Interview 5, Participant 1 70-75 Female Degree or higher Actress Wandsworth With family or friends Good Yes 
Interview 5, Participant 1 70-75 Female Degree or higher Health service manager Enfield With family or friends Good Yes 
Interview 6, Participant 1 70-75 Female A Levels IT-Document Controller Westminster Near family or friends but on your own Very good Yes 
Interview 7, Participant 1 70-75 Female Other Publican/Catering Hammersmith and Fulham With family or friends Bad Yes 
Interview 7, Participant 2 70-75 Female   Nurse Ealing With family or friends Very good Yes 
Interview 7, Participant 3 70-75 Female No formal qualifications Housewife Hammersmith and Fulham With family or friends Good Yes 
Interview 7, Participant 4 70-75 Female No formal qualifications       Bad Yes 
Interview 8, Participant 1 75-80 Female Degree or higher Various -professional Lambeth Near family or friends but on your own Good Yes 
Interview 8, Participant 2 75-80 Female O Levels Wedding caterer Lambeth On your own, not near family or friends Fair Yes 
Interview 9, Participant 1 85-90 Male Degree or higher Engineer Ealing With family or friends Good Yes 
Interview 9, Participant 2 80-85 Male A Levels Airline Management Ealing With family or friends Good Yes 
Interview 10, Participant 1 75-80 Female   Play and learning Tower Hamlets On your own, not near family or friends Good Yes 
Interview 10, Participant 2 80-85 Female No formal qualifications Shopwork Tower Hamlets Near family or friends but on your own Fair Yes 
Interview 10, Participant 3 80-85 Female   Nursery Nurse Tower Hamlets   Fair Yes 
Interview 11, Participant 1 85-90 Female   Clerk Runnymeade* Near family or friends but on your own Fair Yes 
Interview 11, Participant 2 70-75 Female No formal qualifications Carer Runnymeade* With family or friends Very good No 
Interview 11, Participant 3 75-80 Female No formal qualifications   Runnymeade* Near family or friends but on your own Good Yes 
Interview 11, Participant 4 85-90 Female Degree or higher   Runnymeade* Near family or friends but on your own Good Yes 
Interview 12, Participant 1 85-90 Female No formal qualifications General nursing Runnymeade* On your own, not near family or friends Fair Yes 
Interview 12, Participant 2 80-85 Male Other Military Runnymeade* With family or friends Good Yes 
Interview 12, Participant 3 70-75 Female A Levels Data processor Runnymeade* On your own, not near family or friends Good Yes 
Interview 12, Participant 4 80-85 Female A Levels Accountant Runnymeade* On your own, not near family or friends Good No 
Interview 12, Participant 5 70-75 Female Other   Runnymeade* With family or friends Good No 
Interview 12, Participant 6 70-75 Female O Levels A&E Receptionist Runnymeade* With family or friends Good Yes 
Interview 13, Participant 1 70-75 Male Degree or higher Director Kingston upon Thames With family or friends Very good Yes 
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Appendix E: Older Adult Participants-Second Phase 
PARTICIPANT ID AGE 
GENDE
R EDUCATION OCCUPATION 
BOROUGH OF 





Interview 1, Participant 1 
(A) 
70-
75 Female Degree or higher Academic Lambeth With family or friends Good No A 
Interview 2, Participant 1 
(A) 
75-
80 Male Degree or higher IT Manager Camden With family or friends Fair Yes A 
Interview 2, Participant 2 
(A) 
75-
80 Male O Levels Retired Hackney With family or friends Good Yes A 
Interview 3, Participant 1 (B) 
80-
85 Female Other Jack of all trades' 
Hammersmith and 
Fulham 
On your own, not near family or 
friends Fair Yes B 




qualifications Cook and cleaner 
Hammersmith and 
Fulham With family or friends Fair Yes B 
Interview 4, Participant 1 
(A) 
70-
75 Male Degree or higher 
Training Adviser (Church of 
England) Islington With family or friends 
Very 
good Yes A 
Interview 5, Participant 1 
(A) 
85-
90 Female Degree or higher Chemist Kensington and Chelsea 
Near family or friends but on your 
own Good Yes A 
Interview 6, Participant 1 (B) 
70-
75 Female A Levels Registered Nurse Westminster With family or friends Fair Yes B 
Interview 6, Participant 2 (B) 
70-
75 Female Degree or higher Librarian Islington With family or friends Good Yes B 
Interview 6, Participant 3 (B) 
75-
80 Male Degree or higher Research Kensington and Chelsea With family or friends 
Very 
good No B 
Interview 7, Participant 1 (B) 
80-
85 Male Degree or higher Fire Engineering Watford* With family or friends 
Very 
good Yes B 
Interview 7, Participant 2 (B) 
80-
85 Female Other PA Watford* With family or friends Good Yes B 
Interview 8, Participant 1 
(A) 90+ Female 
No formal 
qualifications Telephone operator Lewisham 
Near family or friends but on your 
own Good Yes A 





qualifications Administrator Lewisham 
Near family or friends but on your 
own Good No A 





qualifications HGV Driver Lewisham 
Near family or friends but on your 
own 
Very 
good Yes A 
Interview 8, Participant 4 
(A) 
70-
75 Female Other Dressmaker Lewisham With family or friends Good No A 
Interview 9, Participant 1 (B) 
75-
80 Female Other Day Nursery Owner Lewisham 
On your own, not near family or 
friends Good Yes B 
Interview 9, Participant 2 (B) 
70-
75 Female A Levels PA Lewisham With family or friends 
Very 
good Yes B 
Interview 9, Participant 3 (B) 
70-
75 Female O Levels Civil Servant Lewisham 
On your own, not near family or 
friends   No B 
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Interview 9, Participant 4 (B) 
80-
85 Female Prefer not to answer Cook Lewisham With family or friends Fair Yes B 
Interview 10, Participant 1 
(B) 
70-
75 Male Degree or higher Consulting Engineer Kingston upon Thames 
Near family or friends but on your 
own 
Very 
good Yes B 
Interview 11, Participant 1 
(A) 
70-
75 Female Other Hairdresser Kensington and Chelsea With family or friends Fair Yes A 
Interview 11, Participant 2 
(A) 
70-
75 Male Degree or higher Mental Health Counsellor Kensington and Chelsea With family or friends Good No A 
Interview 12, Participant 1 
(A) 
75-
80 Female Degree or higher Accountant Kensington and Chelsea 
On your own, not near family or 
friends 
Very 
good No A 
Interview 13, Participant 1 
(B) 
70-
75 Male A Levels Civil Servant Epsom* 
On your own, not near family or 
friends Good Yes B 
Interview 14, Participant 1 
(A) 
70-
75 Other Degree or higher Executive Officer Westminster 
On your own, not near family or 
friends 
Very 
good Yes A 
Interview 14, Participant 2 
(A) 
70-
75 Female A Levels   Westminster 
Near family or friends but on your 
own Good Yes A 
Interview 15, Participant 1 
(B) 
70-
75 Female Degree or higher Teacher Redbridge 
Near family or friends but on your 
own Good No B 
Interview 16, Participant 1 
(B) 
75-
80 Male Degree or higher Company Director Kensington and Chelsea With family or friends Good Yes B 
Interview 17, Participant 1 
(A) 
70-
75 Female A Levels Office Worker Westminster 
On your own, not near family or 
friends Bad Yes A 
Interview 18, Participant 1 
(B) 
75-
80 Male Other Nurse Manager Islington With family or friends Fair No B 
Interview 19, Participant 1 
(B) 
75-
80 Male Degree or higher Musician Kensington and Chelsea 
On your own, not near family or 
friends Good Yes B 
Interview 20, Participant 1 
(A) 
70-
75 Female Degree or higher Social Worker Kingston upon Thames With family or friends Fair Yes A 
Interview 21, Participant 1 
(A) 
70-
75 Male Degree or higher Scientist Enfield With family or friends Fair Yes A 
Interview 22, Participant 1 
(A) 
70-
75 Male Prefer not to answer Retired Richmond upon Thames With family or friends 
Very 
good Yes A 
Interview 23, Participant 1 
(B) 
75-
80 Female Degree or higher Teacher Kingston upon Thames With family or friends Good No B 
Interview 23, Participant 2 
(B) 
80-
85 Male Other Teacher Kingston upon Thames With family or friends 
Very 
good No B 
Interview 24, Participant 1 
(A) 
70-
75 Female Degree or higher Teacher Enfield 
Near family or friends but on your 
own Fair Yes A 
Interview 24, Participant 2 
(A) 
70-
75 Male Degree or higher University Lecturer Kingston upon Thames With family or friends Good No A 
Interview 24, Participant 3 
(A) 
70-
75 Female Degree or higher Teacher Kingston upon Thames With family or friends Fair Yes A 
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Appendix F: Scenario Injects-Phase One 








Appendix G: Scenario Injects-Phase Two 



















Appendix H : Participant Questionnaires 
Appendix H1 : Participant Questionnaire-Older Adults 
 
Age:  
70-75  75-80  80-85    85-90  90+ 
 
Gender: 
Male      Female 
Other:_________________   Prefer not to answer 
 
Education:  
No formal qualifications 
O Levels      
A Levels 
Degree or higher 
Other 
Prefer not to answer 
 
Occupation (If retired, previous occupation): _______________________________ 
 
Borough of Residence: ________________________________________ 
 
Do you live: 
With family or friends    
Near family or friends but on your own   
On your own, not near family or friends 
 
Do you consider your health in general to be…?: 
Very good              Bad         
 Good    Very bad 
  Fair    Prefer not to answer 
 
Did you have the seasonal flu vaccine last year?:  
Yes  No  Prefer not to answer 
 
Where do you go for day-to-day news? (Tick all that apply) 
Friends or family 
Internet-news sites (ie: BBC News, Guardian online) 
Internet-general 
Print newspapers-National (ie: Telegraph, Guardian, Times, 
Independent) 
Print newspapers-Local (ie: Metro, Evening Standard) 
Radio 






Where do you get your medical/health information? (Tick all that apply) 
Friends or family 
Healthcare professionals (ie: GP, pharmacist) 
Local government website 
Official departments and agencies (ie: Department of Health, Public 
Health Agency, World Health Organization) 
Official websites (ie: NHS website) 
















Home   EU  Overseas 
 
Do you live in student halls?: 
Yes   No  Not this year but previously 
 
Program of Study: 
Arts and Humanities   Natural Sciences and 
Mathematics 
Health and Medicine   Psychology/Psychiatry 
Law     Social Sciences 
Other: _______________________________ 
 
Do you have a chronic condition for which you take daily medication?: 
Yes  No  Prefer not to answer 
 
Did you have the seasonal flu vaccine last year?: 
Yes  No 
 
Where do you go for day-to-day news? (Tick all that apply) 
Friends or family 
Internet-news sites (ie: BBC News, Guardian online) 
Internet-general 
Print newspapers-National (ie: Telegraph, Guardian, Times, 
Independent) 
Print newspapers-Local (ie: Metro, Evening Standard) 
Radio 








Where do you get your medical/health information? (Tick all that apply) 
Friends or family 
Healthcare professionals (ie: GP, pharmacist) 
Local government website 
Official departments and agencies (ie: Department of Health, Public 
Health Agency, World Health Organization) 
Official websites (ie: NHS website) 




Appendix I: Interview Schedules-Phase One 
Appendix I1: Interview Schedule-Older Adults 
 
Knowledge/perception of pandemic  
1. When you hear the term ‘pandemic influenza’ what does it make you 
think/what do you think it means? 
1. Do you have any experience of pandemic influenza? 
2. When you hear the term ‘at-risk’, what does it make you think? 
3. When you hear the term ‘vulnerability’, what does it make you think? 
4. Do you think either of these terms would apply to you in a pandemic? 
4a. Why/why not? 
5. Who do you think these terms would apply to in a pandemic? 
 
Scenario Inject #1 
1. How would you respond? (ie: information seeking, call the doctor, turn the 
page) 
2. Would you change anything in your day-to-day routine; do anything 
different on the basis of what you just read? 
2b. Why/why not? 
2c. If yes, what? 
3. Do you feel you need more information? 
3b. If so, what kind of information would you want? 
3c. Where would you go for this information? 
4. Do you think you would be at-risk? 
4b. Why/why not? 
 
Scenario Inject #2  
1. How would you respond? (ie: information seeking, call the doctor, turn the 
page) 
2. Would you change anything in your day-to-day routine; do anything 
different on the basis of what you just read? 
3b. Why/why not? 
3c. If yes, what? 
3. Do you feel you need more information? 
4b. If so, what kind of information would you want? 
4c. Where would you go for this information?? 
4. Do you think you would be at-risk? 
5b. Why/why not? 
5. Has anything changed from a few weeks ago? 
 
With this scenario (situation) in mind: 
1. What sort of things do you think older adults could do to avoid getting sick? 
a. Do you think you would do these?  
b. Why/why not? 
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2. I’m going to go through four possible behaviours and I’d like you to tell me 
whether you think this is something that would be useful to protect yourself 
and others from the flu and whether this is something you think you would 
(or could) do? 
a. Handwashing 
b. Using a tissue or your sleeve to cover a cough/sneeze 
c. Minimizing how often you go out:  
(ie: not going to organized activities (university/older adult 
day centres or classes), avoiding commuting at peak times, 
not going out on a Saturday evening) 
d. Vaccination 
3. What do you thing would be some of the challenges for older adults during 
a pandemic? 
(ie: Transport (public transport), Medical/Home care, Accessing 
groceries/medication, loss of support from family/friends) 
4. If you got sick… 
a. Would you seek medical assistance? 
i. If so, how would you go about this? 
(ie: make an appointment to see a doctor, go to a drop-in 
clinic, call a help or information line) 
ii. During the last outbreak of pandemic influenza, in 2009, 
there was the National Pandemic Flu Service; a dedicated 
website and phone line for people to get information, check 
their symptoms and get access to antivirals, if necessary.  Do 
you think this is something that you would use? 
1. Why/why not? 
2. If so, would you be more likely to use the website or 
the phone line? 
b. Would you stay home?  
i. When would you start to stay home? 
ii. What obstacles would there be to staying home 
c. Are you familiar with the concept of ‘flu friends’? 
i. Do you think this is something that would be helpful for older 
adults? 
ii. Is this something that you would do? 
1. Why/why not? 
d. What do you think the biggest challenges would be for you if you 
were to get sick? 
5. As we close, I’d like to get any final thoughts on what you think would be 
important in the context of communicating with older adults in the event of 
an influenza pandemic? 
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Appendix I2: Interview Schedule-Younger Adults 
 
Knowledge/perception of pandemic  
6. When you hear the term ‘pandemic influenza’ what does it make you 
think/what do you think it means? 
7. When you hear the term ‘risk’, what does it make you think? 
8. When you hear the term ‘vulnerability’, what does it make you think? 
9. Who do you think would be at risk or vulnerable in a pandemic? 
10. Do you have any experience of pandemic influenza? 
 
Scenario Inject #1  
5. How would you respond? (ie: information seeking, call the doctor, turn the 
page) 
6. Would it make a difference if it was term time? 
7. Would you change anything in your day-to-day routine; do anything 
different on the basis of what you just read? 
3b. Why/why not? 
3c. If yes, what? 
8. Do you feel you need more information? 
4b. If so, where would you go for this information? 
4c. What kind of information would you want? 
9. Do you think you would be at risk? 
5b. Why/why not? 
 
Scenario Inject #2  
6. How would you respond? (ie: information seeking, call the doctor, turn the 
page) 
7. Would it make a difference if it was term time? 
8. Would you change anything in your day-to-day routine; do anything 
different on the basis of what you just read? 
3b. Why/why not? 
3c. If yes, what? 
9. Do you feel you need more information? 
4b. If so, where would you go for this information? 
4c. What kind of information would you want? 
4d. Who do you trust to deliver the information? 
10. Do you think you would be at risk? 
5b. Why/why not? 
11. Has anything changed from a few weeks ago? 
 
With this scenario (situation) in mind: 
6. What sort of things do you think your fellow students could do to avoid 
getting sick? 
a. Do you think you would do these?  
b. Why/why not? 
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7. I’m going to go through four possible behaviours and I’d like you to tell me 
whether you think this is something that would be useful to protect against 
getting sick and whether this is something you think you would (or could) 
do? 
a. Handwashing 
b. Using a tissue or your sleeve to cover a cough/sneeze 
c. Minimizing how often you go out:  
(ie: not going to organized activities (university/older adult 
day centres or classes), avoiding commuting at peak times, 
not going out on a Saturday evening) 
d. Vaccination 
8. If you got sick… 
a. Would you seek medical assistance? 
i. If so, how would you go about this? 
(ie: make an appointment to see a doctor, go to a drop-in 
clinic, call a help or information line) 
ii. Last time, in 2009, there was the National Pandemic Flu 
Service; a dedicated website and phone line for people to get 
information, check their symptoms and get access to 
antivirals, if necessary.  Do you think this is something that 
you would use? 
1. Why/why not? 
b. Would you stay home?  
i. When would you start to stay home? 
ii. What obstacles would there be to staying home 
c. Are you familiar with the concept of ‘flu friends’? 
i. Do you think this is something that would be helpful? 
ii. Is this something that you would do? 
1. Why/why not? 
9. As we close, I’d like to get any final thoughts on what you think would be 




Appendix J: Scenario Questionnaires-Phase Two 
 
Appendix J1: Scenario Stage One 
The Independent: ‘Ovine Flu continues to spread as government 
announces vaccine’ 
1. How likely would you be to get the vaccine at this point? 
Very likely   Likely Uncertain     Unlikely      Very 
unlikely 
 
2. Do you think you would be part of an at-risk group? 




Appendix J2: Scenario Stage Two 
Leaflet: ‘Ovine Flu Vaccination: What you need to know’ 
 
1. How likely would you be to get the vaccine at this point? 
Very likely   Likely Uncertain     Unlikely      Very 
unlikely 
 
2. Do you think you would be part of an at-risk group? 




Appendix J3: Scenario Stage Three 
The Sun: ‘Outrage in London as NHS denies flu vaccine to 
grandmother of six’ 
1. How likely would you be to get the vaccine once it is available to 
everyone? 
Very likely   Likely Uncertain     Unlikely      Very 
unlikely 
 
2. Do you feel it’s acceptable that over-65’s are not initially offered 
the vaccine? 




Appendix K : Interview Schedule-Phase Two (Older Adults) 
 
Knowledge/perception of pandemic  
1. When you hear the term ‘pandemic influenza’ what does it make you 
think/what do you think it means? 
1a. Where would you go to discover more information about pandemic 
influenza? 
2. Do you have any experience of pandemic influenza? 
3. Who do you think would be at-risk in a pandemic? 
4. If you were told you were at-risk, how would that make you feel? 
5. What if you were told you were vulnerable; would your reaction be the 
same? 
6. Thinking of the terms ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerability’, what do you think these 
terms mean/are they interchangeable?.  
 
Scenario Inject #1 
7. What are your initial thoughts/reaction to the article? 
8. Who do you think would be most at risk? 
9. Do you feel you would be at risk? 
9a. Why/why not? 
10. Would you intend to get the vaccine? 
11. What sort of things, aside from getting vaccinated, do you think people 
could do to avoid getting sick? 
11a. Do you think you would do these?  
11b. Why/why not? 
11c.  If not already mentioned, ask about handwashing, respiratory hygiene, 
minimizing how often you go out and vaccination 
12. If you were to become ill, or suspect you were ill would you seek medical 
assistance? 
12a. If so, how would you go about this? (ie: make an appointment to see a 
doctor, go to a drop-in clinic, call a help or information line) 
12b. During the last outbreak of pandemic influenza, in 2009, the 
government set up a National Pandemic Flu Service which was a dedicated 
website and phone line where people could get information, check their 
symptoms, and get access to antivirals, if necessary.  Do you think this is 
something that you would use? 
12c. Why/why not? 
12d. If so, would you be more likely to use the website or the phone line? 
 
Vaccination leaflet (Scenario Inject #2) 
13. What are your initial thoughts/reaction to the leaflet? 
14. How likely would you be to get the vaccine at this time? 
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15. Do you think you would be part of an at-risk group? 
16. 15a. If so why/ if not why not 
17. Do you feel you need more information? 
16a. If so, what type of information? 
16b. Where would you want to get that information from (source)? 
16c. Who would you consider to be a trusted authority? (AgeUk or other 
older adult stakeholder groups?) 
18. Would you feel confident in the government’s vaccination strategy? (ie: 
priority groups) 
17a. Why/why not? 
 
Scenario Inject #3 
19. What are your initial thoughts/response to the article? 
20. Do you feel you need more information? 
19a. If so, what? 
21. Would you intend to get vaccinated when the vaccine becomes available to 
over-65 year olds? 
20a. Why/why not? 
22. Certain groups have been identified as at-risk.  Do you think it’s reasonable 
to initially give the vaccine only to those groups? 
21a. Why/why not? 
23. Do you feel that it’s acceptable that over-65’s are not initially offered the 
vaccine? 
22a. Why/why not? 
24. Were you surprised that the vaccine was not available to everyone at first?   
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